KAVITA SANJU KADKOL W/O SANJU KADKOL vs STATE OF KARNATAKA

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

th
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

R

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT PETITION ( HABEAS CORPUS ) NO.100022 OF 2026

BETWEEN:

KAVITA SANJU KADKOL W/O. SANJU KADKOL,
A/A: 30 YRS, OCC: HOUSE WIFE,
R/O: 177, RUDRASWAMI PET, JAMAKHANDI,
TQ: JAMAKHANDI,
DIST: BAGALKOT – 587 301.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. AVINASH M. ANGADI, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY IT’S UNDER SECRETARY,
HOME DEPARTMENT, (LAW AND ORDER),
VIDHANA SOUDA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS JOINT SECRETARY
HOME DEPARTMENT (LAW AND ORDER),
VIDHANA SOUDA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
THE OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
BAGALKOT – 587 101.

4. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
BAGALKOT DISTRICT,
BAGALKOT – 587 101.











Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

5. THE SUPERINTENDENT,
CENTRAL PRISON – INDALAGA,
DIST: BELGAVI – 570 002.

6. THE POLICE INSPECTOR,
JAMAKHANDI TOWN POLICE STATION,
JAMAKHANDI – 587 301.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RAKESH M. BILKI, GA FOR R1 TO R6)


THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS PRAYING TO, A ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO QUASH THE DETENTION OF SRI. SANJU VITHHAL KADAKOL
BY ORDER DATED 06/07/2026 IN NO. DCB/MAG-1/CR-07/2026-
RD
2027 ANNEXURE-A PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 3 TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE ORDER BEARING
NO.16.07.2026 BEARING NO. HD 387 SST 2026 BENGALURU
PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.02.
TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 18/08/2026 IN NO. HD 387 SST 2026 ANNEXURE-D
PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 AND ETC.

THIS WRIT PETITION ( HABEAS CORPUS ) HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 13.10.2026, COMING
ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY
M.NAGAPRASANNA J.,
MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )

The petitioner who is wife of the detenu is before the Court
seeking the following prayer:
“Wherefore, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court be
pleased to –


(a) Call for record;


(b) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the detention of
Sri Sanju Vithhal Kadakol by order dated 6-07-
2026 in No.DCB/MAG-1/CR-07/2026-27 Annexure-
A passed by the respondent No.3;


(c) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order bearing
No.16-07-2026 bearing No.HD 387 SST 2026
Bengaluru produced at Annexure-C passed by
respondent No.2;


(d) Issue a writ or certiorari to quash the order dated
18-08-2026 in No.HD 387 SST 2026 Annexure-D
passed by respondent No.1;


(e) Pass such other order or orders declaring the order
of detention, the order of approval as illegal and
void ab initio;


(f) Pass such other order including release of the
detenu forthwith;


(g) Award cost.”

2. Heard Sri Avinash M. Angadi, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner and Sri Rakesh M. Bilki, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 6.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:
rd
The 3 respondent/Deputy Commissioner passes an order
on 06-07-2026 under Section 3 of the Karnataka Prevention of
Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Drug Offender, Gamblers,
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers, and Video
or Audio Pirates Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for
short). The detention of the husband of the petitioner is on the
ground that the detenu is involved in other crimes. The detention
order observes that notwithstanding the fact that he has been
released on bail, he is in the habit of creating fear in the public.
Criminal antecedents of the detenu are noticed in the order of
detention and the husband of the petitioner was taken into
custody. He is now in the Central Prison, Hindalaga, Balagavi.
The wife was before the Court in an earlier petition seeking a writ
of , which comes to be withdrawn reserving liberty
habeas corpus
to knock at the doors of this Court yet again after a decision was
taken by the Advisory Board. It is in that light the present
petition is preferred after the Advisory Board also rejects the
claim for release of the detenu.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri
Avinash M. Angadi would vehemently contend that the
documents relied upon while passing the order of detention have
not been furnished to the detenu, which is in violation of Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel would submit
that the documents are required to be furnished to the detenu in
a language known to him. The grounds of detention were not
served upon the detenu at the time of detention. He would
contend that the detenu is out on bail in every crime that is
registered. The State has not sought cancellation of bail in any
of the crimes in which the detenu is on bail. He has been
attending Court proceedings regularly and no non-bailable
warrant is issued against him. Preventive proceedings that are
instituted under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. cannot become a
ground for detaining the detenu. He would submit that mere
registration of criminal cases without there being any disturbance
to public order cannot mean that the detenu could be detained
eternally.

5. The learned Additional Government Advocate appearing
for the State would refute the submissions in contending that the
detenu is informed of his right to make a representation in terms

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

of the Act. The documents relied upon in the detention order
have been provided to the detenu. The detenu is a habitual
criminal offender and continuously indulge in illegal usage of
weapons and is charged under the Arms Act, 1959. The Advisory
Board has considered the same and rejected release of the
detenu. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

6. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have
perused the material on record. In the light of the submissions
and contra-submissions, the issues that fall for consideration
are:
(i) Whether preventive detention can become an
alternative to cancellation of bail?

(ii) Whether the order of preventive detention can be
made on mere breach of law and order or on being a
threat to public order?

(iii) Whether the documents denied to the detenu would
be in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of
India?

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

These issues would be considered in seriatim .

ISSUE NO.1:
7. The contention of the State is that there are four crimes
pending against the detenu. The four crimes are as follows:
Sl.
No
Police Crime Number Status of the
Station and offences. Case as per
the
Detention
order
Actual status of the
present case and rank of
the detenu.
Acquitted Acquitted

Pending Trial
1. Jamkhandi Crime No.102/
Town PS 2014
Offences: 323,
324, 341, 504
r/w 34 IPC.
Pending Trial Pending Trial

The detenu is accused
No.1.

3. Jamkhandi Crime No.102 of
Rural PS 2023
Offences: 143,
147, 120-B, 511
r/w 148\9 IPC
and Sec.25(1-A)
Arms Act.
2. Jamkhandi Crime No.163 of
Rural PS 2018
Offence: 25(1-
B(A) Arms Act
Pending Trial Pending Trial

The detenu is accused
No.6
Pending Trial Pending Trial

Detenu was accused No.3
4. Mahalingpur Crime No.06 of
PS 2026.
Offences: 137(2)
and 310(2) BNS,
2023

The detenu has been acquitted in Crime No.102 of 2014 and in
other aforementioned crimes trial is pending. The detenu is out
on bail in all the three cases where trial is pending. Therefore,
the issue that would arise is, whether mere pendency of criminal

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

cases where the detenu is already on bail can be used for
preventive detention, as it would amount to using the power of
preventive detention as an alternative for cancellation of bail.
The issue thus need not detain us for long or delve deep into the
matter.

7.1. The Apex Court in the case of AMEENA BEGUM v.
1
STATE OF TELANGANA holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
59. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid
excerpts from the detention order lay bare the
Commissioner's attempt to transgress his jurisdiction and
to pass an order of detention, which cannot be construed
as an order validly made under the Act. The quoted
observations are reflective of the intention to detain the
detenu at any cost without resorting to due procedure. It
is neither the case of the respondents that the detenu had
not complied with the terms of the notice issued under
Section 41-ACrPC, nor has it been alleged that the
conditions of bail had been violated by the detenu. It is
pertinent to note that in the three criminal
proceedings where the detenu had been released
on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had
been moved by the State. In the light of the same,
the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary
statute, should not have been resorted to when
ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to
address the apprehensions leading to the impugned
detention order. There may have existed sufficient
grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the
circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of
ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an
extraordinary measure of the law of preventive
detention.

1
(2023) 9 SCC 587

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026


60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar
[ Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar , (1984) 3 SCC
14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] , Hon'ble E.S.
Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was)
observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)

32 . … It is well settled that the law of
preventive detention is a hard law and
therefore it should be strictly construed.
Care should be taken that the liberty of a
person is not jeopardised unless his case
falls squarely within the four corners of the
relevant law . The law of preventive
detention should not be used merely to clip
the wings of an accused who is involved in a
criminal prosecution. It is not intended for
the purpose of keeping a man under
detention when under ordinary criminal law
it may not be possible to resist the issue of
orders of bail, unless the material available
is such as would satisfy the requirements of
the legal provisions authorising such
detention. When a person is enlarged on
bail by a competent criminal court, great
caution should be exercised in scrutinising
the validity of an order of preventive
detention which is based on the very same
charge which is to be tried by the criminal
court .”

(emphasis supplied)

61. Resonance of these principles is traceable in
Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana [ Banka Sneha
Sheela v. State of Telangana , (2021) 9 SCC 415 : (2021)
3 SCC (Cri) 446] . There, while examining an order of
detention passed with reference to 5 (five) offences
involving Sections 420, 406 and 506IPC, in respect
whereof the detenu had obtained orders of
bail/anticipatory bail, this Court had the occasion to say
that : (SCC p. 427, para 15)

“ 15 . … A close reading of the detention
order would make it clear that the reason for the
said Order is not any apprehension of widespread
public harm, danger or alarm but is only because
the detenu was successful in obtaining
anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each of

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

the five FIRs. If a person is granted anticipatory
bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies
in the ordinary law to take care of the situation.
The State can always appeal against the bail
order granted and/or apply for cancellation of
bail. The mere successful obtaining of
anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real
ground for detaining the detenu, there can
be no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm
or feeling of insecurity among the general
public spoken of in Section 2(a) of the
Telangana Prevention of Dangerous
Activities Act is make-believe and totally
absent in the facts of the present case . ”

(emphasis supplied).”

7.2. The Apex Court in the case of NENAVATH BUJJI v.
2
STATE OF TELENGANA has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
43. The learned counsel appearing for the
appellant detenu is also right in his submission that
if it is the case of the detaining authority that there
was no other option but to pass an order of
preventive detention as the appellant detenu came
to be released by the regular criminal courts on bail
then the State should have gone for cancellation of
bail. Whenever, any accused is released on bail by
any criminal court in connection with any offence,
whether specifically said so in the order of bail
while imposing conditions or not, it is implied that
the bail is granted on the condition that the accused
shall not indulge in any such offence or illegal
activities in future. In some cases, courts do deem
fit to impose one of such conditions for the grant of
bail. However, even in those cases, where such a
condition is not specifically imposed while granting
bail it is implied that if such accused after his
release on bail once again commits any offence or
indulges in nefarious activities then his bail is liable
to be cancelled. In the case on hand, the State

2
(2024) 17 SCC 294

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

instead of proceeding to pass an order of detention
could have approached the courts concerned for
cancellation of the bail on the ground that the
appellant detenu had continued to indulge in
nefarious activities and many more FIRs have been
registered against him.

44. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the
decision of this Court in SK. Nazneen v. State of
Telangana [ SK. Nazneen v. State of Telangana , (2023) 9
SCC 633 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 800] , wherein in paras 11
and 19, respectively, this Court observed as under: (SCC
pp. 637-38 & 640)

“ 11 . The detention order was challenged
by the wife of the detenu in a habeas corpus
petition before the Division Bench of the
Telangana High Court. The ground taken by the
petitioner before the High Court was that reliance
has been taken by the Authority of four cases of
chain snatching, as already mentioned above.
The admitted position is that in all these
four cases the detenu has been released on
bail by the Magistrate. Moreover, in any
case, the nature of crime as alleged against
the petitioner can at best be said to be a law
and order situation and not the public order
situation, which would have justified
invoking the powers under the preventive
detention law. This, however did not find
favour with the Division Bench of the High
Court, which dismissed [ SK. Nazneen v.
State of Telangana , 2022 SCC OnLine TS
3423] the petition, upholding the validity of
the detention order .

*

19 . In any case, the State is not
without a remedy, as in case the detenu is
much a menace to the society as is being
alleged, then the prosecution should seek
for the cancellation of his bail and/or move
an appeal to the higher court . But definitely
seeking shelter under the preventive
detention law is not the proper remedy
under the facts and circumstances of the
. ”
case

(emphasis supplied)”

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

7.3. The Apex Court in the case of DHANYA M v. STATE
3
OF KERALA has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
20. Moreover, it has been stated therein by the
authority that the detenu is violating the conditions
of bail imposed upon him in the cases that have
been considered for passing the order of detention.
However, pertinently, no application has been filed
by the respondent-State in any of the four cases,
alleging violation of such conditions, if any, and
moreover, have not even been spelt out here.

21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had
observed that the State should move for
cancellation of bail of the detenu, instead of placing
him under the law of preventive detention, which is
not the appropriate remedy . Similarly, in Ameena
9
v. , this Court observed:
Begum State of Telengana

“59. … It is pertinent to note that in the
three criminal proceedings where the detenu had
been released on bail, no applications for
cancellation of bail had been moved by the State.
In the light of the same, the provisions of the
Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not
have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law
provided sufficient means to address the
apprehensions leading to the impugned detention
order. There may have existed sufficient
grounds to appeal against the bail orders,
but the circumstances did not warrant the
circumvention of ordinary criminal
procedure to resort to an extraordinary
measure of the law of preventive
detention.”

60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar
[ Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar , (1984) 3
SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361], Hon'ble E.S.
Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was)
observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)


3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

32. … It is well settled that the
law of preventive detention is a hard
law and therefore it should be strictly
construed. Care should be taken that
the liberty of a person is not
jeopardised unless his case falls
squarely within the four corners of the
relevant law. The law of preventive
detention should not be used
merely to clip the wings of an
accused who is involved in a
criminal prosecution. It is not
intended for the purpose of
keeping a man under detention
when under ordinary criminal law
it may not be possible to resist the
issue of orders of bail, unless the
material available is such as would
satisfy the requirements of the
legal provisions authorising such
detention. When a person is
enlarged on bail by a competent
criminal court, great caution
should be exercised in scrutinising
the validity of an order of
preventive detention which is
based on the very same charge
which is to be tried by the criminal
court. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

22. Keeping in view the above expositions of law,
we have no doubt that the order of detention cannot be
sustained. The circumstances pointed out in the
order by the detaining authority may be ground
enough for the State to approach the competent
Courts for cancellation of bail, but it cannot be said
that the same warranted his preventive detention.
We clarify that if such an application for
cancellation of the detenu's bail is made by the
respondent-State, the same must be decided
uninfluenced by the observations made
hereinabove. ”

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7.4. In the case of ROSHINI DEVI v. STATE OF
4
TELANGANA the Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
11. From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that
the detaining authority intended to detain the mother of
the appellant at any cost. Her conduct during the
period from 2016 to 2023 has been kept in mind. If
the detaining authority was of the view that the
detenu had violated any conditions of bail, steps for
cancellation of her liberty could have been taken.
That has not been done here.

12. In this regard, we may refer to the
decision of this Court in Ameena Begum v. State of
Telangana [ Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana ,
(2023) 9 SCC 587: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754],
wherein the effect of extraneous factors weighing
in the mind of the detaining authority while passing
an order of detention has been considered.
Incidentally, the order of detention therein was also
passed under the 1986 Act. It has been observed in paras
56 to 60 as under: (SCC pp. 623-25)

“ 56 . … At the same time, the detaining
authority ought to ensure that the order does not
manifest consideration of extraneous factors. The
detaining authority must be cautious and
circumspect that no extra or additional word or
sentence finds place in the order of detention,
which evinces the human factor — his mindset of
either acting with personal predilection by
invoking the stringent preventive detention laws
to avoid or oust judicial scrutiny, given the
restrictions of judicial review in such cases, or as
an authority charged with the notion of
overreaching the courts, chagrined and frustrated
by orders granting bail to the detenu despite stiff
opposition raised by the State and thereby failing
in the attempt to keep the detenu behind bars.

