Leena Paulose vs State Nct Of Delhi

$~P-1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 08.04.2026
Pronounced on: 05.05.2026
Uploaded on: 05.05.2026

+ BAIL APPLN. 1802/2024 & CRL.M.A. 18038/2025, CRL.M.A.
32923-32924/2025

LEENA PAULOSE .....Petitioner

versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent

Appearances:-
For Petitioner:
Mr. Anant Malik, Mr. Paul John, Mr. Kunal Narwal & Ms. Ananya
Chandra, Advocates.
For Respondent:
Mr. Sanjay Jain, Senior Advocate with Mr. Akhand Pratap Singh, SPP &
Mr. Nishank Tripathi, Mr. Krishna Mohan Chandel, Ms. Samriddhi
Dobhal, Mr. Apoorv Paliya, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
JUDGMENT
1. By way of this application under Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC”] (corresponding to Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”]), the petitioner
seeks regular bail in connection with FIR No. 208/2021, dated
07.08.2021, lodged at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi. The FIR was
originally registered under Sections 170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
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of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC”], and Section 66D of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 [“IT Act”]. At the time of filing of the
chargesheet, Sections 3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised
Crime Act, 1999 [“MCOCA”], were also invoked.
2. This is the second bail application filed by the petitioner before this
1
Court. Her first bail application was dismissed by a judgment of this
Court dated 11.07.2023 [hereinafter, “the 2023 judgment”]. Against the
2023 judgment, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of a
2
special leave petition , which was withdrawn on 30.10.2023, with liberty
to the petitioner to approach the Special Court afresh in view of some co-
accused having been granted bail in the interregnum. Pursuant to this
liberty, the petitioner applied for bail before the Special Court for the
second time. The Special Court rejected her application vide order dated
09.04.2024, which has brought her back to this Court.
3. I have heard Mr. Anant Singh Malik, learned counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent
– State. The prosecution has handed up a status report, which is taken on
record.
A. P ROSECUTION C ASE :
4. The prosecution case, as it emerges from the FIR and status report,
is summarized hereinbelow:
A. FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Police Station
Special Cell, Delhi, under Sections

1
BAIL APPLN. 3706/2022.
2
SLP (CRL.) No. 13605/2023.
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170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of IPC and Section 66D of the
IT Act, has been registered at the instance of one Ms. Aditi Singh.
B. According to the complaint, on 15.06.2020, the complainant
received a call on her mobile phone from a landline number. The
caller introduced himself as a senior officer in the Ministry of Law
and offered assistance in securing bail for her husband, who was in
judicial custody in cases related to M/s Religare Enterprises Ltd.
C. It is alleged that the caller demanded Rs. 50 crores in exchange for
facilitating the bail and explained the method of delivering the
money.
D. Subsequently, through his associates, the caller allegedly extorted
money from the complainant on multiple occasions between June
2020 to August 2021, amounting to a total of Rs. 217 crores. There
are further allegations with regard to impersonation of senior
officials, including the Home Secretary, Government of India, and
misrepresenting the involvement of other government
functionaries, including the Home Minister.
E. Acting on the said information, the police laid a trap and
apprehended co-accused Pradeep Ramdanee while he was
receiving the extorted amount. During interrogation, he disclosed
that he was acting on the instructions of his brother, Deepak
Ramnani, who was subsequently arrested.
F. Using technical surveillance of the mobile phone used for making
the calls, and the statements of co-accused, the caller was identified
as one Sukesh Chandra Shekhar @ Sukash Chandra Shekhar
[hereinafter, “Sukesh”], who is the husband of the petitioner.
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G. At this time, Sukesh was already lodged in Tihar Jail as an
undertrial prisoner in a separate case, involving allegations of
collecting money from a political leader on the pretext of helping
him retain a particular election symbol. He was later shifted to
Rohini Jail.
H. A raid was conducted on the intervening night of 07/08.08.2021 by
the Special Cell, during which two mobile phones were recovered
from Sukesh, while he was in custody, and he was formally
arrested in connection with the present FIR. His interrogation led to
the identification and arrest of other associates and co-conspirators.
I. During investigation, it was found that Sukesh was involved in
multiple cases, including attempt to murder, criminal intimidation,
cheating, and extortion, often by impersonating high-ranking
officials.
J. The investigation revealed that Sukesh, alongwith the petitioner
herein, had allegedly been operating an organized crime syndicate
since 2013 with the objective of unlawful financial gain through
cheating and extortion. Four criminal cases had been registered
against the petitioner, in all of which Sukesh was also a co-accused.
Details of the said cases are as follows:
i. FIR No. 186/2017, lodged at Police Station Crime Branch,
Delhi, under Sections 201/120B of IPC and Sections 7/12/13
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
ii. Crime No. 24/2013, registered at Central Crime Branch
Police, Chennai, under Sections 406/409/420/34 of IPC and
Section 66D of the IT Act.
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iii. Crime No. 33/2015, registered at Economic Offences Wing,
Mumbai, under Sections 420/120B of IPC and Sections 3/4
of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes
3
(Banning) Act, 1978 .
iv. Crime No. 64/2013 [RC 6E/2014/BSFC] registered at
Central Crime Branch, Chennai, under Sections
406/409/420/120B of IPC and Sections 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
K. During further investigation, it emerged that co-accused Kamlesh
Kothari, B. Mohan Raj, Joel Daniel Jose, Arun Muthu, Subhash
Batra, and Dharam Singh Meena, were actively involved in
operating the organized crime syndicate led by Sukesh and the
petitioner, with the objective of obtaining unlawful financial gains
and other benefits.
L. Furthermore, as more than one chargesheet had been filed against
the petitioner for offences punishable with imprisonment of three
years or more, and cognizance had been taken in those cases by the
Trial Court within the last ten years, Sections 3 and 4 of the
MCOCA, were invoked with due approval from the competent
authority.
M. Investigation indicated that the petitioner maintained continuous
contact with Sukesh while he was lodged in prison, where he was
allegedly allowed the use of mobile phones, with the assistance of

3
The petitioner was not chargesheeted in Crime No. 33/2015, registered at Economic Offences Wing,
Mumbai.
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VASHIST
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jail staff. Further, she also maintained contact with Dharam Singh
Meena and Subhash Batra, who were officials of Rohini Jail.
N. It is alleged that the petitioner was actively and continuously
coordinating with Sukesh as well as his associates, in furtherance
of organised crime and disposal of proceeds of crime. Specifically,
4
she paid for a “Silent Calling App” , used by Sukesh to commit the
foundational offence of extortion, while in custody. She also
received funds from Sukesh through hawala channels with the
assistance of associates such as Joel Daniel Jose, Kamlesh Kothari,
B. Mohan Raj, and Arun Muthu. The petitioner facilitated the
routing of funds into her accounts through various entities and
individuals, against cash provided by her. These funds were then
invested in luxury cars, real estate, and her business ventures. A
total of 23 high-end luxury vehicles were reportedly seized, out of
which 16 were seized from the petitioner’s premises in Chennai in
August 2021.
O. On 05.09.2021, the petitioner was formally arrested in this case.
During her interrogation, she disclosed that since Sukesh was
lodged in jail, she handled disposal of the money obtained through
cheating and extortion, with the assistance of B. Mohan Raj,
Kamlesh Kothari, Arun Muthu, Sudhir, and Joel Daniel Jose. She
further admitted that she utilized funds sent to her by Sukesh
through hawala channels. She also disclosed that on 09.08.2021,
upon learning about Sukesh’s arrest in the extortion case, she
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VASHIST
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contacted Arun Muthu via WhatsApp and instructed him to move
and park 7–8 luxury vehicles at his premises.
P. During the investigation, several other accused persons involved in
the crime syndicate, being the petitioner, Arun Muthu, B. Mohan
Raj, Joel Daniel Jose, Kamlesh Kothari, and Sukesh, were arrested.
Q. Disclosure statements of multiple accused persons, including Arun
Muthu, B. Mohan Raj, Joel Daniel Jose, Kamlesh Kothari, and
Sukesh, were recorded, wherein all have attributed active roles to
Sukesh and the petitioner, as the leaders of the organised crime
syndicate.
R. Additionally, confessional statements under Section 18 of the
MCOCA were made by Sukesh, B. Mohan Raj, and Dharam Singh
Meena. Sukesh disclosed that hawala funds were received in
Chennai and distributed among associates such as Sudheer, Joel,
Mohanraj, Kamlesh Kothari, and Arun Muthu, each handling
specific aspects like collection, investment, and banking entries. B.
Mohanraj, in his statement, confirmed his association with Sukesh,
who had contacted him in June 2020 to buy cars and houses in the
name of other persons, and the same were utilised by the petitioner.
He also admitted that the petitioner started a business, being M/s
Super Car Artistry and got cash converted to be shown as
legitimate business funds. Dharam Singh Meena, in his statement,
confirmed being in contact and coordinating with the petitioner,
who was actively monitoring the activities of the crime syndicate.

