Kanpur Development Authority vs Hakkim Singh And 4 Others

A.F.R
Reserved On: 21.08.2026
Delivered On: 27.10.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 35471 of 2025
Kanpur Development Authority
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Hakkim Singh and 4 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Abhinava Krishna Srivastava
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Digvijay Kumar Mishra, Shreya
Gupta
Connected With:-
(1) Writ C No. 35353 of 2025 (Kanpur Development Authority Through its Vice
Chairman Vs. Ram Avtar Pal (Deceased) and 7 others)
(2) Writ C No. 6679 of 2026 (Kanpur Development Authority Vs. Madan Mohan
Singh and others)
Court No. - 40
HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
HON'BLE SUDHANSHU CHAUHAN, J.
(Delivered by Hon’ble Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.)
1. Heard Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel assisted
by Shri Abhinava Krishan Srivastava, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Shri Ashok Srivastava and Shri Digvijay Kumar
Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. As the three writ petitions arise out of proceedings under the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter

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referred to as, the Act, 1976, and involve the same legal question,
hence, all three writ petitions are being decided by this common
judgment and order.
WRIT C No. 35353 of 2025.
3. The facts of the case are that the original tenure holder,
despite notice under the Act, 1976, did not file a ceiling return.
Consequently, the competent authority got a survey made and
prepared a draft treatment, which was sent along with notice dated
05.07.1979 under Section 8(3) of the Act, 1976, through registered
post. As the tenure holder did not file any objection to the notice,
the order under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976, was passed on
20.07.1983, by means of which 6,632.61sq m of land was declared
as vacant surplus. Thereafter, the final statement under Section 9,
dated 31.08.1985, was sent to the tenure holder. After the
publication of the notification under Section 10(1) and Section
10(3) in the State Gazette, notice under Section 10(5) dated
21.04.1990 was issued. Subsequently, the possession of the land in
dispute was taken on 12.11.1991 and handed over to the Kanpur
Development Authority. The land in dispute was also recorded in
the name of Kanpur Development Authority in the revenue records.
The respondents at no point in time had challenged the proceedings
initiated under the Act, 1976. In the meanwhile, the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to
as, ‘the Act, 1999’) came into force in the State of U.P. on
18.3.1999.However, it is only sometime in the year 2009 that the
private respondents had filed an appeal under Section 33 of the Act,
1976, before the District Judge, Kanpur, against the order dated
20.07.1983 passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976. In the
appeal it was admitted that the original land holder had passed away
on 21.02.1994 and also that the provisions of the Act, 1976 were not

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applicable to the land in dispute. The learned District Judge, by
means of the impugned judgment and order dated 24.12.2024, had
disposed of the appeal while arriving at a finding that record does
not support the contention of actual transfer of the land in dispute
from the original tenure holder to the State,hence,the appeal is
liable to be abated.
WRIT C No.35471 of 2025.
4. The facts of the case are that the original tenure holder, had
filed a ceiling return consequently, the competent authority sent a
notice under Section 8(3) dated 28.05.1979. However, as no
objections were filed by the tenure holder, order under Section 8(4)
was passed on 30.10.1982, thereby declaring 16676.46 sq m of land
as vacant surplus. Thereafter, notice dated 16.11.1984 under Section
9 containing the final statement was issued through registered post.
Subsequently, after publication of notices under Section 10(1) and
Section 10(3) in the State Gazette, a notice dated 19.04.1990 was
issued under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1976. The possession of the
land in dispute was taken on 12.11.991 and handed over to the
Kanpur Development Authority. The land in dispute was also
recorded in the name of Kanpur Development Authority in the
revenue records. The private respondents at no point in time had
challenged the proceedings initiated under the Act, 1976. In the
meanwhile, the Repeal Act,1999 came into force in the State of U.P.
on 18.3.1999. However, it is only some time in the year 2011 that
the private respondents had filed an appeal under Section 33 of the
Act, 1976, before the District Judge, Kanpur, against the order dated
30.10.1982 passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976. In the
appeal it was admitted that notice under Section 11 of the Act, 1976
was served on the land holder on 10.12.2003. The learned District
Judge, by means of the impugned judgment and order dated

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24.12.2024, had disposed of the appeal while arriving at the finding
that the record does not support the contention of actual transfer of
the land in dispute from the original landholder to the State, hence,
the appeal is liable to be abated.
WRIT C No. 6679 of 2026.
5. The facts of the case are that the original tenure holder had
filed a ceiling return. Consequently, a draft statement, was sent
through notice dated 09.02.1979 under Section 8(3) of the Act,1976.
However, as no objections were filed by the tenure holder, an order
under Section 8(4) was passed on 11.09.1979, declaring 9242.50 sq
m of land as vacant surplus. Subsequently, notice under Section 9
dated 14.08.1978 containing the final statement was sent to the
tenure holder through registered post. After publication of
notifications under Section 10(1) and Section 10(3) in the State
Gazette, a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act 1976 was issued on
28.10.1985. In pursuance thereto, the possession of the land in
dispute was taken on 20.02.1986. Thereafter, the possession of the
land in dispute was transferred to the Kanpur Development
Authority. The tenure holder at no point in time had challenged the
proceedings under the Act, 1976. In the meanwhile, the Repeal
Act,1999 was enforced in the State of UP on 18.03.1999. It was
only sometime in the year 2013, that the private respondents had
filed an appeal under Section 33 of the Act 1976 before the District
Judge, Kanpur against the order dated 11.09.1979 passed under
Section 8(4) of the Act 1976. In the appeal it was admitted that the
land holder came to know about the revenue entries in respect of the
land in dispute in the name of the State on 16.05.2000. The learned
District Judge, by means of the impugned judgment and order dated
24.12.2024, had disposed of the appeal with the finding that the
record does not support the contention of actual transfer of the land

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in dispute from the original tenure holder to the State
Government ,hence, the appeal is liable to be abated.
6. Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant while challenging the impugned judgments
dated 24.12.2024 passed by the learned District Judge, has
submitted that after the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999, in the
State of U.P. on 18.03.1999, the Act, 1976 stood repealed. Further
by virtue of Section 4, all proceedings relating to any order made or
purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately
before the commencement of the repeal Act stood abated, and as
such, the provisions of Section 4 would be squarely applicable to
appeals filed under Section 33 of the Act, 1976. Further, Section 3
of the Repeal Act, 1999, contains the saving clause. Thus, the
perusal of the scheme of the Repeal Act, 1999 itself shows that the
pending appeals under Section 33 of the Act 1976 stood abated.
Under the circumstances, there was no question of entertaining any
appeal under Section 33 after the enforcement of the Repeal Act
1999.Thus, the proceedings under the Act, 1976, which stood
terminated much prior to the coming into force of the Repeal Act,
1999, could not have been reopened by the learned District Judge
under Section 33, when the Act 1976, itself still stood repealed. .
Hence, the impugned judgments and orders passed by the learned
District Judge were passed without jurisdiction. The learned
counsel, in support of his contention, relies upon the judgment and
order passed by a coordinate bench of this Court in Writ C No.
62283 or 2012 (State of UP versus Jagdish Chandra).
7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the private
respondents have essentially relied upon the findings of the learned
District Judge in the impugned judgments. It is further contended
that even after the enforcement of the Repeal Act,1999 the right to

