Baljit Singh vs The Chief Administrator Ias Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board And Others

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RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --2--
Appeals shall stand disposed of as they involve common question of law and
fact. For the sake of brevity, the facts are being culled out from RSA-4295
of 2025 (O&M).
2. By way of the present appeal, challenge has been laid to the
judgment and decree dated 10.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional
District Judge, Bhiwani (hereinafter referred to as the "First Appellate
Court" ), whereby an appeal filed at the instance of the defendants-
respondents, as also cross-objections filed at the instance of the plaintiff-
appellant, against the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2017 passed by the
learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhiwani (hereinafter
referred to as the "Trial Court" ), decreeing the suit for declaration filed by
the plaintiff to the extent of holding him entitled to regularisation of service
w.e.f. 18.06.2014 while declining the same w.e.f. 01.10.2003, were both
dismissed, thereby affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned
Trial Court in its entirety.
FACTS
3. Briefly stating, plaintiff-Baljit Singh filed a suit for declaration
claiming that he joined the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board,
Bhiwani, on 01.01.2000 as a Road Roller Driver on daily-wage basis against
a vacant and sanctioned post. After the road rollers became non-functional,
he was retained as a Peon on daily-wage basis. It was pleaded that the
plaintiff rendered satisfactory service since 01.01.2000 and thus was entitled
to regularisation under the Haryana Government notifications dated
01.10.2003 and 18.06.2014. It was further pleaded that 85 Class-IV posts
were created for regularisation of daily-wage employees and that several
posts were lying vacant in the Board. It was also averred that his juniors
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were regularised under the aforesaid policies but the case of the plaintiff was
not considered. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought a declaration that he was
entitled to regularisation as Peon w.e.f. 01.10.2003, with consequential
benefits and arrears of pay and allowances along with interest @ 12% per
annum. In the alternative, he sought regularisation w.e.f. 28.05.2014 under
the policy dated 18.06.2014. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff is
legally entitled to minimum of pay-scale and dearness allowance for ten
years w.e.f. 01.01.2010, along with consequential benefits and interest and
prayed for a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to grant
the aforesaid benefits.
4. Upon notice, the defendants appeared and filed their joint
written statement while taking preliminary objections like lack of
maintainability, lack of locus standi , lack of cause of action, lack of non-
joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties etc. On merits, the suit was
resisted mainly on the ground that the plaintiff did not approach the Court
with clean hands and suppressed true and material facts. It was pleaded that
the plaintiff was not appointed against a regular post and that he was
engaged through a contractual agency and therefore, was not entitled for
regularisation. As such, prayed for dismissal of the suit.
5. Replication to the written statement was filed. On the basis of
the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the following
issues:-
“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for
declaration alongwith consequential relief of mandatory
injunction? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi and cause of
action to file the present suit? OPD
3. Whether the present suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-
joinder of necessary parties? OPD
4. Whether the plaintiff has not approached the court with
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RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --4--
clean hands and suppressed true and material facts?
OPD
5. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to try and
decide the present suit? OPD
6. Relief?”
6. The learned Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated
28.09.2017, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff while holding that he is
legally entitled to regularization w.e.f. 18.06.2014 with all consequential
benefits like arrears of pay and allowances etc. along with interest @ 12%
per annum from the date of accrual till actual realization. The claim for
regularisation w.e.f. 01.10.2003 was declined on the ground that the
plaintiff's case could not be considered at the appropriate time due to
administrative reasons.
7. Aggrieved thereof, the respondents-defendants preferred an
appeal whereas the appellant-plaintiff filed cross-objections confining his
claim to the extent that regularisation from 01.10.2003 was declined. Both
the appeal and the cross-objections came to be dismissed by the learned First
Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 10.10.2025, while
affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court in its
entirety, and additionally holding that the policy of 01.10.2003 was "no more
existing" on the date of institution of the suit (13.10.2015) and that only the
policy of 18.06.2014, being subsisting on that date, could be given effect to.
CONTENTIONS
ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF
8. Impugning the aforesaid judgments & decrees passed by both
learned Courts below, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
concurrent findings recorded, insofar as they decline regularization of the
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services of the appellant w.e.f. 01.10.2003 along with consequential arrears
of pay and allowances with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of
accrual till actual payment, are contrary to the evidence on record and are,
therefore, liable to be set aside. It has been submitted that once it stands
admitted through DW1 that the appellant fulfilled every condition prescribed
under the policy dated 01.10.2003, and that a substantial number of the 85
sanctioned Class-IV posts remained vacant, the bare recital of
"administrative reasons" cannot defeat an entitlement that had already
accrued in favour of the appellant. It has further been submitted that the
respondents cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own default in
implementing the 2003 policy within a reasonable time by taking shelter
behind the subsequent policy of 2014. Thus, he prays that the judgments and
decrees passed by the learned Courts below, to the extent they decline
regularization of the appellant's services w.e.f. 01.10.2003, were liable to be
set aside, and that the present appeal deserves to be allowed.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS
9. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents-defendants submits that the judgments and decrees passed by
both the learned Courts below were based on proper appreciation of the
material facts and the relevant rules, and thus call for no interference. It has
been submitted that the policy dated 01.10.2003 stood superseded and was
no longer in existence either on the date of institution of the suit or
thereafter, and that the appellant was rightly extended the benefit of
regularisation only under the subsisting policy dated 18.06.2014. It is
submitted that the present appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
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DISCUSSION AND REASONING
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the paper-book as well as the complete records provided by the learned
counsel for the appellant-plaintiff.