4
I was informed by learned counsel for the parties that the “Silent Calling App” permits generation of
masked telephone numbers, which makes it difficult to identify the caller, despite caller identification
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VASHIST
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S. During investigation, bank statements of several proprietorship
firms operated by the petitioner, namely M/s Nail Artistry, M/s
Super Car Artistry, M/s LS Fisheries, M/s LS Education, and M/s
News Express Post, were obtained. It was found that three of these
entities, namely Nail Artistry, Super Car Artistry, and News
Express Post, were extensively used to park and layer the proceeds
of crime by disguising them as legitimate business transactions.
Between June 2020 and August 2021, approximately Rs. 21 crores
was deposited into these accounts through cash deposits, card
swipes, and arranged banking entries, all of which were alleged to
be sham transactions intended to legitimize illicit funds.
T. The proceeds of crime have also been used by Sukesh for various
other purposes, including gratification of jail officials for provision
of facilities such as single use of barrack, uninterrupted use of
mobile phones, electronic gadgets to run the syndicate, and gifts to
celebrities. Some of the other co-accused are alleged to have
provided for adjustment of the proceeds of crime in their accounts.
U. The material against the petitioner has been detailed in the status
report, as follows:
“
• Involvement in four cases with Sukash, i.e. 1. FIR No. 33/2015
u/s 420, 120 B IPC & 3, 4, Price Chits and Money Circulation
Act. EOW, Mumbai, 2. FIR No. 24 of 2013, Central Crime
Branch Police Chennai, u/s 406, 420 r/w 34 I.P.C. and u/s 66 D
of Information Technology Act and 3. FIR No. 186/2017 u/s
7/12/13 POC Act & 120B IPC, PS Crime Branch, Delhi. 4.
CCB Crime No. 64/13, now RC 6E/2014/BSFC u/s

on the recipient’s telephone.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
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406,409,420, 120B IPC & 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of PC Act, 1988
Chennai.
• Recharge of Silent Calling APP & mobile number 9311910260
(Sukash) from her account.
• Recovery of 26 high end cars, Benami property papers
(purchased in the name of Jitender Kothari, cousin of Kamlesh
Kothari), details of other costly items worth in crores.
• Cash amount in A/Cs of her two firms, i.e. Super Car Artistry
and Nail Artistry as well as her personal bank accounts.
• Money spent in opening of three salons (at Chennai, Bangalore,
and Cochin) received through hawala channels and used
debit/credits cards of various persons who swapping purpose
for escalating the fake sale in the saloons during even
Corona/Pandemic period.
• Statements u/s 18(1) MCOC Act of Sukash, B. Mohan Raj and
D.S. Meena.
• 9311910260 – This number belongs to Sukash & recovered
from him. Recharge of this number was done through Leena by
using a/c of one Noufal.
• Statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. of Naufal, Surender Panwar, Sarvan
Priyan, Shiva Subramanium, T. Macheil, Jitender Kothari,
Bharat K. Duggar, Jagdish K. Naveen Kumar, Alok Damani, T.
Shobby Paul, and Anand Murthy were recorded, the
examination of these witnesses clearly established that
accused/applicant was instrumental in carrying out the illegal
activities of organized crime syndicate. ”
ELEVANT PROVISIONS
B. R :
5. Statutory provisions referred to by learned counsel for the parties
5
in the course of their arguments are set out below for ease of reference .
a. MCOCA:

Section 2: Definitions.
“
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) “ abet ”, with its grammatical variations and cognate
expression, includes,

5
Learned counsel for the parties also referred to the bail provisions in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 [Section 37], and Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 [Section 45].
These are not separately reproduced as they are pari materia to Section 21(4) MCOCA.
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VASHIST
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(i) the communication or association with any person with the
actual knowledge or having reason to believe that such person is
engaged in assisting in any manner, an organised crime syndicate ;
(ii) the passing on or publication of, without any lawful
authority, any information likely to assist the organised crime
syndicate and the passing on or publication of or distribution of any
document or matter obtained from the organised crime syndicate; and
(iii) the rendering of any assistance, whether financial or
otherwise, to the organised crime syndicate ;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) “continuing unlawful activity” means an activity
prohibited by law for the time being in force, which is a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more,
undertaken either singly or jointly, as a member of an organised
crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect of which
more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a Competent Court
within the preceding period of ten years and that Court has taken
cognizance of such offence;
(e) “organised crime” means any continuing unlawful activity
by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a member of an
organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate , by use of
violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other
unlawful means, with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or
gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other
person or promoting insurgency;
(f) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of two or more
persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as a syndicate or
gang indulge in activities of organised crime ;

Section 3: Punishment for organized crime.
(1) Whoever commits an offence of organised crime shall,—
xxx xxx xxx

(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a
minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates,
abets or knowingly facilitates the commission of an organised crime or
any act preparatory to organised crime, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than five years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a
fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
xxx xxx xxx
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VASHIST
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(4) Any person who is a member of an organised crime
syndicate shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a
minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(5) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from
commission of an organised crime or which has been acquired through
the organised crime syndicate funds shall be punishable with a term
which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine, subject to a
minimum fine of rupees two lacs.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 17: Special rules of evidence.
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
Code, or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), for the purposes of
trial and punishment for offences under this Act or connected offences,
the Court may take into consideration as having probative value, the
fact that the accused was,-
(a) on any previous occasion bound under section 107 or section
110 of the Code;
(b) detained under any law relating to preventive detention; or
(c) on any previous occasion was prosecuted in the Special Court
under this Act.
(2) Where it is proved that any person involved in an organised
crime or any person on his behalf is or has at any time been in
possession of movable or immovable property which he cannot
satisfactorily account for, the Special Court shall, unless contrary is
proved, presume that such property or pecuniary resources have been
acquired or derived by his illegal activities.
(3) Where it is proved that the accused has kidnapped or
abducted any person, the Special Court shall presume that it was for
ransom.