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appeal continued to remain available to the respondents in view of
the provisions of Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1887. The
right to appeal, being a substantial right, cannot be taken away
except by a subsequent enactment if it so provides, expressly, or by
necessary intendment, and not otherwise. It is also contended that it
was the case of the appellants that the possession of the land in
dispute had already been taken under the Act, 1976, and under such
circumstances, the original enactment, that is, the Act, 1976, would
continue to govern the matter in controversy. Under these
circumstances, the proceedings under the Act, 1976, cannot be said
to have been abated. It is also contended that the Apex Court
repeatedly has held that a civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain
disputes arising under the Act, 1976. Under the circumstances, the
respondents could not have been left remediless, and as such, the
only remedy available to the respondents lay under Section 33 of
the Act, 1976. The learned counsel in support of his case has relied
upon the judgment and order passed by a coordinate bench of this
Court in Writ C No. 48613 of 2009 (State of U.P. and another
versus Nek Singh). Besides, it is also contended that the law relied
upon by the appellant in the case of Jagdish Chandra (supra) does
not lay good law.
8. We have considered the contentions made by the respective
parties and are of the view that the only two questions required to
be decided in the present writ petitions are as below:-
(A) Whether, after the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999, the
right to file an appeal under Section 33 of the Act, 1976, against an
order passed under Section 8 (4) of the Act, 1976 by the competent
authority still survives, more so keeping in view the provisions of
Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 ?

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(B) Whether the right to file an appeal under Section 33 of the Act,
1976, is saved under the provisions of Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1997 ?
9. Question No.(A) and Question No.(B) being interrelated, are
being taken up together.
10. Before proceeding any further, it is necessary to look into the
statutory scheme of the Act 1976, more so in the light of the
provisions of the Repeal Act ,1999.
11. The Act, 1976, was enacted to provide for the imposition of a
ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition
of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the
construction of buildings on such land, and for matters connected
therewith with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land
in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering
therein, and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution
of land in urban agglomerations to serve the common good.
12. Under Section 6 of the Act, 1976, persons holding vacant land
in excess of the ceiling limit were required to file a statement.
Section 8 of the Act, 1976 pertained to the preparation of a draft
statement as regards vacant land held in excess of the ceiling limit.
Under Section 8(3), the draft statement was to be served upon the
person concerned, together with a notice stating that any objection
to the draft statement shall be preferred within 30 days of the
service thereof. Under Section 8(4), the competent authority has to
consider any objection received, if any from the person concerned
and pass such orders as it deems fit after giving the objector a
reasonable opportunity of being heard. Section 9 pertains to the
final statement and provides that after disposal of objections, under
Section 8(4), the competent authority shall make the necessary

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alterations in the draft statement in accordance with the orders
passed on the objections and shall determine the vacant land held by
the person concerned in excess of the ceiling limit.
13. Section 10 pertains to acquisition of vacant land in excess of
ceiling limit. Sub section (1) of Section 10 provides that after the
service of statement under Section 9 on the person concerned, the
competent authority shall cause a notification giving particulars of
the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit,
stating that such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned
State Government; and the claims of all persons interested in such
vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents,
giving particulars of the nature of their interest in such lands. The
competent authority, thereafter, under subsection (2) of section 10,
shall consider the claims of persons interested in the vacant land
and shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass
such orders as it deems fit. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 pertains to
vesting absolutely of the vacant land in the State Government, free
from all encumbrances, with effect from the date so specified. Sub-
section (4) of Section 10 prohibits transfer by way of sale,
mortgage, gift, lease, or otherwise, of any excess vacant land, and
also alteration of the use of such vacant land during the period
commencing on the date of publication of the notification under
subsection (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration
made under subsection (3).
14. Subsections (5) and (6 ) pertain to transfer or possession of
the vacant land vested in the State Government and read as under :-
“(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3),
the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in
possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or

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to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty
days of the service of the notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order may under sub-section (5),
the competent authority may taken possession of the vacant land or cause it to be
given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such
State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be
necessary. ”
15. Section 11 pertains to payment of amount for vacant land
acquired. Section 12 pertains to constitution of Urban Land
Tribunal and appeal to Urban Land Tribunal against an order of the
competent authority under Section 11 of the Act, 1976. Section 13
provides for a second appeal to the High Court from the decision of
the Tribunal under Section 12. Section 14 provides for the mode of
payment of amounts to the persons entitled.
16. Section 20 provides for power to exempt to the State
Government, either on its own motion or otherwise to, any person
who holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, having regard
to the location of such land , the purpose for which such land is
being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as
the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or
expedient in the public interest so to do. Besides, the State
Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, may exempt
any person who holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit if it
is satisfied that application of the provisions of Chapter III of the
Act,1976 would cause undue hardship to such person. Further the
State Government can withdraw by order, such exemption if it is
satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption
has been granted are not complied with.
17. Section 33 of the Act ,1976 pertains to an appeal, and the
same reads as under:-

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“33.(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under
this Act, not being an order under section 11 or an order under sub-section (1) of
section 30, may, within thirty-days of the date on which the order is communicated
to him, prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed (hereafter in this
section referred to as the appellate authority):
Provided that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the
said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
(2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the appeal authority shall, after
giving the appellant an opportunity of being hearing, pass such orders thereon as it
deem fit as expeditiously as possible.
(3) Every order passed by the appellate authority under this section shall be final.”
18. Section 34 of the Act,1976 provides for revision before the
State Government.
19. Subsequently, the Repeal Act,1999 was enforced. The
statement of objects and reasons in the Repeal Act ,1999 are very
relevant and read as under :-
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was passed with a laudable
social objective, The main purpose was to prevent concentration of urban land in a
few hands and to provide affordable housing to the Economically Weaker Sections. It
has on the contrary pushed up land prices, practically brought the housing industry to
a stop and provided opportunities for corruption. There is a widespread demand for
removing this irritant to land assembly and construction activity. During the
implementation of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, there have
been a spate of litigations giving rise to serious hurdles in taking over possession of
land, by the State Governments. Public opinion is nearly unanimous that the Act has
failed to achieve its objectives as expected.
2. Parliament has no power to repeal or amend the Act unless resolutions are passed
by two or more State Legislatures as required under clause (2) of article 252. The
Legislatures of Haryana and Punjab have passed resolutions empowering Parliament
to repeal the Act in those States. The Act stands repealed in those States and in the