57 . What we have expressed above is best
exemplified by the observations of the
Commissioner in the Detention Order under

4
(2026) 7 SCC 302

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challenge, which are considered appropriate to be
quoted. Therein, the Commissioner inter alia
stated as follows:

‘The proposed detenu and his
associate are notorious offenders and
rowdy sheeters….

The proposed detenu was
surrendered before the Hon'ble Court
in Cr. No. 35/2023 of Falaknuma PS
and the Hon'ble Magistrate remanded
him to judicial custody, he moved bail
petitions in Cr. Nos. 18/2023 of
Golconda PS and 35/2023 of
Falaknuma PS.

The prosecution has filed
suitable counters strongly opposing the
grant of bail to him, but the Hon'ble
Magistrate granted bail to him in both
the cases and ordered for his release.
Subsequently, he was released from
judicial remand on bail.

As seen from his past criminal
history, background and antecedents
and also his habitual nature of
committing crimes one after the other
and his efforts to come out of the
prison, I strongly believe that if such a
habitual criminal is set free, his
activities would not be safe to the
society and there is an imminent
possibility of his committing similar
offences by violating the bail conditions
in one of the cases, which would be
detrimental to public order, unless he
is preventively detained from doing so
by an appropriate order of detention.’

58 . With respect to the stage of
proceedings in the offences which form its basis,
the Detention Order states that despite being
contested by the State, bail has been granted to
the detenu in Crimes Nos. 4 and 5. Insofar as
grant of bail to the detenu is concerned, the
Commissioner states that:

‘I strongly believe that if such a
habitual criminal is set free his
activities would not be safe to the
society and there is an imminent
possibility of his committing similar

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offences by violating the bail conditions
in one of the cases, which would be
detrimental to public order, unless he
is preventively detained from doing so
by an appropriate order of detention.’

59 . We are of the opinion that the
aforesaid excerpts from the Detention Order lay
bare the Commissioner's attempt to transgress
his jurisdiction and to pass an order of detention,
which cannot be construed as an order validly
made under the Act. The quoted observations are
reflective of the intention to detain the detenu at
any cost without resorting to due procedure. It is
neither the case of the respondents that the
detenu had not complied with the terms of
the notice issued under Section 41-ACrPC,
nor has it been alleged that the conditions
of bail had been violated by the detenu. It is
pertinent to note that in the three criminal
proceedings where the detenu had been
released on bail, no applications for
cancellation of bail had been moved by the
State. In the light of the same, the
provisions of the Act, which is an
extraordinary statute, should not have been
resorted to when ordinary criminal law
provided sufficient means to address the
apprehensions leading to the impugned
Detention Order. There may have existed
sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail
orders, but the circumstances did not
warrant the circumvention of ordinary
criminal procedure to resort to an
extraordinary measure of the law of
preventive detention.

60 . In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar
[ Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar , (1984) 3
SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] , Hon'ble E.S.
Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was)
observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)

‘ 32 . … It is well settled that the
law of preventive detention is a hard
law and therefore it should be strictly
construed. Care should be taken that
the liberty of a person is not
jeopardised unless his case falls
squarely within the four corners of the
relevant law . The law of preventive
detention should not be used

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

merely to clip the wings of an
accused who is involved in a
criminal prosecution. It is not
intended for the purpose of
keeping a man under detention
when under ordinary criminal law
it may not be possible to resist the
issue of orders of bail, unless the
material available is such as would
satisfy the requirements of the
legal provisions authorising such
detention. When a person is
enlarged on bail by a competent
criminal court, great caution
should be exercised in scrutinising
the validity of an order of
preventive detention which is
based on the very same charge
which is to be tried by the criminal
court . ’ ”

(emphasis in original and
supplied)

13. Thus, mere apprehension on the part of
the detaining authority that in the event of the
detenu being released on bail, she was likely to
indulge in similar crimes that would be prejudicial
to maintenance of public order would not be a
sufficient ground to order her preventive detention.

14. Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act enables the
Government, if it is satisfied that a drug offender
ought to be prevented from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, to
make an order of preventive detention. The
expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order” has been defined by
Section 2( a ) of the 1986 Act. As per the Explanation
to the said provision, if any of the activities of the
person concerned causes or is calculated to cause
any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity
among the general public or a section thereof or in
case of a grave widespread danger to life or public
health is likely to be caused, such power can be
exercised.

15. The order of detention does not indicate in
what manner the maintenance of public order was
either adversely affected or was likely to be

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adversely affected so as to detain the detenu. Mere
reproduction of the expressions mentioned in
Section 2( a ) of the 1986 Act in the order of
detention would not be sufficient. The detention
order ought to indicate the recording of subjective
satisfaction by the detaining authority in that
regard. It is well settled that there is a fine
distinction between “law and order” and “public
order”. Mere registration of three offences by itself
would not have any bearing on the maintenance of
public order unless there is material to show that
the narcotic drug dealt with by the detenu was in
fact dangerous to public health under the 1986 Act.
This material is found to be missing in the order of
detention. ”

The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments would clearly hold
that the State cannot resort to passing an order of preventive
detention merely on the score that the detenu is violating the
conditions of bail. The State should seek cancellation of bail if the
detenu is violating the conditions of bail. The Detaining Authority
cannot pass an order of detention on the mere apprehension that
the detenu is likely to indulge in similar acts after the grant of
bail. The Apex Court in the cases of AMEENA BEGUM supra ,
NENAVATH BUJJI supra and ROSHINI DEVI supra was
interpreting the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders etc. Act, 1986 (‘Telangana Goonda Act’ for short),
which is pari materia to the Act and holds that preventive
detention cannot be an alternative for seeking cancellation of

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bail. Therefore, this is the first illegality committed by the State
in the order of detention.

ISSUE NO.2:

8. The learned Government Advocate submits, by taking
this Court through the statement of objections, that there are a
plethora of cases registered against the detenu invoking Section
107 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 126 of the BNSS and the detenu
has executed bond of good conduct in all the cases and then he
is let off. Whether this could become the fulcrum of an order of
preventive detention being passed again need not detain us for
long or delve deep in the matter. The Apex Court, in a plethora
of cases, has interpreted Section 2(a) and the Explanation
thereto of the Telangana Goonda Act, which is pari materia to
Section 2(a) of the Act, and holds that an order of preventive
detention can be made only when there is a threat to public
order and not for mere breach of law and order.

8.1. The Apex Court in the case of BANKA SNEHA
5
SHEELA v. STATE OF TELANGANA holds as follows:
“…. …. ….


5
(2021) 9 SCC 415

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

13. As is well-known, the expressions “law
and order”, “public order”, and “security of State”
are different from one another. In Ram Manohar
Lohia v. State of Bihar [ Ram Manohar Lohia v. State
of Bihar , (1966) 1 SCR 709: AIR 1966 SC 740: 1966
Cri LJ 608] the question before this Court arose
under a preventive detention order made under
Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, which
permits apprehension and detention of a person
likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. This Court set out the
distinction between a mere law and order
disturbance and a public order disturbance as
follows: (SCR pp. 738-39 & 745-46: AIR pp. 755 & 758-
59, paras 42 & 51-52)

“ 42 . The Defence of India Act and the
Rules speak of the conditions under which
preventive detention under the Act can be
ordered. In its long title and the preamble the
Defence of India Act speaks of the necessity to
provide for special measures to ensure public
safety and interest, the defence of India and civil
defence. The expression “public safety” and
interest between them indicate the range of
action for maintaining security, peace and
tranquillity of India whereas the expressions
“defence of India” and “civil defence” connote
defence of India and its people against
aggression from outside and action of persons
within the country. These generic terms were
used because the Act seeks to provide for a
congeries of action of which preventive detention
is just a small part. In conferring power to make
rules, Section 3 of the Defence of India Act
enlarges upon the terms of the preamble by
specification of details. It speaks of defence of
India and civil defence and public safety without
change but it expands the idea of public interest
into maintenance of public order, the efficient
conduct of military operations and maintaining of
supplies and services essential to the life of the
community. Then it mentions by way of
illustration in clause (15) of the same section the
power of apprehension and detention in custody
of any person whom the authority empowered by
the rules to apprehend or detain (the authority
empowered to detain not being lower in rank
than that of a District Magistrate), suspects, on

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grounds appearing to that authority to be
reasonable—

( a ) of being of hostile origin; or
( b ) of having acted, acting or being about to
act or being likely to act in a manner
prejudicial to—

( i ) the defence of India and civil
defence;
( ii ) the security of the State;
( iii ) the public safety or interest;
( iv ) the maintenance of public order;
( v ) India's relations with foreign
States;
( vi ) the maintenance of peaceful
conditions in any part or area of
India; or
( vii ) the efficient conduct of military
operations.

It will thus appear that security of the State,
public safety or interest, maintenance of
public order and the maintenance of
peaceful conditions in any part or area of
India may be viewed separately even
though strictly one clause may have an
effect or bearing on another. Then follows
Rule 30, which repeats the above conditions and
permits detention of any person with a view to
preventing him from acting in any of the above
ways. The argument of Dr Lohia that the
conditions are to be cumulatively applied is
clearly untenable. It is not necessary to analyse
Rule 30 which we quoted earlier and which
follows the scheme of Section 3(15). The
question is whether by taking power to prevent
Dr Lohia from acting to the prejudice of “law and
order” as against “public order” the District
Magistrate went outside his powers.

*

51 . We have here a case of detention
under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules
which permits apprehension and detention of a
person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. It follows that if
such a person is not detained public disorder is
the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt
prevented by the maintenance of law and
order also but disorder is a broad spectrum

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which includes at one end small
disturbances and at the other the most
serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does
the expression “public order” take in every
kind of disorders or only some of them? The
answer to this serves to distinguish “public
order” from “law and order” because the
latter undoubtedly takes in all of them.
Public order if disturbed, must lead to public
disorder. Every breach of the peace does not
lead to public disorder. When two drunkards
quarrel and fight there is disorder but not
public disorder. They can be dealt with
under the powers to maintain law and order
but cannot be detained on the ground that
they were disturbing public order. Suppose
that the two fighters were of rival
communities and one of them tried to raise
communal passions. The problem is still one
of law and order but it raises the
apprehension of public disorder. Other
examples can be imagined. The contravention
of law always affects order but before if can
be said to affect public order, it must affect
the community or the public at large. A
mere disturbance of law and order leading
to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient
for action under the Defence of India Act
but disturbances which subvert the public
order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to
take action under Rule 30(1)( b ) to prevent
subversion of public order but not in aid of
maintenance of law and order under
ordinary circumstances.

52 . It will thus appear that just as
“public order” in the rulings of this Court
(earlier cited) was said to comprehend
disorders of less gravity than those
affecting “security of State”, “law and
order” also comprehends disorders of less
gravity than those affecting “public order”.
One has to imagine three concentric circles.
Law and order represents the largest circle
within which is the next circle representing
public order and the smallest circle
represents security of State. It is then easy
to see that an act may affect law and order
but not public order just as an act may
affect public order but not security of the
State. By using the expression

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

“maintenance of law and order” the District
Magistrate was widening his own field of
action and was adding a clause to the
Defence of India Rules .”

14. There can be no doubt that for “public
order” to be disturbed, there must in turn be public
disorder. Mere contravention of law such as
indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust
certainly affects “law and order” but before it can
be said to affect “public order”, it must affect the
community or the public at large.

15. There can be no doubt that what is alleged in
the five FIRs pertain to the realm of “law and order” in
that various acts of cheating are ascribed to the detenu
which are punishable under the three sections of the
Penal Code set out in the five FIRs. A close reading of
the detention order would make it clear that the
reason for the said order is not any apprehension of
widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is
only because the detenu was successful in
obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the courts in
each of the five FIRs. If a person is granted
anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-
known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of
the situation. The State can always appeal against
the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation
of bail. The mere successful obtaining of
anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real ground
for detaining the detenu, there can be no doubt that
the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity
among the general public spoken of in Section 2( a )
of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities
Act is make-believe and totally absent in the facts
of the present case.

…. …. ….

18. The reference to Madhu Limaye v. Sub-
Divisional Magistrate [ Madhu Limaye v. Sub-
Divisional Magistrate , (1970) 3 SCC 746] is wholly
inapposite. This judgment dealt with the scope of
the expression “in the interests of public order”
which occurs in Articles 19(2) to 19(4) of the
Constitution of India. The observations made by
this judgment were in the context of a challenge to

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Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Importantly, this Court referred to the judgment in Ram
Manohar Lohia [ Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar ,
(1966) 1 SCR 709 : AIR 1966 SC 740 : 1966 Cri LJ 608]
and then opined : ( Madhu Limaye case [ Madhu Limaye v.
Sub-Divisional Magistrate , (1970) 3 SCC 746] , SCC pp.
755-56, paras 19-20)

“ 19 . Adopting this test we may say
that the State is at the centre and society
surrounds it. Disturbances of society go in a
broad spectrum from mere disturbance of
the serenity of life to jeopardy of the State.
The acts become graver as we journey from
the periphery of the largest circle towards
the centre. In this journey we travel first
though public tranquillity, then through
public order and lastly to the security of the
State.

20 . In dealing with the phrase
“maintenance of public order” in the context
of preventive detention, we confined the
expression in the relevant Act to what was
included in the second circle and left out
that which was in the largest circle. But that
consideration need not always apply
because small local disturbances of the even
tempo of life, may in a sense be said to
effect “public order” in a different sense,
namely, in the sense of a state of law
abidingness vis-à-vis the safety of others. In
our judgment the expression “in the interest
of public order” in the Constitution is
capable of taking within itself not only those
acts which disturb the security of the State
or act within ordre publique as described
but also certain acts which disturb public
tranquillity or are breaches of the peace. It
is not necessary to give the expression a
narrow meaning because, as has been
observed, the expression “in the interest of
public order” is very wide. Whatever may be
said of “maintenance of public order” in the
context of special laws entailing detention
of persons without a trial on the pure
subjective determination of the Executive
cannot be said in other circumstances. In
the former case this Court confined the
meaning to graver episodes not involving

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

cases of law and order which are not
disturbances of public tranquillity but of
ordre publique .”

19. To tear these observations out of context
would be fraught with great danger when it comes to the
liberty of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. The reason for not adopting a narrow
meaning of “public order” in that case was because
of the expression “in the interests of” which occurs
in Articles 19(2) to 19(4) and which is pressed into
service only when a law is challenged as being
unconstitutional for being violative of Article 19 of
the Constitution. When a person is preventively
detained, it is Articles 21 and 22 that are attracted
and not Article 19. Further, preventive detention
must fall within the four corners of Article 21 read
with Article 22 and the statute in question. To
therefore argue that a liberal meaning must be
given to the expression “public order” in the
context of a preventive detention statute is wholly
inapposite and incorrect. On the contrary,
considering that preventive detention is a
necessary evil only to prevent public disorder, the
Court must ensure that the facts brought before it
directly and inevitably lead to a harm, danger or
alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general
public or any section thereof at large.

