SUVRADIP HALDER vs THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE


PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

CRR 307 of 2026

Suvradip Halder
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.


For the petitioners : Mr. Ayan Bhattacharjee
Mr. Shounak Mondal



For the State : Mr. Gouranga Kumar Das
Mr. Sankalpa Bhattacharjee


Heard on : 20.07.2026


Judgment on : 13.11.2026



Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. Petitioner has preferred the present revisional application against the
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order dated 3 December, 2025 passed by learned Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Chandannagore Hooghly, whereby charges have been
framed against the petitioner under sections 127(2)/351(3) of the BNS read
with section 4/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 (hereinafter referred to as POCSO Act)
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2. It is alleged in the instant application that although the investigation
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culminated in submission of charge sheet on 9 September 2025, the
petitioner was consistently deprived of complete and mandatory prosecution
documents including seizure list, medical report of alleged victim, medical
report of the accused and statutory notice under section 179 of the BNSS.
On multiple occasions, the learned Trial Court itself acknowledged such
deficiencies and directed the prosecution to supply the same. However,
despite the admitted non supply of vital documents and previous repeated
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adjournments, on that ground, the court below on 3 December, 2025
proceeded to frame charges without affording him an opportunity to exercise
his valuable statutory right to seek discharge.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Bhattacharya submits that no
opportunity was granted to address arguments at the pre-charges stage, no
indication was sought from the petitioner regarding his intention to file a
discharge application and no separate date was fixed for consideration of
discharge, thereby foreclosing a substantive safeguard, recognised under
criminal jurisprudence. He further submits that stage of framing charge is
not a mere formality, but a critical judicial exercise requiring conscious
application of mind to the materials on record coupled with an opportunity
to the accused to demonstrate the absence of prima facie case. The
impugned order does not reflect any such application of mind nor does it
record reasons or satisfaction justifying the continuance of prosecution. The
procedure adopted by the court below is mechanical, perfunctory and
contrary to the settled principles governing criminal trials. Therefore, the
action of the learned Trial Judge has resulted in grave prejudice to the
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petitioner and constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice,
particularly the rule of audi alteram partem . He further stressed that even
in cases under special statutes like the POCSO Act, expedition cannot be
achieved at the cost of fairness, due process and statutory safeguards
available to the accused. He further submits that the framing of charge was
undertaken on the very first date on which the petitioner was shown as
present through Hazira, immediately after repeated adjournments
occasioned solely due to non-supply of mandatory documents, thereby
rendering the entire exercise mechanical and contrary to the settled
principles of criminal jurisprudence.
4. He further argued that Learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate that
the petitioner had consistently raised issues regarding non supply of vital
documents but the hurried framing of charges, notwithstanding such
deficiencies, reflects non-application of judicial mind and abdication of the
duty cast upon the court at the pre-trial stage and thereby resulting in
miscarriage of justice. He also laid emphasis that the court below failed to
appreciate that the right of an accused to seek discharge at the stage of
consideration of charge is a substantive and valuable right recognised under
the scheme of BNSS and cannot be reduced to a mere ritualistic formality.
The said right is intended to act as crucial filter to prevent vexatious,
frivolous or groundless prosecutions from proceeding to trial. By abruptly
framing charges without granting the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to
invoke such statutory remedy, the court below has effectively rendered the
safeguard otiose and illusory.
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5. Even in cases under special statues such as the POCSO Act where
expeditious trial has been encouraged by the legislature , the same cannot
be achieved by sacrificing the fundamental rights of the accused or by short-
circuiting mandatory procedural stages recognised by law. Therefore, since
the order of framing charge is arbitrary and bad in the eye of law, the
impugned order is liable to be said aside.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the state placed the Case
Diary (CD) and submits that the court framing charge is under a legal
obligation to frame such charge in writing within a period of 60 days from
first hearing of charge. However, section 35 of the POCSO Act 2012 provides
that the evidence of child is to be recorded within the period of 30 days from
the date of taking cognizance of the offence by the special court. Therefore,
the provision contained in section 35 over-rides the provisions contained in
section 250(1) of the BNSS in view of section 31 of the POCSO Act, which
provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, the provisions of Cr.P.C.
shall apply to the proceeding before a special court. The provisions
contained in section 250 and 251 of the BNSS cannot have any overriding
effect on the provisions of the POCSO Act. The Court below therefore was
justified in framing charge against the accused persons, so that there can be
no non-compliance of section 35 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, the order
impugned is justified and does not call for any interference by this High
Court.
Decision
7. In the instant case it is not in dispute that by a put up petition dated
24.9.2025, the petitioner sought for supply of some missing prosecution
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papers, when the learned Special court fixed the same for consideration on
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26.09.2025. Thereafter on 24 October, 2025 learned Trial court was
pleased to allow the prayer made by the petitioner, thereby directing the
prosecution to supply copies, which includes four seizure lists, medical
report of two boys and medical report of accused, thereby fixing the next
date for supply of copies of said documents to the accused/petitioner and
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for consideration of charge on 17 November, 2025. The petitioner could not
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be produced on 17 November 2025 and the trial court fixed next date on
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3 December, 2025 for supply of copies of foresaid missing prosecution
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documents and also for consideration of charge. However, on 3
December, 2025 without addressing the issue of supply of copies of missing
documents as ordered vide order dated October 24,2025 the court below
had taken up the matter for consideration of charge and thereby framed
charges under section 127 (2)/351 (3) of the BNS read with section 4/6 of
POCSO Act against petitioner/accused.
8. It is therefore evident from the aforesaid facts and circumstances of
the case that the charges were framed by the trial court without supplying
copies of missing documents, as was directed by the same trial court in its
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order dated 24 October, 2025.
9. Needless to mention that supply of prosecution papers is an obligation
of the court as would be evident from the language of section 232 read with
section 230 & 231 of the BNSS. The court must arrive at a satisfaction
regarding supply of copy prior to proceeding further in a case.
10. Now I am to consider whether the procedure followed by trial court in
the present case, while framing charge was in conformity with the provisions
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laid down in section 251 read with section 250(1) of the BNSS. In that
context, for brevity of discussion let me first reproduce section 250 and 251
of the BNSS 2023 which reads as follows:-
“250. Discharge.
(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of
sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under section 232.
(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents
submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and
the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and
record his reasons for so doing.”