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Union territories immediately after promulgation of the repeal Ordinance and
subsequently if State Legislatures adopt this Repeal Act by resolution, then the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 will stand repealed in those States,
from the date of its adoption.
3. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Bill, 1998 was examined by the
Standing Committee on Urban and Rural Development. The Committee felt that the
land which is yet to be put to use for the original purposes stated in the Act, under
possession of the Government should not be restored to previous owners as such
restoration may lead to avoidable discrimination. The Committee also suggested that
the repeal Bill should contain a provision for abatement of proceedings in the
different courts. Keeping in view the recommendations of the Committee, this Bill is
being introduced to replace the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal
Ordinance, 1999 (Ord. 5 of 1999) notified on 11.1.1999 so that the State
Governments would be free to have their own legislation commensurate with their
needs and experiences. Till this Act is repealed, States have no power to legislate on
this subject.
4. The proposed repeal, along with some other incentives and simplification of
administrative procedures, is expected to revive the stagnant housing industry. The
repeal will facilitate construction of dwelling units both in the public and private
sector and help achievement of targets contemplated under National Agenda for
Governance. The repeal will not, however, affect vesting of any vacant land under
sub-section (3) of section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
the possession of which has been taken over by the State Governments. It will not
affect payments made to the State Governments for exemptions. The exemptions
granted under section 20 of the Act will continue to be operative. The amounts paid
out by the State Governments will become refundable before restoration of the land
to the former owners.
5. The Bill also seeks to facilitate land assembly and a flexible regime for
administering urban land to suit the varying local conditions based on State level
legislation or requirements.
NEW DELHI;
The 17th February, 1999”
20. The relevant sections of the Repeal Act, 1999, read as under:-
“1. Short title and application commencement.—

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(1) This Act may be called the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act,
1999.
(2) It applies in the first instance to the whole of the State of Haryana and Punjab and
to all the Union Territories; and it shall apply to such other State which adopts this
Act by resolution passed in that behalf under clause (2) of Article 252 of the
Constitution.
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force in the States of Haryana and Punjab
and in all the Union territories on the 11th day of January, 1999 and in other State
which adopts this Act under clause (2) of Article 252 of the Constitution on the date
of such adoption; and the reference to repeal of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 shall, in relation to any State or Union Territory, mean the date
on which this Act comes into force in such State or Union Territory.
2. Repeal of Act 33 of 1976.—The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) is hereby repealed.
3. Saving.—(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect—
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of
which has been taken over the State Government or any person duly authorised by
the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20
or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the
contrary;(c)any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting
exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20.
(2) Where—
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3)
of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by
the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this
behalf or by the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land
then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been
refunded to the State Government.
4. Abatement of legal proceedings.—
All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the
principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any

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court, tribunal or other authority shall abate: Provided that this section shall not
apply to the proceedings relating to sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the principal Act in
so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been
taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.
5. Repeal and saving.—
(1)The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Ordinance, 1999 (Ord. 5 of
1999) is hereby repealed.(2)Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any
action taken under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken
under the corresponding provisions of this Act.”
21. Thus, from the perusal of the provisions of the Repeal Act,
1999, the following is evident:-
(A) The Act, 1976 stands repealed by virtue of Section 2.
(B) The saving clause is contained in Section 3. By virtue of
Section 3(1)(a), the Repeal Act, 1999 shall not affect vesting of any
vacant land under subsection (3) of Section 10, possession of which
has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly
authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the
competent authority.
(C) By virtue of the provisions of clause (b) and clause (c) of
subsection (1) of section 3, the validity of any order granting
exemption under subsection (1) of section 20, or any action taken
thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the
contrary, and any payment made to the State Government as a
condition for granting exemption under subsection (1) of section 20,
shall not be affected by the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999.
(D) Any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government
under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the Principal Act, but
possession of which has not been taken over by the State
Government or any person duly authorized by the State

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Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, and any
amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such
land. Then such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if
any, has been refunded to the State Government, meaning thereby
that if any land has been vested in the State Government but it’s
possession has not been taken, then such land shall be restored on
the refund of amount, if any paid towards compensation.
(E) All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be
made under the principal Act pending immediately before the
commencement of the Repeal Act, 1999, before any Court, tribunal,
or authority, shall abate. The only exception being proceedings
relating to sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the principal act, insofar as
such proceedings are relatable to the land possession of which has
been taken over by the State Government or any person duly
authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by competent
authority. Thus, proceedings relating to payment of compensation in
respect of the land acquired possession whereof has been
transferred to the State Government shall not abate.
22. Hence, as far as the question of abatement of proceedings
relating to any order made or purported to be made under the
principal Act is concerned, the Repeal Act,1999 carves out two
categories of land, the first category being any vacant land vested
under subsection (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been
taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized
by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent
authority and other category being any land deemed to have vested
in the State Government under subsection (3) of Section 10 of the
Principal Act, but possession of which has not been taken over by
the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State
Government in this behalf or by the competent authority. The

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Repeal Act,1999 shall not affect the lands falling in the first
category, and the proceedings in respect of the same shall be held to
be concluded. Whereas, as far as the second category is concerned,
the proceedings relating to the same shall abate. The only other
proceedings that would have been saved after the enforcement of
the Repeal Act, 1999, are those provided under the proviso to
Section 4, relating to Sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Principal
Act, insofar as such proceedings are relatable to the land possession
of which has been taken over by the State Government. This is so,
as to protect the interest of the landholders possession of whose
land has already been taken by the State Government, but they are
yet to be paid compensation for the same. Thus from the perusal of
provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999 it appears that except for
proceedings under Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Act, 1976 no
other proceedings pending before any court, tribunal or authority
shall survive.
23. Thus, from the above, it can be very well concluded that in
cases where the land was deemed to have been vested, but
possession has not yet been transferred on the date of enforcement
of the Repeal Act 1999, proceedings in respect of the same shall
abate in view of provisions of Section 4.
24. In the above background, we go on to consider the
consequences of the Repeal Act 1999. Generally, when an act is
repealed, it is treated as revoked or abrogated and removed from
what is popularly known as the statute book. An express repeal will
operate to abrogate an existing law unless there is some indication
to the contrary, such as a saving clause. Even existing rights and
pending litigation, both civil and criminal, may be affected,
although it is not an uncommon practice to use the saving clause in
order to preserve existing rights and to exempt pending litigation.

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25. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, the word "repeal"
has been defined as under:-
“To repeal an Act is to cause it to cease to be a part of the corpus juris or body of law.
To repeal an enactment contained in an Act is to cause it to cease to be in law a part
of the Act containing it. The general principle is that, except as to transactions past
and closed, an Act or enactment which is repealed is to be treated thereafter as if it
had never existed. However, the operation of the principle is subject to any savings
made, expressly or by implication, by the repealing enactment, and in most cases it is
subject also to the general statutory provisions as to the effects of repeal.”
26. In this regard, the contention of the learned counsel for the
private respondents is that the right to appeal, as provided under
Section 33 of the Act, 1976, would be saved despite the
enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999, in view of the provisions of
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under: -
“6. Effect of repeal- Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after
the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to
be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes
effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done
or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred
under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence
committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued
or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the
repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”

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27. Section 6(e) of the Act, 1897, provides that the repeal shall
not affect any investigation, legal proceedings, or remedy in respect
of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture,
or punishment as aforesaid and such investigation, legal
proceedings, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced,
and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed as
if the repealing Act or regulation had not been passed. The learned
counsel for the private respondents, in this regard, has vehemently
argued that a right of appeal, being a substantive right, cannot be
curtailed by the Repeal Act, 1999. Further in view of the provisions
of the aforesaid clause of Section 6, not only can the appeal under
Section 33 be instituted, but it can also be continued.
28. Before we proceed further in the matter, the provisions of
Section 6 of the Act 1897 make it amply clear that the provisions
thereof would be applicable, unless a different intention appears, in
the repealing Act. Thus, what has to be determined is whether under
the Repeal Act,1999 a different intention appears, so that the right
to institute and to continue the proceedings of an appeal under
Section 33 of the Act, 1976, stands extinguished, and all the
pending appeals shall stand abated.
29. The Apex Court while taking into consideration the provisions
of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in the case of Qudrat
Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly (1974) 1 SCC 202 had held as
under:
“18. Certain propositions are clear regarding the consequence of repeal of a statute.
The general principle is that an enactment which is repealed is to be treated, except
as to transactions passed and closed, as if it had never existed. However, the
operation of this principle is subject to any savings which may be made, expressly or
by implication, by the repealing enactment (vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.
36 paragraph 714). The U. P. General Clauses Act (Act 1 of 1904) provides for the

