Aditya Kumar Singh vs The State of Bihar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.4865 of 2016
CNR No. BRHC010429622016
======================================================
1. Aditya Kumar Singh son of Sri Prashant Kumar Singh, resident of Village-
Rakia, Police Station-Bihra, District- Saharsa, (Bihar) and also residing at
Village- Tabhaghat, P.S.-Jasidih, District Deoghar, (Jharkhand).
2. Prashant Kumar Singh, son of Late Tarkeshwar Prasad Singh, resident of
Village- Rakia, Police Station-Bihra, District- Saharsa, (Bihar) and also
residing at Village- Tabhaghat, P.S.-Jasidih, District Deoghar, (Jharkhand).
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Building
Construction, Bihar, Patna.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Building Construction, Bihar, Patna.
3. The Executive Engineer, Department of Building Construction, Patna
Division, Bihar, Patna.
4. District Magistrate, Patna
5. Estate Officer, Bhawan Nirman Vibhag, Vishwasaraiva Bhawan, Bailey
Road, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Jitendra Kishor Verma, Adv.
Mr. Ayush , Adv.
Mr. Ashok Kr. Sinha No. 2
Mr. Anjani Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Ravi Raj, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Sanjeev Kumar Mishra, GP 21
Mr. Binay Kumar, AC to GP 21
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJ KUMAR
C.A.V JUDGMENT
Date : 27-10-2026
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Jitendra
Kishor Verma, as well as learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State.
RELIEFS
2. The petitioners have preferred the present writ
application, bearing CWJC No. 4865 of 2016, primarily seeking
a writ of certiorari for quashing the letter dated 11.02.2013 and

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letter dated 25.06.2015 issued by PWD Building Constructions
Department, Patna, whereby the lease executed in favour of the
original lessees was proposed to be cancelled on the ground of
non-payment of lease rent after 1992-1993. The petitioners
further sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondent
authorities to mutate the 18 dhurs of leasehold land in their
favour and to execute a renewal of the lease deed for a further
period of 30 years, acting upon the renewal application
submitted on 24.01.2014 on the same terms and conditions as
the original deed dated 30.03.1987.
FACTS
3. The factual matrix giving rise to the present dispute
traces back to 25.02.1956, when land measuring 5 Kathas and 15
Dhurs, designated as Holding No. 252, was originally leased out
in favour of Dr. T. N. Banerjee. Subsequently, in the year 1976, a
family arrangement was arrived at, whereby the said leasehold
property was partitioned into three shares. Pursuant to the said
arrangement, an area of 1 Katha and 8 Dhurs fell jointly to the
share of the nephews of Dr. T. N. Banerjee, namely Hemant
Banerjee and Basant Banerjee, culminating in the creation and
carving out of a new holding designated as Holding No. 252A.
4. Holding No. 252A underwent a further partition in the

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year 1980. Through this partition, the eastern part comprising 18
dhurs fell to the share of Hemant Kumar, while the western part
comprising 10 dhurs fell to the share of Basant Kumar Banerjee,
whose son is Subir Kumar Banerjee. On 06.09.1986, the
Government of Bihar granted permission to renew the original
1956 lease deed for a subsequent period of 30 years, effective
from 24.02.1986 to 24.02.2016. The relevant letter No. 5645 is
marked as Annexure -1 to the writ application. Pursuant to this,
on 30.03.1987, the Executive Engineer, Patna, executed a lease
deed jointly in favour of Hemant Banerjee and Subir Banerjee
for the 1 Katha and 8 dhurs of land at an annual rent of Rs. 22
for a 30-year term.
5. On 08.06.1988, Hemant Kumar sought permission from
the authorities to transfer his leasehold rights of 18 dhurs in
favour of grandfather of petitioner no.1, Tarkeshwar Prasad,
which was duly granted. The Executive Engineer took
cognizance of this transfer request, recording it on dairy dated
11.07.1988. The relevant document is marked as Annexure-3 to
the writ application . The receipt was issued in favour of
Tarkeshwar Prasad for the joint lease rent for the years 1987 and
1988, along with a 25% of the yearly rent required to be
deposited prior to the transfer of the leasehold rights.
6. Following the requisite permissions, Hemant Kumar

