Delhi Transport Corporation vs Suresh Chand

IN THE HIGH COURTOF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 15.09.2026
Judgment Pronounced on: 27.10.2026
Judgment Uploaded on: 27.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010233112003
+ W.P.(C) 3387/2003
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION ..... Petitioner
versus
SURESH CHAND ..... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Ms. Manisha Tyagi, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. Jawahar Raja, Ms. Meghna De, Mr.
Siddharth Sapra & Ms. Nitai Hinduja, Advs
CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. The respondent workman was appointed as a Conductor by the
petitioner on 06.08.1985 and his services were regularised on
06.12.1985. The workman remained absent from duty from
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Signed By:SHIKHA
SEHGAL
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10.10.1989. Pursuant to the same, the petitioner issued a notice dated
05.12.1989 calling upon the respondent to report for duty within 72
hours of receipt of the notice and informing him that, in case of
sickness, he could appear before the Medical Officer for medical
examination. The respondent neither resumed duty nor appeared
before the Medical Officer. The petitioner thereafter issued a reminder
dated 16.01.1990, affording him a further opportunity to resume duty.
2. As the respondent did not resume duty, the petitioner issued a
show cause notice dated 22.01.1990 under Clause 14(10)(c) of the
DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952,
calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be deemed to
have resigned from service.
3. The petitioner thereafter passed the order dated 05.02.1990
declaring the respondent as deemed to have resigned from service
under Clause 14(10)(c) of the DRTA Regulations, 1952.
4. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent workman issued a demand
notice dated 27.10.1992 to the petitioner. Conciliation proceedings
were thereafter initiated before the Conciliation Officer, which failed.
Consequently, vide order dated 13.04.1994, the appropriate
Government made the following reference to the learned Labour Court
for adjudication:
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SEHGAL
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''Whether the action of the management in declaring Sh.
Suresh Chand as deemed to have resigned from the
service is illegal and for unjustified and if so, to what
relief is he entitled and what direction are necessary in
this respect".
5. Vide award dated 30.05.2001, the learned Labour Court held
that the action of the management in declaring the respondent as
deemed to have resigned from service was illegal and unjustified. The
learned Labour Court, inter alia , observed that the management had
not properly considered the leave applications submitted by the
respondent and had not afforded him an opportunity to defend himself
in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The respondent
was consequently directed to be reinstated with full back wages.
6. Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filed.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned
Labour Court erred in holding that the principles of natural justice
were not complied with. She submitted that the respondent was
afforded repeated opportunities to resume duty, including vide notice
dated 05.12.1989 and reminder dated 16.01.1990, and was also
permitted to appear before the Medical Officer in case of illness. She
submitted that despite the same, the respondent neither resumed duty
nor responded to the subsequent show cause notice dated 22.01.1990.
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8. She submitted that the learned Labour Court erroneously
proceeded on the premise that a domestic enquiry was mandatory
before action could be taken under Clause 14(10)(c) of the DRTA
Regulations, 1952. She submitted that a domestic enquiry is an
extension of the principles of natural justice and would arise only
where the workman comes forward with an explanation requiring an
enquiry into its truthfulness. She submitted that, in the present case,
despite repeated opportunities, the respondent neither resumed duty
nor furnished any explanation to the show cause notice.
9. She submitted that the respondent was declared to have deemed
to have resigned strictly in terms of Clause 14(10)(c) of the DRTA
Regulations, 1952. She submitted that the said provision itself
contemplated the procedure to be followed in cases of prolonged
absence. She submitted that once the procedure prescribed under the
applicable Regulation/Standing Order had been followed, there was no
requirement of conducting a separate domestic enquiry.
10. She submitted that the learned Labour Court failed to properly
appreciate the respondent's own evidence. She submitted that the
respondent, in his cross-examination, admitted that he had no
documentary evidence to establish that the alleged communications
regarding the illness had been sent to the management by post or
through his colleagues. She submitted that the management could not
have been faulted for acting upon the record available to it in the
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absence of any response from the respondent to the notices issued to
him.