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consequences of a repeal under Section 6. The relevant parts of which may be
reproduced here:
"6. EFFECT OF REPEAL. Where any (Uttar Pradesh) Act repeals any enactment
hitherto made or thereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the
repeal shall not-
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done
or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred
under any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any remedy, or any investigation of legal proceeding commenced before
the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punish-ment as aforesaid:
and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal
proceeding may be continued and concluded. and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed."
If a contrary intention appears from the repealing statute, that prevails. It was pointed
out to us that Section 2 of the later Act specifically states that:
"Nothing in this Act shall apply to-
(a) any building belonging to or vested in. ...any local authority.
Even so, we have to read this provision in conformity with Section 43 which
repealed the Act viz. U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. Section 43 (2) is the saving clause. If
the repealing enactment, as in this case, makes a special provision regarding pending
or past transactions it is this provision that will determine whether the liability
arising under the repealed enactment survives or is extinguished. Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act applies generally in the absence of a special saving provision in
the repealing statute, for when there is one then a different intention is indicated. In
any case where a repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the subject, the Court
has to look to the provisions of the new Act to see whether they indicate a different
intention."
30. In this regard, we consider the law laid down by the Apex
Court in the case of Mahammadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh

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vs. Union of India and others, (2009) 2 SCC 1 wherein the Apex
Court, amongst others, decided the question relating to
constitutional validity and also the interpretation of Section 2(3) and
Section (5) of the Prevention of Terrorism Repeal Act, 2004, and
had held as under :-
“34……
(a)………...
(f) If any Central Act is repealed, without making any provision for savings, the
provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will apply. But
where the repealing Act itself contains specific provisions in regard to savings, the
express or special provision in the repealing Act will apply. Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act makes it clear that it will not apply when a different intention appears in
the repealing statute. Where the provision relating to savings is excluded, the repeal
will have the effect of complete obliteration of the statute. (Vide State of Orissa v.
M.A. Tulloch & Co.13, Nar Bahadur Bhandari v. State of Sikkim and Southern
Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & ETI015.)
35. The repealing Act contains an exhaustive provision relating to savings in sub-
sections (2) to (5) of Section 2. Therefore, the savings from repeal will be governed
by Sections 2(2) to 2(5) of the repealing Act and not by Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897.
36. Parliament in its plenary power, can make an outright repeal which will not only
destroy the effectiveness of the repealed Act in future, but also operate to destroy all
existing inchoate rights and pending proceedings. This is because the effect of
repealing a statute is to obliterate it completely from the record, except to the extent
of savings. If Parliament specifically excludes any saving clause in a repealing Act,
or severely abridges the provision for saving, which it has the power to do, the effect
would be that after the repeal of the statute, no proceeding can continue, nor can any
punishment be inflicted for violation of the statute during its currency.”
(emphasis added)
31. Further, the Apex Court in the case of Sushila N Rungta Dead
through LRs vs The Tax Recovery Officer and others,( 2019) 11
SCC 795, where proceedings arising under the Gold Control Act,

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1968, were pending before the Apex Court, and in the meanwhile,
the Gold Control Repeal Act, 1990, was enforced, while
considering the effect of the Repeal Act,1990 had held as under:-
“3. While the stay order of this Court continued, the Gold (Control) Act itself was
repealed. This was effected by two sections, namely-
"1. Short title. This Act may be called the Gold (Control) Repeal Act,1990.
2. Repeal of Act 45 of 1968. The Gold (Control) Act, 1968 is hereby repealed."
4. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for this Act is as follows:
"Gold control which regulated the domestic trade and movement of gold within the
country was introduced on 9-1-1963 as part of the Defence of India Rules. Later on,
the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 was enacted with the broad objectives of controlling
the production, manufacture, supply. distribution, use and possession of and business
in gold, ornaments and articles of gold. The said enactment was meant to supplement
other preventive measures to make circulation of smuggled gold difficult and its
detection casier by extending the control over gold beyond the stage of import.
2. Over the past 22 years, the results achieved under the Act have not been
encouraging and the desired objectives for which the Act was introduced have not
been achieved due to various socio-economic and cultural factors in the vast
multitude of the country's population and the lack of administrative machinery. On
the other hand, this regressive and purely regulatory Act has given rise to
considerable dissatisfaction in the minds of the public as it has caused hardship and
harassment to the artisans and small self-employed goldsmiths who have not been
able to develop their skills and earn proper living on account of the rigours which
this Act imposed upon them.
3. Taking these factors into consideration and the advice of experts who have
examined issues related to this Act, it is proposed to repeal the Gold (Control) Act,
1968.
4. The Bill seeks to achieve the said object.
5……
6……..

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7. Having heard the learned counsel for both sides, we are of the view that the
Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it clear that over 22 years. the results
achieved under the Act have not been encouraging and the desired objectives for
which the Act has been introduced have failed. Following the advice of experts, who
have examined issues related to the Act, the Objects and Reasons goes on further to
state that this Act has proved to be a regressive measure which has caused
considerable dissatisfaction in the minds of the public and hardship and harassment
to artisans and small self-employed goldsmiths.
8. This being the case, we are of the opinion that the repeal simpliciter, in the present
case, does not attract the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as a
contrary intention is very clearly expressed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons
to the 1990 repeal Act. In this behalf, it would be apposite to refer to New India
Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma³, SCC para 10.
9. This Court noticed in C. Padma case that, in a parallel instance of simpliciter
repeal, Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury that had been caused to
heirs of LRs of victims of accidents if their petitions were rejected only on the
ground of limitation. This being the case, this Court found that a different intention
had been expressed and, therefore, Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act would not
in that situation apply.
10. We find a similar situation in the present case. In point of fact, on going through
the impugned judgment, it is clear that every time an amendment was made to the
Defence of India Rules and / or repeal of the said Rules had taken place, there was
always an inbuilt saving clause. In fact, Section 116 of the Gold (Control) Ordinance
6 of 1968 also made it clear that it went to the extent, in sub-section (2) thereof, by
saving show-cause notices which, ordinarily, are not saved even if Section 6 were to
apply (see. M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka SRTC (1980) 1 SCC 149, following
Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang)
11. This being the case, we are of the vierw that the show- cause notice dated 1-6-
1971, which is the subject-matter of this appeal, no longer survives. In this view of
the matter, the appeal is disposed of. ”
32. Thus the following position emerges in respect of
applicability of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897:

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(1) If the Repeal Act itself contains specific provisions in regard to
saving, the expression or special provisions in repealing Act will
apply.
(2) Section 6 of the General Clauses Act ,1897makes it clear that it
will not apply when a different intention appears in the repeal
statute. Where the provision relating to saving is excluded, the
repealing will have effect of complete obliteration of the statute.
(3) The statement of object and reasons of the Repeal Act can be
taken into consideration while determining as to whether the
provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would be
applicable.
(4) In case the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the
subject, the Court has to look to the provisions of the new Act to see
as to whether they indicate a different intention.
33. In the light of the above we consider the provisions of the
Repeal Act, 1999 to determine as to whether any different intention
has been expressed in the same or not.
34. The Statement of object and reasons of the Repeal Act, 1999
itself shows that the Act, 1976 has pushed up land prices practically
brought the housing industry to stop and provided opportunities for
corruption. There is a widespread demand to removing this irritant
land assembly and construction activity. Public opinion is nearly
unanimous that the Act has failed to achieve its objective as
expected. Besides this the Standing Committee has also suggested
that the Repeal Act should contain a provision for abatement of
proceedings in different courts. Thus, it is evident from the
statement of object and reasons of the Repeal Act, 1999 provides

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WRIC No. - 35353 of 2025
that the Act, 1976 has failed to achieve the desired objective for
which it had been framed.
35. Further the public opinion is also against the continuation of
the Act, 1976. Thus, the intention to Repeal the Act, 1999 to abate
the proceedings arising from the Act,1976 pending before different
courts is clear. Hence, from the statement of object and reasons it is
evident that there was no intention for enacting any new legislation
and also to abate the various proceedings under the Act, 1976.
Further Section 3 of the Act, 1976 also contains a saving clause
wherein the Repeal Act, 1999 shall not affect the vesting of vacant
land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 possession of which has
been taken over by the State Government or any person duly
authorized by the State Government or the competent authority.
36. At the same time, where the vesting of the vacant land under
sub-section (3) of section 10, the possession has not been taken over
by the State Government the said land shall be restored, the only
condition being that if any amount has been paid, the same will be
refunded to the State Government. Thus, the saving clause as
contained in Section 3 of the repealing Act carves out two
categories of land after vesting of land under Section 10 (3) where
the possession has been taken by the State Government and where
the possession of the vacant land has not been taken by the State
Government.
37. Further under Section 4 of the Repeal Act all proceedings
relating to any order made or purported to be made under the
principal Act immediately before the commencement of the Act
before any court, tribunal or authority shall abate. However, the said
provision would not be applicable to proceedings relating to
Sections 11, 12, 13 an 14 of the principal act insofar as the said

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proceedings. Insofar as the said proceedings are relatable to the land
possession of which has been taken by the State Government. Thus,
any proceedings pending before the competent authority, court of
tribunal under the Act, 1976 shall abate.
38. Under Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 the
repeal shall not affect any investigation, legal proceedings, or
remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation etc and
any such investigation, legal proceedings, or remedy  instituted
continued to enforce an any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment
may be imposed as if the repeal act or regulation has not been
passed. Thus, it is beyond doubt that Section 4 of the Repeal Act,
1999 express an intendment contrary to the provisions of Section 6
of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The intention of the legislature is
clear that all proceedings before any court, tribunal or other
authorities under the Act, 1976 shall abate, which is not so under
the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,1897.
39. Hence, the intention of the legislature would not have been to
give the right of appeal to the land holder while abating other
proceedings under the Repeal Act, 1999. It is also settled that an
appeal is nothing more than a continuation of original proceedings,
hence, it can be very well concluded that the Repeal Act, 1999
clearly carves out a different intention from what is contained in
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Under the
circumstances it can be very well concluded that under the
provisions of Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999, the proceedings of
appeal under Section 33 of the Act, 1976 shall stand abated and
cannot continue further, and also with the enforcement of the
Repeal Act, 1999 by virtue of Section 2 thereof of the Act, 1976
stands repealed, which includes the provisions of Section 33.

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40. It is next contended by learned counsel for private
respondents that the right to appeal being a substantive right cannot
be curtailed by Repeal Act, 1999. In support of his contention
reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of Garika Pati Veeraya v. N. Sabbiah Choudhary and others
(1957) 1 SCC 180 wherein the Apex Court in para 32 in respect of
the proceedings of appeal had held as under:-
“32. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:
32.1. That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but
steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be
regarded as one legal proceeding.
32.2. The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
32.3. The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal
then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.
32.4. The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court
accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and
although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such
right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the d date of the institution of the suit
or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date
of the filing of the appeal.
32.5. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment,
if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.”
41. Besides the learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Transmission
Corporation of AP v. C.H. Prabhakar and others 2004 (5) SCC 551
wherein in para 18 the law laid down in the case of Garika Pati
Veeraya (supra) has been reiterated.
42. In view of the contention so raised by the learned counsel for
the private respondents we are in full agreement with the law so laid
down by the Apex Court. Further the law so laid down itself

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provides that the vested right of appeal can be taken away only by
subsequent enactment, if it is so, provides expressly or by necessary
intendment, and not otherwise.
43. In view of what has been held by us we are of the view that in
view of Section 4 of the Repeal Act, the vested right of appeal as
contained in Section 33 of the Act, 1976 has been taken away and
all such appeals are to abate. Further with the enforcement of the
Repeal Act, 1999 w.e.f. 18.03.1999, the Act, 1976 stands
obliterated, and as such the question of filing an appeal after the
enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999 does not arise.
44. It is also contended on behalf of private respondent that in the
absence of the provision of Section 33 of the Act, 1976 regarding
right to appeal, the respondent would be left without a remedy in
respect of arbitrary action of the State in respect of the vacant land
whose possession continue with the land holder. In this regard a
perusal of the Repeal Act, 1999 itself reveals that the vacant land
whose possession has not been taken by the State are to be restored,
on the refund of the amount, if any. Thus, the right of the land
holders to continue to remain in possession of the vacant land,
which was a subject matter of proceedings under the Act,1976 has
been protected by means of the Repeal Act, 1999.
45. Under the circumstances, the land holder who have remained
in custody of their land are entitled to protection their possession
under remedies available under common law. This view of ours is
further fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
State of U.P. and another v. Ehsan (2024)14 SCC 269 wherein the
Apex Court after considering the law laid down that ordinarily a
suit to question the order passed and consequential notification
issued under the Act, 1976 is not maintainable inasmsuch as the

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Act, 1976 is a self-contained code and any order passed thereunder
are subject to statutory appeal etc. For the same reason the suit may
not lie to declare that surplus land, which has been notified as such
under Section 10 (3) of the Act,1976 is free from ceiling for failure
to take possession prior to enforcement of the Repeal Act. The Apex
Court in this regard in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Ehsan
(supra), however, has considered instances when the suit would be
maintainable and has held as under:
“23. The factum of possession is essentially a question of fact. Although there is no
hard-and-fast rule that a question of fact cannot be determined in writ jurisdiction
but, in the event of a serious dispute between the parties on a question of fact, a writ
court ordinarily refrains from deciding it. More so, when the writ petitioner has an
alternative remedy where such disputed questions of fact can be decided
authoritatively.
24….
25….
26. Before we proceed further on the aforesaid issue, it would be useful to examine
whether at the time of filing the third writ petition, the original petitioner had an
alternative remedy of a suit to seek appropriate relief for protecting his rights, if any,
over the land in dispute. In this regard, we may observe that ordinarily a suit to
question the orders passed, and consequential notifications issued, under the Ceiling
Act, 1976 is barred, inasmuch as the Ceiling Act, 1976 is a self-contained Code and
any orders passed thereunder are subject to statutory appeal, etc. For the same
reason, a suit may not lie to declare that surplus land, which has been notified as
such under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act, 1976, is free from ceiling for failure to
take actual possession prior to enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999. (See: State of
M.P. v. Ghisilal13; State of W.B. v. David Mantosh14; and Saurav Jain v. A.B.P.
Design15.)
30. No doubt, in a writ proceeding between the State and a landholder, the Court can,
on the basis of materials/evidence(s) placed on record, determine whether possession
has been taken or not and while doing so, it may draw adverse inference against the
State where the statutory mode of taking possession has not been followed [See State
of U.P. v. Hari Ram³]. However, where possession is stated to have been taken long