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executed a transfer deed on 20.07.1988. This deed jointly
transferred his leasehold land of 18 Dhurs in favour of
Tarkeshwar Prasad and his grandson, petitioner no.1. The
relevant document is marked as Annexure-5 to the writ
application . Information regarding this transfer was
communicated to the Executive Engineer on 06.11.1990,
whereupon a copy of the conveyance deed was requested.
Tarkeshwar Prasad furnished the requested copy along with the
permission letter on 03.06.1995.
7. The record reveals that between 1988 and 2013,
Tarkeshwar Prasad submitted repeated representations before the
Executive Engineer seeking execution of the lease deed and
mutation of the subject 18 Dhurs of leasehold land in his favour.
In order to liquidate the outstanding dues, he tendered a Demand
Draft dated 03.06.2008 for a sum of Rs. 470/- towards lease rent
for the period 1989–1990 to 2008–2009, inclusive of interest at
the rate of 10% per annum; receiving no response, he forwarded
a subsequent Demand Draft dated 14.10.2008 for Rs. 600/-,
requesting return of the earlier draft if the tendered amount was
found deficient (brought on record as Annexures 7 and 8). The
department retained the Demand Draft for Rs. 600/- and returned
the draft of Rs. 470/- under departmental instructions.
Thereafter, pursuant to the department’s communication dated

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28.02.2009 and the subsequent requests dated 12.12.2008 and
07.03.2013, a further payment of Rs. 1,360/- was deposited
through three bank drafts, demonstrating consistent steps taken
on behalf of the petitioners to secure execution of the lease deed
and rebutting the allegation of default in payment of rent.
8. Despite retaining the lease rent, the Executive Engineer,
on 11.02.2013, issued a letter to the vendor of the petitioners
stating that the lease in their favour was being cancelled on the
grounds of non-payment of lease rent after the period of 1992-
1993.The relevant document is marked as Annexure-12 to the
writ application.
9. Tarkeshwar Prasad passed away on 12.09.2013.
Following his demise, the petitioners submitted representations
dated 24.01.2014 and 01.04.2015 vide Annexure 15 before the
respondent authorities, specifically bringing the factum of his
death on record along with his death certificate. Notwithstanding
the submission of the said death certificate, the respondent
authorities proceeded to issue Letter No. 3012 dated 21.07.2014
in the name of the deceased Tarkeshwar Prasad Singh,
purportedly conferring leasehold rights on the terms stipulated in
the 1987 joint lease deed, which eventually culminated in the
issuance of the communication marked as Annexure-16 , also

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erroneously issued vide the name of the deceased.
10. However, shortly thereafter, Petitioner No. 2 received
Letter No. 2931 dated 25.06.2015, issued by Respondent No. 3
(Executive Engineer) marked as Annexure-12 to the writ
application. This communication proposed the cancellation of
the lease and threatened eviction with the aid of the District
Magistrate and police, reasoning that the lease deed contained no
provision allowing the leasehold rights to devolve upon a son or
grandson for the residual period following the original
transferee's demise.
11. It is further the case of the petitioners that they have
been subjected to discriminatory treatment by Respondent No. 3.
It is stated that while the formal execution of the lease deed in
favour of the petitioners remained pending for over 27 years, the
respondent authorities granted permission to the joint
leaseholder, Subir Banerjee, to construct a multistoried (G+5)
building over his respective share of the freehold land and utilize
his 10-dhur portion of the leasehold land as a setback and
common access area. In support of their claim for the renewal
and execution of the lease, the petitioners also rely upon a spot
inspection report dated 04.01.1988, prepared by the then Chief
Engineer, wherein it was reportedly observed that the 18 dhurs
of land in question was of no practical use to the Building

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Construction Department.
12. Aggrieved by the prolonged pendency of their
representations, the alleged discriminatory treatment meted out
by the respondent authorities, the imminent threat of
dispossession, and the issuance of the impugned
communications namely, Letter No. 468 dated 11.02.2013 and
Memo No. 2931 dated 25.06.2015 ( vide Annexure-12 Series)
proposing cancellation of the lease,the petitioners have invoked
the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. By way of the present writ petition,
the petitioners primarily prayed for the quashing of the aforesaid
impugned communications dated 11.02.2013 and 25.06.2015; a
direction commanding the respondent authorities to transfer and
renew the leasehold rights in favour of Petitioner No. 1 for a
further period of thirty years with effect from 25.02.2016 to
24.02.2046 upon execution and registration of a fresh lease deed,
and an appropriate order restraining the respondents from
forcefully evicting the petitioners or creating any third-party
encumbrance over the subject leasehold premises.
Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
respondent authorities have falsely asserted ignorance regarding