Section 18: Certain confessions made to the police officer to be taken
into consideration.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), but subject to the provisions of this
section, a confession made by a person before a police officer not
below the rank of the Superintendent of Police and recorded by such
police officer either in writing or on any mechanical devices like
cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from which sounds or images can be
reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person or co-
accused, abettor or conspirator:
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Provided that, the co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and
tried in the same case together with the accused.
(2) The confession shall be recorded in a free atmosphere in the
same language in which the person is examined and as narrated by
him.
(3) The police officer shall, before recording any confession
under sub-section (1), explain to the person making it that he is not
bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as
evidence against him and such police officer shall not record any such
confession unless upon questioning the person making it, he is satisfied
that it is being made voluntarily. The concerned police officer shall,
after recording such voluntary confession, certify in writing below the
confession about his personal satisfaction of the voluntary character of
such confession, putting the date and time of the same.
(4) Every confession recorded under sub-section (1) shall be sent
forthwith to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial
Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in which such confession
has been recorded and such Magistrate shall forward the recorded
confession so received to the Special Court which may take cognizance
of the offence.
(5) The person from whom a confession has been recorded under
sub-section (1) shall also be produced before the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the confession is
required to be sent under sub-section (4) alongwith the original
statement of confession, written or recorded on mechanical device
without unreasonable delay.
(6) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial
Magistrate shall scrupulously record the statement, if any, made by the
accused so produced and get his signature and in case of any
complaint of torture, the person shall be directed to be produced for
medical examination before a Medical Officer not lower in rank than
of an Assistant Civil Surgeon.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 21: Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody,
be released on bail or on his own bond, unless -
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the
application of such release; and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
Signature Not Verified
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VASHIST
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xxx xxx xxx

Section 23: Cognizance of, and investigation into, an offence.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,-
(a) no information about the commission of an offence of organised
crime under this Act, shall be recorded by a police officer without the
prior approval of the police officer not below the rank of the Deputy
Inspector General of Police;
(b) no investigation of an offence under the provisions of this Act shall
be carried out by a police officer below the rank of the Deputy
Superintendent of Police.
(2) No Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this
Act without the previous sanction of the police officer not below the
6
rank of Additional Director General of Police. ”

6. As noted above, an earlier bail application filed by the present
petitioner before this Court, was dismissed by the 2023 judgment. It was
Mr. Malik’s submission that the Court must re-consider the question of
the petitioner’s entitlement to bail, in light of lapse of two and half years
since then. However, he rightly accepted that this Court is bound by the

6
Emphasis supplied.
7
Emphasis supplied.
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VASHIST
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factual and legal findings contained in the said judgment. It is therefore
necessary to enumerate the following prima facie factual findings and
legal conclusions recorded in the 2023 judgment:
A. After noticing the case of the prosecution and the contents of
various statements recorded in the course of investigation, the
Court considered the submissions made on behalf of the present
petitioner, including as to the petitioner’s independent source of
income, good faith use of money received from her husband –
Sukesh, conduct in joining the investigation, and that the petitioner
has firm roots in society, being a successful professional, qualified
as a dentist, and a businesswoman in her own right.
B. In order to satisfy the ingredients of Sections 2(1)(d) of MCOCA,
it is not necessary that the chargesheet should be against an
individual, but a chargesheet against the syndicate as a whole,
8
would also suffice .
C. Individual members of the syndicate may have different roles in the
commission of the crime. Channelising the money obtained
through the foundational crime of extortion is, in fact, sufficient to
9
make out an offence under MCOCA .
D. Membership of the syndicate itself constitutes an offence under
10
Sections 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(e) of MCOCA .
E. The question of whether confessional statements recorded under
Section 18 of MCOCA can be read into evidence in the absence of

8
2023 judgment, paragraph 45.
9
2023 judgment, paragraph 46.
10
2023 judgment, paragraph 47.
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11
independent corroboration is a matter of trial . Confessional
12
statement may also be attributable to the co-accused .
F. Objections with regard to validity of the sanction under Sections
23(1)(a) and 23(2) of MCOCA can only be examined at trial,
except when they touch upon inherent lack of jurisdiction, which
13
was not argued in this case .
G. The twin conditions for grant of bail incorporated in Section 21(4)
of MCOCA requires the Court to be satisfied that there are
“ reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of
such offence ”, which is “ something more than prima facie
14
grounds ” .
H. The present petitioner “ was involved in running an organized crime
syndicate since 2013 with the motive of pecuniary gain by cheating
and extortion ”. She was in continuous contact with Sukesh, who
was using a mobile phone despite being in custody, as well as co-
accused Dharam Singh Meena and Subhash Batra, who were jail
officials. She was coordinating with Sukesh and his associates in
furtherance of organized crime and disposal of crime proceeds. She
procured bank entries from various entities/persons to whom she
provided cash received from Sukesh through hawala transactions,
and invested thereafter in high-end cars, properties, and her
business firms. She is also stated to have made the payment for the

11
2023 judgment, paragraph 49.
12
2023 judgment, paragraph 50.
13
2023 judgment, paragraph 54.
14
2023 judgment, paragraph 55.
Signature Not Verified
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VASHIST
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“Silent Calling App” used by Sukesh to allegedly commit the
15
foundational crime of extortion .
I. These conclusions are supported by various statements recorded
16
under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC .
J. During the period of offence [June 2020 to August 2021], a sum of
Rs. 21 crores was deposited into the bank accounts in the name of
the petitioner or her proprietorship concerns, namely M/S Nail
17
Artistry, M/S Super Car Artistry, and M/S News Express Post .
K. Although a mini trial is not called for at this stage, the present
petitioner was involved in the organized crime syndicate, and
cannot be found to have accepted such large sums of money from
18
her husband, only in the context of the matrimonial relationship .
D. S UBMISSIONS BY L EARNED C OUNSEL FOR THE P ETITIONER :
7. In the light of the findings already recorded in the 2023 judgment,
Mr. Malik confined his submissions to two broad aspects:
i. Prolonged incarceration and likely delay in completion of trial.
ii. Parity with other co-accused who have already been granted bail.
i. Re: Prolonged incarceration and delay in completion of trial
8. Mr. Malik submitted that the petitioner has already been in custody
for a period of over four and half years, but charges have not yet been
framed. The prosecution filed the first chargesheet in November 2021,
but also filed five supplementary chargesheets thereafter, the last of
which was filed only on 04.10.2024. Thus, filing of chargesheets itself

15
2023 judgment, paragraphs 56-57.
16
2023 judgment, paragraphs 58-59.
17
2023 judgment, paragraphs 60-62.
18
2023 judgment, paragraph 76.
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VASHIST
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took a period of almost three years. The arguments on charge were
commenced upon filing of each of the chargesheets, but were disrupted
on account of filing of successive chargesheets. He submitted that, even
after the filing of the last chargesheet, arguments were addressed, but
there was a change in the Presiding Officer of the Special Court on
05.12.2025, after which arguments recommenced. It is specifically urged
that, as far as the present petitioner is concerned, there was no delay
whatsoever in advancing arguments on charge, either before the
predecessor Judge or before the Judge presently presiding over the
Special Court. As the case involves 23 accused persons, 403 witnesses
cited in the chargesheets, and the chargesheets collectively exceed 10,000
pages, Mr. Malik submitted that the trial is unlikely to conclude within a
reasonable time.
19
9. Mr. Malik submitted that, in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, and
several later cases, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the mandate
under Article 21 of the Constitution prohibits prolonged pre-trial
incarceration of an accused, particularly when there is no reasonable
likelihood of expeditious conclusion of proceedings. He submitted that, in
KA Najeeb , this principle was applied even to UAPA, which also
incorporates similar stringent conditions for the grant of bail, as in
MCOCA.
10. Relying upon Section 479 of the BNSS [corresponding to Section
436A of CrPC], Mr. Malik submitted that the petitioner has already been
in custody for close to the minimum period of sentence under Section
3(1) of MCOCA, which is five years. Although the sentence can extend to
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life imprisonment, he submitted that the allegations in the present case are
not at all commensurate with such a sentence and that the petitioner,
being a woman, would in any event be entitled to release after seven
years.
11. Mr. Malik also drew my attention to several judgments and orders
of the Supreme Court and this Court, in which bail has been granted on
this ground even in cases under MCOCA, to which I shall refer at the
appropriate stage.
ii. Re: Parity with co-accused
12. Mr. Malik, in support of the argument on parity with other co-
accused, pointed out that four co-accused have been granted bail – Joel
20 21 22
Daniel by the Special Court , and Avtar Singh Kochhar , Pinky Irani
23
and Sunil Kumar by this Court. He submitted that the role attributed to
the petitioner in the commission of the offence is no graver than that
attributed to the co-accused.
E. S UBMISSIONS BY THE R ESPONDENT -S TATE :
i. Re: Prolonged incarceration and delay in completion of trial
13. Mr. Jain, on the other hand, submitted, on the basis of the statement
of objects and reasons of MCOCA, that the offences contemplated
thereunder are serious offences with the potential of prejudicing the
security of the nation. In the present case, he emphasized that the offences
alleged against the syndicate were committed by impersonation of senior
government officials, on the inducement of securing bail for the