20. Several judgments of this Court have reminded
us about the role of the High Courts and this Court in
cases of preventive detention. Thus, in Frances Coralie
Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [ Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C.
Khambra , (1980) 2 SCC 275: 1980 SCC (Cri) 419], a
Division Bench of this Court held : (SCC p. 279, para 5)

“ 5 . We have no doubt in our minds about
the role of the court in cases of preventive
detention : it has to be one of eternal vigilance.
No freedom is higher than personal freedom and
no duty higher than to maintain it unimpaired.
The Court's writ is the ultimate insurance against
illegal detention. The Constitution enjoins
conformance with the provisions of Article
22 and the Court exacts compliance. Article
22(5) vests in the detenu the right to be
provided with an opportunity to make a
representation. Here the Law Reports tell a

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

story and teach a lesson. It is that the
principal enemy of the detenu and his right
to make a representation is neither high-
handedness nor mean-mindedness but the
casual indifference, the mindless
insensibility, the routine and the red tape of
the bureaucratic machine.”

21. Likewise, in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of
Bihar [ Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar , (1984) 3 SCC
14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] , a three-Judge Bench of this
Court (in which A.P. Sen, J., dissented), Venkataramiah,
J., speaking for the majority, reminds us : (SCC pp. 35-
36, para 32)

“ 32 . … It is well settled that the law of
preventive detention is a hard law and therefore
it should be strictly construed. Care should be
taken that the liberty of a person is not
jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within
the four corners of the relevant law. The law of
preventive detention should not be used
merely to clip the wings of an accused who
is involved in a criminal prosecution.
It is
not intended for the purpose of keeping a
man under detention when under ordinary
criminal law it may not be possible to resist
the issue of orders of bail, unless the
material available is such as would satisfy
the requirements of the legal provisions
authorising such detention. When a person
is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal
court, great caution should be exercised in
scrutinising the validity of an order of
preventive detention which is based on the
very same charge which is to be tried by the
criminal court .”

(emphasis supplied)

22. O. Chinappa Reddy, J., in a short concurring
judgment also sets out the constitutional fundamentals
qua preventive detention as follows: ( Vijay Narain Singh
case [ Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar , (1984) 3 SCC
14: 1984 SCC (Cri) 361], SCC pp. 18-19, para 1)

“ 1 . I entirely agree with my Brother
Venkataramiah, J. both on the question of
interpretation of the provisions of the Bihar
Control of Crimes Act, 1981 and on the question

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

of the effect of the order of grant of bail in the
criminal proceeding arising out of the incident
constituting one of the grounds of detention. It is
really unnecessary for me to add anything to
what has been said by Venkataramiah, J., but my
Brother Sen, J. has taken a different view and
out of respect to him, I propose to add a few
lines. I am unable to agree with my Brother Sen,
J. on several of the views expressed by him in his
dissent. In particular, I do not agree with the
view that “those who are responsible for the
national security or for the maintenance of
public order must be the sole judges of what
the national security or public order
requires”. It is too perilous a proposition.
Our Constitution does not give a carte
blanche to any organ of the State to be the
sole arbiter in such matters. Preventive
detention is considered so treacherous and
such an anathema to civilised thought and
democratic polity that safeguards against
undue exercise of the power to detain
without trial, have been built into the
Constitution itself and incorporated as
Fundamental Rights. There are two
sentinels, one at either end. The Legislature
is required to make the law circumscribing
the limits within which persons may be
preventively detained and providing for the
safeguards prescribed by the Constitution
and the courts are required to examine,
when demanded, whether there has been
any excessive detention, that is, whether
the limits set by the Constitution and the
Legislature have been transgressed.
Preventive detention is not beyond judicial
scrutiny. While adequacy or sufficiency may
not be a ground of challenge, relevancy and
proximity are certainly grounds of
challenge. Nor is it for the court to put itself
in the position of the detaining authority
and to satisfy itself that the untested facts
reveal a path of crime. I agree with my
Brother Sen, J. when he says, “It has always
been the view of this Court that the
detention of individuals without trials for
any length of time, however short, is wholly
inconsistent with the basic ideas of our
Government and the gravity of the evil to
the community resulting from anti-social
activities can never furnish an adequate

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

reason for invading the personal liberty of
the citizen except in accordance with the
procedure established by law.”

23. In Union of India v. Yumnam Anand M. [ Union
v. , (2007) 10 SCC 190:
of India Yumnam Anand M.
(2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 608: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 622], this
Court reiterated some of these principles as follows :
(SCC p. 193, para 8)

“ 8 . In case of preventive detention no
offence is proved, nor any charge is
formulated and the justification of such
detention is suspicion or reasonability and
there is no criminal conviction which can
only be warranted by legal evidence.
Preventive justice requires an action to be
taken to prevent apprehended objectionable
activities. (See R. v. Halliday [ R. v. Halliday ,
1917 AC 260: (1916-17) All ER Rep Ext
1284: 86 LJ KB 1119: 116 LT 417 (HL)] and
Kubic Darusz v. Union of India [ Kubic
Darusz v. Union of India , (1990) 1 SCC 568:
1990 SCC (Cri) 227].) But at the same time,
a person's greatest of human freedoms i.e.
personal liberty is deprived, and, therefore,
the laws of preventive detention are strictly
construed, and a meticulous compliance
with the procedural safeguard, however
technical, is mandatory. The compulsions of
the primordial need to maintain order in
society, without which enjoyment of all
rights, including the right of personal liberty
would lose all their meanings, are the true
justifications for the laws of preventive
detention. This jurisdiction has been
described as a “jurisdiction of suspicion”,
and the compulsions to preserve the values
of freedom of a democratic society and
social order sometimes merit the
curtailment of the individual liberty. (See
Ayya v. State of U.P. [ Ayya v. State of U.P. ,
(1989) 1 SCC 374: 1989 SCC (Cri) 153]) To
lose our country by a scrupulous adherence
to the written law, said Thomas Jefferson,
would be to lose the law, absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means. No law is
an end itself and the curtailment of liberty
for reasons of State's security and national
economic discipline as a necessary evil has

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

to be administered under strict
constitutional restrictions. No carte blanche
is given to any organ of the State to be the
sole arbiter in such matters.”

24. In Rekha v. State of T.N. [ Rekha v. State of
T.N. , (2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] , a
three-Judge Bench of this Court spoke of the interplay
between Articles 21 and 22 as follows : (SCC p. 252,
paras 13-14 and 17)

“ 13 . In our opinion, Article 22(3)( b ) of the
Constitution of India which permits preventive
detention is only an exception to Article 21 of the
Constitution. An exception is an exception, and
cannot ordinarily nullify the full force of the main
rule, which is the right to liberty in Article 21 of
the Constitution. Fundamental rights are meant
for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and
not to put them in jail for a long period without
recourse to a lawyer and without a trial. As
observed in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home
Deptt., ex p Stafford [ R. v. Secy. of State for the
Home Deptt., ex p Stafford , (1998) 1 WLR 503
(CA)] : (WLR p. 518 F-G)

‘… The imposition of what is in
effect a substantial term of
imprisonment by the exercise of
executive discretion, without trial, lies
uneasily with ordinary concepts of the
rule of law.’

Article 22, hence, cannot be read in
isolation but must be read as an exception to
Article 21. An exception can apply only in rare
and exceptional cases, and it cannot override the
main rule.

14 . Article 21 is the most important of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of India. Liberty of a citizen is a
most important right won by our forefathers after
long, historical and arduous struggles. Our
Founding Fathers realised its value because they
had seen during the freedom struggle civil
liberties of our countrymen being trampled upon
by foreigners, and that is why they were
determined that the right to individual liberty
would be placed on the highest pedestal along

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

with the right to life as the basic right of the
people of India.
*
17 . Article 22(1) of the Constitution
makes it a fundamental right of a person
detained to consult and be defended by a lawyer
of his choice. But Article 22(3) specifically
excludes the applicability of clause (1) of Article
22 to cases of preventive detention. Therefore,
we must confine the power of preventive
detention to very narrow limits, otherwise the
great right to liberty won by our Founding
Fathers, who were also freedom fighters, after
long, arduous and historical struggles, will
become nugatory.”

25. This Court went on to discuss, in some detail,
the conceptual nature of preventive detention law as
follows: ( Rekha case [ Rekha v. State of T.N. , (2011) 5
SCC 244: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] , SCC p. 255, paras
29-30)

“ 29 . Preventive detention is, by nature,
repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema
to the rule of law. No such law exists in the USA
and in England (except during war time). Since,
however, Article 22(3)( b ) of the Constitution of
India permits preventive detention, we cannot
hold it illegal but we must confine the power of
preventive detention within very narrow limits,
otherwise we will be taking away the great right
to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India which was won after long,
arduous and historic struggles . It follows,
therefore, that if the ordinary law of the
land (the Penal Code and other penal
statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse
to a preventive detention law will be illegal .

30 . Whenever an order under a
preventive detention law is challenged one
of the questions the court must ask in
deciding its legality is: was the ordinary law
of the land sufficient to deal with the
situation? If the answer is in the
affirmative, the detention order will be
illegal. In the present case, the charge
against the detenu was of selling expired
drugs after changing their labels. Surely the
relevant provisions in the Penal Code and

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient
to deal with this situation. Hence, in our
opinion, for this reason also the detention
order in question was illegal .”

(emphasis supplied)

26. In an important passage, this Court then dealt
with certain general observations made by the
Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B.
[ Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. , (1975) 3 SCC 198:
1974 SCC (Cri) 816] as follows: ( [ v.
Rekha case Rekha
State of T.N. , (2011) 5 SCC 244: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri)
596], SCC pp. 255-57, paras 33-36 and 39)

“ 33 . No doubt it has been held in the
Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha
case [ Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. , (1975) 3
SCC 198: 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] that even if a
person is liable to be tried in a criminal court for
commission of a criminal offence, or is actually
being so tried, that does not debar the
authorities from passing a detention order under
a preventive detention law. This observation, to
be understood correctly, must, however, be
construed in the background of the constitutional
scheme in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution
(which we have already explained). It is Article
21 which is central to the whole chapter on
fundamental rights in our Constitution. The right
to liberty means that before sending a person to
prison a trial must ordinarily be held giving him
an opportunity of placing his defence through his
lawyer. It follows that if a person is liable to be
tried, or is actually being tried, for a criminal
offence, but the ordinary criminal law (the Penal
Code or other penal statutes) will not be able to
deal with the situation, then, and only then, can
the preventive detention law be taken recourse
to .

34 . Hence, the observation in SCC para 34
in Haradhan Saha case [ Haradhan Saha v. State
of W.B. , (1975) 3 SCC 198: 1974 SCC (Cri) 816]
cannot be regarded as an unqualified statement
that in every case where a person is liable to be
tried, or is actually being tried, for a crime in a
criminal court a detention order can also be
passed under a preventive detention law.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

35 . It must be remembered that in cases
of preventive detention no offence is proved and
the justification of such detention is suspicion or
reasonable probability, and there is no conviction
which can only be warranted by legal evidence.
Preventive detention is often described as a
“jurisdiction of suspicion” (vide State of
Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande
[ State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao
Gawande , (2008) 3 SCC 613: (2008) 2 SCC (Cri)
128], SCC para 63). The detaining authority
passes the order of detention on subjective
satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22
specifically excludes the applicability of clauses
(1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer
or the right to be produced before a Magistrate
within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of
this potentially dangerous power the law of
preventive detention has to be strictly construed
and meticulous compliance with the procedural
safeguards, however technical, is, in our opinion,
mandatory and vital.

36 . It has been held that the history of
liberty is the history of procedural safeguards.
(See Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of
India [ Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of
India , (1995) 4 SCC 51: 1995 SCC (Cri) 643]
vide para 49.) These procedural safeguards are
required to be zealously watched and enforced by
the court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be
diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged
activities of the detenu. As observed in Rattan
Singh v. State of Punjab [ Rattan Singh v. State
of Punjab , (1981) 4 SCC 481: 1981 SCC (Cri)
853]: (SCC p. 483, para 4)

‘ 4 . … May be that the detenu is
a smuggler whose tribe (and how their
numbers increase) deserves no
sympathy since its activities have
paralysed the Indian economy. But the
laws of preventive detention afford
only a modicum of safeguards to
persons detained under them, and if
freedom and liberty are to have any
meaning in our democratic set-up, it is
essential that at least those safeguards
are not denied to the detenus.’

*

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

39 . Personal liberty protected under
Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the
scale of constitutional values that it is the
obligation of the detaining authority to show that
the impugned detention meticulously accords
with the procedure established by law. The
stringency and concern of judicial vigilance that is
needed was aptly described in the following
words in Reverend Thomas Pelham Dale case
[ Reverend Thomas Pelham Dale case , (1881) LR
6 QBD 376 (CA)] : (QBD p. 461)

‘Then comes the question upon
the habeas corpus. It is a general rule,
which has always been acted upon by
the courts of England, that if any
person procures the imprisonment of
another he must take care to do so by
steps, all of which are entirely regular,
and that if he fails to follow every step
in the process with extreme regularity
the court will not allow the
imprisonment to continue.’ ”

(emphasis supplied)

…. …. ….

32. On the facts of this case, as has been
pointed out by us, it is clear that at the highest, a
possible apprehension of breach of law and order
can be said to be made out if it is apprehended that
the detenu, if set free, will continue to cheat
gullible persons. This may be a good ground to
appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to
cancel bail but certainly cannot provide the
springboard to move under a preventive detention
statute. We, therefore, quash the detention order
on this ground. Consequently, it is unnecessary to
go into any of the other grounds argued by the
learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner. The
impugned judgment [ Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of
Telangana , 2021 SCC OnLine TS 937] is set aside and the
detenu is ordered to be freed forthwith. Accordingly, the
appeal is allowed.”

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

8.2. In the case of MALLADA K SRI RAM v. STATE OF
6
TELANGANA , the Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
15. A mere apprehension of a breach of law
and order is not sufficient to meet the standard of
adversely affecting the “maintenance of public
order”. In this case, the apprehension of a
disturbance to public order owing to a crime that
was reported over seven months prior to the
detention order has no basis in fact. The
apprehension of an adverse impact to public order
is a mere surmise of the detaining authority,
especially when there have been no reports of
unrest since the detenu was released on bail on 8-
1-2021 and detained with effect from 26-6-2021.
The nature of the allegations against the detenu are
grave. However, the personal liberty of an accused
cannot be sacrificed on the altar of preventive
detention merely because a person is implicated in
a criminal proceeding. The powers of preventive
detention are exceptional and even draconian.
Tracing their origin to the colonial era, they have
been continued with strict constitutional safeguards
against abuse. Article 22 of the Constitution was
specifically inserted and extensively debated in the
Constituent Assembly to ensure that the
exceptional powers of preventive detention do not
devolve into a draconian and arbitrary exercise of
State authority. The case at hand is a clear example
of non-application of mind to material
circumstances having a bearing on the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority. The two FIRs
which were registered against the detenu are
capable of being dealt by the ordinary course of
criminal law .”



6
(2023) 13 SCC 537

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

8.3. In the case of SHAIKH NAZNEEN v. STATE OF
7
TELANGANA , the Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
9. Now under Section 3(1) of the Act,
detention order can be passed, inter alia, against a
“goonda”, “with a view to prevent him from acting
in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order…”. Due to the detenu’s alleged
involvement in four criminal cases relating to
“robbery” he has been declared a “goonda” and it is
said that this is acting in a manner which is
“prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”.

10. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision
shows that the “maintenance of public order” has a
crucial bearing here and unless the Government is
justified in holding that the act of the detenu is
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the
preventive detention would be bad and would be in
violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of
India as it encroaches upon the liberty and freedom
of an individual.

11. The detention order was challenged by the wife
of the detenu in a habeas corpus petition before the
Division Bench of the Telangana High Court. The ground
taken by the petitioner before the High Court was that
reliance has been taken by the Authority of four cases of
chain snatching, as already mentioned above. The
admitted position is that in all these four cases the detenu
has been released on bail by the Magistrate. Moreover, in
any case, the nature of crime as alleged against the
petitioner can at best be said to be a law and order
situation and not the public order situation, which would
have justified invoking the powers under the preventive
detention law. This, however did not find favour with the
Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed the
petition, upholding the validity of the detention order.

12. Shri Rahul Gupta, learned counsel for the
petitioner before this Court has confined his arguments

7
(2023) 9 SCC 633

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

on two aspects. Firstly, the detenu is allegedly
involved in four criminal cases where he has been
granted bail, and that too has been granted as the
prosecution, in all four cases, failed to file its
charge-sheet in time. Now they cannot resort to the
law of preventive detention. Secondly, even
assuming the allegations of the prosecution to be
correct, then too it only reflects a “law and order”
problem and not a “public order” problem as
mentioned under the Act.

13. There is absolutely no doubt in our mind
that the facts and circumstances of the case as
alleged in the detention order dated 28-10-2021
though do reflect a law and order situation which
can be dealt with under the ordinary law of land,
and there was absolutely no occasion for invoking
the extraordinary powers under the law of
preventive detention. The reasons assigned by the
authority in its detention, justifying the invocation
of the provisions of the detention law are that the
detenu has been granted bail in all the four cases
and since he is likely to indulge in similar crime,
hence the order of preventive detention.

14. The reason why bail was granted in all four
cases, however, has not been given. Bail was granted
in all the four cases due to the inability of the
prosecution, which did not complete its
investigation in time. The bail had to be given as the
charge-sheet was not filed by the police in all the cases
within the stipulated period of 60 days. The fault thus lies
with the prosecution.

15. The other reason assigned is that the trial
court while granting bail did not lay down any conditions.
This is again a wrong presentation of the case. Conditions
were not imposed simply as it was a default bail, and in
bail of this nature conditions are not liable to be imposed.

16. Having heard the learned counsel for the
petitioner and the learned counsel for the State of
Telangana, we are of the considered view that in the
present case invocation of the preventive detention
law against the petitioner was not justified. The
powers to be exercised under the preventive

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

detention law are exceptional powers which have
been given to the Government for its exercise in an
exceptional situation as it strikes hard on the
freedom and liberty of an individual, and thus
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The
distinction between law and order situation and a
public order situation has been dealt with by the
Supreme Court in a catena of decisions.

17. In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [ Ram
Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar , 1965 SCC OnLine SC 9] ,
it has been held as under : (SCC OnLine SC paras 54-55)

“ 54 . We have here a case of detention
under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules
which permits apprehension and detention of a
person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. It follows that if
such a person is not detained public
disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder
is no doubt prevented by the maintenance
of law and order also but disorder is a broad
spectrum which includes at one end small
disturbances and at the other the most
serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does
the expression “public order” take in every
kind of disorders or only some of them? The
answer to this serves to distinguish “public
order” from “law and order” because the
latter undoubtedly takes in all of them.
Public order if disturbed, must lead to public
disorder. Every breach of the peace does not
lead to public disorder. When two drunkards
quarrel and fight there is disorder but not
public disorder. They can be dealt with
under the powers to maintain law and order
but cannot be detained on the ground that
they were disturbing public order. Suppose
that the two fighters were of rival
communities and one of them tried to raise
communal passions. The problem is still one
of law and order but it raises the
apprehension of public disorder. Other
examples can be imagined. The
contravention of law always affects order
but before if can be said to affect public
order, it must affect the community or the
public at large. A mere disturbance of law
and order leading to disorder is thus not
necessarily sufficient for action under the

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

Defence of India Act but disturbances which
subvert the public order are. A District
Magistrate is entitled to take action under
Rule 30(1)( b ) to prevent subversion of
public order but not in aid of maintenance of
law and order under ordinary
circumstances.

55 . It will thus appear that just as
“public order” in the rulings of this Court
(earlier cited) was said to comprehend
disorders of less gravity than those
affecting “security of State”, “law and
order” also comprehends disorders of less
gravity than those affecting “public order”.
One has to imagine three concentric circles.
Law and order represents the largest circle
within which is the next circle representing
public order and the smallest circle
represents security of State. It is then easy
to see that an act may affect law and order
but not public order just as an act may
affect public order but not security of the
State. By using the expression
“maintenance of law and order” the District
Magistrate was widening his own field of
action and was adding a clause to the
Defence of India Rules.”

18. In two recent decisions [ Banka Sneha
Sheela v. State of Telangana , (2021) 9 SCC 415 :
(2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 446; Mallada K. Sri Ram v. State
of Telangana , (2023) 13 SCC 537 : 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 424] , this Court had set aside the detention
orders which were passed, under the same Act i.e.
the present Telangana Act, primarily relying upon
the decision in Ram Manohar Lohia [ Ram Manohar
Lohia v. State of Bihar , 1965 SCC OnLine SC 9] and
holding that the detention orders were not justified
as it was dealing with a law and order situation and
not a public order situation.

19. In any case, the State is not without a
remedy, as in case the detenu is much a menace to
the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution
should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or
move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely
seeking shelter under the preventive detention law

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

is not the proper remedy under the facts and
circumstances of the case. ”

8.4. The Apex Court in the case of AMEENA BEGUM supra
holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
42. Turning our attention to Section 3(1) of
the Act, the Government has to arrive at a
subjective satisfaction that a goonda (as in the
present case) has to be detained, in order to
prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order. Therefore, we first
direct ourselves to the examination of what
constitutes “public order”. Even within the
provisions of the Act, the term “public order” has,
stricto sensu , been defined in narrow and restricted
terms. An order of detention under Section 3(1) of
the Act can only be issued against a detenu to
prevent him “ from acting in any manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order ”. “Public order”
is defined in the Explanation to Section 2( a ) of the
Act as encompassing situations that cause “ harm,
danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the
general public or any section thereof or a grave
wide-spread danger to life or public health ”.

43. Ram Manohar Lohia [ Ram Manohar Lohia
v. State of Bihar , 1965 SCC OnLine SC 9: (1966) 1
SCR 709] is an authority to rely upon for the
proposition that if liberty of an individual can be
invaded under statutory rules by the simple process
of making of a certain order, he can be so deprived
only if the order is in consonance with the said rule.
Strict compliance with the letter of the rule, in such
a case, has to be the essence of the matter since
the statute has the potentiality to interfere with the
personal liberty of an individual and a Court is
precluded from going behind its face. Though
circumstances may make it necessary for ordering a
detention without trial, but it would be perfectly
legitimate to require strict observance of the rules
in such cases. If there is any doubt whether the

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

rules have been strictly observed, that doubt must
be resolved in favour of the detenu.

44. Rekha [ Rekha v. State of T.N. , (2011) 5
SCC 244: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] too provides a
useful guide. It is said in para 30 that: (SCC p. 255)

“ 30 . Whenever an order under a
preventive detention law is challenged, one
of the questions the court must ask in
deciding its legality is : was the ordinary law
of the land sufficient to deal with the
situation? If the answer is in the
affirmative, the detention order will be
illegal. In the present case, the charge
against the detenu was of selling expired
drugs after changing their labels. Surely the
relevant provisions in the Penal Code and
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient
to deal with this situation. Hence, in our
opinion, for this reason also the detention
order in question was illegal.”

45. At this stage, it would be useful to consider
certain events anterior to the detention order but referred
to therein. The earlier order of detention dated 4-3-2021
was challenged by the detenu's father before the High
Court. Such order of detention was passed considering 4
(four) FIRs under Sections 420 and 406IPC, wherein the
detenu was arraigned as an accused. In its reasoned
judgment dated 16-8-2021 [ Hakeem Khan v. State of
Telangana , 2021 SCC OnLine TS 3663] , the High Court
noted this Court having opined in a catena of decisions
that there is a vast difference between “law and order”
and “public order”; when offences are committed against
a particular individual it falls within the ambit of “law and
order” whereas when the public at large is adversely
affected by the criminal activities of a person, then such
conduct of the person is said to disturb “public order”.
Holding that the true distinction between the areas
of “law and order” and “public order” lies not
merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the
proper degree and extent of its impact on the
society, it was ruled that the cases do not fall
within the ambit of the words “public order” or
“disturbance of public order”, instead, they fall
within the scope of the words “law and order”, and
that there was no need for the detaining authority

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

to pass the impugned order. Based thereon, the
impugned order was quashed and the detenu set at
liberty.

46. In fine, what we find is that the order of
detention impugned in that writ petition failed to
differentiate between offences which create a “law
and order” situation and which prejudicially affect
or tend to prejudicially affect “public order”. The
present detention order fares no better. Even if the
offences referred to in the detention order, alleged
to have been committed by the detenu have led to
the satisfaction being formed, still the same are
separate and stray acts affecting private individuals
and the repetition of similar such acts would not
tend to affect the even flow of public life. The offence
in respect of the minor girl did exercise our consideration
for some time but we have noted that the detenu was not
arrested because of an order passed by the High Court on
an application under Section 438 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (“CrPC” hereafter). The investigating
agency not having elected to have such order
quashed by a higher forum, the facts have their
own tale to tell. Even otherwise, the gravity of the
offences alleged in Arun Ghosh [ Arun Ghosh v. State of
W.B. , (1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67] was higher
in degree, yet, the same were not considered as affecting
“public order”. The only other offence that could attract
the enumerated category of “acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” and an
order of preventive detention, if at all, is the stray
incident where the detenu has been charged under
Section 353IPC and where the police has not even
contemplated an arrest under Section 41CrPC.

47. On an overall consideration of the
circumstances, it does appear to us that the existing legal
framework for maintaining law and order is sufficient to
address like offences under consideration, which the
Commissioner anticipates could be repeated by the
detenu if not detained. We are also constrained to
observe that preventive detention laws—an exceptional
measure reserved for tackling emergent situations—ought
not to have been invoked in this case as a tool for
enforcement of “law and order”. This, for the reason that,
the Commissioner despite being aware of the earlier

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

judgment and order of the High Court dated 16-8-2021
[ Hakeem Khan v. State of Telangana , 2021 SCC OnLine
TS 3663] passed the detention order ostensibly to
maintain “public order” without once more appreciating
the difference between maintenance of “law and order”
and maintenance of “public order”. The order of detention
is, thus, indefensible.”

8.5. In the case of NENAVATH BUJJI supra , the Apex
Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
20. The law is well settled that the power under
any enactment relating to preventive detention has to be
exercised with great care, caution and restraint. In order
to pass an order of detention under the 1986 Act
against any person, the detaining authority must be
satisfied that he is a “G OONDA ” within the meaning
of Section 2( g ) of the 1986 Act, who either by
himself or as a member of or a leader of a gang
habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets
the commission of offences punishable under
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII IPC as
according to the Explanation to Section 2( a ) of the
1986 Act, it is such a “G OONDA ” who for the purpose
of Section 2 of the 1986 Act shall be deemed to be a
person “acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order” and against whom an
order of detention may lawfully be made.

21. Further, sub-section (1) of Section 3
confers power on the State Government and a
District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police as
the case may be under the direction of the State
Government to detain a person on being satisfied
that it is necessary to do so with a view to prevent
him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of “public order”.

22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to
a decision of this Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v.
State of W.B. [ Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of W.B. ,
(1969) 1 SCC 10]: (SCC pp. 14-15, para 13)

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026


“ 13 . … Does the expression “public
order” take in every kind of infraction of
order or only some categories thereof. It is
manifest that every act of assault or injury
to specific persons does not lead to public
disorder. When two people quarrel and fight
and assault each other inside a house or in a
street, it may be said that there is disorder
but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt
with under the powers vested in the
executive authorities under the provisions
of ordinary criminal law but the culprits
cannot be detained on the ground that they
were disturbing public order. The
contravention of any law always affects
order but before it can be said to affect
public order, it must affect the community
or the public at large. In this connection we
must draw a line of demarcation between
serious and aggravated forms of disorder
which directly affect the community or
injure the public interest and the relatively
minor breaches of peace of a purely local
significance which primarily injure specific
individuals and only in a secondary sense
public interest. A mere disturbance of law
and order leading to disorder is thus not
necessarily sufficient for action under the
Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance
which will affect public order comes within
the scope of the Act .”

(emphasis supplied)

23. The Explanation attached to Section 2( a )
of the 1986 Act reproduced above contemplates
that “public order” shall be deemed to have been
affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be
affected adversely, inter alia, if any of the activities
of any person referred to in Section 2( a ) directly or
indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any
harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity
among the general public or any section thereof or
a grave or widespread danger to life, property or
public health. The Explanation to Section 2( a ) also
provides that for the purpose of Section 2, a person
shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

when such person is a “G OONDA ” and engaged in
activities which affect adversely or are likely to
affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It,
therefore, becomes necessary to determine
whether besides the person being a “G OONDA ” his
alleged activities are such which adversely affected
the public order or are likely to affect the
maintenance of public order.

24. The essential concept of preventive
detention is that the detention of a person is not to
punish him for something he has done but to
prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is
the satisfaction of the executive about the
likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner, similar
to his past acts, which is likely to affect adversely
the maintenance of public order and, thereby
prevent him, by an order of detention, from doing
the same. A criminal conviction on the other hand is
for an act already done which can only be possible
by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel
between the prosecution in a court of law and a
detention order under the 1986 Act. One is a
punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In
one case a person is punished on proof of his guilt,
and the standard is proof beyond the reasonable
doubt, whereas in the other a person is detained
with a view to prevent him from doing such act(s)
as may be specified in the Act authorising
preventive detention.

25. The power of preventive detention is
qualitatively different from punitive detention. The
power of preventive detention is a precautionary
power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may
or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel
proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution
even if it relies on certain facts for which
prosecution may be launched or may have been
launched. An order of preventive detention, may be
made before or during prosecution. An order of
preventive detention may be made with or without
prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or
even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no
bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of
preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

(See: Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. [ Haradhan Saha v.
State of W.B. , (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] )

26. In Halsbury's Laws of England , it is stated
thus:

“The writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum” unlike other writs, is a prerogative
writ, that is to say, it is an extraordinary remedy,
which is issued upon cause shown in cases where
the ordinary legal remedies are inapplicable or
inadequate. This writ is a writ of right and is
granted ex debito justitiate. It is not, however, a
writ of course. Both at common law and by
statute, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted
only upon reasonable ground for its issue being
shown. The writ may not in general be refused
merely because an alternative remedy by which
the validity of the detention can be questioned.
“Any person is entitled to institute proceedings to
obtain a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of
liberating another from an illegal imprisonment
and any person who is legally entitled to the
custody of another may apply for the writ in order
to regain custody. In any case, where access is
denied to a person alleged to be unjustifiably
detained, so that there are no instructions from
the prisoner, the application may be made by any
relation or friend on an affidavit setting forth the
reason for it being made.”

