RAJSTHAN STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION vs ORIGO COMMODITIES INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED

[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2450/2026
URN: CMA / 4241U / 2026
Rajsthan State Warehousing Corporation, (A Government
Undertaking Established Under The Warehousing Corporation
Act, 1962) Office Bhawani Singh Road, Jaipur Rajasthan 302015
Through Its Officer In-Charge
----Appellant
Versus
Origo Commodities India Private Limited, Registered Office At Fk-
06, Somdatt Chamber- 1, 5, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi
110066, Corporate Office At Plot No. 37, 1St Floor, Sector-18,
Institutional Area, Gurgaon, Haryana- 122002
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ripu Daman Singh Naruka
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Suhail Sehgal (through VC) with
Mr. Raghvendra Singh for
Mr. Susshil Daga
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA
Order
Reportable
17/07/2026
Per: Arun Monga, J.
1. Appeal herein is directed against an order dated 18.4.2026 passed
by the learned Commercial Court No.2, Jaipur, whereby it stayed the
operation and enforcement of the Award dated 03.06.2025 during the
pendency of the proceedings under Section 34, subject to the condition
that the appellant shall deposit 100% of the awarded amount of Rs.
6,80,35,258/- within one month.
2. Brief facts, as stated in the appeal, are that a Contract Agreement
dated 25.06.2020 was executed between the appellant and the respon-
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(2 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
dent for the joint operation and management of warehouses on a rev-
enue-sharing basis under the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model.
The Agreement contained an arbitration clause governing resolution of
disputes between the parties.
2.1 Disputes subsequently arose in relation to the Agreement and
were referred to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause. On con-
clusion of the arbitral proceedings, the learned Arbitrator passed an
Award dated 03.06.2025.
2.2 Aggrieved by the Award, the appellant instituted proceedings un-
der Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the
learned Commercial Court, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, seeking to set it
aside. Along with the objections, the appellant filed an application under
Section 36 of the Act seeking stay of the enforcement and operation of
the Award pending adjudication of the objections.
2.3 The application under Section 36 came up for hearing on
18.04.2026. By order of the same date, the learned Commercial Court
stayed the operation and enforcement of the Award during the pen-
dency of the Section 34 proceedings, subject to the condition that the
appellant deposit 100% of the awarded amount within one month. The
Court further directed that 50% of the deposited amount be kept in a
fixed deposit receipt in the name of the Court with automatic renewal,
and that the remaining 50% be released to the respondent on furnish-
ing an undertaking to redeposit the amount with applicable interest
should the objections under Section 34 be allowed.
2.4 Hence this appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant, inter alia, submits that the
Commercial Court committed a gross illegality in exercising its discre-
tion under Section 36(3) of the Act by failing to consider the prima facie
merits of the Section 34 challenge and the substantial financial burden
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(3 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
imposed on the appellant. The Court, he contends, erroneously treated
the Arbitral Award as an ordinary money decree and mechanically di-
rected deposit of 100% of the awarded amount, though no statutory re-
quirement or settled principle mandates such a deposit in every case.
The condition of full deposit was imposed without assigning any reasons
, particularly incongruous, he urges, given that the appellant is a Gov-
ernment undertaking, rendering the exercise of discretion arbitrary and
unsustainable.
3.1 He further argues that the Award being ex facie patently illegal,
the Commercial Court ought to have granted an unconditional stay; in-
stead, the direction to deposit the entire award amount imposed so
onerous a burden as effectively to defeat the statutory right of chal-
lenge under Section 34. The condition, he submits, is contrary to the
principle of balancing equities and inconsistent with the law laid down
by the Supreme Court on Section 36(3), which confers a discretion to
impose such conditions as the Court deems fit. Less burdensome alter-
natives securing the award by bank guarantee or appropriate undertak-
ings would have adequately protected the respondent's interests, yet
were not considered. He accordingly urges that the order dated
18.04.2026 be set aside to the extent it requires deposit of the entire
award amount, or alternatively that the condition be suitably modified
in accordance with equity and settled law.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
case file.