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the death of Tarkeshwar Prasad Singh to explain why the
approval for execution was belatedly issued in the name of a
dead person. It is contended that Petitioner No. 1 had already
apprised the concerned authorities by submitting detailed
representations on 24.01.2014 and 01.04.2015 , duly enclosing
the death certificate of the deceased. Consequently, the
authorities are legally estopped from pleading ignorance of his
demise. The relevant document is marked as Annexure -15
series to the writ application
14. Refuting the stand of the State that the lease dated
06.09.1986 does not contain any covenant extending the right of
lease to the son or grandson of the deceased original lessee,
learned counsel submitted that leasehold interest and the right to
seek execution/renewal of a lease constitute heritable property
that devolves upon and vests in the legal heirs by operation of
law. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the
renewal of lease deed in 1987 part II, clause 2, as reflected in
the recitals which clearly recognizes such right of inheritance.
The relevant paragraph of lease deed is reproduced hereinbelow:
Note:- I n the case of succession by
inheritance no fee as aforesaid shall

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be payable, the person succeeding
shall apply forthwith to the Executive
Engineer, for mutation of names and
such application shall bear the court
fee stamp prescribed by law.
15. It was further submitted that permission had already
been accorded by the authorities in favour of the deceased
Tarkeshwar Prasad Singh vide permission letter No. 155 (Memo
No.155) dated 08.06.1988, which explicitly stipulated the grant
for the remainder of the lease period on the self-same terms and
conditions. The relevant document is marked as Annexure -3 to
this writ application.
16. It was further submitted that respondent no.3 has
permitted Subir Banerjee, the joint leaseholder under the same
lease deed, to construct a G+5 multistoried building on his 10
dhurs , while arbitrarily denying the petitioners even a lease deed
which is clear case of discrimination.
17. Learned counsel next submitted that the parent lease
executed in favour of Hemant Kumar and Subir Banerjee, as
well as the lease in question, contained a specific clause
providing for renewal. In this backdrop, placing reliance upon

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the representation dated 01.04.2015 ( vide Annexure-15 Series ),
it was prayed that the respondent authorities be directed to
execute a fresh lease deed in favour of the petitioner for a further
term of 30 years, running from 25.02.2016 to 24.02.2046.
Judgement relied upon by the petitioners
18. Learned counsel for petitioners have placed reliance
upon the judgement of this court in Parvinder Singh v. Renu
Gautam , (2004) 4 SCC 794, and referred to paragraph 6 of the
judgement which is reproduced hereinbelow:
6. Tenancy is a heritable right unless a legal
bar operating against heritability is shown to
exist. Thus, the one who inherits tenancy
rights also inherits the obligations incurred
by the deceased tenant along with the rights
which he had. It is difficult to accept a
proposition that on death of the tenant his
heirs inherit only rights and not obligations.
If that be so, then the heirs would not be
liable to pay any arrears of rent which were
not paid by the deceased tenant.

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19. Learned counsel for petitioners have further placed
reliance upon the judgement of this court in H.C. Pandey v.
G.C. Paul , (1989) 3 SCC 77, and referred to paragraph 4 of the
judgement which is reproduced hereinbelow:
4. It is now well settled that on the death of
the original tenant, subject to any provision
to the contrary either negativing or limiting
the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on
the heirs of the deceased tenant. The
incidence of the tenancy are the same as
those enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a
single tenancy which devolves on the heirs.
There is no division of the premises or of the
rent payable therefor. That is the position as
between the landlord and the heirs of the
deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs
succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the
present case it appears that the respondent
acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid
rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice
also on behalf of all. In the circumstances,
the notice served on the respondent was