251. Framing of charge.
(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of
opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence which-
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge
against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and
direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or the
Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and
thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the
procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge
against the accused within a period of sixty days from the date of first
hearing on charge.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the
charge shall be read and explained to the accused present either physically or
through audio-video electronic means and the accused shall be asked
whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.


11. Therefore, section 250(1) provides a time limit of 60 days from the
date of commitment of the case made under section 232, within which the
discharge application may be filed by the accused. No such time limit was
fixed under erstwhile section 227 of Cr.P.C. and it has been newly
incorporated in the BNSS, 2023. On the other hand, section 251 of BNSS is
identical to section 228 of Cr.P.C. except a slight modification in sub-section
1(b) wherein time limit of 60 days from the date of first hearing on charge,
has been prescribed. Section 251 BNSS/228 of Cr.P.C., which starts with
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the words ‘if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid’ , is indicative.
The question is how the period of 60 days is to be reckoned for filing
discharge petition by the accused, where committal procedure is not
contemplated, specially in respect of special courts, constituted under
various legislations, including POCSO Act. Under Section 33(1) of POCSO
Act, Special Court is empowered to take cognizance of any offence under the
Act or upon a receipt of police report without the commitment procedure.
Section 33(1) of the PPCSO Act may be reproduced below:-
“33 (1)A Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the
accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts
which constitute such offence, or upon a police report of such facts.

12. So far as discharge prayer in connection with warrant cases instituted
upon a police report are concerned, it is guided by section 262 of BNSS.
Sub-section (2) of Section 262 contemplates the examination of accused
either physically (which was also provided under Cr.P.C). or via Audio Video
Electronic mode (newly incorporated). Sub section (1) of section 262
prescribes a time limit for filing discharge petition by the accused within 60
days from the date of supply of copies of documents under section 230 of
BNSS. Section 262 may be reproduced below for better understanding.
262. When accused shall be discharged.
(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of
sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under section
230.
(2) If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it
under section 193 and making such examination, if any, of the accused,
either physically or through audio-video electronic means, as the
Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the
accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the
charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the
accused, and record his reasons for so doing.

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13. Therefore, taking aid from section 262 (1) of BNSS, it can be said that
where there is no contemplation for committal of the case to the sessions
court, the time period for preferring discharge application under section
250(1) of BNSS shall be 60 days from the date of supply of the copies of
prosecution documents/police papers to the accused.
14. But the issue gets complicated in view of apparent contradiction of
section 250(1) read with section 262 (1) of the BNSS with that of section 35
(1) of the POCSO Act, which states that the evidence of the child shall be
recorded within a period of 30 days of the Special Court taking cognizance of
the offence and the reason for delay if any shall be recorded by the special
court. Though section 31 of POCSO Act provides that the procedure laid
down in Cr.P.C. (now BNSS) shall apply to the cases under the POCSO Act
and the Special court under the said Act shall be deemed to be a court of
sessions but it also provides that unless as otherwise provided under the
POCSO Act, the provision of Cr.P.C./BNSS shall apply to the proceeding
before a Special Court.
15. Therefore, while the BNSS gives an opportunity to the accused to seek
for his discharge within a period of 60 days from the date of commitment
and in the case of warrant procedure cases instituted on police report, 60
days from the date of supply of copies under section 230, but in
contradistinction section 35 of the POCSO Act provides that evidence of the
child shall be recorded within a period of 30 days from the date of taking
cognizance. Section 31 of the POCSO Act may be reproduced below as it is
relevant in this context:-
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31. Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before
a Special Court.— Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)(including the provisions
as to bail and bonds)shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court
and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be
deemed to be a court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution
before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor

16. On a plain reading of section 31 of the POCSO Act, it is apparent that
the provision contained in section 35 of POCSO Act, that evidence of the
child shall be recorded within a period of 30 days from the date of taking
cognizance shall override the provision contained in section 250(1)/262(1) of
BNSS.
17. During the course of argument Mr. Bhattacharya, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for petitioner raised a question as to whether the BNSS,
2023 being a later statute, the provision contained in section 250(1) and
section 262(1) of BNSS, so far as it relates to 60 days time limit for filing
discharge application by the accused, shall have overriding effect on the
previously legislated POCSO Act or not.
18. It is important to mention here that POCSO Act does not provide any
specific provision with regard to the framing of charge or discharge of an
accused. Therefore, there is no bar to follow the procedure laid down in
BNSS with regard to framing of charge under the POCSO Act. In this context
section 33(9) of the POCSO Act may be relevant to refer.
33 (9) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Special Court shall, for the
purpose of the trial of any offence under this Act, have all the powers of a
Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of
Session, and as far as may be, in accordance with the procedure
specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for trial
before a Court of Session.

19. Therefore, the mandate is clear that the special court, after taking
cognizance under section 33(1) of POCSO Act, is required to frame charge
following the provisions of BNSS. Thus the question which now arises is as
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to when and upto what stage the accused would get an opportunity to file a
discharge application. As I have stated above that in the absence of any
specific provision in the POCSO Act 2012, the provision of Cr.P.C. (now
BNSS) shall regulate the procedure of framing of charge. Moreover there is
no requirement to follow commitment procedure by the special court under
the said Act as the Special Court itself is authorized to take cognizance of
the offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.

20. Needless to say that the incorporation of time limit of 60 days in the
BNSS as stated above is to provide ample time to the accused to prepare
himself with the help of the copies of supplied prosecution documents, to
prefer his discharge application, if any, so as to preserve the right of the
accused to a fair trial as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. In this context it would be apt to mention that Apex Court and
various High Courts have emphasised the absolute significance of preserving
the right of the accused to a fair trial. Here I may profitably refer the
following observations of the Apex Court to enumerate the importance of
upholding the accused person’s right to fair trial. In Md. Hussain Vs. State
(Government of NCT, Delhi), reported in (2012) 9 SCC 408 it was held by
the Apex Court in Para 40 as follows:-
40. “Speedy trial” and “fair trial” to a person accused of a crime are integral
part of Article 21. There is, however, qualitative difference between the right to
speedy trial and the accused's right of fair trial. Unlike the accused's right of
fair trial, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the
accused in defending himself. The right to speedy trial is in its very nature
relative. It depends upon diverse circumstances. Each case of delay in
conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen in the facts and circumstances of
such case. Mere lapse of several years since the commencement of prosecution
by itself may not justify the discontinuance of prosecution or dismissal of
indictment. The factors concerning the accused's right to speedy trial have to
be weighed vis-à-vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence of
the people in judicial system. Speedy trial secures rights to an accused but it
does not preclude the rights of public justice. The nature and gravity of crime,
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persons involved, social impact and societal needs must be weighed along
with the right of the accused to speedy trial and if the balance tilts in favour of
the former the long delay in conclusion of criminal trial should not operate
against the continuation of prosecution and if the right of the accused in the
facts and circumstances of the case and exigencies of situation tilts the
balance in his favour, the prosecution may be brought to an end. These
principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the
question whether or not retrial of an accused should be ordered.

21. In Anokhilal Vs. state of M.P. reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196
Supreme Court held in Para 26 as follows:-
26. Expeditious disposal is undoubtedly required in criminal matters and that
would naturally be part of guarantee of fair trial. However, the attempts to
expedite the process should not be at the expense of the basic elements of
fairness and the opportunity to the accused, on which postulates, the entire
criminal administration of justice is founded. In the pursuit for expeditious
disposal, the cause of justice must never be allowed to suffer or be sacrificed.
What is paramount is the cause of justice and keeping the basic ingredients
which secure that as a core idea and ideal, the process may be expedited, but
fast tracking of process must never ever result in burying the cause of justice.