11. The claim in the present appeal being confined to regularisation
of the appellant's services w.e.f. 01.10.2003 and the consequential benefits
flowing therefrom, the only question that falls for determination is whether
the learned Courts below were justified in declining regularisation from that
date while granting it w.e.f. 18.06.2014.
12. Admittedly, the appellant joined the services of respondents as
Road Roller Driver on 01.01.2000 and the claim for regularization of his
services was made in terms of policy dated 01.10.2003. In view of the
findings recorded by the Courts below there is no dispute that the appellant-
plaintiff fulfilled the requirements of policy dated 01.10.2003 for
regularization of his services. However, his services were regularized in
terms of subsequent policy/instruction dated 18.06.2014 w.e.f. the date of
policy along with other consequential benefits of arrears of pay and
allowances with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accrual till
actual realization. The benefit of regularization in terms of policy dated
01.10.2003, has been declined for the following reasons:-
“(i) The regularization of services of the respondent-
plaintiff w.e.f. 01.10.2003 cannot be granted as his case could
not be considered at appropriate time due to administrative
reasons.
(ii) Policy of 01.10.2003 has been subsequently render
ineffective by virtue of coming into force of other policies in this
regard.”
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12.1. In the humble opinion of this Court, the aforesaid two reasons
are legally unsustainable. Taking up the first reason, that the case of the
appellant could not be considered due to administrative reasons, the mere
mentioning of administrative reasons, without any further description or
particulars, cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated as a certificate
sufficient to deny the claim of regularization of services of the appellant-
plaintiff w.e.f. 01.10.2003, especially when, against 85 sanctioned Class-IV
posts, only a fraction had been filled and 49 vacancies still remained, as
admitted by DW1 himself in his cross-examination. A vague and
unparticularised assertion of administrative difficulty is not a substitute for a
specific and justiciable explanation, and it cannot be permitted to defeat a
benefit that had already accrued to the appellant on his fulfilling every
condition of the 2003 policy.
13. As regards the second reason, that the policy of 01.10.2003 was
subsequently rendered ineffective by the coming into force of the policy
dated 18.06.2014, this premise does not survive scrutiny of the record. A
Coordinate Bench of this Court, in Ashish Sharma and others v. State of
Haryana and others , CWP-2158-2020 and connected cases, vide decision
dated 13.03.2024, upon examining the State's own record, held that the
policies dated 17.06.1997, 05.11.1999, 01.10.2003 and 10.02.2004, though
rescinded on 13.04.2007, were revived by the notification dated 18.06.2014
itself, the very notification relied upon by the respondents in the present
case. This finding stands independently reinforced by the Hon’ble Division
Bench of this Court in State of Haryana and others v. Balwinder Singh and
others , LPA No. 688 of 2021 and other connected cases, decided on
02.12.2022, which, examining the same Government communication dated
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21.12.2018, held that the State had itself kept a window open for these
policies to be applied to persons not yet regularised, and that it did not lie in
its mouth to contend that they stood withdrawn. The relevant portion of
Balwinder Singh’s case (supra) judgment is reproduced hereunder:-
“Thus, we are of the considered opinion that a window had been
kept open by the State that the policies dated 17.06.1997,
05.11.1999, 01.10.2003, 10.02.2004 were to be applied to persons
who had not been regularized and, therefore, it does not lie in the
mouth of the counsel for the State to argue that the policies stood
withdrawn. The learned Single Judges were justified in issuing
directions for consideration. As noticed above the claim is based on
a legal right for seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus and in such
circumstances it cannot be said that the learned Single Judges were
in error in allowing the writ petitions. Accordingly, the appeals filed
by the State are dismissed. All pending civil miscellaneous
applications, if any, are also disposed of.”
Therefore, the policy dated 01.10.2003 was never rendered
ineffective by the 2014 notification; it was revived by it, and the second
reason assigned by the learned First Appellate Court cannot be sustained.