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sufficient. It seems to us that the view taken
in Ramesh Chand Bose [AIR 1977 All 38:
1976 AWC 301: 1976 Ren CJ 380: (1976) 2
ALR 711] is erroneous where the High Court
lays down that the heirs of the deceased
tenant succeed as tenants in common. In our
opinion, the notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act served by the
appellant on the respondent is a valid notice
and therefore the suit must succeed.
20. Learned counsel for petitioners also placed reliance
upon the judgement of this court in Damadilal v. Parashram,
(1976) 4 SCC 855, and referred to paragraph 11 of the
judgement which is reproduced hereinbelow:
11. We find it difficult to appreciate how in
this country we can proceed on the basis that
a tenant whose contractual tenancy has
determined but who is protected against
eviction by the statute, has no right of
property but only a personal right to remain
in occupation, without ascertaining what his

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rights are under the statute. The concept of a
statutory tenant having no estate or property
in the premises which he occupies is derived
from the provisions of the English Rent Acts.
But it is not clear how it can be assumed that
the position is the same in this country
without any reference to the provisions of the
relevant statute. Tenancy has its origin in
contract. There is no dispute that a
contractual tenant has an estate or property
in the subject-matter of the tenancy, and
heritability is an incident of the tenancy. It
cannot be assumed, however, that with the
determination of the tenancy the estate must
necessarily disappear and the statute can
only preserve his status of irremovability and
not the estate he had in the premises in his
occupation. It is not possible to claim that
the “sanctity” of contract cannot be touched
by legislation. It is therefore necessary to
examine the provisions of the Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961

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to find out whether the respondents'
predecessors-in-interest retained a heritable
interest in the disputed premises even after
the termination of their tenancy.
Submission on behalf of respondent no.3 (The Executive
Engineer, Department of Building Constructions, Patna
Division, Bihar)
21. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the
State submitted that the grandfather of Petitioner No.1 died on
12.09.2013 , and during his lifetime, no lease was ever registered
or renewed in his favour. It was contended that since the primary
tenure originating from Hemant Kumar Banerjee lapsed in the
year 2016, no subsisting right survives, and there is no occasion
or statutory obligation for the authorities to renew or execute a
lease in favour of Petitioner No. 1.
22. Learned State counsel further submitted that the
demise of Tarkeshwar Prasad Singh was never formally
communicated to the competent authority through proper
channels. Consequently, the approval order ( vide Annexure-16 )
came to be issued in the name of the deceased purely on account
of bona fide ignorance and lack of notice on part of the

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department.
23. It was lastly contended that because the lease deed
was never registered during the lifetime of the deceased original
applicant, no legally enforceable or heritable leasehold rights
accrued to or devolved upon Petitioner No. 1. Therefore,
Petitioner No. 1 lacks locus standi to maintain the present claim
or seek a writ of mandamus for execution or renewal of a fresh
lease deed.
Conclusion
24. Having perused the materials on record, the rival
contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, and the pleadings
therein, what emerges is that a deed was initially executed in
favour of Hemant and Subir by respondent no.3 on 30.03.1987,
which was duly approved and accordingly registered.
25. In a similar manner, another deed came to be executed
by Hemant kumar in favour of Tarkeshwar Prasad, grandfather
of Petitioner No. 1 (who was also made a co-lessee) on
20.07.1988, upon obtaining requisite permission from the
concerned authorities.
26. Accordingly, the rent in question was duly paid by

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Tarkeshwar Prasad and Petitioner No. 1 as co-lessees; however,
no approval was accorded by the concerned authorities for
registering the deed. In the interregnum, Tarkeshwar Prasad
passed away, and Petitioner No. 1 submitted a representation
before the authorities seeking grant of approval to execute the
lease deed. This representation was never acted upon by the
authorities.
27. On 11.02.2013 notice was issued by the authorities to
Tarkeshwar Prasad, grandfather of Petitioner No. 1, calling upon
him to deposit rent under the threat of lease cancellation. These
directions were duly complied with. Appropriate steps were
taken, and up-to-date payments till 02.03.2013 were cleared;
thus, no arrears of rent remained due or payable either by
Tarkeshwar Prasad or by the co-lessee, Petitioner No. 1. Even
though the lease deed was executed in the year 1986 for a period
of 30 years, the matter was kept pending without any justifiable
reason at the behest of the authorities.
28. Following the demise of Tarkeshwar Prasad on
12.09.2013, the petitioners preferred an application for renewal
before the concerned authorities on 24.01.2014 ( vide Annexure-
15 ), formally bringing the factum of his death on record by