11. She submitted that the learned Labour Court further erred in
relying upon the alleged leave applications without appreciating that
the management's witness had only admitted their receipt and that the
respondent had not established that the said applications had been duly
sanctioned. She submitted that mere submission of an application for
leave does not amount to sanction of leave.
12. She submitted that, in any event, the respondent attained the age
of superannuation on 31.07.2024 and, therefore, the direction for
reinstatement can no longer be implemented. She submitted that the
respondent has also already received a sum of Rs.6,52,241/- pursuant
to the attachment order passed by the SDM, Darya Ganj. She
submitted that reinstatement with full back wages is not an automatic
consequence even where termination is found to be improper, and that
the appropriate relief must depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case.
13. Per Contra , the learned counsel for the respondent vehemently
opposed the present petition. He submitted that the impugned award is
well reasoned and the petitioner has failed to establish any grounds so
as to warrant interference of this Court.
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14. He submitted that the respondent was a permanent employee of
the petitioner and remained absent from duty from 10.10.1989 on
account of an accident resulting in a fracture of his leg, due to which
he remained under medical treatment. He submitted that upon
recovery, the respondent reported for duty and furnished a medical
fitness certificate, but was not permitted to resume duty.
15. He submitted that the respondent had, during the period of his
illness, submitted several applications seeking leave and had duly
intimated the petitioner about his medical condition. He submitted that
the petitioner’s own witness, Shri G.D. Srivastava, admitted in cross-
examination that five applications seeking leave had been received
from the respondent and that an application submitted by his wife had
also been received.
16. He submitted that the petitioner could not have invoked
Regulation 14(10)(c) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority
(Conditions of Appointment & Services) Regulations, 1952 to declare
the respondent as having deemed to have resigned from service
without complying with the principles of natural justice. He relied
upon Delhi Transport Corporation v. Om Kumar & Ors. : 2001
SCC OnLine Del 1183 .
17. He submitted that, irrespective of whether the respondent’s
absence was characterised as unauthorised absence or abandonment of
service, the petitioner was required to enquire into the circumstances
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and justification for such absence before taking any action resulting in
termination of service. He submitted that the petitioner admittedly
neither issued a chargesheet nor conducted any domestic enquiry
against the respondent.
18. At the outset, it is necessary to note that the scope of
interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
with an Award passed by the Labour Court is limited. This Court does
not sit as a Court of appeal over findings of fact rendered by the
Labour Court. Interference is warranted only where the findings are
perverse, based on no evidence, suffer from patent illegality, or
disclose a jurisdictional error. Reference in this regard may be made to
the judgment in International Airport Authority of India v.
International Air Cargo Workers Union : (2009) 13 SCC 374 where
the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
“47. It is true that in exercising the writ jurisdiction,
the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings
and award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore,
cannot reappreciate evidence. The findings of fact
recorded by a fact-finding authority should ordinarily
be considered as final. The findings of the Tribunal
should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction merely
on the ground that the material on which the Tribunal
had acted was insufficient or not credible.
48. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are
based on some materials which are relevant, findings
may not be interfered with merely because another
view is also possible. But where the Tribunal records
findings on no evidence or irrelevant evidence, it is
certainly open to the High Court to interfere with the
award of the Industrial Tribunal.”
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19. Adverting to the merits of the present case, the principal
question which arises for consideration is whether the petitioner was
justified in finding the respondent deemed to have resigned from
service under Regulation 14(10)(c) of the Delhi Road Transport
Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations,
1952.
20. Regulation 14(10)(c) provides that where an employee fails to
resume duty on the expiry of the maximum period of extraordinary
leave granted to him, or where the period of absence together with the
extraordinary leave granted exceeds the permissible limit under Clause
(b), “he shall be deemed to have resigned his appointment and shall
accordingly cease to be in the employment of the authority.”
21. The operation of Regulation 14(10)(c) has been considered by a
Co-ordinate bench of this Court in DTC v. Om Kumar , 2001 SCC
OnLine Del 1183 . In the said judgment it was observed that the
requirement of audi alteram partem must be read into its operation.
The relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereinbelow:
“16. A distillation of the many judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court discloses that the consistent opinion has been its insistence
that Statutes must conform with the acid test of rules of natural
justice. The Apex Court has relentlessly struck down provisions in
which the audi alteram partem principle has been ignored. Where
it has been argued that this principle maybe read into the statutory
provision the Court has accepted the plea and thereby saved it
from being struck down as unconstitutional. In those cases where
the vires of the Statute has not been assailed it has nonetheless
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looked for a compliance with the audi alteram partem requirement,
such as in the Aligarh Muslim University's case (supra) where it
observed that nothing new had been stated by the petitioner in his
writ petition apart from the reasons which had previously given by
him to the University and had been rejected by it. In the present
case the statutory rule is not nullified by insisting that the DTC
must enable the delinquent workman to be heard before his
services are terminated on the premise of ‘deemed resigantion’.
On the Corporation issuing a notice to the workman he may
furnish an unacceptable defence or no explanation at all. But it
would atleast enable a workman who, by way of to take an
illustration, may have suffered an accident on his way to
reporting back for duty, to furnish an explanation which a
reasonable Management would accept with alacrity. It would
empower the DTC to apply the regulation after a due
consideration of the cause shown by the workmen. Granting an
opportunity to be heard does not inexorably result in an enquiry
calling for being held.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. The aforesaid position was specifically clarified by a co-
ordinate bench of this Court in DTC v. Lakhmi Chand ( supra ). It was
noted that Om Kumar had not struck down Regulation 14(10)(c), but
had merely read into it the requirement of compliance with natural
justice by affording an opportunity of hearing before dispensing with
the services of an employee on the ground of deemed resignation. The
Court expressly held that invocation of Regulation 14(10)(c) is not
illegal per se ; it is the invocation of the provision without compliance
with natural justice which vitiates the decision. The relevant extract of
the same is reproduced hereinbelow:
“10. Vikramajit Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was) did not,
therefore, strike down Regulation 14(10)(c) of the Regulations in
Om Kumar (supra); he merely read, into it, the requirement of
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compliance with the principles of natural ;ustice, by affording an
opportunity of hearing, to the workman concerned, before
dispensing of his services on the ground of " deemed resignation " .
It is clear, from a holistic reading of the judgement, the
invocation of Regulation 14(10)(c) has not held to be illegal per
se, but that invocation of the said sub-Regulation, without
complying with the principles of natural justice, by affording a
prior opportunity of hearing to the workman concerned, was held
to vitiate the decision .”
(emphasis supplied)
23. The aforesaid order was affirmed by a Division Bench of this
Court in LPA No. 628/2018, wherein the Division Bench reiterated
that Regulation 14(10)(c) was though not struck down by this Court in
Om Kumar , but was read down to incorporate the requirement of
compliance with the principles of natural justice by affording the
workman a prior opportunity of hearing before invoking the
consequence of deemed resignation. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“2. The judgment of the learned Single Judge succinctly sets out
the facts of the case in detail. In brief, the Respondent was
regularly employed as a driver on 1st November 1974. He was
arrested by the Rajasthan Police and remained in custody there
between 24th April 1989 and 21st February 1991. The DTC treated
his period of absence as extraordinary leave without pay and held
him to have deemed to have resigned from his post under
Regulation 14(10)(c) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority
(Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations 1952
(hereinafter „Regulations‟). Subsequently, this very regulation
was read down by this Court in DTC v. Om Kumar 95 (2002) DLT
425 to be unconstitutional to the extent it did not require the
employee to be issued a notice prior to declaring him to have
deemed to have resigned. As rightly pointed out by the learned
Single Judge in the impugned judgment, this Court in Om Kumar
“did not, therefore, strike down Regulation 14(10)(c) of the
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Regulations” but “merely read, into it, the requirement of
compliance with the principles of natural justice, by affording an
opportunity of hearing, to the workman concerned, before
dispensing of his services on the ground of "deemed resignation ".
Thus “the invocation of Regulation 14(10)(c) was not held to be
illegal per se, but that invocation of the said sub-Regulation,
without complying with the principles of natural justice, by
affording a prior opportunity of hearing to the workman
concerned, was held to vitiate the decision.” This decision was
subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court. The learned Single
Judge held that since the DTC had adopted the route of „deemed
resignation‟, there was no inquiry held for concluding that his
absence was unauthorised. ”
(emphasis supplied)
24. Thus, it is no more res integra that before the consequence to
Regulation 14(10)(c) is imposed upon an employee, principles of
natural justice ought to be followed and the employee must be
afforded a meaningful opportunity to explain the circumstances of his
absence. The question in the present case is consequently whether that
requirement stood satisfied.
25. In the present case, the respondent was declared deemed to have
resigned under Regulation 14(10)(c) on account of his absence from
duty with effect from 10.10.1989. However, the management witness,
Shri G.D. Srivastava, admitted that the management had received five
leave applications submitted by the respondent in respect of the period
commencing from 10.10.1989, along with an application submitted by
the respondent’s wife. It was further admitted that none of the said
applications were considered or decided by the management, nor was
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any reply furnished thereto or any verification undertaken regarding
the circumstances stated therein.
26. It is no doubt correct that the mere submission of leave
applications does not amount to sanction of leave. However, the
significance of the said applications lies in the fact that they
constituted the respondent’s explanation for the very period of absence
on the basis of which Regulation 14(10)(c) was invoked and the order
of termination is completely silent in that regard. Once those
applications had been received by the management, it ought to have
considered and decided the same before proceeding to treat the
respondent’s absence as attracting the consequence of deemed
resignation. The failure to do so assumes significance in the context of
the requirement of principles of natural justice read into Regulation
14(10)(c).
27. The requirement of principles of natural justice cannot, in the
present case, be treated as satisfied merely by issuance of a show
cause notice. The management witness, Shri G.D. Srivastava, admitted
that the leave applications submitted by the respondent in respect of
the period of his absence had been received by the management, but
had neither been considered nor decided. Significantly, the order dated
05.02.1990 declaring the respondent to deemed to have resigned is
completely silent with regard to the said leave applications and does
not disclose any consideration of the explanation furnished by the
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respondent for his absence. The issuance of a notice, without any
consideration of the material placed by the respondent in response
thereto or otherwise available with the management, would amount to
no more than a formal compliance with the requirement of natural
justice. An opportunity of hearing is not an empty exercise, the
explanation furnished by the employee must receive due consideration
before the consequence contemplated under Regulation 14(10)(c) is
invoked. The procedure followed by the petitioner, therefore, cannot
be said to have complied with the principles of natural justice.
28. It is also relevant that the management witness, G.D. Srivastava,
while deposing before the learned Labour Court, stated that
Regulation 14(10)(c) itself had been declared unconstitutional. It is
also not in dispute that Regulation 14(10)(c) was subsequently
withdrawn by DTC on 06.02.1991, just one year after the impugned
order was passed.
29. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution, is not sitting as an appellate authority over the
findings recorded by the Labour Court. Where the view taken by the
Labour Court is a plausible view based upon the material available on
record, interference would not be warranted merely because another
view may also be possible.
30. Considering the totality of circumstances, this Court is of the
opinion that the view adopted by the learned Labour Court is a
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plausible view and does not warrant interference of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
31. However, it is pertinent to note that the respondent-workman
has already attained the age of superannuation and has also received
the amounts payable to him pursuant to the impugned Award. The
only issue that, therefore, survives for consideration is the question of
reinstatement, which is no longer feasible in view of the respondent
having already crossed the age of superannuation.
32. In these circumstances, considering that the workman served the
petitioner for around 5 years and has already received a sum of
Rs.6,52,241/- before the Executing Court, this Court is of the opinion
that awarding lump-sum compensation of ₹2,00,000/- to the
respondent-workman in lieu of reinstatement would serve the ends of
justice. The petitioner is directed to pay the aforesaid amount to the
respondent within a period of 8 weeks of this order.
33. The present petition is disposed of and the impugned award is
modified in the aforesaid terms.
34. Pending applications (if any) also stand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
OCTOBER 27, 2026
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