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ago and there is undue delay on the part of landholder in approaching the writ court,
infraction of the prescribed procedure for taking possession would not be a
determining factor, inasmuch as, it could be taken that the person for whose benefit
the procedure existed had waived his right thereunder (see State of Assam v. Bhaskar
Jyoti Sarma). In such an event, the factum of actual possession would have to be
determined on the basis of materials/evidence(s) available on record and not merely
by finding fault in the procedure adopted for taking possession from the landholder.
And if the writ court finds it difficult to determine such question, either for
insufficient/inconclusive materials/evidence(s) on record or because oral evidence
would also be required to form a definite opinion, it may relegate the writ petitioner
to a suit, if the suit is otherwise maintainable.
35. In view of the discussion above and having regard to the following:
(a) that there was a serious dispute with regard to taking of possession of the surplus
land;
(b) that there was a delay of about seven years in filing the first writ petition from the
date when possession was allegedly taken by the State, after publication of the
vesting notification;
(c) that no documentary evidence such as a khasra or khatauni of the period between
alleged date of taking possession and filing of the first writ petition was filed by the
original petitioner;
(d) that in the earlier two rounds of litigation, the High Court refrained from deciding
the issue of possession of the surplus land even though that issue had arisen directly
between the parties; and
(e) that infraction of the prescribed statutory procedure for taking possession cannot
be the sole basis to discard the State's claim of possession, when it is stated to have
been taken long before the date the issue is raised, we are of the considered view that
the High Court should have refrained from deciding the issue with regard to taking
of actual possession of the surplus land prior to the cut-off date specified in the
Repeal Act, 1999. Instead, the writ petitioner should have been relegated to a suit.
36.In view of the above conclusion, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order
passed by the High Court is set aside. The first respondent's writ petition is dismissed
without prejudice to his right to institute a suit. Parties to bear their Own Casts.”

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46. Thus, in view of the above, the Apex Court has held that if the
remedy of filing a writ petition is available to the land holder and if
on the basis of material evidence available on record the writ Court
finds it difficult to determine the question of possession it may
relegate the writ petitioner to suit, if a suit is otherwise
maintainable.
47. In this regard it is made clear that this Court in the case of
State of U.P and another v. Balbir Singh and others 2015 SCC
Online All 9243 while considering the question as to whether the
writ petition would be maintainable after abatement of proceedings
under the principal Act with the enforcement of the Repeal
Act,1999 and it was held as under:
“4.The first issue which arises for consideration is whether the writ petition would
abate in view of section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999.
5. Section 4 of the Repeal Act provides that all proceedings relating to any order
made or purported to be made under Principal Act (except for proceedings relating to
sections 11, 12, 13 and 14) pending before any Court, Tribunal or other authority,
shall abate. The question is whether proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India can be said to be proceedings relating to any order made or
purported to be made under the Principal Act.
6. It is well settled that writ petition is not a continuation of the original suit or
proceedings unlike an appeal or a revision. A writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are proceedings quite independent of the original controversy.
The writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not a
continuation of suit or proceedings giving rise to it and their exists a clear distinction
between an appeal or revision and a writ petition directed against orders passed
therein. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ahmedabad Manufacturing and
Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Remanand, has observed as under:
"A decision in a writ petition is not a decision about the merits of the rights of the
parties in issue in the proceedings giving rise to it."
7. Writ petition being not a continuation of original proceedings unlike an appeal or
revision, the order passed in such proceedings or in an appeal or revision arising

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therefrom, therefore do not merge in the orders passed in writ petition. Thus, a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be held to be a
proceeding relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal
Act so as to result in its abatement under section 4 of the Repeal Act.
8. The view taken by us finds support from a Full Bench decision of this Court in the
case of Udai Bhan Singh v. Board of Revenue The Full Bench was considering the
import of section 5(2)(a) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act providing for
abatement of every proceeding for correction of records and every suit and
proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land in respect
whereof a notification for consolidation operations has been issued under section
4(2)(1). It was held that section 5(2)(a) has no impact on writ petitions or Special
Appeals arising out of them in which judgments and orders passed in suits or
proceeding relating to declaration of rights in land covered by a notification under
section 4 are in challenge and they will remain unaffected by the provision.
9. The power of judicial review being a vital principle of our Constitution, it cannot
be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, as
far as the existence of power is concerned, it cannot be doubted that the power of
High Court under Article 226 and that of the Hon'ble Apex Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution, cannot be abridged, abrogated or diluted, even by the amendment of
the Constitution, neither the power can be taken away by judge, pronouncements, nor
by Legislative enactment or even by the amendment in the Constitution.
10. The aforesaid being the settled proposition of law, writ petition arising out of
proceedings under the 1976 Act shall not abate in view of section 4 of the Repeal
Act, 1999.”
(emphasis added)
48. Hence, in view of the above, the contention of the respondents
that the respondents would be remediless if the right to appeal under
Section 33 is taken away with the enforcement of the Repeal Act,
1999 is devoid of merits.
49. As far as the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in Writ C No. 48613 of 2009 (State of U.P and another v. Nek
Singh) decided on 19.05.2010 is concerned, it fails to consider the
view previously taken by this Court that after enforcement of the

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Repeal Act, 1999 the appeal under the Act, 1976 ought to have been
abated and judgments passed after the repeal would be a nullity. A
similar view has been held by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in the case of State of U.P. v. Sitara, (2006) 100 RD 202.
50. Further this Court in the case of Nek Singh (supra) has also
failed to consider the view of the Apex Court in this regard, the
Apex Court in the case of Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune
Municipal Transport and others, (2010) 8 SCC 467 while
considering the provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999 had held that in
a case where possession has been taken, the repeal of the Act would
not confer any benefit to the owner of the land. In the said case it
was held as under:-
“36. Undoubtedly, the 1976 Act, stood repealed by the 1999 Act. However, it has no
bearing on this case for the reason that proceeding pending in any court relating to
the 1976 Act, stood abated, provided the possession of the land had not been taken
from the owner. Therefore, in a case, where the possession has been taken, the repeal
of the Act would not confer any benefit on the owner of the land. (Vide Pt. Madan
Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P. (2000) 6 SCC 325,
Ghasitey Lal Sahu v. Competent Authority (2004) 13 SCC 452 and Mukarram Ali
Khan v. State of U.P. (2007) 11 SCC 90”
51. Recently, the Apex Court in Dalshukhbhai Bachchu Bhai
Satasiya and others versus State of Gujarat and others, 2026 INSC
21, while considering the provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999 and
while relying upon the law laid down in the case of State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 and in the case of AP
Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tehsildar, 2025 SCC Online
SC 447,while considering the question of possession in the light of
the provisions of the Repeal Act 1999, had held as under :-
“22.4. Therefore, as per the provisions of Sections 10(3) and 10(5) of the ULC Act,
the subject land, despite having 'vested' (along with acquisition of title or interests) in
the State Government, was not in the possession of the Government. Further,