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enclosing his death certificate. Incongruously, seven months
after receiving the said representation, Respondent No. 3 issued
Letter No. 3012 dated 21.07.2014 in favour of the deceased
Tarkeshwar Prasad, according permission for the transfer of
leasehold rights and interest in the 18 Dhurs of land on the same
terms and conditions as contained in the joint lease deed dated
30.03.1987.
29. The State completely failed to appreciate that
Petitioner No. 1, being the legal heir of Tarkeshwar Prasad,
possessed heritable rights that could not be extinguished upon
the death of the original lessee. Having stepped into the shoes of
the original lessee, even if the approval order issued in favour of
the deceased Tarkeshwar Prasad is treated as a nullity qua a dead
person, it remained valid and operative with respect to Petitioner
No. 1. Petitioner No. 1 was not only a legal heir but also a
recognized co-lessee possessing equal rights; consequently, the
lease continued to remain operative until 2016, when upon the
completion of 30 years, the authorities arbitrarily allowed it to
lapse.
30. Furthermore, subsequent to the demise of Tarkeshwar
Prasad and despite the approval granted in 2014 for transfer of

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leasehold right, no notice was issued to the petitioner calling
upon him to renew and execute a fresh lease deed in terms of
Part II , Clause 2 of the original lease deed.
31. In this backdrop, learned counsel for the petitioner
vehemently contended that Petitioner No. 1 has an indefeasible
heritable right upon the demise of his grandfather, the original
lessee Tarkeshwar Prasad, and as such, their case is squarely
governed by clause of the lease deed.
32. The contention of the State that upon the death of the
original lessee Tarkeshwar Prasad, the petitioner had no heritable
rights cannot be sustained, particularly in view of the fact that
the petitioner is a co-lessee.
33. In, Union of India v. N. Murugesan , (2022) 2 SCC
25 , Hon’ble Apex Court held that, the doctrine of approbate and
reprobate squarely applies against the State. Having accepted the
rent and granted approval, the State cannot now turn around and
contend that no heritable rights exist under Part II, Clause 2 of
the lease deed date 30.03.1987.
34. In Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar,
(2007) 11 SCC 447 , the Supreme Court clearly laid down the

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rule that if a legal duty or obligation is cast upon a party and
they fail to perform it, they cannot be allowed to take benefit of
the situation created by their own fault. The Court based this on
the well-settled legal maxim commodum ex injuria sua nemo
habere debet, which simply means that no party can take undue
advantage of their own wrong.
35. Applying this settled law to the present case, the State
authorities themselves failed in their duty by delaying the
execution of the lease deed for decades. They cannot now be
permitted to use their own delay and inaction as a weapon to
cancel the lease and deny the lawful rights of the petitioners.
36. Therefore, after granting the requisite approval, the
State failed to appreciate that the said approval operated to the
benefit of the co-lessee and legal heir of Tarkeshwar Prasad, who
had effectively stepped into the shoes of the original lessee.
When the Government accorded approval in 1988 in favour of
Tarkeshwar Prasad and the co-lessee, it implicitly accepted them
as its tenants and recognized the legal rights of the grandson
under the guardianship of his father (Petitioner No. 2). As a
corollary, the assignment vide letter dated 08.06.1988 became
legally valid and continued in force until 24.02.2016.

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37. The record reveals that the respondent authorities
issued the impugned letters dated 11.02.2013 and 25.06.2015,
proposing to cancel the lease deed. The proposed cancellation
was premised on two distinct grounds: firstly, the alleged non-
payment of lease rent, which was paid and also representation
was made to respondent no.3 explaining payment of rent with
calculation chart for period 1993-1994 to 24.02.2016 was duly
made to Respondent no.3, vide Annexure -13 . Secondly, the
contention that no leasehold rights devolve upon the son or
grandson under the terms of the original lease deed was wholly
misconceived. These communications have understandably
created a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the petitioners
that if these letters are left outstanding, they will cause serious
injury to their settled rights and lead to arbitrary eviction.
38. In this context, the underlying equitable principle of
Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 becomes highly
relevant. The legislative intent of this provision is clear: it
empowers any person against whom a written instrument is void
or voidable to seek its cancellation, provided they have a
reasonable apprehension that the continued existence of such an
instrument will cause them serious injury. Applying this
principle to the present facts, since the impugned cancellation