5. Before adverting to the merits, a threshold question arises, i.e.,
whether the appeal is maintainable at all. We are unable to accept the
submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the appeal lies by
virtue of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(4 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
6. On a Court query, learned counsel candidly admits that Section 37
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not include, within the
categories of appealable orders, an interim order passed by the Com-
mercial Court under Section 36(3); the remedy of appeal under Section
37 is confined, in this context, to the final order under Section 34 either
setting aside or refusing to set aside the award. He, however, places
heavy reliance on the non-obstante clause in Section 13 (2) of the Com-
mercial Courts Act, 2015. For ready reference Section 37 of the Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Sections 13(1A) and 13(2) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 are reproduced hereunder reference:
Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
"37. Appealable orders. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from the
following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law
to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order,
namely:-
(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;
(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under sec-
tion 34.
(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tri-
bunal-
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3)
of section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section
17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under
this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or takeaway any
right to appeal to the Supreme Court."
Sections 13(1A) and 13(2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
"13(1A) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Com-
mercial Court at the level of District Judge exercising original civil
jurisdiction or, as the case may be, Commercial Division of a High
Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High
Court within a period of sixty days from the date of the judgment or
order: Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a
Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically
enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) as amended by this Act and section 37 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).]
13(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall
lie from any order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commer-
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(5 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
cial Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this
Act."
6. A bare reading of provisions, as above, shows that the appellant's
reliance on the non-obstante clause is misplaced. Far from enlarging the
right of appeal, Section 13(2) operates restrictively, i.e., notwithstand-
ing anything in any other law or Letters Patent, no appeal lies from any
order of a Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance with the Act.
And the proviso to Section 13(1A) confines appealable orders to two
categories alone viz (a) those enumerated under Order XLIII of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and (b) those specified in Section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The main body of Section
13(1A) cannot be read in isolation from its proviso so as to create a
general right of appeal against every order of a Commercial Court.
7. Section 37 opens with the words "an appeal shall lie from the follow-
ing orders (and from no others)", language that is not merely enumera-
tive but deliberately exclusionary. Parliament has thus not simply listed
appealable orders; it has affirmatively barred appeals from everything
else. An order under Section 36(3), staying (conditionally or otherwise)
the enforcement of an award pending Section 34 proceedings, finds no
place in that enumeration. Section 37(1) permits appeals only against
orders under Section 8 (refusing reference), Section 9 (interim mea-
sures), and Section 34 (setting aside or refusing to set aside an award).
A Section 36(3) order is a creature distinct from all three: it neither ad-
judicates the validity of the award nor grants interim measures under
Section 9; it merely regulates enforcement pendente lite. To treat it as
appealable would be to add a category to Section 37 by judicial con-
struction, precisely what the phrase "and from no others" forbids.
8. In Kandla Export Corporation & Anr. v. OCI Corporation &
1
Anr. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court squarely addressed the interplay be-
1 (2018) 14 SCC 715
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(6 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
tween Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act and the appeal provi-
sions of the Arbitration Act, in the following terms:
"14. The proviso goes on to state that an appeal shall lie from such
orders passed by the Commercial Division of the High Court that are
specifically enumerated under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure Code, 1908, and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. It will at once
be noticed that orders that are not specifically enumerated under Or-
der 43 CPC would, therefore, not be appealable, and appeals that are
mentioned in Section 37 of the Arbitration Act alone are appeals that
can be made to the Commercial Appellate Division of a High Court.
15. Thus, an order which refers parties to arbitration under Section 8,
not being appealable under Section 37(1)(a) would not be appealable
under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Similarly, an ap-
peal rejecting a plea referred to in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section
16 of the Arbitration Act would equally not be appealable under Sec-
tion 37(2)(a) and, therefore, under Section 13(1) of the Commercial
Courts Act.