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possession was not taken by any of the three possible means, i.e., voluntary transfer
by the appellants, issuance of notice under Section 10(5) to the appellants followed
by peaceful transfer or forceful acquisition of possession under Section 10(6) of the
ULC Act. The possession of the land continues with the appellants herein till date.
22.5. Such a scenario is clearly one where the provision of abatement under Section
4 of the Repealing Act applies. The proviso to Section 4 states that the section would
not apply to proceedings under Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the ULC Act relating to
land that has already been taken possession of by the State Government. Therefore,
the proviso has no applicability to the facts at hand and the benefit of abatement
under the section would apply wholesale.
22.6. That the approach to be had with cases such as the present one is also evident
upon a reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the Repealing Act. Clearly, the legislative
intent is that in cases where lands were deemed to have been vested but possession
was not yet transferred as on date of enforcement of the Repealing Act (such as the
present case), the lands were to remain in possession of the private parties. Section 3
(2) of the Repealing Act prescribes the procedure to be followed in specific types of
situations, i.e., where amounts paid by the State Government must be refunded. This
is not so in the present case. However, the underlying concepts are clear that vesting
and possession are distinct and that without the latter, the private parties have a claim
over continuing to be in possession. This is subsequently further emphasised in
Section 4 of the Repealing Act, as explained earlier under which proceedings abate
as a result.”
52. Hence, it is the consistent view of the Apex Court that after
the Repeal Act, 1999 all proceedings under the Act, 1976 shall stand
abated. Further there is no question of maintaining a fresh appeal
under Section 33, once, the Act, 1976 itself stands repealed. Further
reliance placed upon in the judgment of Nek Singh (supra) on the
judgments of the Apex Court in the Case of Garika Pati Veeraya
(Supra) and Transmission Corporation of A.P. (supra) has already
been argued by the learned counsel for private respondents and
duly dealt with the paragraphs above, and would not be applicable
in the present case.

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53. In view of the above we are of the view that the law laid down
by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ C No. 62283 of
2012 (State of U.P. and another v. Jagdish Chandra) decided on
19.08.2013 lays down the correct law and is also in consonance
with the earlier views of the Apex Court and the Co-ordinate
Benches of this Court that proceedings of appeal under the Act,
1976 shall stand abated with the enforcement of Repeal Act, 1999,
and no appeal under Section 33 of the Act, 1976 would be
maintainable after the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999
54. There is another aspect of the subject matter in controversy. In
Writ C No. 35353 of 2025 the possession of the land in dispute was
taken on 12.11.1991 and the appeal was filed in the year 2009
challenging the order dated 20.07.1983 passed under Section 8(4) of
the Act, 1976. Similarly in Writ C No. 35471 of 2025 the
possession of the land in dispute was taken on 12.11.1991 and the
appeal was filed in the year 2011 against the order dated 30.10.1982
passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976 and in Writ C No. 6679
of 2026 the possession of the land in dispute was taken on
02.02.1986 and the appeal was filed in the year 2013 against the
order dated 11.09.1979 passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976.
55. Thus, in the three petitions the challenge to the proceedings
under the Act, 1976 was raised after about 18 years, 20 years and 27
years respectively after the taking over of the possession of the land
in dispute by the State. The limitation prescribed under Section 33
of the Act, 1976 is 30 days from the knowledge of the order under
challenge. Thus, it can be held without doubt that the original land
holder had acquiesced to the proceedings under the Act, 1976
having never questioned the same under the provisions of the
Repeal Act, 1976. The remedy of appeal under Section 33 of the
Act, 1976 was duly available to the original land holder at the time

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when the proceedings under the Act, 1976 were underway. Further,
as per showing of the petitioner the possession of the land in dispute
having been taken long time ago and revenue entries mutated in the
name of the State, it can very well we concluded that the original
land holder had acquiesced to the proceedings, under the Act, 1976.
Further the present appeals have been preferred/ contested by the
successors of the original land holder, and as such the successors-
private respondents have no personal knowledge about the
proceedings under the Act, 1976. The land holders having kept
quite for such a long duration of time impliedly abandoned their
rights over the land in dispute. Thus, the land holders having
acquiesced to the proceedings under the Act, 1976 renders the
appeals as not maintainable.
56. The Apex Court in the case of Chairman State Bank of India
and another v. M.J. James, 2022 (2) SCC 301 while considering the
question of delay amounting to acquiescence had held as under:-
“38. ……...Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in
para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. Applying this
principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal
Nigam v. Jaswant Singh after referring to several judgments, has accepted the
following clucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England: (Jaswant Singh case29, SCC
pp. 470-71, paras 12-13)
"12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England,
Para 911, p. 395 as follows:
"In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief
points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is
in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has

35
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become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct,
he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or
where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the
other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are
most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.'
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty
since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not
challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have
filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the
claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for
filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting
the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the
question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other
parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the
respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions
of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as
to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed
time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions
claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise
funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial
management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons
when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between
"acquiescence" and "delay and laches". Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable
doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another
dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after
violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot
afterwards complain. In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit
consent, concurrence, or acceptance, which denotes conduct that is evidence of an
intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from
which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. Acquiescence can
be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a
person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a
manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action
mirroring acceptance. However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no
importance or consequence.

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40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy
the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable
considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the
other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel
in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the
violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent,
which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches.
Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually
destroys the right of the person. Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive
acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal,
and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being
in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of
fair representation.
41. The questions of prejudice, change of position, creation of third-party rights or
interests on the part of the party seeking relief are important and relevant aspects as
delay may obscure facts, encourage dubious claims, and may prevent fair and just
adjudication. Often, relevant and material evidence go missing or are not traceable
causing prejudice to the opposite party. It is. therefore, necessary for the court to
consciously examine whether a party has chosen to sit over the matter and has woken
up to gain any advantage and benefit, which aspects have been noticed in Dehri
Rohtas Light Railway Co. Lid. v. District Board, Bhojpur and State of Maharashtra v.
Digambar's. These facets, when proven, must be factored and balanced, even when
there is delay and laches on the part of the authorities. These have bearing on grant
and withholding of relief. Therefore, we have factored in the aspect of prejudice to
the appellants in view of the relief granted in the impugned judgment'.
42. The relief as granted certainly has serious financial repercussions and would also
prevent the appellants from taking further action, which aspect has been noticed,
though not finally determined in the impugned judgment. The studied silence of the
respondent, who did not correspond or make any representation for nine years, was
with an ulterior motive as he wanted to take benefit of the slip-up though he had
suffered dismissal. The courts can always refuse to grant relief to a litigant if it
considers that grant of relief sought is likely to cause substantial hardship or
substantial prejudice to the opposite side or would be detrimental to good
administration. This principle of good administration is independent of hardship, or
prejudice to the rights of the third parties and does not require specific evidence that
this has in fact occurred, though in relation to withholding relief some evidence may
be required. Relief should not be denied for mere inconvenience but when the