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letters are legally unsustainable and pose a direct threat to the
recognized, inheritable co-lessee rights of the petitioners, this
Court is fully empowered to adjudge such communications
invalid and order their quashing to prevent any grave
miscarriage of justice. The section 31(1) of the Specific relief act
is reproduced hereinbelow:
1) Any person against whom a written instrument is
void or voidable, and who has reasonable
apprehension that such instrument, if left
outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue
to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court
may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to
be delivered up and cancelled.
39. In view of the admitted facts, the impugned letter
dated 11.02.2013 has become infructuous following the demise
of Tarkeshwar Prasad, requiring no formal order of quashing
from this Court. However, the subsequent communication dated
25.06.2015 continues to hold the field. Therefore, the challenge
to this communication warrants active adjudication, especially
given the petitioners' grievance that they have been wrongfully
denied their heritable rights in terms of Clause 2, Part II of the

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lease deed dated 30.03.1987.
40. In Suresh Kumar Kohli v. Rakesh Jain , (2018) 6
SCC 708 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly explained that
when a person holds a specific and separate share in a leasehold
property, their rights do not simply end or pass to the surviving
co-owners upon their death. Instead, their specific share legally
and safely passes on to their own legal heirs. Applying this
binding judgment to the present case, the lease right of Late
Tarkeshwar Prasad over the 18 dhurs of land is
unquestionably a heritable right. Since there is no statutory or
contractual condition barring this, his rights naturally and
legally devolve upon his legal heirs . Furthermore, the record
reveals that the other legal heirs of the deceased have explicitly
relinquished their respective rights and interests in the said
property in favour of the grandsons, namely Siddharth Kumar
Singh and Aditya Kumar Singh (Petitioner No. 1), as evidenced
by Annexure-18. Therefore, the State’s argument that the
grandson cannot hold or inherit the lease rights is legally
incorrect and cannot be accepted.
41. Moreover, the conduct of the authorities has been
thoroughly callous and attended with mala fides. No steps were

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taken by them since 1988, and it was only after the demise of
Tarkeshwar Prasad in 2013 that they belatedly proceeded to
grant approval in his favour. The authorities cannot plead
ignorance of his death, as the petitioner had already submitted a
representation enclosing the death certificate prior to the
issuance of the approval.
42. In the opinion of this Court, such action on the part of
the State authorities is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, and in
complete violation of the lawful rights of the petitioners.
43. Thus, this Court holds that Petitioner No. 1 not only
possessed an inheritable right in terms of Part II, Clause 2 of the
original sale deed of 1987, but was simultaneously vested with
the status of a co-lessee. This right was explicitly recognized by
the State firstly, by granting permission in the year 1988, and
secondly, vide the communication dated 21.07.2014 (Annexure-
16), which was issued even after the demise of his grandfather.
44. The respondent authorities completely lost sight of the
fact that while an approval granted in the name of a deceased
person may be a nullity in the eyes of law, such an anomaly does
not extinguish or prejudice the independent rights of Petitioner
No. 1. Being a co-lessee possessed of heritable rights, Petitioner

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No. 1 had legally stepped into the shoes of the original lessee.
Furthermore, applying the doctrine of approbate and reprobate,
the State cannot now be permitted to take a contradictory stand
to deny him his rightful claims. Therefore, the authorities had no
justifiable occasion or legal basis to refuse the execution of a
fresh lease deed in favour of Petitioner No. 1 on the self-same
terms and conditions as the original lease deed of 1987. This is
especially true given that Respondent No. 3 had already granted
approval for the transfer in favour of the deceased on identical
terms vide Letter dated 21.07.2014 (Annexure-16).
45. What has to be considered in this matter is that the
authorities kept the execution of the lease on hold for almost 27
years, thereby depriving the deceased as well as the petitioner
from proceeding with the execution of the deed without any
rhyme or reason. The fact that the authorities ultimately granted
approval for transfer of leasehold right vide Annexure-16 in
favour of the deceased automatically accrued to the benefit of
the co-lessee, Petitioner No. 1. Thus, issuing the impugned
notice after the death of the deceased, and proposing cancellation
on the misconceived ground that no inheritable rights had
accrued in favour of Petitioner No. 1, was entirely arbitrary and
untenable, especially in light of Section 45 of the Transfer of