19
(2021) 3 SCC 713 [hereinafter, “ KA Najeeb ”].
20
Order dated 21.11.2022 in SC 308/2021.
21
Avtar Singh Kocchar v. State of NCT of Delhi; BAIL APPLN 1811/2023, decided on 29.11.2023.
22
Pinky Irani v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi; BAIL APPLN 1127/2023, decided on 20.10.2023.
23
Sunil Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi; BAIL APPLN. 1130/2023, decided on 02.04.2024.
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complainant’s husband. He argued that the offence thus involves a grave
attempt to interfere with the administration of justice, which is further
underlined by the fact that Sukesh committed the offence while lodged in
jail, by procuring the complicity of jail officials. He submitted that the
seriousness of the offences, and the facts relating to the petitioner’s
involvement have already been determined in the 2023 judgment, and
ought not to be revisited by this Court.
14. Mr. Jain also urged that, on the question of admissibility of
confessional statements under Section 18 of MCOCA, the MCOCA
24
regime is stricter than the corresponding regime under the NDPS Act ,
rendering the judgments under the NDPS Act inapplicable to a case under
MCOCA.
15. Specifically on the question of prolonged incarceration, Mr. Jain
submitted that the bail provisions in MCOCA are materially different
from the corresponding provision in UAPA, and have been held to be “ on
a higher pedestal ”. In any event, Mr. Jain argued that several judgments
of the Supreme Court and this Court make it clear that, in the case of
special statutes incorporating conditions restricting bail, prolonged
incarceration is not by itself a ground for release of an accused on bail.
Reference to the said judgments is included at the appropriate juncture in
this judgment.
16. Factually, it was argued by Mr. Jain that the present case is not one
where delay can be attributed to the prosecution alone, so as to enable the
Court to grant bail to the petitioner on this ground. He submitted that, in

24
Section 67 of the NDPS Act read with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tofan Singh v. State of
T.N. , (2021) 4 SCC 1.
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fact, several adjournments have been taken by the accused, resulting in
delay in framing of charges.
ii. Re: Parity with Co-accused
17. On the ground of parity, Mr. Jain submitted that the roles of the co-
accused who have been enlarged on bail were materially different. The
petitioner is the leader of the syndicate and played a central role in the
foundational offence of extortion. She made payments for the “Silent
Calling App,” which Sukesh allegedly used from jail to carry out the
foundational crime of extortion, and remained in constant contact with
Sukesh through mobile phones illegally used by him while in jail, as well
as actively facilitated the handling and disposal of the proceeds of crime.
In contrast, the roles of the other co-accused were limited and distinct –
Avtaar Singh Kochhar acted as a hawala operator, Joel Daniel was a
salaried employee, Sunil Kumar was a jail official, and Pinky Irani was
involved in arranging meetings with celebrities.
F. A NALYSIS
i. Re: Prolonged incarceration and delay in completion of trial
a) Statement of Objects and Reasons of MCOCA
18. In order to appreciate the statutory scheme of MCOCA in its proper
context, reference may be made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the statute, which is re-produced hereinbelow:
“ Statement of Objects and Reasons
Organised crime has been for quite some years now come up as a very
serious threat to our society . It knows no national boundaries and is
fueled by illegal wealth generated by contract killing, extortion,
smuggling in contrabands, illegal trade in narcotics kidnappings for
ransom, collection of protection money and money laundering , etc.
The illegal wealth and black money generated by the organised crime
being very huge, it has had serious adverse effect on our economy . It
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was seen that the organised criminal syndicates made a common cause
with terrorist gangs and foster narco terrorism which extend beyond
the national boundaries. There was reason to believe that organised
criminal gangs have been operating in the State and thus, there was
immediate need to curb their activities.

It was also noticed that the organized criminals have been making
extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal
activities. The interception of such communications to obtain evidence
of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission would be an
indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.

2. The existing legal framework i.e. the penal and procedural laws and
the adjudicatory system were found to be rather inadequate to curb or
control the menace of organised crime. Government, therefore, decided
to enact a special law with stringent and deterrent provisions including
in certain circumstances power to intercept wire, electronic or oral
communication to control the menace of the organised crime.

It is the purpose of this act to achieve there objects.

An Act to make special provisions for prevention and control of, and for
coping with, criminal activity by organized crime syndicate or gang,
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Whereas it was expedient to make special provisions for prevention and
control of, and for coping with, criminal activity by organized crime
syndicate or gang and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto;

And whereas both Houses of the State Legislature were not in session;

And whereas it is expedient to replace the said Ordinance by an Act of
the State Legislature; It is hereby enacted in the Fiftieth Year of the
25
Republic of India as follows—..
”

b) Legal Principles
19. Before turning to the judgments cited on both sides, as several of
them are under UAPA, it may be noted that the bail provision under the
two statutes (reproduced above) are not identical. It has been held that

25
Emphasis supplied.
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Section 21(4) of MCOCA provides for a stricter regime, than Section
43D(5) of UAPA. Both in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor
26
Ahmad Shah Watali and Kekhriesatuo Tep & Ors. v. National
27
Investigation Agency , the Supreme Court has indicated that the test
under MCOCA requires a much stronger degree of satisfaction, than the
corresponding stipulation in UAPA. The key distinction, as analysed by
the Court, lies in the difference in the formulation of the test: in UAPA,
the Court must be satisfied that “ there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true ”,
whereas under MCOCA, the satisfaction required is that “ there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence ”.
20. The Division Bench of this Court in Neelam Ranolia v. State of
28
NCT of Delhi has also followed the aforesaid decisions. KA Najeeb , and
other judgments under UAPA, must therefore be read in this context.
21. That said, it is also clear from the judgments and orders of the
Supreme Court under MCOCA itself, that prolonged incarceration is a
relevant ground, despite the distinction in the bail provisions.
22. Mr. Malik has, in this context, relied upon the following orders and
judgments of the Supreme Court, all being cases of offences under
MCOCA:
29
i. In Rockysingh Jalindersingh Kalyani v. State of Maharashtra , the
Supreme Court granted bail to the accused having regard to the fact

26
(2019) 5 SCC 1, paragraph 23.
27
(2023) 6 SCC 58, paragraph 13.
28
2025 SCC OnLine Del 5742, paragraphs 15-16.
29
Criminal Appeal No. 176/2022, decided on 03.02.2022.
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that the accused was disabled, the trial was yet to commence, and
the accused had already been in custody for four years.
30
ii. In Ranjana Tanaji Wanve v. State of Maharashtra , the Supreme
Court noted that charges had not been framed despite filing of the
chargesheet more than three years before, and more than 100
witnesses were to be examined. In view thereof, the Supreme Court
granted bail to the accused.
31
iii. In Siddhant v. State of Maharashtra , the Supreme Court recorded
that the accused had been incarcerated for a period of
approximately five years without charges having been framed,
which would amount to imposition of a sentence without trial. The
accused was, therefore, released on bail.
32
iv. In Vinod v. State of Maharashtra , the Supreme Court granted bail
to the accused, having regard to the fact that charges had not yet
been framed, the accused had already undergone a sentence of 20
months, with 65 witnesses to be examined.
33
v. In Vivek @ Vicky Janak Paneri v. State of Maharashtra , the
Supreme Court, while noting the prolonged period of incarceration,
granted bail to the accused primarily on the ground of parity with a
co-accused.
34
vi. In Kailash Ramchandani v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. , the
Supreme Court found that only one witness had been examined out

