UMABAI vs MR NAZEERAHMED
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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MFA No. 102046 of 2026
R
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
RD
DATED THIS THE 3 DAY OF JULY 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.102046 OF 2026 (MV-D)
BETWEEN:
1. UMABAI W/O. PRAKASH NALAGE,
AGE: 43 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
2. PRATISHA D/O. PRAKASH NALAGE
AGE: 29 YEARS,
GANAPATHRAO ANNARAO NALAGE
DIED ON 09.12.2012 AS PETITIONER NO.3.
3. VATSALABAI W/O. GANAPATRAO NALAGE,
AGE: 79 YEARS,
ALL ARE R/O. BANDARHALLI,
TQ: SAUNDATTI-591126.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.VIJAYKUMAR KOTIN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MR NAZEERAHMED
S/O. SHAIK CHANDH, NO. 1-4-725,
INDIRA NAGAR, TANDUR,
DIST: RANGAREDDI, STATE: ANDHRA PRADESH,
(OWNER OF THE TRUCK NO.ABK-7399).
2. THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.,
H.B.COMPLEX, KODANGAL ROAD,
TANDUR (A.P) THROUGH ITS BELGAUM
DIVISIONAL OFFICE, CLUB ROAD, BELGAUM-590001.
INSURER OF THE TRUCK NO. ABK-7399,
(POL.NO.612501/31/83/21460
VALID FROM 20-12-2003 TO 19-12-2004)
…RESPONDENTS
Digitally
signed by
GIRIJA A.
BYAHATTI
Location:
HIGH COURT
OF
KARNATAKA
DHARWAD
BENCH
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MFA No. 102046 of 2026
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THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 173(1) OF MOTOR
VEHICLE ACT, 1988, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED
10.02.2006 PASSED IN MVC NO.746/2004 ON THE FILE OF CIVIL
JUDGE (SR. DN.) AND MEMBER ADDL. MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL BAILHONGAL AT BAILHONGAL PARTLY ALLOWING THE
CLAIM PETITION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT
OF COMPENSATION.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, JUDGMENT
WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
ORAL JUDGMENT
This is the appeal filed under Section 173(1) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ’M.V. Act’) challenging
the judgment and award dated 10.02.2006 passed in MVC
No.746/2004 on the file of Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) & Member
Addl. MACT, Bailhongal (for short ‘Tribunal’) by the
claimants being dissatisfied with the compensation
awarded in favour of the claimants.
2. Parties would be referred with their ranks as
they were before the Tribunal for the sake of convenience
and clarity.
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3. IA.No.1/2026 is filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of 7354
days in preferring the appeal.
4. In the affidavit annexed to I.A.No.1/2026,
appellant No.1, on her own behalf and on behalf of
appellant Nos.2 and 3, has stated that they had filed MVC
No.746/2004 on the file of the MACT, Bailahongal, seeking
compensation for the death of her husband-Prakash, who
died in the road traffic accident. The said petition came to
be allowed, and compensation of ₹4,50,000/- with interest
at 6% per annum was awarded by judgment dated
10.02.2006.
5. It is further stated in the affidavit annexed to
I.A. No.1/2026 that first appellant had no legal knowledge
regarding filing an appeal for enhancement of
compensation. She was under mental shock, and even
after passing of the award, she was not aware that an
appeal could be filed. She has further stated that in
January 2020, one of her relatives informed her that the
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compensation awarded was very meagre and advised her
to meet an advocate. However, due to COVID-19
pandemic and financial difficulties, she could not meet her
advocate. During June-2022, she met her advocate and
furnished all the relevant papers. She has further stated
about the merits of the case. She was thereafter advised
to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and award once
again. Accordingly, she applied for certified copy during
December 2023 and obtained on 19.12.2023. Thereafter,
she was admitted to the hospital for treatment of her
Tthyroid ailment. She took bed rest for couple of months
and could not meet her present advocate till the third
week of August-2025. Thereafter, she was instructed to
prefer the appeal, and accordingly the present appeal
came to be filed in the year 2026. According to appellant
No.1, delay is caused due to the bona fide reasons stated
above. She has also stated about the avocation of her
husband and other relevant facts. Hence, she prayed for
allowing I.A.No.1/2026.
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6. This is all mentioned in the affidavit annexed to
I.A.No.1/20206.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently
submitted that the Motor Vehicles Act is a benevolent
legislation and, therefore, the Courts have to take very
lenient view while considering an application of the present
nature.
8. The other claimants, namely appellant Nos.2
and 3, have not stated anything as to why they did not
prefer the appeal for all these years. Appellant No.2 is
aged 29 years, as stated in the cause title. Thus, she
attained majority more than ten years prior to filing of the
present appeal. Even then, she did not make any effort to
file the appeal. The reason as to why she did not take any
interest in filing the appeal has not been explained.
9. Appellant No.1 has narrated that she was not
having legal knowledge that she can prefer the appeal.
However, it is to be noted here that appellants were
represented by their counsel in MVC case before MACT and
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award was passed on 10.02.2006. Thus, the say of
appellant that she was in mental shock cannot be accepted
because the MVC petition was filed in the year 2004 itself
and they have obtained the award in the year 2006. 20
years 4 months after such passing of the award, the
appellants are filing the present appeal without assigning
any admissible reason.
10. Even according to the appellant during January-
2020 itself, she came to know that she can prefer the
appeal. But, it is filed only on 29.06.2026 i.e., 6 years 5
months after her knowledge. No reasons are assigned for
such inordinate delay except stating that there was
COVID-19 restrictions. The said restrictions were only from
15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 and even after withdrawing the
restrictions, appellants slept for more than 4 years.