13.1. Even otherwise, and independent of the above, once the
respondents-defendants failed to discharge the obligation cast upon them
under the 2003 policy within a reasonable time, despite the appellant's
admitted eligibility and the admitted availability of vacant sanctioned posts,
the subsequent notification of 2014 cannot be taken as a defence to non-suit
an otherwise eligible beneficiary of the earlier policy. A right that has
already accrued cannot be extinguished merely because the department
chose not to act upon it before a new policy came into force; the
responsibility to identify, consider, and regularise eligible employees such as
the appellant rested squarely upon the respondents, and their failure to
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RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --9--
discharge it in time cannot now be turned to his detriment. Administrative
inaction of this kind cannot be converted into a tool to deprive a workman of
his accrued rights, for that would allow the State to take advantage of its
own wrong, an outcome wholly impermissible in constitutional
jurisprudence.
13.2. The conclusion recorded above finds further doctrinal support
in the well-established principle of accrued or crystallised rights, which
holds that once an employee fulfils all the conditions of a policy while it is
in operation, the benefit ceases to be contingent and becomes a vested
entitlement. In the humble opinion of this Court, a subsequent withdrawal or
supersession of that policy cannot retrospectively defeat such a vested
entitlement. Applying this principle, the appellant, having fulfilled every
condition prescribed under the 2003 policy prior to the cut-off date of
30.09.2003 fixed therein, had his right crystallised in his favour on that very
date, well before either the 2014 notification or the institution of the present
suit came into the picture. Regularization from that date is accordingly a
legal consequence flowing from this crystallised right, and not an equitable
indulgence granted at the Court's discretion; it merely gives effect to a right
that already stood vested, restoring the appellant to the position he would
have lawfully occupied had the respondents discharged their obligations in a
timely manner.
13.3. This also disposes of the reasoning that the 2003 policy could
not be given effect to merely because it was not "existing" on the date of
institution of the suit (13.10.2015). A suit for declaration does not create the
right, it only enforces a right that already exists, and the suit filed in 2015
was merely a step to enforce a right that had already crystallised in 2003, not
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the origin of that right. Whether the 2003 policy remained in force on the
date of filing is, therefore, immaterial. If this reasoning were accepted, an
employee's right, once accrued, would depend entirely on how long the
respondents could delay him before he was forced to approach the Court,
and that cannot be the correct position in law.
14. It is also relevant to notice that the appellant's own juniors,
namely Sh. Rajesh Kumar, Sh. Satpal and Sh. Rajbir, were regularised by the
very same Board under the policy dated 01.10.2003, while the appellant,
despite being equally, if not more, eligible, was left out. The respondents
have not been able to point out any legally sustainable distinction between
the appellant and those juniors who have already been regularized under the
very same policy. Such selective application of policy results in hostile
discrimination and creates an unreasonable classification devoid of any
rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Equality before law
requires that persons similarly situated must be treated alike, and any State
action which suffers from such arbitrariness is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State
of Tamil Nadu , (1974) 4 SCC 3, held that arbitrariness is the very negation
of equality. This position finds direct application to service jurisprudence in
Hari Nandan Prasad v. Employer I/R to FCI , (2014) 7 SCC 190, where the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“However, wherever it is found that similarly situated
workmen are regularised by the employer itself under some
scheme or otherwise and the workmen in question who have
approached Industrial/Labour Court are at par with them,
direction of regularization in such cases may be legally
justified, otherwise, non-regularization of the left over
workers itself would amount to invidious discrimination qua
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them in such cases and would be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Thus, the Industrial adjudicator would be
achieving the equality by upholding Article 14, rather than
violating this constitutional provision.”
15. The State, as a model employer, is constitutionally bound to act
fairly, reasonably, and with sensitivity toward its employees. Denying the
appellant regularization w.e.f. 01.10.2003, when the very same benefit was
extended to his similarly situated juniors from that date, would render the
promise of equality illusory and would legitimize a course of conduct that is
arbitrary, discriminatory and constitutionally impermissible.
15.1 For the reasons recorded above, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the policy dated 01.10.2003 was neither rendered ineffective by
the subsequent notification dated 18.06.2014, nor could the respondents'
own default in implementing it within a reasonable time be used to defeat a
right that had already accrued and crystallised in favour of the appellant. The
denial of regularisation w.e.f. 01.10.2003, when the appellant's own juniors
stood regularised under the very same policy, is accordingly unsustainable in
law.
RELIEF
16. Accordingly, both appeals are allowed and the findings recorded
by the learned Courts below to the extent they decline regularisation of the
appellants services w.e.f. 01.10.2003, are hereby set aside. The appellant(s)-
plaintiff(s) are held entitled for regularization of their services w.e.f. 01.10.2003
with all consequential benefits including pay fixation/refixation of
pay/increments etc. from the said date along with interest @ 12% per annum
from the date of accrual till actual realization. The respondents are directed to
release the aforesaid benefits to the appellant(s) within three months from the
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date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
17. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
18 A copy of this order be placed on the file of the connected
appeal.
10.09.2026 (HARKESH MANUJA)
sonika
JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes Whether reportable: Yes
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