30
SLP (Crl.) No. 12740/2024, decided on 22.10.2024.
31
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3798.
32
SLP (Crl.) No. 14166/2024, dated 08.01.2025.
33
SLP (Crl.) No. 2677-2678/2025, dated 15.04.2025.
34
SLP (Crl.) No. 4276/2025, dated 06.01.2026.
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of 146 witnesses, and released the accused on bail, as the trial
would take a long time.
35
vii. In Jagruti Dhanesh Thorat v. State of Maharashtra , the Supreme
Court observed that the accused was alleged to have received sale
proceeds arising out of MCOCA offence for her own use, but held
that the question of utilization of proceeds of crime would be
examined at trial. The Supreme Court released the accused on
bail, principally on the ground of parity with other co-accused.
23. Coordinate Benches of this Court in Arun v. State (Government of
36 37
NCT of Delhi) , Ashish @ Deva v. State (NCT of Delhi ) , Rajesh Kumar
38
v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) , and Jitender Dixit @ Bantu v.
39
The State (Government of NCT of Delhi) have also inter alia , adopted
the yardstick of prolonged incarceration, without likelihood of
completion of proceedings, to grant bail to petitioners accused of offences
under MCOCA.
24. While these decisions clearly establish that grounds under Article
21 are indeed relevant, even while considering bail applications of
persons accused under MCOCA, Mr. Jain has cited the following
judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court which, according to him,
suggest that Section 21(4) of MCOCA cannot be overridden:
40
i. In Jayashree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. , the
judgment of the High Court granting bail to a MCOCA accused

35
SLP (Crl.) No. 17295/2025, dated 13.01.2026.
36
BAIL APPLN. 3348/2023, dated 07.04.2025.
37
BAIL APPLN. 1618/2024, dated 29.04.2025.
38
BAIL APPLN. 2986/2023, dated 08.05.2025.
39
BAIL APPLN. 3831/2023, dated 19.05.2025.
40
(2025) 2 SCC 797.
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was set aside, on the ground that the High Court had not considered
the parameters under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Although a plea
was raised before the Supreme Court that the accused was entitled
to bail in view of the fundamental rights under Part-III of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court set aside the order granting bail,
holding that the High Court had not decided the case on such a
ground.
41
ii. In Dheerpal v State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) , a coordinate Bench
of this Court declined to extend the benefit of Section 436A CrPC,
notwithstanding that the accused had undergone eight years of
incarceration, noting that the offence was punishable with death or
imprisonment for life. The Court held that, while delay in trial is a
relevant consideration, it cannot by itself be a determinative ground
for grant of bail. The facts of each case must be assessed to
determine whether there has been a violation of the fundamental
rights of the accused. It was further observed that the rights of the
society must be balanced with those of the accused, particularly in
cases involving heinous offences, or those under special statutes
such as MCOCA.
42
iii. In Umesh @ Kala v. State , a coordinate Bench of this Court,
while declining bail to the accused, held that factors such as
prolonged incarceration or delay in trial cannot, by themselves,
justify the grant of bail. The Court emphasized that such
considerations must be weighed alongside the gravity of the

41
2024 SCC OnLine Del 4106.
42
2025 SCC OnLine Del 6573.
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offence and the specific role attributed to the accused, which can
only be assessed upon a proper examination of the merits of the
case.
iv. In another decision, also entitled Dheerpal v. Govt. of NCT of
43
Delhi , a coordinate Bench of this Court, while declining grant of
bail, noted that although the accused had undergone incarceration
for a considerable period, of about nine years, “ the same has to
take a back seat, unless there are other mitigating circumstances
44
therewith ” , particularly in view of the stringent twin conditions
prescribed under Section 21(4) of MCOCA.
25. Additionally, Mr. Jain, referred to two recent judgments, which
arose out of the same proceedings under the UAPA. Gulfisha Fatima v.
45
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT
46
of Delhi , were rendered by the Supreme Court and a Division Bench of
this Court, respectively. He submitted that these judgments require an
analysis of the factual allegations and seriousness of the offence, in
addition to the ground urged under Article 21 of the Constitution. As
these judgments were rendered in the context of the bail provision under
UAPA, Mr. Jain submitted that they would fortiori apply to the more
stringent provision of MCOCA.
26. In Gulfisha Fatima , delivered on 05.01.2026, the Supreme Court
has dealt with the interplay between Article 21 of the Constitution and
Section 43D(5) of UAPA, referring to KA Najeeb and other authorities.