27. In Corpus Juris Secundum , the nature of the
writ of habeas corpus is summarised thus:

“The writ of habeas corpus is a writ
directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner at a designated time and place with the
day and cause of his caption and detention to do,
submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or
Judge awarding the writ shall consider in that
behalf. “Habeas corpus” literally means “have the
body”. By this writ, the court can direct to have
the body of the person detained to be brought
before it in order to ascertain whether the
detention is legal or illegal. Such is the
predominant position of the writ in the Anglo-
Saxon Jurisprudence.”

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

28. In Constitutional and Administrative Law by
Hood Phillips & Jackson, it is stated thus:

“The legality of any form of detention may
be challenged at common law by an application
for the writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus was
a prerogative writ, that is, one issued by the King
against his officers to compel them to exercise
their functions properly. The practical importance
of habeas corpus as providing a speedy judicial
remedy for the determination of an applicant's
claim for freedom has been asserted frequently
by judges and writers. Nonetheless, the
effectiveness of the remedy depends in many
instances on the width of the statutory power
under which a public authority may be acting and
the willingness of the courts to examine the
legality of decision made in reliance on wide-
ranging statutory provision. It has been
suggested that the need for the “blunt remedy”
of habeas corpus has diminished as judicial
review has developed into an ever more flexible
jurisdiction. Procedural reform of the writ may be
appropriate, but it is important not to lose sight
of substantive differences between habeas corpus
and remedies under judicial review. The latter are
discretionary and the court may refuse relief on
practical grounds; habeas corpus is a writ of
right, granted ex debito justitiae.”

29. The ancient prerogative writ of habeas corpus
takes its name from the two mandatory words “habeas”
and “corpus”. “Habeas corpus” literally means “have his
body”. The general purpose of these writs as their name
indicates was to obtain the production of the individual
before a court or a Judge. This is a prerogative
process for securing the liberty of the subject by
affording an effective relief of immediate release
from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in
prison or in private custody. This is a writ of such a
sovereign and transcendent authority that no
privilege of power or place can stand against it. It is
a very powerful safeguard of the subject against
arbitrary acts not only of private individuals but
also of the Executive, the greatest safeguard for
personal liberty, according to all constitutional
jurists. The writ is a prerogative one obtainable by
its own procedure. In England, the jurisdiction to
grant a writ existed in Common law, but has been

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

recognised and extended by statute. It is well
established in England that the writ of habeas
corpus is as of right and that the court has no
discretion to refuse it. “Unlike certiorari or
mandamus, a writ of habeas corpus is as of right”
to every man who is unlawfully detained. In India,
it is this prerogative writ which has been given a
constitutional status under Articles 32 and 226 of
the Constitution . Therefore, it is an extraordinary
remedy available to a citizen of this country, which he can
enforce under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India.

30. It is the duty of the Court to issue this
writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against
arbitrary and illegal detention. Habeas corpus is a
remedy designed to facilitate the release of persons
detained unlawfully, not to punish the person
detaining and it is not, therefore, issued after the
detention complained of has come to an end. It is a
remedy against unlawful detention. It is issued in
the form of an order calling upon the person who
has detained another, whether in prison or in
private custody, to “have the body” of that other
before the Court in order to let the Court know on
what ground the latter has been confined and thus
to give the Court an opportunity of dealing with him
as the law may require. By the writ of habeas
corpus, the Court can cause any person who is
imprisoned to be brought before the Court and
obtain knowledge of the reason why he is
imprisoned and then either set him free then and
there if there is no legal justification for the
imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to
trial. Habeas corpus is available against any person
who is suspected of detaining another unlawfully
and not merely against the police or other public
officers whose duties normally include arrest and
detention. The Court must issue it if it is shown that
the person on whose behalf it is asked for is
unlawfully deprived of his liberty. The writ may be
addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a
private individual who has another in his custody.
The claim (for habeas corpus) has been expressed
and pressed in terms of concrete legal standards
and procedures. Most notably, the right of personal

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

liberty is connected in both the legal and popular
sense with procedures upon the writ of habeas
corpus. The writ is simply a judicial command
directed to a specific jailer directing him or her to
produce the named prisoner together with the legal
cause of detention in order that this legal warrant
of detention might be examined. The said detention
may be legal or illegal. ”

8.6. The Apex Court again in the case of DHANYA supra,
holds that while detaining an individual under preventive
detention, the detention order is required of ascribe as to how
the actions of the detenu are against public order of the State.
The Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
17. From perusal of Section 2(j), it is evident
that a person who indulges in activities “harmful to
maintenance of public order” is sought to be
covered by the Act. This Court in SK. Nazneen v.
7
State of Telangana had emphasized on the
distinction between public order as also law and
order situations:

“18. In two recent decisions [ Banka
Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana , (2021)
9 SCC 415 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 446; Mallada
K. Sri Ram v. State of Telangana , (2023) 13
SCC 537], this Court had set aside the
detention orders which were passed, under
the same Act i.e. the present Telangana Act,
primarily relying upon the decision in Ram
Manohar Lohia [ Ram Manohar Lohia v. State
of Bihar , 1965 SCC OnLine SC 9] and holding
that the detention orders were not justified
as it was dealing with a law and order
situation and not a public order situation.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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18. Similarly, in Nenavath Bujji v. State of
8
Telangana , this Court observed:

“32. The crucial issue is whether the
activities of the detenu were prejudicial to
public order. While the expression ‘law and
order’ is wider in scope inasmuch as
contravention of law always affects order,
‘Public order’ has a narrower ambit, and
could be affected by only such
contravention, which affects the community
or the public at large. Public order is the
even tempo of life of the community taking
the country as a whole or even a specified
locality. The distinction between the areas
of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is one
of degree and extent of the reach, of the act
in question on society. It is the potentiality
of the act to disturb the even tempo of life
of the community which makes it prejudicial
to the maintenance of the public order. If a
contravention in its effect is confined only to
a few individuals directly involved as
distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it
could raise problem of law and order only.
In other words, the true distinction between
the areas of law and order and public order
lies not merely in the nature or quality of
the act, but in the degree and extent of its
reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but
committed in different contexts and
circumstances, might cause different reactions.
In one case it might affect specific individuals
only, and therefore touches the problem of law
and order only, while in another it might affect
public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not
determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it
may not differ from other similar acts, but in its
potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it
may be very different.”

(Emphasis supplied)

19. In consonance with the above expositions
of law, in our view, the attending facts and
circumstances do not fall under the category of a
public order situation. The observations made in the
detention order do not ascribe any reason as to how
the actions of the detenu are against the public
order of the State. As discussed above, given the

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extraordinary nature of the power of preventive
detention, no reasons are assigned by the detaining
authority, as to why and how the actions of the
detenu warrant the exercise of such an exceptional
power.”

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments considers
the difference between ‘law and order’, ‘public order’ and ‘public
disorder’ by traversing through the law laid down by the Apex
Court right from the landmark pronouncement in the case of
RAM MANOHAR LOHIA v. STATE OF BIHAR reported in AIR
1966 SC 740 , and holds that an order of preventive detention
under Section 3(1) of the Act, which curtails the liberty of a
citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, can be
passed only under a circumstance where the detenu is required
to be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order.

9. With the elucidation of law laid down by the Apex Court
in the afore-quoted judgments, the order of detention and the
grounds of detention are required to be noticed. The order of
detention reads as follows:

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

“ DETENTION ORDER

I, Sangappa, IAS, District Magistrate and District
Commissioner, Bagalkote District, have perused and
carefully considered the records, materials, and official
reports placed before me by the law enforcement
authorities against Shri Sanju Vitthal Kadakol, Son of
Vitthal Kadakol, aged about 33 years, residing at
Rudraswami Pete, Jamkhandi Town, Bagalkote District,
which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Jamkhandi Town Police Station; and upon scrutiny, it is
explicitly established from the records that the said
individual has been continuously, habitually, and
relentlessly engaging himself in anti-social, criminal, and
society-threatening activities, including assault, criminal
intimidation, unlawful assembly, criminal conspiracy,
illegal possession of arms/weapons, organized dacoity,
and other dangerous offenses.

And, Whereas, it is further placed on record that
the said individual is a habitual offender, repeatedly and
deliberately involving himself in offenses enumerated and
punishable under Chapters XVI, XXII, II, VIII, XXIII, and
VA (5A) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC); Chapters XVIII
and VI of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023; and
Chapter V (5) of the Arms Act; and whereas, upon a
holistic evaluation of his repeated criminal record, I am
fully satisfied and convinced that it is absolutely
imperative to place him under preventive detention to
restrain him from committing further anti-social activities
that are highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order, safety, and tranquility.

And, Whereas, based on the compelling material
facts and history of offenses placed before me, I am
objectively satisfied that the said individual is a "Goonda"
within the meaning, intent, and definition of Section 2(g)
of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas,
Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video or
Audio Pirates Act, 1985 (Karnataka Act No. 12 of 1985).

Now, Therefore, in exercise of the statutory powers
vested in me under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) of the
Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Drug- Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas,

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Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video or
Audio Pirates Act, 1985, read in conjunction with
Government Notification No. HD 140 SST 2026, dated:
09.06.2026, hereby direct and order that the said Shri
Sanju Vitthal Kadakol, S/o Vitthal Kadakol, be
immediately taken into custody and detained at the
Central Prison, Hindalaga, Belagavi , until further
orders; and furthermore, let it be noted that the true
copies of the Grounds of Detention along with all reliance
documents and material evidence are appended herewith
to this order.

The Grounds of Detention together with the
documents relied upon are enclosed herewith.

This order is issued under my hand and seal on this
day, the 06 day of July, 2026.”

9.1. The grounds of detention are as follows:
“ Grounds of Detention

Subject:- Proposal under sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the
Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities
of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers,
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum
Grabbers and Video or Audio Pirates Act
1985, seeking preventive detention of Sri
Sanju Vitthal Kadakol, S/o Vitthal Kadakol,
aged about 33 years, residing at
Rudraswami Peth, Jamkhandi Town,
Bagalkote District.

Reference:- Report of Superintendent of Police,
Bagalkote District Office letter No:
BGK/DCR/359/2026-27 Dated 25.06.2026
(03.07.2026)

*
You, Sri Sanju Vitthal Kadakol, S/o Vitthal Kadakol,
aged about 33 years, residing at Rudraswami Peth,
Jamkhandi Town, Bagalkote District, are hereby informed
of the grounds on which an order of detention has been
passed against you under Section 3 of the Karnataka
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video or Audio Pirates Act,
1985 (Karnataka Act No.12 of 1985), hereinafter referred
to as "the Act".

Under Section 8 of the Act, the grounds and
reasons which have led to the passing of the detention
order against you are communicated as follows:

As per available records, you were born on
06.07.1993 and are aged about 33 years. You are
residing at Rudraswami Peth, Jamkhandi Town, Bagalkote
District. You are married to Smt. Kavita and have two
children namely Vihan and Vinit. You have studied up to
5th Standard.

You claim to be working as a tiles labourer.
However, police verification, local enquiries and
intelligence inputs reveal that the occupation shown by
you is merely nominal in nature and does not correspond
with your lifestyle, expenditure, influence and financial
activities. Reliable information indicates that you do not
possess any permanent or lawful source of income. It is
further revealed that a substantial portion of your income
is derived directly or indirectly from criminal activities and
through the influence and support of your criminal
network. Information gathered by the police indicates
that you use your criminal influence, unlawful
associations and network of anti-social elements for
obtaining pecuniary benefits and illegal financial gains.

Local enquiries, surveillance reports and
intelligence inputs further reveal that you maintain close
association with several known offenders, rowdy elements
and anti-social persons operating in Jamkhandi Town and
surrounding areas. Your activities and movements have
therefore been under continuous police watch and
surveillance for several years.

The material placed before me further discloses
that you have, over a period of time, established yourself
as an influential anti-social element in Jamkhandi Town
and neighbouring areas. Intelligence reports indicate that
you have developed and maintained a network of loyal
associates and criminal elements who operate under your
influence and direction. It is revealed that you actively

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

recruit and influence impressionable youths by offering
financial inducements, protection and criminal patronage
and thereafter use them for carrying out unlawful
activities.

The material further indicates that you rarely
expose yourself directly during commission of offences
and instead utilise your associates and henchmen for
execution of criminal acts. While your name may not
appear in every offence committed by the group,
intelligence inputs, local enquiries and investigation
records consistently identify you as the principal
organiser, instigator, financier and beneficiary of the
criminal activities carried out by your associates. Your
role is often that of a planner, coordinator and
mastermind who directs and controls criminal activities
from behind the scenes.

The criminal network operating under your
influence is involved in offences such as assault, criminal
intimidation, extortion, illegal recovery of money,
robbery, dacoity, unlawful coercion and other acts
intended to create fear and establish dominance in the
locality. By reason of your activities and the activities of
the criminal network functioning under your influence, an
atmosphere of fear and insecurity has been created
among members of the public.

CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS

The records placed before me disclose that you
have been continuously involved in criminal activities
from the year 2014 onwards. The following criminal cases
have been registered against you:

Sl. Crime Number & Offences Present
No. Police Station status
1. Crime No.102/2014, Sections 323, 324,
Jamkhandi Town PS 341, 504, 506 r/w
34 IPC
Acquitted
2. Crime No.163/2018, Section 25(1- Pending Trial
Jamkhandi Rural PS B)(A) Arms Act
3. Crime No.102/2023, Sections 143, 147,
Jamkhandi Rural PS 120-B, 511 r/w
149 IPC and
Section 25(1-A)
Arms Act
Pending Trial

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

4. Crime No.06/2026, Sections 137(2)
Mahalingpur PS and 310(2) BNS,
2023
Pending Trial

The details of the above cases and their relevance
in assessing your activities prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order are set out below.

1. Crime No.102/2014 of Jamkhandi Town Police
Station

Jamkhandi Town Police Station registered Crime
No.102/2014 against you and another accused person on
23.09.2014 for offences punishable under Sections 323,
324, 341, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code.

The records reveal that when the complainant was
proceeding towards his relative's house, you and your
brother intercepted him on a public road. You wrongfully
restrained him, picked up a quarrel, abused him in filthy
language and assaulted him. During the incident, you
actively participated in attacking the complainant and
caused injuries to him. You and your associate further
threatened him with dire consequences.

The incident occurred in a public place and created
fear and panic among persons present in the locality.
Your actions disturbed public peace and adversely
affected the sense of security of law-abiding citizens in
the area.

You were arrested on 23.09.2014 and subsequently
released on bail. After completion of investigation, charge
sheet was filed before the competent court and the case
was tried in C.C. No.1094/2014.

Though the case ultimately ended in acquittal on
18.09.2017, the records placed before me reveal that the
acquittal was not on account of the incident being false.
The prosecution witnesses failed to support the
prosecution case during trial. Local enquiries, police
verification and intelligence inputs reveal that witnesses
were subjected to fear, intimidation and influence
exercised by you and your associates. Because of such
intimidation, material witnesses did not freely depose

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

before the Court, resulting in failure of the prosecution to
establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstances surrounding the acquittal are
highly significant. They demonstrate your capacity to
create fear among witnesses and interfere with the
normal administration of criminal justice. The inability of
witnesses to come forward against you is itself indicative
of the fear and influence exercised by you in the locality.