16. So far, so good. However, it is Shri Giri's main argument that Sec-
tion 50 of the Arbitration Act does not find any mention in the proviso
to Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act and, therefore, not-
withstanding that an appeal would not lie under Section 50 of the Ar-
bitration Act, it would lie under Section 13(1) of the Commercial
Courts Act.
17. To answer this question, it is necessary to advert to the judgment
in Fuerst Day Lawsons. The common question that arose for consid-
eration in the batch of cases before the Court was whether an order,
though not appealable under Section 50 of the Arbitration Act would,
nevertheless be subject to appeal under the Letters Patent of the High
Court. In answering this question, this Court exhaustively reviewed
the authorities and then stated, in para 36, that the decisions noticed
so far lay down certain broad principles. We are directly concerned
with the principle laid down in sub-section (vii), which reads as un-
der: (SCC p. 350, para 36)
"36. ... (vii) The exception to the aforementioned rule is
where the special Act sets out a self-contained code and in
that event the applicability of the general law procedure
would be impliedly excluded. The express provision need
not refer to or use the words "letters patent" but if on a
reading of the provision it is clear that all further appeals
are barred then even a letters patent appeal would be
barred.
x-x-x-x-x
21. However, the question still arises as to why Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act was expressly included in the proviso to Section
13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, which is equally a special
provision of appeal contained in a self-contained code, which in
any case would be outside Section 13(1) of the Commercial
Courts Act. One answer is that this was done ex abundanti
cautela. Another answer may be that as Section 37 itself was
amended by the Arbitration Amendment Act, 2015, which came
into force on the same day as the Commercial Courts Act, Par-
liament thought, in its wisdom, that it was necessary to empha-
sise that the amended Section 37 would have precedence over
the general provision contained in Section 13(1) of the Com-
mercial Courts Act. Incidentally, the amendment of 2015 intro-
duced one more category into the category of appealable orders
in the Arbitration Act, namely, a category where an order is
made under Section 8 refusing to refer parties to arbitration.
Parliament may have found it necessary to emphasise the fact
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(7 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
that an order referring parties to arbitration under Section 8 is
not appealable under Section 37(1)(a) and would, therefore, not
be appealable under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts
Act. Whatever may be the ultimate reason for including Section
37 of the Arbitration Act in the proviso to Section 13(1), the ra-
tio decidendi of the judgment in Fuerst Day Lawsons would ap-
ply, and this being so, appeals filed under Section 50 of the Ar-
bitration Act would have to follow the drill of Section 50 alone.
22. This, in fact, follows from the language of Section 50 itself.
In all arbitration cases of enforcement of foreign awards, it is
Section 50 alone that provides an appeal. Having provided for
an appeal, the forum of appeal is left "to the Court authorised
by law to hear appeals from such orders". Section 50 properly
read would, therefore, mean that if an appeal lies under the said
provision, then alone would Section 13(1) of the Commercial
Courts Act be attracted as laying down the forum which will
hear and decide such an appeal."
9. Reverting to the debate in hand, the position which emerges thus
is that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained code
on matters of arbitration, including appeals; Section 37 exhaustively
enumerates the orders from which an appeal lies and, by necessary
implication, bars appeals from all others. Section 13(1A) of the
Commercial Courts Act creates no independent or additional right of
appeal in arbitration matters, its proviso expressly tethers the right of
appeal back to Section 37. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Kandla
Export Corporation & Anr. v. OCI Corporation & Anr. (supra) ,
ibid , rejected the very argument advanced before us: that the general
appellate provision of the Commercial Courts Act could be invoked to
sustain an appeal which the Arbitration Act itself does not provide. If an
order refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8, or
rejecting a jurisdictional plea under Section 16, is not appealable
because Section 37 does not so provide, an interim order imposing
conditions of stay under Section 36(3) can stand on no better footing.
10. The reliance on Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act by the
learned counsel for the appellant rests, in our view, on a
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(8 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
misinterpretation of the provision. Let us see how. Three features of
Section 13 itself defeat the argument.
10.1. First, the main body of Section 13(1A) confers a right of appeal
in general terms, but the proviso immediately channels that right:
appeals shall lie only from orders enumerated in Order XLIII CPC and
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. It is settled that where a proviso
qualifies the generality of the main enactment, the two must be read
together, the proviso carving the true scope of the right. The main body
cannot be pressed into service shorn of its proviso; otherwise the
proviso becomes surplusage.
10.2. Second, Section 13(2) is restrictive, not expansive. Its non-
obstante clause operates to shut out appeals available under other laws
or Letters Patent unless they conform to the Act, it does not
manufacture a right of appeal where none exists. A non-obstante clause
gives overriding effect to the provision it introduces; here the provision
it introduces is a prohibition.
10.3. Third, and more fundamentally, an appeal is a creature of
statute; there is no inherent or equitable right to appeal. Where two
statutes intersect, the special and self-contained code governs. The
Arbitration Act, is a self-contained code on all matters of arbitration,
including appeals; the exhaustive enumeration in Section 37 impliedly
excludes recourse to general appellate provisions elsewhere. The
Commercial Courts Act, far from displacing this scheme, expressly
defers to it by incorporating Section 37 into its own proviso. The two
statutes thus speak with one voice.
11. Aside above, at the cost of repetition, the above conclusion is
fortified by parity of reasoning in Kandla Export, ibid, wherein the
Supreme Court held that an order not appealable under Section 50 of
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(9 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
the Arbitration Act cannot be rescued by Section 13(1) of the
Commercial Courts Act. Equally, orders under Section 8 refusing
reference (pre-2015 position) and orders rejecting jurisdictional pleas
under Section 16(2) and (3) are non-appealable for the sole reason that
Section 37 omits them, notwithstanding that such orders may cause
real prejudice. If prejudice alone cannot found an appeal in those cases,
it cannot do so here. An interim order under Section 36(3), however
onerous its conditions, stands on no higher footing.
12. Furthermore, the 2015 amendments to Section 36 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were designed to remove the
automatic-stay regime and expedite enforcement of awards. The
impugned order dated 18.04.2026 is an interim conditional order
passed in exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 36(3); it
neither sets aside nor refuses to set aside the Award under Section 34,
and it falls within none of the categories enumerated in Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act or Order XLIII of the Code. If every conditional-stay
order were appealable, a fresh tier of interlocutory litigation would be
grafted onto Section 34 proceedings, defeating the twin objects of
speedy enforcement and minimal court interference. The legislative
omission of Section 36(3) from Section 37 is therefore not casual but
deliberate.
13. As an upshot, we hold that an order passed under Section 36(3),
whether granting stay unconditionally, conditionally, or refusing it, is not
appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, and Section 13 of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 confers no independent right of
appeal against it.
14. In the parting we may hasten to observe that an aggrieved party
is not remediless qua an order passed under Section 36(3), ibid. Its
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)

(10 of 10)
[2026:RJ-JP:27316-DB] [CMA-2450/2026]
correctness and/or the conditions imposed etc. may be tested in
appropriate proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution (within
the narrow supervisory limits), or the order may be assailed along with
the final Section 34 order (since the interim order merges into final, on
conclusion of proceedings), if and when an appeal under Section 37 is
ultimately carried. But the present appeal, being outside the compass of
Section 37, must fail on maintainability alone.
15. Thus the instant appeal, being beyond the compass of Section 37
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is held not maintainable. It
is accordingly disposed of, with liberty to the appellant to seek such
other remedy as may otherwise be available in accordance with law. We
express no opinion on the merits of the challenge to the condition of
deposit.
16. All pending application(s), also stand disposed of.
(MANEESH SHARMA),J (ARUN MONGA),J
DEEPA-9
(Uploaded on 22/07/2026 at 12:38:01 PM)
(Downloaded on 22/07/2026 at 01:08:33 PM)
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)