43
2026 SCC OnLine Del 909.
44
Ibid, paragraph 8.
45
2026 SCC OnLine SC 10 [hereinafter, “ Gulfisha Fatima ”].
46
2025 SCC OnLine Del 5754 [hereinafter, “ Tasleem Ahmed ”].
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As this is the very issue at the heart of the present matter, albeit in the
context of MCOCA, it is appropriate to extract the relevant observations
at some length:
“ 29. We may at the outset clarify the limited compass of the present
discussion. This Court is not engaged in any abstract comparison
between the Constitution and a statute, nor in declaring that delay
must invariably prevail over statutory restrictions, or that delay can
never warrant constitutional relief. The question is more precise: in
prosecutions under the UAPA, when delay and prolonged
incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail, what is the principled
approach by which a constitutional court is to examine such a plea.
30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional scheme.
The right to life and personal liberty, and the insistence that any
deprivation must conform to procedure established by law, are
foundational guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has been
recognised as an important facet of this guarantee. It follows that pre-
trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to
assume the character of punishment.
31. At the same time, Article 21 has never been understood as
operating in isolation from law. The constitutional promise is not that
liberty will be unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be
arbitrary, unconscionable, or unfair. The expression “procedure
established by law” reflects that balance. The UAPA, as a special
statute enacted to address offences alleged to affect the security of the
State and the stability of civic life, represents a legislative judgment as
to the conditions under which bail may be granted at the pre-trial
stage. Section 43D(5) of UAPA embodies the exercise of that judgment.
32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a
constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions
cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty
illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or
conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain the
jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The
decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable
detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes
determinative in every case arising under a special statute. The
jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by Parliament to
address offences of a special category.
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34. The constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt.
It is an inquiry into whether continued detention remains
constitutionally permissible in the circumstances of the case. That
inquiry is necessarily contextual. Context includes the nature of the
allegation, the statutory field, the stage of the proceedings, the
realistic trajectory of the trial, the causes contributing to delay, and
the risks attendant upon release. Delay cannot be detached from
these considerations and treated as a solitary determinant.
35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether
Article 21 is superior to Section 43D(5). The proper question is how
Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament has expressly conditioned
the grant of bail in relation to offences alleged to implicate national
security. The law does not contemplate an either-or approach. Nor
does it contemplate an unstructured blending of statutory and
constitutional considerations. What is required is disciplined judicial
scrutiny that gives due regard to both.
36. The appellants have urged that their continued incarceration over
a prolonged period, coupled with the pace at which the trial has
progressed, warrants their enlargement on bail notwithstanding the
statutory embargo contained in Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Prolonged custody undoubtedly
implicates the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution, and such a plea cannot be rejected on
the basis of duration alone without a careful and fact-sensitive
examination. At the same time, the Court is required to examine
whether the narrative of delay, as projected, is borne out by the
record, and whether such delay is of a nature that constitutionally
displaces the statutory mandate.
xxx xxx xxx
45. A finding that these circumstances exist does not, by itself, compel
bail. It merely calls for the next level of constitutional consideration.
At that stage, the Court is required to examine whether,
notwithstanding delay, continued detention remains constitutionally
justified having regard to the statutory context and the facts of the
case. This examination is not a free-ranging balancing exercise; it is
structured by legally relevant considerations.
46. One such consideration is the gravity of the alleged offence in its
statutory setting. Under the UAPA, Parliament has legislatively
characterised certain conduct as implicating the security of the State
and the peace of society. That legislative characterisation does not
conclude the judicial inquiry, but it is not constitutionally irrelevant. It
forms part of the context in which the Article 21 claim is assessed.
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47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused.
Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of
participation, ranging from peripheral acts to strategic,
organisational, or ideological centrality. The constitutional
significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be assessed uniformly
for all accused regardless of role. Where the attribution suggests a
central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for
circumspection before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory
embargo is correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is
peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more readily
assume a punitive character.
48. Another consideration is the prima facie strength of the accusation
at the limited threshold contemplated by Section 43D(5). At this stage,
the Court does not weigh evidence, test defences, or conduct a mini
trial. Yet, the constitutional inquiry cannot proceed as if all allegations
are identically situated. Whether the prosecution material, taken at its
highest, discloses a prima facie nexus between the accused and the
statutory ingredients is a circumstance that informs the assessment of
continued detention.
49. Consideration must also be given to the integrity of the trial
process and the risks associated with release. Depending on the nature
of the case, these may include the possibility of influencing witnesses,
tampering with evidence, or undermining the fairness of the
proceedings. In prosecutions alleging organised activity, the
assessment of such risks may differ from that in ordinary criminal
cases. This is not to presume guilt, but to recognise that bail decisions
are necessarily forward-looking in terms of ensuring an effective trial.
50. The Court must also bear in mind that it is not confined to a binary
choice between continued custody and unconditional release. Where
delay becomes a matter of constitutional concern, appropriate
directions for expeditious trial, prioritisation of witnesses, or periodic
review of progress may be issued. Such measures are constitutionally
significant responses that address the vice of delay while respecting
the statutory framework. The liberty to renew a prayer for bail upon
continued stagnation may also be preserved.
51. There is a further constitutional aspect that warrants articulation.
Article 21 protects individual liberty. It also, within the same
guarantee of life, reflects the State's obligation to protect the life and
security of the community. In prosecutions alleging threats to public
order and national security, the Court cannot be unmindful that both
dimensions are engaged. The constitutional order is not served by an
approach that treats liberty as the sole value and societal security as
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peripheral. Both must be accommodated through reasoned
adjudication.
52. The consequence of the above is that Najeeb (supra) must be
understood as a principled safeguard against unconscionable
detention. Prolonged incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional
concern and carries great weight. It is not, however, the sole
determinant. The Court must consider, in totality, whether continued
detention has become constitutionally unjustifiable, having regard to
the role attributed, the statutory context, the limited prima facie
material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay, and the
availability of intermediate remedies.
53. This approach does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21
structured content in a field where the Constitution itself recognises
competing interests. Nor does it render Section 43D(5) absolute. It
recognises that statutory restraint must yield in an appropriate case
where detention becomes punitive by reason of unreasonable and
unjustified delay. What it excludes is a mechanical override based on
time alone, divorced from legal context.
xxx xxx xxx
61. To read Najeeb (supra) as mandating bail solely on account of
prolonged incarceration, irrespective of the statutory context or the
nature of the allegations, would be to attribute to the decision a
consequence it neither intended nor supports. Such a construction
would also lead to an interpretive absurdity, whereby a special statute
enacted by Parliament to address offences implicating the sovereignty,
integrity, and security of the State would stand effectively neutralised
by the mere passage of time, even at a pre-trial stage. Such an outcome
cannot be countenanced in constitutional adjudication. Accordingly,
the finding in Najeeb (supra) is properly situated as a constitutional
safeguard to be invoked in appropriate cases, and not as a
mathematical formula of universal application.
xxx xxx xxx
101. It is well recognised that Article 21 rights, though not absolute,
require the State and the Court to justify continued custody with
reference to the specific individual before it. Treating all accused
identically irrespective of their roles would risk transforming pre-trial
detention into a punitive mechanism divorced from individual
circumstances. The constitutional mandate demands a differentiated
inquiry: where prolonged custody disproportionately burdens those
whose roles are limited, the balance between individual liberty and
collective security may call for conditional release, while the same
balance may tilt differently for those alleged to have orchestrated the
offence.
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102. The statutory restrictions under special enactments do not
preclude the Court from recognising distinctions between accused
persons based on the quality of material, the nature of involvement,
and the necessity of further detention.
103. At this stage, the Court must be careful not to confuse two distinct
legal exercises. One is the determination of criminal liability, which
belongs to trial. The other is the regulation of personal liberty pending
trial, which is the limited concern of bail. The law of conspiracy
explains how several persons, acting at different levels and at different
points of time, may be bound together by a common design. That
doctrine answers the question of liability. It does not answer, by itself,
the separate question of how long and on what basis the liberty of each
individual may be restrained before guilt is proved. Bail adjudication
therefore necessarily proceeds on a different plane. It requires the
Court to look at what is attributed to each accused, how that
attribution fits within the statutory ingredients, and whether continued
detention, at that stage, serves a legitimate purpose recognised by law.
This exercise does not dismantle the prosecution case of conspiracy,
nor does it rank culpability. It merely ensures that pre-trial detention
does not become indiscriminate or automatic, and that statutory
restraint operates with reason, proportion, and fidelity to individual
attribution. Seen thus, differentiation is not an exception to conspiracy
law, but a constitutional discipline imposed upon the exercise of bail
jurisdiction. ”

27. In Tasleem Ahmed , the Division Bench emphasised that the Court
must first satisfy itself with regard to fulfilment of the twin statutory
restrictions on grant of bail, as also the normal considerations mandated
by the bail jurisprudence of our Courts. As far as the aspect of prolonged
pre-trial custody is concerned, the Court held that KA Najeeb requires
harmonization of the constitutional guarantee of liberty and the legislative
objectives which result in statutory provisions restricting bail.
47
28. In Haris Nisar Langoo v. National Investigation Agency , another
recent Division Bench decision under UAPA, cited by Mr. Malik, the
accused were granted bail, after considering the ratio in Gulfisha Fatima .

47
CRL.A. 406/2023 and connected matter, decided on 20.03.2026 [hereinafter, “ Haris Nisar Langoo ”].
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29. The decision in Gulfisha Fatima , in my view, provides guidance on
the approach to be adopted while adjudicating bail application under
MCOCA also. Section 21(4) of MCOCA being on a “higher pedestal”
than Section 43D(5) of UAPA, I agree with Mr. Jain that, at the very
least, the same principles would govern the interplay between Section
21(4) of MCOCA and the Article 21 rights of an accused. The apparently
distinct lines of authority cited above can, in my view, be reconciled, by

applying the ratio of Gulfisha Fatima .
30. The position which emerges therefrom is that statutory restrictions
on grant of bail cannot preclude constitutionally protected claims,
referrable to Article 21 of the Constitution. The ground of prolonged pre-
trial incarceration without likelihood of culmination of proceedings must
therefore be considered, even in cases involving special statutes.
However, these are not stand-alone considerations, but require to be
analysed alongwith the nature of the offence and the prima facie material
on record. Conversely, while adjudicating the satisfaction required in
terms of the statutory conditions, the material must be assessed through
the lens of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In order to
adjudicate such a question, the factors to be borne in mind include the
length of custody already undergone, the possible sentence for the
offence, the possibility of concluding the proceedings within a reasonable
time, whether delay in proceedings is attributable to the prosecution or
the defence, and the nature of the prima facie case made out against the

accused.
31. Haris Nisar Langoo , in my view, does not depart from the above
principles, but provides an example in which the Court was satisfied that
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the petitioner was entitled to bail, even after applying Section 43D(5) of
UAPA. In fact, it may be noted that, even in Gulfisha Fatima , some of the
accused were granted bail, having regard to the specific facts of their
cases.
c) Application to the facts of the present case
32. At the very outset, I accept Mr. Malik’s submission that custody of