This case marks the beginning of your criminal
activities and reveals your tendency to resort to violence,
intimidation and unlawful assertion of dominance. It also
demonstrates the beginning of a continuing pattern of
criminal conduct that has progressively become more
serious over the years.

2. Crime No.163/2018 of Jamkhandi Rural Police
Station

Jamkhandi Rural Police Station registered Crime
No.163/2018 against you and other accused persons on
10.08.2018 for the offence punishable under Section
25(1-B)(A) of the Arms Act, 1959.

The records placed before me reveal that you,
along with other accused persons, were found in
possession of a country-made pistol without any valid
licence or lawful authority. Investigation disclosed that
the weapon had been procured illegally and that you and
your associates were attempting to deal with and dispose
of the weapon unlawfully.

The material collected during investigation,
including the recovery of the firearm and statements of
witnesses, disclosed your active involvement in the
offence. The records further reveal that you were
associated with persons involved in illegal arms-related
activities and were knowingly participating in activities
prohibited under law.

You were arrested on 10.08.2018 and subsequently
released on bail. After completion of investigation, charge
sheet was filed before the competent court and the case
is presently pending trial in C.C. No.1466/2021 before the
jurisdictional court.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026


This case is of considerable significance while
assessing your activities. The offence demonstrates a
clear escalation in your criminal conduct. Your earlier
involvement in offences relating to assault and
intimidation was followed by involvement in activities
concerning illegal firearms.

Possession of illegal firearms by a person having
criminal antecedents poses a serious threat to public
peace, public safety and public order. Illegal weapons are
commonly used for commission of serious offences and
for creating fear among members of the public. Your
involvement in such activities demonstrates a willingness
to employ unlawful and dangerous means for achieving
criminal objectives.

The records therefore reveal that despite earlier
criminal prosecution, you continued to associate yourself
with unlawful activities and criminal elements. thereby
showing complete disregard for the rule of law.

3. Crime No.102/2023 of Jamkhandi Rural Police
Station

Jamkhandi Rural Police Station registered Crime
No. 102/2023 against you and other accused persons on
22.07.2023 for offences punishable under Sections 143,
147, 120-B and 511 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 25(1-A) of the Arms Act, 1959.

The records placed before me disclose that you and
other accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly
and entered into a criminal conspiracy for the commission
of murder.

Investigation revealed that certain individuals had
approached members of the conspiracy for eliminating
specific persons with whom they had disputes. The
records further disclose that substantial amounts of
money had been negotiated for execution of the proposed
murders and that advance payments had been made in
furtherance of the conspiracy.

The investigation also disclosed that illegal
weapons had been procured and arrangements had been

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made for carrying out the intended murders. The accused
persons had assembled with deadly weapons and were
making preparations for execution of the conspiracy when
timely police intervention prevented commission of the
planned offences.

The material collected during investigation reveals
that you were not a mere bystander or passive
participant. You were actively associated with the
unlawful assembly and criminal conspiracy and acted in
furtherance of the common object shared by the accused
persons.

The records further disclose your close association
with persons involved in organised criminal activities and
illegal weapons. The nature of the allegations and the
preparation made by the accused persons demonstrate a
deliberate and organised attempt to take human life for
financial consideration.

You were subsequently granted anticipatory bail.
After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed
before the competent court and the case is presently
pending trial in C.C. No. 18/2024.

This case assumes exceptional significance while
assessing your conduct and criminal propensity. The
offence is not a routine criminal case arising out of a
personal dispute. The allegations disclose organised
criminal activity involving multiple accused persons,
illegal firearms, financial transactions and preparations for
murder.

Your involvement in such a conspiracy
demonstrates a substantial escalation in criminal
behaviour from offences involving assault and
intimidation to organised criminal activity involving
planned violence and threat to human life.

The material placed before me clearly indicates
that your activities were capable of creating widespread
fear and insecurity among members of the public. The
organised nature of the conspiracy and the use of illegal
weapons show that your activities had the potential to
seriously disturb public peace and public order.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

This case further establishes your continued
association with anti-social elements and your active
participation in organised criminal activities despite earlier
criminal prosecutions and preventive measures.

4. Crime No.06/2026 of Mahalingpur Police Station

Mahalingpur Police Station registered Crime
No.06/2026 on 17.01.2026 against you and other
accused persons for offences punishable under Sections
137(2) and 310(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The records placed before me reveal that on the
intervening night of 10.01.2026, a lorry bearing
registration No. MH-09/CU-8190 carrying approximately
25 tonnes of rice valued at about 6,12,500/- was
proceeding from Gangavati towards Kolhapur. While the
lorry was travelling near Saidapur on the Mahalingpur-
Nippani road, it was intercepted by a group of accused
persons travelling in a grey-coloured Toyota Innova
vehicle bearing the marking "S.K. (Sanju Kadakol)" and a
white-coloured Scorpio vehicle.

The investigation records disclose that the accused
persons intentionally blocked the movement of the lorry,
forcibly stopped the vehicle, assaulted the driver and
abducted him against his will. The driver was thereafter
transported to another location and wrongfully confined.
Taking advantage of the situation, the accused persons
removed the entire consignment of rice from the lorry
and unlawfully disposed of the same for financial gain.

The investigation further reveals that after
commission of the offence, the abducted driver was
abandoned near another location and the lorry was left
elsewhere in an attempt to conceal evidence and avoid
detection.

The material collected during investigation,
including witness statements, technical evidence and
other corroborative material, discloses your active
involvement in the commission of the offence.

The records placed before me further reveal that
you were not merely one among the accused persons
involved in the offence. On the contrary, the investigation

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

indicates that you were the principal organiser,
coordinator and mastermind behind the entire operation.
The available material discloses that the offence was
committed pursuant to a well-planned and pre-arranged
conspiracy and that you played a central role in planning,
coordinating and supervising the execution of the crime.

The investigation indicates that the vehicles used in
the commission of the offence were arranged in advance,
the movement of the target vehicle was tracked, the
location of interception was selected beforehand and the
disposal of the stolen property was pre-planned. The
offence was therefore not a spontaneous act but a
carefully organised criminal operation executed for
unlawful pecuniary gain.

The records further reveal that several accused
persons acted in concert under a common plan and
objective. The coordinated manner in which the offence
was committed demonstrates the existence of an
organised criminal network capable of carrying out
serious offences affecting public peace and public safety.

You were arrested on 21.01.2026 and subsequently
released on bail on 11.05.2026. After completion of
investigation, charge sheet has been filed before the
jurisdictional court and the case is presently pending trial
in C.C. No.21/2026.

This case assumes exceptional significance while
assessing your activities and criminal propensity.

Firstly, this is the most recent criminal case
registered against you.

Secondly, the offence discloses a high degree of
planning, coordination and organisation involving multiple
accused persons, multiple vehicles, abduction of a victim
and robbery of valuable property for unlawful financial
gain.

Thirdly, the material collected during investigation
indicates that you were the mastermind and principal
force behind the offence and that the remaining accused
persons acted pursuant to the conspiracy and plan
organised by you.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026


Fourthly, the offence demonstrates that despite
repeated criminal prosecutions, preventive proceedings,
opening of a Rowdy Sheet, continuous police surveillance
and repeated opportunities to reform yourself, you have
continued to engage in serious criminal activities.

The records therefore clearly indicate that ordinary
legal measures have failed to prevent you from indulging
in criminal conduct.

The offence created widespread concern among
transport operators, traders, business establishments and
members of the public. Incidents of this nature create
insecurity among persons engaged in transportation and
commercial activities and adversely affect public
confidence in maintenance of public order.

The organised manner in which the offence was
committed, the use of force, the abduction of the victim
and the unlawful financial motive involved therein clearly
demonstrate that your activities are not confined to
ordinary breaches of law. Rather, they have the tendency
to create fear, panic and insecurity among large sections
of the public and thereby adversely affect public order.

This case therefore provides a clear indication of
your continuing criminal activities an demonstrates the
likelihood of your engaging in similar activities prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order if permitted to remain
at large.

The material placed before me further establishes
that this offence was committed after several earlier
criminal cases, preventive proceedings and police
monitoring had already been initiated against you.
Consequently, the case strongly supports the conclusion
that ordinary criminal law has failed to deter you from
continuing unlawful activities and that stronger preventive
action has become necessary in the interest of
maintaining public order.

PREVENTIVE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED AGAINST
YOU

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

Apart from the criminal cases registered against
you, the records placed before me reveal that several
preventive proceedings were initiated against you by the
jurisdictional police in order to prevent breach of peace
and to restrain you from indulging in activities prejudicial
to public peace and public order.

The records disclose that the following preventive
proceedings were initiated against you:

Sl. No. Preventive Proceeding Provision of Law
No.
1 PAR No.178/2017 Section 110 Cr.P.C.
2 PAR No.81/2019 Section 110 Cr.P.C.
3 PAR No.42/2020 Section 107 Cr.P.C.
4 PAR No.18/2021 Section 107 Cr.P.C.
5 PAR No.01/2022 Section 107 Cr.P.C.
6 PAR No.07/2023 Section 107 Cr.P.C.
7 PAR No.09/2024 Section 107 Cr.P.C.
8 PAR No.68/2024 Section 126 BNSS,
2023
9 PAR No.12/2025 Section 126 BNSS,
2023

In all the above proceedings, you were directed to
execute bonds for maintaining peace and good behaviour.
You were repeatedly warned regarding your conduct and
were given sufficient opportunities to reform yourself and
desist from unlawful activities.

However, despite repeated preventive action, you
failed to improve your conduct and continued to involve
yourself in criminal activities. The subsequent registration
of serious criminal cases against you clearly demonstrates
that the preventive measures initiated against you failed
to achieve their intended purpose.

ROWDY SHEET HISTORY

The records further reveal that owing to your
repeated involvement in criminal activities and your
adverse impact on public peace, a Rowdy Sheet was
opened against you at Jamkhandi Town Police Station on
28.07.2018.

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Following the opening of the Rowdy Sheet, your
movements, activities, associates and criminal conduct
were continuously monitored by the local police.

However, despite continuous surveillance and
monitoring, there was no improvement in your behaviour.
On the contrary, your criminal activities continued and
your influence among anti-social elements increased.

Consequently, considering your continued
involvement in criminal activities and the threat posed by
you to public peace and public order, the Rowdy Sheet
maintained against you was upgraded to "A" Category on
23.02.2023.

The opening and continuation of the Rowdy Sheet,
as well as its subsequent upgradation, clearly
demonstrate your persistent criminal tendencies and the
continuing threat posed by you to society.

YOUR CRIMINAL NETWORK AND GANG ACTIVITIES

The material placed before me, including
intelligence reports, surveillance records, local enquiries
and investigation records, reveals that you have, over a
period of time, developed and established a network of
criminal associates and anti-social elements operating in
Jamkhandi Town and surrounding areas.

The available information indicates that you have
systematically cultivated a group of loyal associates who
operate under your influence, direction and control.

The material further reveals that you actively
identify, influence and recruit impressionable youths and
vulnerable young persons into your group by offering
financial inducements, protection, support and criminal
patronage.

By adopting such methods, you have created a
gang-like structure consisting of anti-social elements and
criminal associates who are willing to participate in
unlawful activities at your instance.

The records further disclose that you generally
avoid direct participation in many criminal activities and

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

instead utilise your associates and followers for execution
of unlawful acts.

Although your name may not appear as an accused
in every offence attributable to the group, the material
collected during investigations and local enquiries
consistently identifies you as the principal organiser,
instigator, planner, financier and beneficiary of the
criminal activities carried out by your associates.

The information placed before me further reveals
that your associates are involved in offences such as
assault, criminal intimidation, extortion, illegal recovery of
money, robbery, dacoity, unlawful coercion and other
activities intended to establish dominance and create fear
in the locality.

Your ability to mobilise multiple persons for
criminal purposes substantially enhances the threat posed
by you to public peace and public order.

ILLEGAL SOURCES OF INCOME

The records placed before me reveal that although
you claim to be engaged in tiles-related labour work, local
enquiries and police verification indicate that such
occupation is merely nominal in nature.

The available material discloses that you do not
possess any permanent, stable or identifiable lawful
source of income commensurate with your lifestyle,
expenditure and activities.

Reliable information further indicates that a
substantial portion of your income is derived directly or
indirectly from criminal activities and from the proceeds
of unlawful acts committed either by yourself or by
persons acting under your influence.

The records further reveal that you utilise your
criminal influence and unlawful network to secure
financial benefits, illegal recoveries and pecuniary gains,
thereby strengthening and sustaining your criminal
activities.

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

FEAR CREATED AMONG THE PUBLIC AND WITNESS
INTIMIDATION

The material placed before me further reveals that
your activities have created fear, insecurity and
apprehension among members of the public residing in
the areas where you operate.

Local enquiries indicate that persons having
knowledge of your activities are often reluctant to provide
information to law-enforcement agencies because of fear
of retaliation from you and your associates. The
circumstances surrounding Crime No.102/2014 are
particularly relevant in this regard. The records reveal
that prosecution witnesses failed to support the case
during trial, resulting in acquittal.

The available material indicates that witnesses
were unwilling to depose freely against you due to fear,
intimidation and influence exercised by you and your
associates. The inability of witnesses to come forward and
speak truthfully against you demonstrates the climate of
fear created by your activities and the influence exercised
by you in the locality.

The material further reveals that victims and
witnesses frequently avoid pursuing complaints against
you because of apprehension regarding their personal
safety and the safety of their family members.

WHY YOU ARE A “GOONDA” UNDER THE ACT

The records placed before me clearly establish that
you are habitually involved in offences involving violence,
intimidation, unlawful assembly, criminal conspiracy,
illegal possession of firearms, Organised robbery and
other criminal activities.

The criminal cases registered against you reveal a
continuous pattern of unlawful conduct extending over
several years.

The material further establishes your association
with anti-social elements, your leadership of a criminal
network, your role as organiser and mastermind behind

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WPHC No. 100022 of 2026

criminal activities and your tendency to create fear and
insecurity among members of the public.

Your conduct therefore squarely falls within the
definition of a "Goonda" as contemplated under the
Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas,
Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video or
Audio Pirates Act, 1985.

YOUR ACTIVITIES ARE PREJUDICIAL TO PUBLIC
ORDER

The material placed before me reveals that your
activities are not confined to isolated violations of criminal
law affecting individual victims.

The cumulative effect of your conduct extends far
beyond individual incidents and has serious implications
for public peace, public safety and public order.

The offences committed by you and the criminal
network functioning under your influence have repeatedly
created fear, insecurity and apprehension among
members of the public.

Your activities have adversely affected the normal
life of the community and have created a situation in
which ordinary citizens are reluctant to oppose you or
cooperate with law-enforcement authorities.

I am therefore satisfied that your activities affect
public order and are not merely matters relating to law
and order.

SATISFACTION OF THE DETAINING AUTHORITY

After carefully considering the criminal cases
registered against you, the preventive proceedings
initiated against you, the Rowdy Sheet history,
surveillance records, intelligence reports, local enquiry
reports and all other material placed before me, I am
satisfied that you are a habitual offender and a dangerous
person whose activities are prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order.

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I am further satisfied that despite repeated criminal
prosecutions, preventive proceedings. police surveillance
and other legal measures, you have continued to engage
in criminal activities.