22. Therefore it is settled proposition of law that while expeditious
disposal is undoubtedly a primary object of every criminal trial involving
such offences and early disposal forms an integral part of guarantee of a
fair trial, but attempts to expedite the trial should not be at the cost of
fairness or affording an opportunity to the accused as prescribed in the
subsequently legislated procedural law, to defend himself.
23. Coming back to the moot question raised in the instant proceeding
which pertains to the time limit by which accused would be entitled to file
discharge application and the next question i.e. from which stage, time will
be reckoned to exercise such right by the accused. It appears as mentioned
above that there is an apparent contradiction of the provision of section
251(1)/261(1) of the BNSS with that of section 35(1) of POCSO Act and
therefore in view of such provision under the POCSO Act, whether time-
frame for filing discharge application by the accused person is liable to be
curtailed in view of section 31 read with section 35 (1) of the POCSO Act.
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24. In my considered opinion since the accused person’s right to prefer
discharge application within a reasonable period on receipt of
prosecution/police papers is an unalienable facet of article 21 of the
Constitution, therefore denial of such opportunity on technical reasons
must lead to denial of opportunity to fair trial. Even in case of trial of
offences by Special Court under POCSO Act, where commitment procedure
has not been contemplated, the time frame as prescribed under BNSS,
which is a subsequent general statute would apply proprio vigore for the
reasons that section 4(2) of BNSS/Cr.P.C. provides that all offences under
any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt
with according to the same provision but subject to any enactment for the
time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, enquiring
into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.
25. At the cost of repetition I would like to mention that no special
procedure has been provided under the POCSO Act relating to framing of
charge or discharge of an accused. In the absence of special procedure
relating to framing of charge or discharge of an accused, the principle laid
down in section 250 (1) read with section 262(1) shall apply in view of clear
mandate in the subsequent general legislation.
26. In Ajoy Kumar Banerjee Vs. Union of India, reported in (1984) 3
SCC 127 Supreme Court had dealt with the rule of interpretation with
regard to the general law as well as special law and held in paragraph 39 as
follows:-
39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are deducible and these are: (i)
The legislature has the undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated
through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may be altered, abrogated or
repealed by a later general law by an express provisions, (iii) A later general
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law will override a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each other
that they cannot co-exist even though no express provision in that behalf is
found in the general law, and (iv) It is only in the absence of a provision to the
contrary and of a clear inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly
unaffected by a later general law. See in this connection, Maxwell on the
Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edn., pp. 196-198.

27. In S. Prakash and Anr. Vs. KM Kurian (Kuniyan) and Ors .
reported in (1999) 5 SCC 624 Apex Court has emphasised the legislative
intent while discussing the maxim generalia specialibus derogant (Special
things derogate from general thing) held if language of general provision is
clear and unqualified, it prevails over special provision and special provision
must give way to general provision if legislative intent was to establish a rule
of universal application. Therefore it is clear that if the intention of the rule
making authority was to establish a rule of universal application in the
interest of just and fair trial, to give reasonable opportunity to the accused
concerned to prefer his discharge application within a time limit, the
provision incorporated in subsequent legislation shall follow.
28. The expression in section 250 (2) of the BNSS ‘ and after hearing the
submission of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge
considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused, he shall discharge the accused and records his reasons for so doing’
includes the submission of the accused on the records of the case as filed by
the prosecution and the documents relied by them.

29. It is needless to mention that in a plethora of judgments, the Apex
Court and the High Courts have taken a clear stand that the trial court
cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but
has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the court for consideration at
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the time of framing charge, though the probative value of the materials on
record cannot be gone into. Nevertheless while framing charge the court
must apply its judicial mind and the materials placed on record must satisfy
that the commission of the offence by the accused was possible.
30. Therefore, the provisions contained in section 250 and 251 are not
empty formalities and that the court exercising the power is required to
evaluate the entire materials and documents made available on record with
the object of finding out if the facts emerging therefrom and taken at their
face value, discloses the existence of all ingredients constituting the alleged
offences. On a plain reading of section 250(1) /262(1) it is clear that while
incorporating the new provision relating to the 60 days time for preferring
application for discharge from the date of commitment/from the date of
service of copies of the documents, the intention of the legislature was to
establish a rule of universal application. There appears to be no reasonable
explanation as to why accused of a POCSO Case shall not get reasonable
time-period to prefer his discharge application, where there is possibility of
the accused being punished with grave punishment, specially when the
accused of much lesser offences are getting reasonable time period upon
receiving prosecution documents to prefer such application before the court.
31. Though in section 31 of the POCSO Act the reference has been made
to Cr.P.C, yet the provision of BNSS would apply in place and instead of
Cr.P.C. on the doctrine of legislation by reference. Section 31 of the POCSO
Act is a legislation by reference for which the subsequent changes in the
referred legislation would apply in the Special Act. There is a difference
between a legislation by incorporation and a legislation by reference. In case
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of legislation by incorporation the provisions referred to are bodily
transplanted from the referred legislation to the special act. Therefore,
subsequent changes are inconsequential, however in case of legislation by
reference, the subsequent changes in the referred legislation are also applied
in the special Act by virtue of the provision under section 8 of the General
Clauses Act. Hence any change in the referred legislation would apply in
case of a legislation by reference.