four and a half years, without framing of charges, is a substantial period.
33. The question of responsibility for the delay is, however, in the facts
of this case, seriously contested. Mr. Malik and Mr. Jain, both placed
detailed list of dates with regard to the proceedings before the Special
Court.
34. Mr. Malik emphasised that the prosecution filed six chargesheets
between 02.11.2021 and 04.10.2024. Thereafter, arguments on charge
were addressed on 17.01.2025 on behalf of six accused, including the
present petitioner. Several accused were heard until 12.11.2025, after
which there was a change in Presiding Officer of the Special Court.
Subsequently also, arguments on behalf of the present petitioner were
concluded on 24.12.2025, and the case has been pending at the stage of
arguments on charge by other accused. Mr. Malik submitted that, in these
circumstances, the majority of delay in trial can only be attributed to the
prosecution, and in any event, cannot be attributed to the petitioner
herein.
35. Mr. Jain, on the other hand, submitted that, even after filing of the
last supplementary charge sheet on 04.10.2024, the Special Court
scheduled and listed the case on 93 occasions, out of which 32
adjournments was sought by one or the other of the defence counsel. He
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48
has drawn my attention to specific orders of the Special Court, which
record that none of the defence counsel came forward for arguments on
several dates, and that many opportunities were given to the accused to
complete arguments on charge.
49
36. In Gulfisha Fatima , the Supreme Court has analysed the question
of responsibility of delay in trial inter alia in the following terms:
“ 37. The present prosecution arises out of FIR No. 59 of 2020 and
involves multiple accused persons, voluminous documentary and
electronic evidence, and allegations of a structured and continuing
conspiracy. The record reflects that compliance under Section 207 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure was completed only on 05.08.2023,
after which the Trial Court directed that arguments on charge would
commence on a day-to-day basis from 11.09.2023 onwards. The
nature of the prosecution, the number of accused, and the breadth of
material necessarily render the proceedings complex and time-
consuming. The mere passage of time, therefore, cannot be viewed in
isolation.
38. What assumes significance is that the procedural history and
order sheets do not support the assertion that the delay is attributable
to prosecutorial inaction or judicial inaction. The common counter
affidavit and the Trial Court's orders record that, at various stages, the
prosecution expressed readiness to proceed, including readiness to
commence arguments on charge, while objections, requests for
deferment, and issues relating to sequencing of arguments were raised
on behalf of the accused. At the stage of compliance under
Section 207 CrPC itself, the Trial Court noted that despite repeated
directions, certain accused declined to receive copies of the charge-
sheet in the manner directed, insisted on alternate modes of supply, or
filed successive applications, necessitating further procedural orders
and contributing to delay at the pre-charge stage. These aspects
emerge from the record and are not matters of conjecture.
39. The plea of delay has also undergone judicial scrutiny in respect of
a co-accused arising out of the very same FIR. In Tasleem
3
Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) , the High Court of Delhi undertook a
detailed examination of the Trial Court order-sheets and, after
tabulating the procedural history, recorded categorical findings that

48
17.01.2025; 21.01.2025; 22.02.2025; 28.02.2025; 06.03.2025; 07.03.2025; 06.05.2025; 11.08.2025;
25.08.2025; 26.08.2025; 27.08.2025; 08.09.2025; 09.09.2025; 23.09.2025; 06.10.2025.
49
Paragraphs 37-44.
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the alleged inordinate delay could not be attributed either to the
prosecution or to the Trial Court. The High Court noted repeated
adjournments sought on behalf of the accused, reluctance to commence
arguments on charge despite directions for day-to-day hearing and
recorded the Trial Court's expression of distress at the inability to
move forward notwithstanding consensus schedules arrived at amongst
the defence. The High Court expressly rejected the contention that bail
under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA could be granted solely on the
ground of delay in such circumstances, holding that the statutory
embargo cannot be permitted to be circumvented by delay attributable,
at least in part, to the manner in which the defence conducted the
proceedings.
40. This Court is conscious that the appellants in the present appeal
may not stand on identical factual footing in all respects with the co-
accused whose appeal was considered by the High Court.
Nevertheless, the findings recorded therein are relevant insofar as
they arise from the same trial, the same order-sheets, and the same
procedural milieu. They negate the overarching portrayal that the
appellants have remained in custody solely on account of
prosecutorial inertia or a dormant trial.
41. At the same time, the Court does not proceed on the assumption
that the entire delay can be laid at the door of the accused, nor does it
characterise the proceedings as free from institutional or systemic
constraints. This is not a casual prosecution, nor one involving a
narrow factual canvas. The law has taken its course, albeit at a pace
dictated by the complexity of the case, the number of accused, and
the nature of issues raised. The constitutional concern arising from
prolonged custody is therefore acknowledged, but it does not, on the
present record, translate into a finding that continued detention has
become punitive or unconscionable solely by reason of delay.
42. The approach of addressing delay-related concerns through
calibrated judicial supervision, rather than automatic enlargement on
bail, stands reinforced by the decision of this Court in Union of
4
India v. Saleem Khan . In that case, despite the accused having
remained in custody for over five years and the trial not having
commenced, this Court declined to interfere with the rejection of bail
qua one accused, while upholding bail granted to another, thereby
reiterating that delay-based pleas must necessarily be adjudicated on
an accused-specific footing. Significantly, even while acknowledging
the constitutional imperative of a speedy trial, the Court did not eclipse
the statutory rigour under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA but instead
directed expeditious conclusion of the trial and cautioned against any
conduct on the part of the accused that may further protract the
proceedings. The decision thus affirms that prolonged custody, though
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a matter of concern, does not operate as an automatic ground for
grant of bail where the statutory threshold continues to be attracted.
43. Viewed cumulatively, the record does not support the absolute
proposition that the appellants have remained “innocently
incarcerated” without any contribution to delay, nor does it disclose
a situation where the delay is so wholly unjustified as to override the
statutory embargo contained in Section 43D(5). The appropriate
constitutional response, at this stage, lies in ensuring vigilant oversight
of the trial and its expeditious progression, rather than in eclipsing the
statutory mandate governing bail in offences of the present nature. The
plea of delay in the facts of the particular case, therefore, does not
warrant enlargement on bail, though it justifies continued judicial
emphasis on the timely conduct of the proceedings.
44. It is in this sense that the plea of delay must first be examined to
see whether it arises in a manner that warrants constitutional scrutiny
of continued custody. Broadly stated, the Court must consider whether
the custody undergone is substantial, whether the proceedings have
made meaningful progress, and whether there exists a realistic
prospect of conclusion of trial within a reasonable period. The Court
must also take note of the causes contributing to delay, including
whether delay is attributable to the inherent complexity of the
50
prosecution or to the conduct of parties, including the accused. ”
37. These factors, applied to the present case do not, in my view, make
out a case for release of the petitioner on bail at this stage, on the ground
of delay in trial. On the basis of the undisputed records, even after filing
of the supplementary chargesheets, several adjournments have been taken
on behalf of the accused, albeit not the petitioner. The delay is not
attributable to prosecutorial inaction or Court delays alone, without any
contribution of the accused. The case is also undoubtedly complex, and
the pace of trial is impacted by the number of accused and institutional
factors, such as change in the Presiding Officer, for which the prosecution
cannot be held responsible.