11. One more reason assigned by the appellants is
appellant No.1 was suffering from Thyroid and hospitalized
for sometime. However, no document is produced to show
that she was hospitalized.
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12. In this regard, this Court relies upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeshwaran and another in
Civil Appeal No………of 2025 (arising out of SLP( C)
No.17575 of 2023), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as
follows:-
“28. Since the Respondents assigned the very same reasons
in I.A. No. 1 of 2022 in Unnumbered A.S. No... of 2022 as
raised in I.A. Nos. 462 of 2018 and 119 of 2019 that had
already been dismissed by this Court vide S.L.P.(C)
Nos.2054 & 2055 of 2022, the application for condonation of
delay of 1116 days cannot be sustained. This Court in S.L.P.
(C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, after going through the
evidence placed on record, rightly held that the delay has not
been properly explained. The relevant portion of the order is
reproduced hereunder:
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view
taken by the High Court. Once it was found even
by the learned trial Court that delay has not been
properly explained, and even there are no merits
in the application for condonation of delay,
thereafter, the matter should rest there and the
condonation of delay application was required to
be dismissed. The approach adopted by the
learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in
absence of any material evidence it cannot be said
that the delay has been explained and that there
are no merits in the application, still to condone
the delay would be giving a premium to a person
who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of
delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of
this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane
v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10
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SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said
decision, it is observed and held that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving
full effect to the same.
5.1 In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v.
Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5
SCC 157, in paragraph 14, it is observed and held
as under:
"The law of limitation is founded on public
policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been
enacted with the object of destroying the rights of
the parties but to ensure that they approach the
court for vindication of their rights without
unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the
concept of limitation is that every remedy should
remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed
by the legislature. At the same time, the courts
are empowered to condone the delay provided
that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for
not availing the remedy within the prescribed
period of limitation.”
6. In view of the above and for the reasons
stated above, we are in complete agreement with
the view taken by the High Court. The Special
Leave Petitions stand dismissed.
Pending application, if any, also stands disposed
of.
29. xxxxx
30. xxxxx
31. xxxxx
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32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases
that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity.
The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of
causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the
respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable
grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement
for condoning the delay remains unmet.”
13. This Court further places reliance on the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in In the case of
Pathapati Subba Reddy’s case cited supra, by relying
upon earlier judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, finally it is
concluded as under:
“28. On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down
by this Court, it is evident that:
28.1. Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;
28.2 . A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an
end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
28.3. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to
be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
28.4. In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or
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cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the
same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
28.5. Courts are empowered to exercise discretion
to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in
nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause
is established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
28.6. Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others are also
entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied
with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
28.7 . Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
28.8. Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the
delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the
conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision.
29. xxxxx
30. xxxxx
31. xxxxx
32. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice
as imposition of conditions are not warranted when
sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the
delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned
merely because some persons have been granted relief
on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in
such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent
or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been
deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that
they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not
a correct approach, particularly when both the above
decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier
pronouncement in Basawaraj.”
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14. The second judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court is
in respect of land acquisition matters. Land Acquisition
Act is also beneficial legislation. Even then, the Hon’ble
Apex held that no Court would be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. In first of the above cited judgments of
Hon’ble apex court, the 1116 days. However, Hon’ble
Court has not condoned the delay on the ground that no
admissible reasons are furnished. It is clearly held that the
appellate courts must first ascertain the bonafides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking condonation of
delay and not the merits of the case.
15. Even in the present case as discussed above, no
admissible reason is furnished. Condoning of delay merely
for the reason that claimants have been deprived of the
interest for the delayed period without holding that they
made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct
approach.
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16. Even, in the present case as discussed above,
Appellant Nos.2 and 3 have not at all filed affidavit and not
come forward to say that they could not approach the
appellate Court. Appellant No.2 is not an uneducated one.
But, she is well educated woman as per her signature
appeared in vakalathnama itself. These facts disentitle the
appellants to file the appeal 20 years after passing of the
judgment. Hence, issuance of notice to respondents is also
not required because that would consume unnecessary
time of the Court. Furthermore, respondents have also to
engage their counsel and contest the appeal and spent
money from their packet unnecessarily. When there is no
admissible ground at all to condone delay of 20 years,
there is no question of issuance of notice to respondents.
Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court holds that the
appellants have not made a sufficient cause to condone
delay in preferring the appeal. Accordingly, IA No.1/2026
is dismissed. Appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by
limitation.
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17. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit
that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has condoned the
delay on similar nature in several cases. In this regard, he
places reliance on the orders passed in MFA
No.102840/2022 dated 19.03.2024, wherein delay of 4405
days was condoned; and MFA No.104681/2024 dated
12.12.2024 wherein delay of 3253 days condoned.
18. On perusal of the orders passed in both the
above said judgments, it is noticed that both the above
orders came into existence before passing judgment of
Hon’ble apex court judgments cited supra.
19. Under these circumstances, relying on the
principles noted in the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble
Apex Court, this Court holds that appellants have not
produced any material to establish that they were
prevented from sufficient cause in not filing the appeal
within the prescribed period. The reasons assigned to
condone the delay of 7354 days in the affidavit annexed to
I.A.No.1/2026 are not acceptable one. The appellants are
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not diligent in prosecuting the appeal. Hence, this Court
passes the following:
ORDER
I.A.No.1/2015 filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is dismissed.
Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed as
barred by limitation.
Sd/-
(GEETHA K.B.)
JUDGE
gab – upto para 8
HMB – para 9 to end
CT:VH
List No.: 3 Sl No.: 19