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difficulty caused to the decision maker approaches impracticability or when there is
an overriding need for finality and certainty. ”
57. In this regard the Apex Court on the question of delay in the
case of State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Saram and others 2015 (5)
SCC 321 had held as under:-
“16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in
possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate
analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged
violation of Section 10 (5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the
th
erstwhile land owner on 7 December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any
grievance based on Section 10 (5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time
of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession
would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation ther owner or
the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right uner Section 10
(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a license to a litigant to
make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be
redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstances of a Repeal Act tempted him
to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed
procedure.
17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari
Ram’s Case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the
respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram’s case (supra)
considering whether the work ‘may’ appearing in Section 10 (5) gave to the
competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking
physical possession of the land in question under Section 10 (6). The question
whether breach of Section 10 (5) and possible dispossession itself or render it non est
in the eyes of law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what
Section 10 (5) prescribed is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be
followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under
Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant’s version regarding dispossession
of the erstwhiel owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession
was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not
vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the
Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sharma-erstwhile owner had not make any
grievance based on breach of Section 10 (5) at any stage during his lifetime implying
thereby that he had waived his right to do so.”

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58. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
Indore Development Authroity v. Manohar Lal 2020 (8) SCC129
while considering the law laid down in the case of State of Assam v.
Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) has held as under:
“This Court held that provisions of the Repeal Act could not be extended in such a
case where possession has been taken without following the procedure, and the
landowner cannot retain the land. This Court also observed that once possession has
been taken over in the year 1991, any grievance as to non-compliance of Section 10
(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. By
sheer lapse of time, the possession would acquire legitimacy. Thus, the owner or the
person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10 (5)
of the Act. This Court also observed that only because of the fortuitous
circumstances of a Repeal Act, which confers regarding his dispossession, being in
violation of the prescribed procedure. It is clear from the aforesaid decision that such
claim cannot be entertained, and any such dispute raised belatedly was repelled by
this Court.".
59. Recently the Apex court in the case of Dalsukhbhai
Bachubhai Satasia and others vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR
2026 SC 475 in paragraph 20 had held as under:-
“20. We are inclined to agree with this view of this court in AP Electrical regarding
the effect of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma: (2015 AIR SCW 548) on the dictum in Hari Ram:
(AIR 2013 SC 1793). In the former, de facto possession had actually been transferred
to the State Government. Albeit, this was done by force in contravention of the
requirement to mandatorily issue notice under Section 10 (5) of the ULC Act. In this
regard, this Court held that if the objection regarding the non-compliance with
Section 10 (5) is not made within a "reasonable time", then the right to so object is
"waived””.
60. In view of the above the original land holder having
acquiesced to the proceedings under the Act, 1976 it would no
longer be open for the private respondents to have availed the
remedy of appeal under Section 33 of the Act, 1976. However, this
very relevant aspect of the matter in controversy has been

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completely overlooked by the learned District Judge while deciding
the appeal.
61. Before we part, we express our anguish over the manner in
which the learned District Judge has dealt with the issue. A perusal
of the impugned judgment and order reveals that the law laid down
in the case of Jagdish Chandra (supra) by the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court was duly placed before the learned District Judge. The
relevant part of the impugned judgment in this regard is being
reproduced hereunder:
“(I) Out of the above five points, 1 to 4 have been answered by the Hon’ble High
Court in Paragraph No.52 of the Jagdish Chandra (supra) case, relevant extracts of
which are reproduced herein below:-
“(1)- An appeal U/s 33 of the Act, 1976 against an order passed by the Competent
Authority declaring a land surplus U/s 8(4) of the Act, 1976 cannot be filed after
Repeal Act, 1999.
(II)- The right of appeal U/s 33 of the Act, 1976 is not saved U/s 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 after the Repeal Act, 1999.
(III) – The appellate authority (District Judge) could not have entertained and
decided the appeal U/s 33 of the Act, 1976 against the order passed by the
Competent Authority under the Act, 1976 declaring a land surplus after the Repeal
Act, 1999.
th
(IV)- The order passed by the appellate authority dated 13 August, 2012 is without
jurisdiction. ”
62. Thus, the learned District Judge despite being fully aware of
the law laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case
of Jagdish Cahdra (supra) has failed to assign any valid reason as to
why it would not be applicable in the facts of the present case.
Further the judgment in the case of Nek Singh (supra) was not even
placed before the learned District Judge yet the learned District

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Judge had held the appeal to be maintainable and had decided the
same on merits.
63. The perusal of the records further reveals that the private
respondents in support of their contention that the appeal was
maintainable had relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case
of Manoj Kumar Parashar v. State of U.P. 2021 (2) AWC 2015,
which was a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, challenging the order passed by District Judge in proceedings
under Section 33 of the Act, 1976 thereby allowing the application
for impleadment of the subsequent purchaser of the land in dispute.
It is under such circumstances that this Court while dismissing the
petition had directed the District Judge to decide the appeal
expeditiously and positively within a period of six months. Thus, it
is evident that the question of maintainability of the appeal under
Section 33 was not even a subject matter in dispute in the said
proceedings. Thus, the law enunciated in the said case by this Court
was of no assistance to the private respondents.
64. Lastly the private respondents in the appeal so filed before the
learned District Judge have themselves admitted that the provisions
of the Act, 1976 were not applicable to the land in dispute. Thus,
once the private respondents-appellants in the appeal themselves
having admitted that the provisions of the Act, 1976 were not
applicable to the land in dispute, an obvious corollary thereto
would be that no appeal would be maintainable under Section 33 of
the Act, 1976.
65. The perusal of the impugned judgment and order further
reveals that the learned District Judge while arriving at a finding
that the record does not support the contention of the actual physical
transfer of the land in dispute from the original land holder to the

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State Government, had held that the appeal is liable to be abated.
However, no reason whatsoever has been assigned for arriving at a
finding as to how the appeal stood abated. If the appeal has been
held to be abated in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the
Repeal Act, 1999, the same would have been the position at the
time when the appeal was filed before the learned District Judge,
thereby implying that the appeal itself was not maintainable at the
time the same was filed. Hence, even otherwise for the sake of
arguments, if the contention of the learned counsel for private
respondents that the appeal was maintainable under Section 33 of
the Act, 1976 even after the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999 is
taken to be correct, then the learned District Judge ought not to have
abated the appeal but would have allowed the same. Thus, the
impugned judgment and order itself is self contradictory and in
violation of the provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999 as nothing
survived in the Act, 1976 after the enforcement of the Repeal Act,
1999 except what has been provided in the saving clause of the
Repeal Act, 1999 which does not include remedy of appeal under
Section 33 of the Act, 1976.
66. Under the circumstances, the writ petitions are allowed and
the impugned judgments and orders dated 24.12.2024 passed by the
District Judge, Kanpur in the three connected writ petitions are set
aside. No order as to costs.
(Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.) (Saral Srivastava,J.)
October 27, 2026
Nadeem
Digitally signed by :-
NADEEM AHMAD
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad