STATE vs PANCHANAN PALAI

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.135 of 2013

CNR No. ODHC010299812013
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Panchanan Palai Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : None

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 01.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 10.04.2013 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Berhampur, Ganjam, in G.R. Case No.6 of 2006 (V),
corresponding to T.R. No.44 of 2006, arising out of Berhampur

Vigilance P.S. Case No.06, whereby the opposite-party Panchanan Palai,
a retired Revenue Inspector, was acquitted of the charges under Section
7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant, Biranjan
Majhi, had applied on 04.05.2006 before the Tahasildar,
Paralakhemundi, for issuance of a legal heir certificate in connection
with the claim relating to the arrear family pension of his deceased
mother. The Tahasildar forwarded the application to the respondent, who
was then serving as the Revenue Inspector of Machamara Revenue
Circle, for enquiry and submission of a report. As the enquiry report had
not been submitted, the complainant approached the respondent in
connection with the pending work. It was alleged that the respondent
demanded illegal gratification of Rs.300/- from the complainant as a
motive or reward for submitting the requisite enquiry report. On the

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basis of the written report lodged by the complainant before the
Vigilance authorities, a decision was taken to lay a trap.

4. It is further alleged that, pursuant to the trap arrangement, the
complainant proceeded to the office of the respondent accompanied by
the designated overhearing witness and other Vigilance personnel. At
about 11.00 A.M., the respondent arrived at the office and, during the
ensuing interaction with the complainant, the tainted currency notes
amounting to Rs.300/- allegedly came into his possession. On receiving
the pre-arranged signal, the Vigilance officials entered the office and
apprehended the respondent. The tainted currency notes were recovered,
and the hands of the respondent as well as his shirt pocket were washed
in sodium carbonate solution, which reportedly turned pink.

5. Upon completion of investigation and obtaining the requisite
sanction for prosecution, the investigating agency submitted a charge-
sheet against the respondent for the offences punishable under Section 7
and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.

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6. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined eight
witnesses and exhibited documentary and material evidence relating to
the complaint, preparation of the trap, detection, seizure and chemical
examination. The complainant, Biranjan Majhi, was examined as P.W.1,
while Manoj Kumar Choudhury, the Junior Engineer selected as the
overhearing witness, was examined as P.W.2. Ramesh Chandra Sahu,
the other official witness associated with the trap, was examined as
P.W.3. The Tahasildar concerned was examined as P.W.4, and the
prosecution also examined witnesses connected with the investigation
and chemical examination. The defence examined D.W.1 and relied
upon the documents marked as Exts.A and B in support of its plea.

7. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
the prosecution had established that the complainant's application for a
legal heir certificate had been forwarded to the respondent for enquiry
and that the respondent was a public servant at the relevant time. The
learned trial Court, however, found material inconsistencies in the
evidence relating to the alleged initial demand of Rs.300/- and the
circumstances in which the money was allegedly handed over or

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received during the trap. The Court noted that the complainant's version
regarding the initial demand was not consistent with the contents of the
written complaint and that the evidence of P.W.2 did not satisfactorily
corroborate the alleged conversation between the complainant and the
respondent. Although the recovery of the tainted currency notes and the
positive chemical examination report were accepted, the learned trial
Court held that those circumstances, in the absence of reliable proof of
demand and voluntary acceptance, were insufficient to establish the
offences charged. Consequently, the respondent was acquitted under
Section 248(1) Cr.P.C. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“ 23. Considering the cumulative effect of the
evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and others vis-à-vis D.W.1,
the Court arrives at a finding that the demand and
acceptance by the accused to submit an inquiry
report of P.W.1 is not fully established. The
prosecution needs to prove the case beyond all
reasonable doubt. According to the Court, doubt
looms large especially when the evidence of P.W.1
and 2 and others are appreciated in proper
perspective. Thus ultimate conclusion is that the
prosecution utterly failed to bring sufficient evidence
in order to discharge the burden of proof and to hold
the accused culpable for offences punishable U/s.7
and Section 13(2) of the Act. Hence ordered.

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In the result the accused is found not guilty for
offences punishable U/s.7 and Sec.13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and accordingly
he is acquitted U/s.248(1) Cr.P.C. The accused is set
at liberty forthwith. ”

8. Assailing the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel appearing
for the State submitted that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate
the evidence of the complainant in conjunction with the evidence of
the official witnesses. It is contended that P.W.1 categorically stated
that the respondent asked him whether he had come prepared and,
upon receiving an affirmative answer, instructed him to keep the
money in his shirt pocket. According to the State, the conduct of the
respondent in verifying the money after it had been placed in his
pocket, considered together with the recovery of the tainted currency
notes, sufficiently establishes conscious acceptance of the illegal
gratification. The learned trial Court ought not to have discarded the
complainant's testimony merely because the overhearing witness
could not hear the precise conversation between the parties.
9. Learned counsel for the State further submits that the evidence
of P.Ws.2, 3 and 7, read with the preparation report, detection report,

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seizure documents and the chemical examination report, corroborates
the material circumstances of the trap. He argued that the hand-wash
and shirt-pocket-wash solutions turning pink and the subsequent
detection of phenolphthalein provide significant corroborative
evidence concerning the handling of the tainted currency notes. He
also submitted that the defence plea of forcible insertion of the
money is inconsistent with the circumstances established during the
trap and is not supported by any independent evidence sufficient to
rebut the prosecution case. The testimony of D.W.1, according to the
State, ought not to have been accorded undue weight merely because
he supported the respondent's version.

10. He contended that the learned trial Court failed to apply the
statutory presumption contemplated under Section 20 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as discussed in the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. Shankar Prasad v. State of Andhra
Pradesh , reported in AIR 2004 SC 1242 . According to the State,
once the tainted money was recovered from the respondent and the
chemical test yielded a positive result, the Court ought to have

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examined whether the respondent had discharged the burden of
rebutting the statutory presumption. It is also urged that the findings
of the learned trial Court regarding demand and acceptance are based
upon an erroneous appreciation of the evidence and that the acquittal
is liable to be interfered with.
11. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State at
length.

12. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate

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Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing

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so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible. ”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this

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challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to

rebut the same in appeal.”

13. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra)
, the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court

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before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
14. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 13 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal

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or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
15. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st

Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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