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Property Act, 1882.
46. The stand of the authorities that no inheritable right
existed under the original deed stands completely demolished by
Clause 2, Part II of the renewed lease of 1986. This clause
categorically mentioned that no fee would be levied for claims
by inheritance, cementing the position that Petitioner No. 2
(father of Tarkeshwar Prasad) was a Class-I legal heir, and
Petitioner No. 1 (being the grandson) was another rightful legal
heir as well as a co-lessee.
47. Hence, the respondent authorities are legally bound to
act upon and comply with their own communication issued vide
Annexure-16, wherein they had, in unequivocal terms, granted
approval for the transfer in favour of the deceased, Tarkeshwar
Prasad. Consequently, this right legally extended to Petitioner
No. 1, who was not merely a co-lessee but also a co-owner.
However, the said transfer could not be formally executed solely
on account of the unfortunate demise of Tarkeshwar Prasad.
48. A citizen cannot be arbitrarily deprived of their
property, which enjoys constitutional protection under Article
300A of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the lawful
enjoyment of the property has been impeded by the authorities

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on account of their callous, arbitrary, discriminatory, and mala
fide actions.
49. Thus, the transfer dated 20.07.1988 was not an
unauthorized transaction; it was followed by requisite
permission from competent authorities and the continuous
payment of rent. Yet, the execution never became a reality, and
the belated objection regarding inheritance was completely
inconsistent with the lease clauses. The public authorities acted
arbitrarily to the legal framework and cannot now be permitted
to saddle their administrative failures upon the Petitioner No. 1,
who, by virtue of transfer, inheritance, and his status as a co-
lessee, acquired a vested right that had to be honoured by
granting approval for execution.
50. In light of the aforesaid discussions and taking into
consideration the entire materials available on record, the
impugned letter dated 25.06.2015 ( vide Annexure-12 ) is hereby
quashed, specifically to the extent of the denial of the heritable
rights of Petitioner No. 1 by the respondent authorities.
51. Accordingly, in terms of relief sought in para 3(ii) of
this writ petition, this Court directs the respondent authorities to
consider and take a decision regarding execution of fresh lease

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deed in favour of Petitioner No.1, strictly in accordance with the
terms and conditions applicable to the original lease, within a
period of four months from the date of receipt or production of a
copy of this order and till then the possession of the petitioners
shall not be disturbed.
52. When the authorities proceed to decide upon the
execution and of new lease it shall duly consider:
i Original lease terms and condition dated 30.03.1987
ii Transfer permission dated 08.06.1988
iii Transfer deed dated 20.07.1988
iv The inheritance clause in the deed dated 30.03.1987
v Status of the Petitioner no. 1 as a legal heir and a co-
lessee
vi The absence of any rent dues
vii The unwarranted and prolonged delay in approving the
execution of the deed.
viii The final approval granted vide Annexure -16 dated
21.07.2014.

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The respondent authorities are hereby directed to consider the
petitioner’s claim for the lease in light of the aforesaid
observations and pass a reasoned and speaking order, which
shall be duly communicated to Petitioner No. 1. Considering that
the matter has remained pending for more than a decade, the said
exercise shall be concluded expeditiously, preferably within the
time stipulated above from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order, with Petitioner No. 1 rendering all necessary cooperation
and submitting further documentation as may be requisitioned.
In the event the authorities fail to conclude the proceedings
within the stipulated timeframe, the petitioner shall be at liberty
to approach this Court again for the redressal of his grievances.
53. In view of the discussions/observations made above
writ petition stands allowed.
54. Pending Interlocutory Applications (I.A.s), if any, also
stand disposed of accordingly.

(Raj Kumar, J)
ashutosh/-
AFR/NAFR A.F.R
CAV DATE 05.10.2026
Uploading Date 27.10.2026
Transmission Date 27.10.2026