50
Emphasis supplied.
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38. Mr. Malik is right in stating that the trial is likely to be prolonged
due to multitude of the accused and witnesses. However, the period of
sentences for the offences in question is also relevant. In this case, the
minimum and maximum sentence for the offence under Section 3 of
MCOCA are five years to life imprisonment, alongwith a minimum fine
of Rs. 5 lakhs. Mr. Malik submitted that, although the maximum sentence
for the offence in question is life imprisonment, the petitioner, being a
woman, would be entitled to remission after seven years, under Rule
1254 of the Delhi Prisons Rules, 2018. Such consideration at this stage, is
in my view, premature. The best that can be said is that the petitioner may
be eligible for consideration for premature release after seven years, but it
cannot be said at this stage that the period of custody must be assessed
against a possible sentence of only seven years.
39. A further significant consideration is the role ascribed to the
petitioner in the commission of the offences. It is here that the prima facie
findings returned in the 2023 judgment, to my mind, come in the
petitioner’s way. The Court has analysed the prima facie material,
including the statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the
CrPC, and held as follows:
“ 56. The investigation has revealed that was Leena Paulose was
involved in running an organized crime syndicate since 2013 with the
motive of pecuniary gain by cheating and extortion. It is a matter of
record that Leena Paulose was accused along with Sukash in the
following four cases:
1. FIR No 186/2017 u/s 7,12,13 POC Act & 201,120B IPC PS Crime
Branch, Delhi Police.
2. Cr.No.24 of 2013 Central Crime Branch Police, Chennai u/s 406, 409,
420 r/w 34 IPC and u/S 66 D of Informationn Technology Act.
3. Crime No.33/2015 u/S 420, 120B IPC and 3/4 Prize Chits and Money
Circulation Act, EOW, Mumbai.
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4. CCB Crime No.64/13, now RC 6E/2014/BSFC u/s 406, 409, 420, 120B
IPC & 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of PC Act, 1988, Chennai.

57. The investigation revealed that the petitioner Leena Paulose
was in continuous contact with Sukash through her mobile phone, as
Sukash was using mobile phone with the connivance of jail staff
during custody period. Further, she also remained in contact with
Sukash‟s associates jail officials namely Dharm Singh Meena and
Subhash Batra. Thus, she was actively and continuously coordinating
with Sukash as well as his associates in furtherance of organized crime
and disposal of crime proceeds . She procured bank entries in her
account from various entities/persons to whom she provided cash,
received from Sukash through Hawala transactions with the help of Joel
Daniel Jose, Kamlesh Kothari, B Mohanraj and Arun Muthu etc. and
invested in high end cars, properties and her business firms. The
Enforcement Directorate, seized 23 High end luxury cars from her house
at ECR Chennai in Aug 2021. During interrogation, the accused
applicant failed to justify as to how she got funds to purchase 12 cars in
Super Car Artistry. Further, it was revealed that she made the payment
of “Silent Calling App” which was being used by accused Sukash in his
51
mobile phone, to commit the crime, while he was in Jail .”

40. On a holistic consideration of the case of the petitioner, I am of the
view that the role attributed to her in the syndicate, and involvement in
the offence, is such that the grant of bail is unjustified, despite the period
of custody undergone. In particular, it prima facie appears, from the
material on record, that she is the person controlling the syndicate in the
52
absence of Sukesh . Further, she is alleged to have been recharging the
mobile phone used by Sukesh while he was in judicial custody, and also
responsible for his use of the “Silent Calling App”, which were central to
the commission of the offence of extortion. It therefore prima facie
appears that she had a pivotal role in the alleged offence, which itself, as
noted above, was one which was a grave attempt to undermine the
administration of justice at many levels. The entire exercise of extortion,

51
Emphasis supplied.
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as alleged, was on the promise of subverting criminal justice system to
secure bail for an accused, and was committed by Sukesh while he was in
judicial custody, with the alleged involvement of jail officials.
41. The allegation with regard to the petitioner’s use of the extorted
money to sustain a lavish life style, and investments in her proprietorship
businesses also, at the very least, demonstrate a prima facie case that she
was an important member of the organized crime syndicate. Mr. Malik
argued that the petitioner’s own income and that of her husband, provide
a credible alternative source of money, thus denying the foundational
case of the prosecution. That, in my view, is a matter which would have
to be agitated at trial. Suffice it to state that the petitioner has placed on
record only an income tax notice dated 03.11.2023 addressed to Sukesh,
pertaining to assessment years 2012–13 to 2018–19, whereby he was
informed of outstanding tax and penalty demands following dismissal of
his appeals. At this stage, this is insufficient to come to the conclusion
that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence of which she is accused.
42. Mr. Malik emphasized the fact that the confession under Section 18
of MCOCA allegedly made by Sukesh, in which the petitioner was also
implicated, was retracted by him at the first possible opportunity. This
53
aspect has, however, already been considered in the 2023 judgment , and
I see no reason to revisit the said finding.
ii. Re: Parity with Co-accused
43. Mr. Malik argued that the petitioner is entitled to parity with four
co-accused who have been granted bail:

52
2023 judgment, paragraphs 58 and 59.
53
2023 judgment, paragraph 49.
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a. Avtar Singh Kochar
b. Pinky Irani
c. Joel Daniel Jose
d. Sunil Kumar
44. At the outset, it may be noted that in the three cases where bail was
granted by this Court, notice has been issued by the Supreme Court in
54
special leave petitions challenging the said orders .
45. In any event, Mr. Jain distinguished the case of the above accused,
on the ground of their specific roles in the offence.
46. Upon consideration of the judgments in each of the cases, I agree
with Mr. Jain. The role of each of the individuals who have been granted
bail are quite distinct from the role attributed to the petitioner, and the
prima facie material against her.
a. In the case of Avtar Singh Kochhar, the Court found that the role of
the accused was limited to facilitation of the transfer of the extorted
money through hawala channels, and that there was no evidence of
55
any direct interaction between him and Sukesh . Noting the
ingredients of offence, the age of the petitioner [about 69 years],
and the fact that he was in poor health, the Court was inclined to
grant bail.
b. In the case of Pinky Irani, the role ascribed to the accused was that
she knew that Sukesh was in judicial custody, but nonetheless
helped him in his effort to impersonate influential public figures,

54
In the case of Avtar Singh Kochhar, SLP (Crl.) 6651/2024, notice was issued on 06.05.2024; In the
case of Pinky Irani, SLP (Crl.) 5659/2024, notice was issued on 19.04.2024; In the case of Sunil
Kumar, SLP (Crl.) 9306/2024, notice was issued on 30.09.2024.
55
Supra (note 21), paragraph 40.
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and arranged meetings between him and famous celebrities, and
buying them gifts, for which she received an amount of Rs. 75
56
lakhs in her bank account .
c. In the case of Joel Daniel Jose, wherein bail was granted by the
Special Court, he was found to be a salaried employee, whose role
was confined to handling of the alleged extorted amount.
d. The fourth co-accused who has been granted bail is Sunil Kumar.
He was the Jail Superintendent of the jail in which Sukesh was an
inmate. He was accused of enabling Sukesh to access various
illegitimate privileges and to operate his syndicate from within the
jail. The detailed facts of the aforesaid case do not require
consideration, as the Supreme Court has specifically directed vide
order dated 30.09.2024 that the said judgment shall not be cited as
57
a precedent in other similar cases .
47. The role of the petitioner, in contrast, is of the co-leader of the
organised crime syndicate, who was directing its affairs in coordination
with Sukesh, particularly during the period of his incarceration. Her role,
and the material against her, have been discussed above. For the reasons
stated, I do not consider her case to be comparable with any of the other
co-accused who have been enlarged on bail in the present case.
ONCLUSION
G. C :
48. For the reasons above, and in view of the findings recorded in the
2023 judgment, I do not consider it to be a fit case for grant of bail to the
petitioner. The petition is accordingly dismissed.

56
Supra (note 22), paragraphs 51-52.
57
State of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil Kumar, [SLP (Crl.) 9306/2024, dated 30.09.2024].
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49. From the order sheets of the Special Court which have been placed
on record, I find that the Court is already scheduling the case several
times in each month. However, if it is possible for the Special Court to
expedite the proceedings further, considering its board and the age of
matters pending before it, it is requested to do so, and to refuse any
unjustified adjournments. It is also expected of the prosecution that, after
the framing of charges, it may reconsider whether all the cited witnesses
are, in fact, required.
50. The bail application is disposed of.
51. It is clarified that the observations made herein are solely for the
purpose of adjudication of the present bail application and shall not be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case, nor shall
they prejudice the rights and contentions of the parties at any stage of the
proceedings.

PRATEEK JALAN, J
MAY 5, 2026
Bhupi/AD/KA/
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