32. In Insolvency and bankruptcy Board of India Vs. Satyanarayan
Bankatlal Malu and Ors. reported in (2024) 6 SCC 508 , the Apex Court
referred the judgment in Girnar Traders (3) Vs. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2011) 3 SCC 1, where it was held that once a finding is
recorded that an Act is a self contained Code, then the application of either
of the doctrines that legislation by reference or legislation by incorporation
would lose their significance particularly when the two acts cannot co exist
and operate without conflict. But in case of general reference in the Act in
question to an earlier act but there being no specific mention of the
provisions of the former Act, then it would clearly be considered as
‘legislation by reference’. In such a case the amending laws of the former act
would become applicable to the later Act. However, when the provisions of
the Act are specifically referred and incorporated in the later statute then
those provisions alone are applicable and the amending provisions of the
former act would not become part of the later act.
33. Further more another question needs to be addressed i.e. from which
date 60 days period shall be reckoned for filing discharge application by the
accused. I have already mentioned that section 250(1) of BNSS speaks about
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60 days from the date of commitment. It is apt to mention that in sessions
triable cases where the procedure for commitment of case record has been
contemplated, the records are being committed after serving copies of
prosecution documents to the accused. Section 262 (1) speaks about 60
days time period from the date of supply of copies of documents under
section 230 of BNSS. Therefore, both the provisions clearly suggests that 60
days should be reckoned from the date of service of copies of prosecution
documents. In this context it also needs to be mentioned that supply of
copies of documents must be interpreted to mean supply of full set of copies
of documents which the prosecution wants to rely upon during trial.
34. Therefore special courts trying under the POCSO Act should follow the
procedure while framing charge against the accused:-
(i) Since no commitment procedure has been prescribed under the
POCSO Act for the cases triable by the Special Court, the date of
service of copies of all the prosecution documents, which are to
be relied upon during trial, shall be treated as the date of
commitment for the purpose of section 250(1) of the BNSS.
(ii) Immediately after taking cognizance when the accused either
appears before the court or the accused is bought before the
special court, the accused shall forthwith be provided with the
copies of prosecution documents as provided in section 231 of
BNSS, if not already provided.
(iii) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within 60
days thereafter under section 250(1) of the BNSS.
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(iv) If the accused does not want to file an application for discharge,
such intention shall be given in writing by the accused and the
court on receipt of such application shall immediately proceed
for charge hearing.
(v) However, in the event the accused filed an application for
discharge within 60 days, such application shall be considered
under section 250(2) BNSS after providing reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the accused and the prosecution, and
the same shall be disposed of forthwith but not later than 60
days from the date of filing such application.
(vi) Unless the accused is discharged under section 250(2) of BNSS,
the court shall proceed for charge hearing against the accused
within 60 days thereafter.
35. Coming back to the case in hand it has already been pointed out that
without supplying complete set of copies of documents as directed by the
court itself on 24.10.2025, it has hurriedly and mechanically framed the
charge against the accused and therefore, the order impugned is not
sustainable in the eye of law and is liable to be set aside.

36. CRR 307 of 2026 is therefore allowed. Court below is directed to
supply copies of complete set of documents, including missing documents,
which are to be relied upon by prosecution during trial, within a period of
two weeks from the date of communication of the order. If the accused
wishes to prefer discharge application, he shall prefer the same within 60
days thereafter but if he does not want to file any application for discharge
such intention shall be disclosed immediately after receipt of the copies and
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the trial court in such cases shall go for charge hearing immediately. In the
event the accused files an application for discharge within the aforesaid
period, the court below will dispose of his prayer within 60 days thereafter.
rd
The order impugned dated 3 December, 2025 passed in case No. ST (Spl)
102 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, POCSO Court,
Chandannagore is hereby set aside.

37. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be
given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.
(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)
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