The records clearly establish that ordinary legal
measures have failed to prevent you from indulging in
activities prejudicial to public order.

I am also satisfied that there exists a real,
imminent and reasonable likelihood of your continuing to
engage in similar activities if you are permitted to remain
at large.

I am therefore satisfied that it is necessary to
detain you under the provisions of the Karnataka
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug
Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video or Audio Pirates Act,
1985 with a view to preventing you from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION

You are informed that you have a right to make
representation against the detention order to the
Government of Karnataka.

You are further informed that you have a right to
submit a representation to the Advisory Board constituted
under the provisions of the Act.

If you wish to make any representation against the
detention order, you may submit the same through the
Superintendent of the Prison in which you are detained,
and such representation shall be forwarded to the
appropriate authority for consideration in accordance with
law.

These are the grounds on which the detention order
has been passed against you.”

The reference in the detention order and the grounds of
detention is to four crimes which are quoted hereinabove. The

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next is about nine proceedings under Sections 107 and 110 of
the Cr.P.C. and under Section 126 of the BNSS. The further
narration is the name of the detenu in the rowdy sheet history
and gang activities; illegal sources of income, fear created
among the public and witness intimidation particularly in Crime
No.102 of 2014. With all these factors what is required to be
noticed is the State does not seek cancellation of bail in the
cases where bail is already granted to the detenu or file an
appeal against the acquittal of the detenu in Crime No.102 of
2014. There is no non-bailable warrant issued against the
detenu for having breached bail conditions or in not attending
Court proceedings. Mere statement that activities are prejudicial
to public order without any material cannot mean that the
detention order can be passed. The Apex Court in the afore-
quoted judgments clearly delineated the issue with regard to
breach of public order. The second issue is thus answered in
favour in the detenu.

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ISSUE NO.3:
10. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner
is that the documents not being provided to the detenu is in
violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. To answer
the issue in the lis , it becomes apposite to notice Article 22(5) of
the Constitution of India. Article 22(5) reads as follows:
“ 22. Protection against arrest and detention in
certain cases .—
… … …
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance
of an order made under any law providing for
preventive detention, the authority making the
order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to
such person the grounds on which the order has
been made and shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the
order.”

11. Whether non-furnishing of documents to the detenu
would be in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India
has borne interpretation by the Apex Court in the case of
8
JASEELA SHAJI v. UNION OF INDIA , wherein it is held as
follows:
“…. …. ….
( a ) As to whether the non-supply of the
statement of Ms Preetha Pradeep has affected the
right of the detenu to make an effective
representation under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India

8
(2024) 9 SCC 53

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23. In M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India [ M.
Ahamedkutty v. Union of India , (1990) 2 SCC 1: 1990
SCC (Cri) 258], this Court was considering the issue as to
whether non-supply of the copies of the bail application
and the bail order vitiated the right of the detenu under
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. After taking the
survey of the earlier judgments, this Court observed thus:
(SCC pp. 12-13, paras 19-20)

“ 19 . The next submission is that of non-
supply of the bail application and the bail order.
This Court, as was observed in Mangalbhai
Motiram Patel v. State of Maharashtra
[ Mangalbhai Motiram Patel v. State of
Maharashtra , (1980) 4 SCC 470: 1981 SCC (Cri)
49] has “forged” certain procedural safeguards
for citizens under preventive detention. The
constitutional imperatives in Article 22(5) are
twofold: (1) The detaining authority must, as
soon as may be i.e. as soon as practicable, after
the detention communicate to the detenu the
grounds on which the order of detention has
been made, and (2) the detaining authority must
afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of
making the representation against the order of
detention. The right is to make an effective
representation and when some documents are
referred to or relied on in the grounds of
detention, without copies of such documents, the
grounds of detention would not be complete. The
detenu has, therefore, the right to be furnished
with the grounds of detention along with the
documents so referred to or relied on. If there is
failure or even delay in furnishing those
documents it would amount to denial of the right
to make an effective representation . This has
been settled by a long line of decisions :
Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India
[ Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India , (1980)
2 SCC 270 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 414] , Frances
Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [ Frances Coralie
Mullin v. W.C. Khambra , (1980) 2 SCC 275 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 419] , Icchu Devi Choraria v.
Union of India [ Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of
India , (1980) 4 SCC 531 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 25] ,
Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India [ Pritam Nath
Hoon v. Union of India , (1980) 4 SCC 525 : 1981
SCC (Cri) 19] , v.
Tushar Thakker Union of India
[ Tushar Thakker v. Union of India , (1980) 4 SCC

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499 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 13] , Lallubhai Jogibhai
Patel v. Union of India [ Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v.
Union of India , (1981) 2 SCC 427 : 1981 SCC
(Cri) 463] , Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v.
Union of India [ Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya
v. Union of India , (1981) 2 SCC 436 : 1981 SCC
(Cri) 471] and Ana Carelina D'Souza v. Union of
India [ Ana Carelina D'Souza v. Union of India ,
1981 Supp SCC 53 (1) : 1982 SCC (Cri) 131(1)] .

20 . It is immaterial whether the detenu
already knew about their contents or not. In
Mehrunisa v. State of Maharashtra [ Mehrunisa v.
State of Maharashtra , (1981) 2 SCC 709: 1981
SCC (Cri) 592] it was held that the fact that the
detenu was aware of the contents of the
documents not furnished was immaterial and
non-furnishing of the copy of the seizure list was
held to be fatal. To appreciate this point one has
to bear in mind that the detenu is in jail and has
no access to his own documents. In Mohd. Zakir
v. State (UT of Delhi) [ Mohd. Zakir v. State (UT
of Delhi) , (1982) 3 SCC 216: 1982 SCC (Cri)
695] it was reiterated that it being a
constitutional imperative for the detaining
authority to give the documents relied on and
referred to in the order of detention pari passu
the grounds of detention, those should be
furnished at the earliest so that the detenu could
make an effective representation immediately
instead of waiting for the documents to be
supplied with. The question of demanding the
documents was wholly irrelevant and the
infirmity in that regard was violative of
constitutional safeguards enshrined in Article
22(5).”

(emphasis supplied)

24. It can thus be seen that this Court in M.
Ahamedkutty [ M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India ,
(1990) 2 SCC 1 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 258] , in
unequivocal terms, has held that the constitutional
requirements under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India are twofold viz. : (1) the
detaining authority must, as soon as practicable,
after the detention communicate to the detenu the
grounds on which the order of detention has been
made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford
the detenu the earliest opportunity of making the

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representation against the order of detention. It
has further been held that the right is to make an
effective representation and when some documents
are referred to or relied on in the grounds of
detention, without copies of such documents, the
grounds of detention would not be complete. In
unequivocal terms, it has been held that the detenu
has the right to be furnished with the grounds of
detention along with the documents so referred to
or relied on. It has been held that failure or even
delay in furnishing those documents would amount
to denial of the right to make an effective
representation.

25. This Court further went on to hold that it
is immaterial whether the detenu already knew
about their contents or not. This Court reiterated
the position that it being a constitutional imperative
for the detaining authority to give the documents
relied on and referred to in the order of detention
pari passu the grounds of detention. It has been
held that there is no question of demanding the
documents.

…. …. ….

28. Insofar as the reliance on the judgment of this
Court in L.M.S. Ummu Saleema [ L.M.S. Ummu Saleema
v. B.B. Gujaral , (1981) 3 SCC 317 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 720]
is concerned, the High Court relied on the following
observations of this Court : (SCC p. 320, para 5)

“ 5 . … It is only failure to furnish copies of
such documents as were relied upon by the
detaining authority, making it difficult for the
detenu to make an effective representation, that
amounts to a violation of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Article 22(5). In our view it is
unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to
which casual or passing reference may be made
in the course of narration of facts and which are
not relied upon by the detaining authority in
making the order of detention.”

29. There can be no doubt that it is not
necessary to furnish copies of each and every
document to which a casual or passing reference

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may be made in the narration of facts and which are
not relied upon by the detaining authority in
making the order of detention. However, failure to
furnish copies of such document/documents as
is/are relied on by the detaining authority which
would deprive the detenu to make an effective
representation would certainly amount to violation
of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India.

30. We may also gainfully refer to the following
observations of this Court in Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran
[ Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran v. State of T.N. , (2000) 9
SCC 170: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1198]: (SCC p. 173, para 8)

“ 8 . We may make it clear that there is no
legal requirement that a copy of every document
mentioned in the order shall invariably be
supplied to the detenu. What is important is that
copies of only such of those documents as have
been relied on by the detaining authority for
reaching the satisfaction that preventive
detention of the detenu is necessary shall be
supplied to him.”

31. It could thus be seen that though this
Court held that a copy of every document
mentioned in the order is not required to be
supplied to the detenu, copies of only such of those
documents as have been relied on by the detaining
authority for reaching the satisfaction that
preventive detention of the detenu is necessary are
required to be supplied to him.

32. In J. Abdul Hakeem [ J. Abdul Hakeem v. State
of T.N. , (2005) 7 SCC 70: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1601], the
position was reiterated by this Court by observing thus:
(SCC p. 74, para 8)

“ 8 . … From the aforesaid authorities it is
clear that the detenu has a right to be supplied
with the material documents on which reliance is
placed by the detaining authority for passing the
detention order but the detention order will not
be vitiated, if the document although referred to
in the order is not supplied which is not relied
upon by the detaining authority for forming of its
opinion or was made the basis for passing the

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order of detention. The crux of the matter lies in
whether the detenu's right to make a
representation against the order of detention is
hampered by non-supply of the particular
document.”

33. In Abdullah Kadher Batcha [ State of T.N.
v. Abdullah Kadher Batcha , (2009) 1 SCC 333:
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 497], again the position was
reiterated by this Court thus: (SCC pp. 335-36, para
7)

“ 7 . The court has a duty to see
whether the non-supply of any document is
in any way prejudicial to the case of the
detenu. The High Court has not examined as
to how the non-supply of the documents
called for had any effect on the detenu
and/or whether the non-supply was
prejudicial to the detenu. Merely because
copies of some documents have (sic not)
been supplied, they cannot by any stretch of
imagination be called as relied upon
documents. While examining whether non-
supply of a document would prejudice a
detenu, the court has to examine whether
the detenu would be deprived of making an
effective representation in the absence of a
document. Primarily, the copies which form
the ground for detention are to be supplied
and non-supply thereof would prejudice the
detenu. But documents which are merely
referred to for the purpose of narration of
facts in that sense cannot be termed to be
documents without the supply of which the
detenu is prejudiced.”

34. This Court reiterated that, primarily, the
copies which form the ground for detention are to
be supplied and non-supply thereof would prejudice
the detenu. It has been further held that the
documents which are merely referred to for the
purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot
be termed to be documents without the supply of
which the detenu is prejudiced.

…. …. ….

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37. It is thus a settled position that though it
may not be necessary to furnish copies of each and
every document to which a casual or passing
reference has been made, it is imperative that
every such document which has been relied on by
the detaining authority and which affects the right
of the detenu to make an effective representation
under Article 22(5) of the Constitution has to be
supplied to the detenu.

…. …. ….

43. It could thus also be seen that the said Preetha
Pradeep is a vital link for transactions between the said
Suresh Babu and the detenu. It, therefore, cannot be said
that the statements of Preetha Pradeep are just a casual
or a passing reference. On the contrary, the said
statements, as has been seen from the preamble of the
grounds of detention as well as the beginning of Para 2 of
the detention order dated 31-8-2023, formed the basis
for arriving at a subjective satisfaction by the detaining
authority. It is difficult to determine as to whether in the
absence of the said statements of Preetha Pradeep the
subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining
authority could have been arrived at or not. However, the
very recording of the factum of the statements of Preetha
Pradeep make them a relevant aspect taken into
consideration by the detaining authority for arriving at its
subjective satisfaction.

44. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents on the
provisions of Section 5-A of the C OFEPOSA is concerned, no
doubt that if the detention order is made on several
grounds and if the said order is vitiated on one of the
grounds and it can be sustained on the other grounds, the
detention would not be vitiated. However, a distinction
will have to be drawn between the detention order passed
on various grounds and the detention order passed on
one ground relying on various materials. If the detention
order is passed on one ground taking into consideration 8
factual aspects, the question would be as to whether non-
supply of the material containing the factual aspects
relied on by the detaining authority would vitiate the
detention order or not. The question, therefore, for our
consideration is as to whether though the grounds of

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detention could be severed, whether the materials which
have been relied on by the detaining authority for arriving
at its subjective satisfaction could also be severed.

45. No doubt, as has been reiterated time and
again by this Court, it may not be necessary to supply
each and every document to which a passing or casual
reference is made. However, all such material which has
been relied on by the detaining authority while arriving at
its subjective satisfaction will imperatively have to be
supplied to the detenu.

46. In our view, the documents relied on by the
detaining authority which form the basis of the material
facts which have been taken into consideration to form a
chain of events could not be severed and the High Court
was not justified in coming to a finding that despite
eschewing of certain material taken into consideration by
the detaining authority, the detention order can be
sustained by holding that the detaining authority would
have arrived at such a subjective satisfaction even
without such material.

47. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the
following observation of this Court in A. Sowkath Ali [ A.
Sowkath Ali v. Union of India , (2000) 7 SCC 148: 2000
SCC (Cri) 1304]: (SCC p. 163, para 27)

“ 27 . … Section 5-A applies where the
detention is based on more than one ground, not
where it is based on a single ground. Same is
also the decision of this Court in the unreported
decision of Prem Prakash v. Union of India [ Prem
Prakash v. Union of India , (2000) 7 SCC 163]
decided on 7-10-1996 relying on K.
Satyanarayan Subudhi v. Union of India [ K.
Satyanarayan Subudhi v. Union of India , 1991
Supp (2) SCC 153: 1991 SCC (Cri) 1013].
Coming back to the present case we find really it
is a case of one composite ground. The different
numbers of the ground of detention are only
paragraphs narrating the facts with the details of
the document which is being relied on but
factually, the detention order is based on one
ground, which is revealed by Ground (1)(xvi) of
the grounds of detention which we have already
quoted hereinbefore. Thus on the facts of this

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case Section 5-A has no application in the
present case .”

(emphasis supplied)

48. In that view of the matter, we have come to a
considered conclusion that non-supply of the statements
of Preetha Pradeep has affected the right of the detenu to
make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of
the Constitution of India and as such, the detention is
vitiated on the said ground.”

If the contention of the detenu is considered on the bedrock of
the elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the case of JASEELA
SHAJI supra the detenu had a right to be furnished with the
grounds of detention along with documents so referred or relied
on. While it may not be necessary to supply each and every
document to which a passing or casual reference is made,
however, all such material which has been relied on by the
Detaining Authority to arrive at its subjective satisfaction will
have to be imperatively supplied to the detenu. It is an admitted
fact that the material that was looked into while passing the
order of detention has not been supplied to the detenu, let alone
in the language known to the detenu.

12. The learned Additional Government Advocate submits
that the Advisory Board has looked into all these factors and has
rejected the claim of the detenu for his release. The Advisory

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Board is constituted under the Act. It is trite law that merely
because the Advisory Board has rejected the claim of the detenu
would not mean that this Court should follow suit and reject the
claim of the detenu.

13. It also becomes apposite to notice the judgment of the
co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of SANGEETA
9
SUNKROL v. THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE ,
wherein the entire spectrum of the law is considered and it is
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
17. The burden of establishing this ‘proximate
and live link’ is on the detaining authority. The law
of Preventive Detention which results in detention
without trial though is sanctioned by article 22 of
the grundnorm i.e. the Constitution, this provision
of preventive detention still falls within Part-III of
the Constitution of India and the only way of
reconciling preventive detention with the other
rights of the same Chapter under Articles 14, 19
and 21 is by treating it as an exception and
requiring making out of grounds justifying
preventive detention in a strict manner.

18. In the present case, the order of detention is
passed by the detaining authority invoking power under
Sections 3(1) and 2 of the Act on 29.05.2024. The
detailed enumeration of offences involving the detenu
starting from 2009 till date of passing of the order would
indicate registering of First Information Reports
commencing from 01.10.2009 and continuing till
08.04.2021.


9
W.P.(H.C.) No.200006 of 2024 decided on 16-10-2024

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19. Between 08.04.2021 and 29.05.2024
admittedly there are no incidents warranting registration
of even first information reports. Insofar as such apparent
time gap of about approximately thirty-five (35) months,
the State points out to proceedings under Section 107 of
Cr.P.C. initiated on the basis of report dated 11.02.2023
and 17.03.2024 as is evidenced by the table extracted
supra at para-8. The question as to whether proceedings
under Section 107 would amount to establishing of
‘proximity’ as well as ‘live link’ and justifying
imperativeness in passing an order of preventive
detention, requires to be addressed.

20. No doubt, the proceedings under Section
107 of Cr.P.C. does indicate that the Executive
Magistrate acting upon information that any person
is likely to commit breach of peace or disturb public
tranquillity may require such person to execute a
bond for keeping peace. However, it must be
noticed that the proceedings under Section 107 do
not by themselves constitute an offence punishable
under Chapters-VIII, XV, XVI, XVII, XXII of IPC as
is required to declare a person as a ‘Goonda’ in
terms of Section 2(g) of the Act. The absence of an
incident leading to registration of first information
report for about thirty-five (35) months is too long
a period to establish a continued propensity to once
again commit offence affecting ‘public order’. The
apprehension of the Executive Magistrate under
section 107 of Cr.P.C. if is to constitute a ‘live link’
is required to be backed by some additional
material as well which is absent in the present
case.

21. The grounds of detention that could
constitute a ‘live link’ are repeat offences proximate
to passing of the detention order since the last
incident. Certain acts in the interregnum may not
constitute offences but may still indicate
potentiality of indulging in crime. An effort towards
demonstration of the above by the police
authorities is by referring to certain grounds such
as; “NBW issued for non-appearance in Court cases;
no respect towards the law of the land; tendency to
indulge in acts prejudicial to public peace and
tranquility; rowdy sheeter and habitual offender”.

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However it must be noticed that the above
grounds that may cast an impression of
apprehension of breach of law must be supported
by material, though may not constitute an offence,
material must be sufficient to at least constitute a
seed of the impending offence. Mere vague
assertions of habitual offender ipso facto may not
be sufficient . The observations made by the Apex Court
in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal and Others4, in
the context of subjective opinion regarding the detenu on
the basis of available material, of immediate relevance to
present context are as follows:-

“9. … Then again the satisfaction must be
grounded “on materials which are of rationally
probative value”. Machindar v. King [AIR 1950 FC
129: 51 Cri LJ 1480: 1949 FCR 827]. The
grounds on which the satisfaction is based must
be such as a rational human being can consider
connected with the fact in respect of which the
satisfaction is to be reached..."

22. The assertion regarding issue of NBW for non
appearance in Court cases, if was supported by reference
to the incidents of non-appearance without obtaining
exemptions from appearance in the case referred at
ground No.5, perhaps could have been considered as an
aspect of behavior in contravention of legal requirement
of appearance unless exempted in criminal proceedings.
However, in the absence of furnishing of order-sheet
reflecting Court proceedings in “Crime No. 586/2016 of
Tunganagar PS, Shimogga District”, there can be no
inference drawn of his non-adherence to mandatory
appearance in criminal proceedings in the absence of
objectively verifiable material. No doubt, in the order of
detention which enumeration the involvement in criminal
offences punishable under various chapters of IPC, at Sl.
No.16 though it is mentioned that the NBW was issued
against the accused on 23.04.2024 but not executed,
such assertions by itself may not be sufficient unless the
order sheet reflecting Court proceedings was produced
and furnished to the accused.

23. It is necessary to note that even after
enumeration of the grounds of detention, if the same is

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premised on material, the same must be shared with the
detenue.

24. In light of the detaining authority referring to
issuance of NBW as a reason for confinement, it was
necessary that such document was furnished to the
detenu which admittedly has not been served. The reason
for construing any deviation in procedure of furnishing
relied upon documents as being fatal to the order of
preventive detention is the primacy given the right to
reply and appose an order of preventive detention as
envisaged under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

The constitutional right contained under
Article 22 sub-clause (5) of making a
representation against the order of preventive
detention will be rendered nugatory unless the
grounds of detention are not only clear but the
documents relied upon are furnished. If the ground
made out is NBW was issued for non-appearance in
Court cases, in such event as observed above
unless the court proceedings indicating absence of
attendance without exemption are communicated
to the detenu, the right of representation will
remain an illusory right that cannot be effectuated.
Accordingly, in spite of details being furnished
regarding issuance of NBW in a portion of detention
order that by itself will not be sufficient in the
absence of document evidencing court proceedings
to enable effective reply. It needs to be noted that
while the order of detention itself details the
availment of an opportunity of representation, at
such point of time the detenu is already under
detention and accordingly, if the detenu is required
to make out a reply or representation while in
custody, it would be necessary that the detenu
must be furnished with the documents relied upon.
Non-supplying of such documents as in the present
case, the record containing the proceedings would
indeed prejudice the right of the detenu to make
out a representation and would consequently
initiate the order of detention.

25. The contention of the State that the
aspect of prejudice is required to be demonstrated
as the detenu is party to the legal proceedings

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cannot be accepted in light of his right to
representation being exercised when he is already
under detention and accordingly, access to records
cannot be effectively exercised.

26. Other assertions in ground No.6 viz., ‘no
respect towards law of land’ or ground No.4 ‘Rowdy
sheeter and habitual offender’ or ground No.12
‘tendency to indulge in acts prejudicial to public
peace and tranquility’ are either vague as in case of
ground No.12 as no specific incident is narrated so
as to fill in the gap between 08.04.2021 and
29.05.2024 or are stale grounds as the rowdy sheet
referred to in ground No.4 relates to the rowdy
sheet opened on 19.08.2011.

27. Accordingly, the lack of demonstration of
a proximate link between 08.04.2021 and
29.05.2024 has resulted in the order of detention
being based on stale incidents. The assertion of
habitual offender or absence of respect towards law
of the land and other assertions as made in the
ground of detention are not sufficient to maintain
the thread of connection between the last incident
and the order of detention in the absence of any
material to substantiate propensity to commit crime
realistically. Thus, the order stands vitiated.

The requirement of ‘proximity/live link’ is
required to demonstrate imperativeness in invoking
power of preventive detention more so where
criminal prosecution is pending which proceedings
may culminate in imposition of a punitive sentence.
It is a settled position of law that the power of
passing an order of preventive detention cannot be
a punitive measure on the apprehension however
reasonable it maybe that the detenu is going to go
scot free in the pending trials due to lack of support
to the prosecution by the crucial witnesses or
otherwise.

28. The power of preventive detention as the
very word indicates has to be used bono fidely for
the purpose of prevention of possible criminal
offences by the detenu based on past behavior with
a pattern of repeat offences. The observations of

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the Apex Court in Khudiram Das (supra) would
throw light on the above, the relevant observations
are as follows:-

“8.… The power of detention is clearly
a preventive measure. It does not partake in
any manner of the nature of punishment. It
is taken by way of precaution to prevent
mischief to the community. Since every
preventive measure is based on the
principle that a person should be prevented
from doing something which, if left free and
unfettered, it is reasonably probable he
would do, it must necessarily proceed in all
cases, to some extent, on suspicion or
anticipation as distinct from proof…”

29. When the incidents constituting the last
incident stops about thirty-five (35) months back and as
discussed above the thread of connectivity between the
last incident and the order of preventive detention is lost.
The order of detention can be stated to be based on stale
events in the absence of live link.

30. Intertwined with the issue of proximity
and live link are other factors that have vitiated the
order of detention in the present case. It is a
settled position that the grounds of detention
cannot be vague but must be certain and spelling
out a ground that can be demonstrated to be absent
by the detenu. To enable such effort of
demonstration, the ground itself should be clear
enough to enable demonstrating its absence.

31. In the present case the ground No.12,
‘tendency to indulge in acts prejudicial to public peace
and tranquility’ is vague as it is not supported by material
incidents that are verifiable, ground No.8 ‘atrocities on
SC/ST communities’, ground No.6 ‘no respect towards law
of the land’, suffer from similar vice of vagueness without
any support from factual and material assertions based
on legally recognizable events. Though in ground No.6
there is a specific assertion detenu has “time and again
violated the terms and conditions imposed by the Court at
the time the bail”, no details are forthcoming as to the
incidents constituting breach of the terms and conditions
imposed at the time of granting bail. Admittedly, copies of

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the order enlarging the detenu on bail containing the
conditions are not produced nor served upon the detenu.
Considering that the right to represent against the order
of detention is exercised while he is in detention, non
furnishing of documents can be taken ipso facto causing
prejudice.

Similarly, while referring to ground No.8, there is
no enumeration of incidents. No doubt as regards ground
No.8, certain cases relating offences under SC/ST
Prevention of Atrocities Act are mentioned but it is also
necessary to link the commission of offences under the
SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, so as to reveal the
commission of offences as regards a community so as to
affect ‘public order’ and not constitute merely a ‘law and
order’ situation. A perusal of the allied offences along with
the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, would indicate that
the allied offences are offences against persons relating to
bodily injury of individuals and though may constitute an
issue of law and order but however, cannot be construed
to be offences leading to an issue of public order namely,
an issue between different communities and the like
circumstances which only can be construed to be an issue
affecting public order.

32. It is necessary to notice that there is a
difference between the concept of law and order and
public order. The legal basis of an order of preventive
detention as under the Act of 1985 has the adverse effect
on the maintenance of public order. The explanation to
Section 2 of the Act throws light on the expression ‘public
order’ as follows:

Explanation.- For the purpose of this
clause, public order shall be deemed to have
been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely
to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the
activities of any of the persons referred to in this
clause directly or indirectly, is causing or is
calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or
a feeling of insecurity, among the general public
or any section thereof or a grave or widespread
danger to life or public health”

The repeated use of the word ‘public order’
must be understood in terms of the explanation and

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in contra distinction to meaning ascribed to the
word law and order.

33. The distinction between 'law and order
and public order’ is best expressed in the words of
Hon’ble M. Hidayatullah, J. in Ram Manohar Lohia v.
State of Bihar5 are as follows:

“54. …Public order if disturbed, must
lead to public disorder. Every breach of the
peace does not lead to public disorder.
When two drunkards quarrel and fight there
is disorder but not public disorder. They can
be dealt with under the powers to maintain
law and order but cannot be detained on the
ground that they were disturbing public
order. Suppose that the two fighters were of
rival communities and one of them tried to
raise communal passions. The problem is
still one of law and order but it raises the
apprehension of public disorder. Other
examples can be imagined. The
contravention of law always affects order
but before it can be said to affect public
order, it must affect the community or the
public at large. A mere disturbance of law
and order leading to disorder is thus not
necessarily sufficient for action under the
Defence of India Act but disturbances which
subvert the public order are…

55. It will thus appear that just as
“public order” in the rulings of this Court
(earlier cited) was said to comprehend
disorders of less gravity than those
affecting “security of State”, “law and
order” also comprehends disorders of less
gravity than those affecting “public order”.
One has to imagine three concentric circles.
Law and order represents the largest circle
within which is the next circle representing
public order and the smallest circle
represents security of State. It is then easy
to see that an act may affect law and order
but not public order just as an act may
affect public order but not security of the
State…”

34. The above observation of Hon’ble M.
Hidayatullah, J. is self-explanatory and would

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clearly indicate that though there is an overlap
between law and order and public order, every
incident that may affect law and order need not
necessarily lead to an issue of public order. It is for
the detaining authority to demonstrate that
incident resulting in a law and order situation has
also graduated in to an issue of public order which
alone can justify passing of an order of preventive
detention. Unless there is such analysis, the order
of preventive detention may fail on the ground of
not reflecting application of mind or on the ground
that the test of fulfillment of public order remains
unfulfilled. The overlap of law and order, public order
and security of state as envisaged by Hon’ble M.
Hidayatullah, J. can be depicted pictorially as below: -

…. …. ….

35. The order of detention does not spell out
by reasons as to how the offences not merely
constitute a breach of ‘law and order’ but in fact
constitutes breach of ‘public order’ and unless such
distinction is made out, mere use of expressions
disturbing public peace, tranquility, etc., are not
sufficient. The burden upon the State while passing
orders of preventive detention is onerous,
warranting clarity in exercise of power on grounds
of public order and not merely of law and order. The
requirement of nexus between the offences stated
to have been committed and the breach of public
order must be clearly established and lack of such
demonstration in the order itself would also make
the order being passed without application of mind.

36. Though the State has contended that the
order of preventive detention can still be upheld if
any one ground of detention is made out and mere
invalidity of some grounds would not vitiate the
order in its entirety, however, in the present case
the requirement of proximity and live link being a
sine qua non of order of detention and in the
absence of proximity and live link, the entirety of
the order stands vitiated. Accordingly, the question
of entering into sustainability of each of the
grounds by clinical dissection also does not arise.

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37. No doubt, the Apex Court has clarified in
Bhupendra v. State of Maharashtra and Another6 that
though the incident may not be of immediate proximity
but may indicate a pattern, however, in the present case,
a perusal of the nature of offence also does not reflect
any pattern indicating continued propensity to commit
offences affecting public order.

38. The details of the cases pending would
reflect offences of various kinds including offences
against the body, offences relating to property
(robbery), offences relating to rioting with
dangerous weapons. The offences enumerated
cannot lead to the inference of a pattern of
commission of offences relating to public order.
Keeping in mind the distinction between offences
affecting law and order and those affecting public
order, there is no pattern regarding commission of
offences relating to the latter category.
Accordingly, the contention of the State that the
aspect of proximity cannot be defeated if there
exists a pattern, is liable to be rejected in light of
the above discussion.

39. It must be noticed that the role of the
advisory board is a constitutional protection
afforded in cases of detention without trial in order
to protect personal liberty. The Apex Court in
Nenavath Bujji etc. v. State of Telangana and
Others7, has dealt with the duties of an Advisory
Board at paragraph Nos.55 to 62 and emphasized
that the opinion of the Advisory Board ought to lead
to confirmation only upon the evaluation and
scrutiny by the Board as an independent authority
which itself ought to determine that such order of
detention is necessary. It is also observed that the
Advisory Board is take into consideration all aspects
and not just the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority but must also examine whether
such satisfaction justifies detention of the detenu.
The Apex Court has opined that “59. … The advisory
board must consider whether the detention is
necessary not just in the eyes of the detaining
authority but also in the eyes of law”. It is
emphasized that the role of the Advisory Board
does amount to an independent scrutiny as