N. Sridhar Reddy vs The State Of A.P. Through Secretary

2026 INSC 1191
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5187 OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO.7708/2019)

N. SRIDHAR REDDY …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS

THE STATE OF A.P.
THROUGH SECRETARY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5188 OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO.7793 OF 2019)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5189 OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO.7812 OF 2019)
J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. The case before us brings into sharp focus the limits of matrimonial forum
shopping, wherein the husband after failing to get his first marriage dissolved
under the Indian jurisdiction, approaches the foreign court, procures a divorce
decree under the foreign jurisdiction and thereafter solemnizes a second
marriage. Can the sanctity of matrimonial status be allowed to yield to such
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NISHA KHULBEY
Date: 2026.11.03
16:51:24 IST
Reason:
forum non conveniens ?
2. Leave granted.
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 1 of 18

1 2
3. The lead Criminal Appeal is preferred by Dr. N. Sridhar Reddy , who is
the husband of N. Geetha Prasanthi, respondent No.2 (first wife). As far as the
3 4
other two Criminal Appeals are concerned, they are preferred by Geetha Inturi ,
5
the second wife of Dr. N. Sridhar Reddy and Nallapareddy Krishna Reddy and
6
Nallapareddy Vasantha Kumari , the parents of Dr. N. Sridhar Reddy,
respectively. These Appeals impugn the common order dated 08.07.2019
passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh whereby the High Court has
dismissed the petitions filed by the present appellants under Section 482 of the
7
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking quashing of C.C. No. 571/2018
pending on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli, Guntur
District, Andhra Pradesh.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
4. The facts giving rise to the present Appeals are as follows:
i. Accused no.1 married respondent No.2 (N. Geetha Prasanthi) on
18.04.2003 at Sattenapalli, Andhra Pradesh, according to Hindu
rites and customs.
ii. After the marriage, they resided in Hyderabad where accused
No.1/husband was doing post-graduation from Osmania Medical
College.

1
Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7708/2019
2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘accused No.1/husband’
3
Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 7793/2019 and 7812/2019
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘accused No.4/second wife’
5
Hereinafter referred to as ‘accused No.2’
6
Hereinafter referred to as ‘accused No.3’
7
For short, ‘Cr.PC’
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 2 of 18

iii. On 04.02.2005, accused No.1/husband went to United Kingdom to
pursue his career as a doctor. On 07.05.2006, respondent
No.2/first wife, joined accused No.1/husband in the United
Kingdom.
iv. In August 2007, respondent No.2/first wife returned to her parental
home at Sattenapalli, Andhra Pradesh, for delivery and their son
was born on 04.11.2007. It is case of accused No.1/husband that
despite repeated requests, respondent no.2/first wife did not return
to United Kingdom.
v. As the matrimonial relationship of the parties deteriorated, accused
No.1/husband instituted a divorce and custody proceedings before
the competent Court at Narasaraopet, Guntur District, Andhra
Pradesh, which were dismissed. Against the dismissal of the
divorce proceedings, accused No.1/husband preferred an appeal
before the High Court, but subsequently, he withdrew the same.
Thus, the original Hindu marriage continue to subsist.
vi. Accused No.1/husband was granted citizenship of the United
Kingdom (by naturalization) after 8 years of continuous residence
in the United Kingdom on 01.02.2013.
vii. Thereafter, on 16.08.2013, accused No.1/husband instituted
divorce proceedings against respondent No.2/first wife before the
Cambridge County Court in England. Respondent No.2/first wife
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filed objections concerning jurisdiction and competence of the
foreign court in granting divorce.
viii. On 27.11.2013, the Cambridge County Court passed an order in
favour of accused No.1/husband and ordered that a decree nisi be
issued. Ultimately on 29.01.2014, the divorce decree issued by the
Cambridge County Court was made absolute wherein the marriage
was dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
ix. On 03.03.2014, accused No.1/husband married Geetha Inturi,
accused no.4/second wife, in Norfolk, United Kingdom.
x. Almost after two years, i.e., on 01.02.2016, respondent No.2/first
wife lodged a complaint with the Sattenapalli Town Police Station,
Guntur District, under Sections 494, 120B read with Section 34 of
8
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , which is the subject matter of these
Appeals.
xi. A chargesheet came to be filed against accused No.1/husband and
his parents as accused Nos.2 and 3 respectively, but the name of
accused no.4/second wife was deleted from the chargesheet. It was,
however, at the cognizance stage that the learned Magistrate
decided to take cognizance against accused no.4/second wife as
well. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants filed petitions under
Section 482 of the Cr.PC praying for quashing of the criminal
proceedings instituted against them.

8
For short, ‘IPC’
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 4 of 18

xii. The High Court vide its common impugned order dismissed the
quashing petitions. Qua accused no.1/husband and accused
no.4/second wife, it was noted that the High Court at the stage of
Section 482 of the Cr.PC, could not conclusively decide the validity
of the divorce decree granted by the foreign court. Further, the
actual date of the second marriage could be determined after the
trial concludes. Thus, the High Court held that the material
available on record was not of such a sterling or impeccable quality
that would justify quashing under Section 482 of the Cr.PC.
xiii. Qua accused nos.2 and 3 (parents of accused no.1/husband), the
High Court observed that at the threshold, the allegations against
them could not be disregarded and that their role in the second
marriage of accused No.1/husband could only be determined at the
stage of trial.
B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
5. The learned senior counsel appearing for accused No.1/husband
submitted that he became a British citizen on 01.02.2013 and got married to
accused no.4/second wife in United Kingdom on 03.03.2014. Thus, it is argued
that at the time of the alleged offence, accused No.1/husband was a British
citizen. Relying on Section 4 of the IPC, it was argued that IPC has no application
to the acts of foreign citizens that have occurred abroad.
6. It was submitted that the divorce decree granted by the Cambridge
County Court is a valid decree and the earlier marriage was not subsisting at
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the time the second marriage was solemnized. Further, respondent No.2/first
wife specifically conceded to the jurisdiction of the UK Court and took the
argument of forum non conveniens. It was also submitted on behalf of accused
No.1/husband that once the divorce decree has been passed after hearing the
respondent No.2/first wife and unless the same is set aside by a competent civil
court in India, the said decree is presumed to be valid as per Section 14 of Civil
9
Procedure Code, 1908 .
7. It was also argued that there has been a substantial delay in filing the
FIR. The decree of divorce granted by the UK Court is dated 27.11.2013 and
29.01.2014 and the second marriage between accused No.1/husband and
accused No.4/second wife took place on 03.03.2014. However, the complaint
by respondent No. 2/first wife was only filed on 01.02.2016. It is asserted that
the said complaint has only been filed to harass accused No.1/husband.
8. Accused Nos.2 and 3, the parents of accused No.1/husband, have
submitted in their rejoinder affidavit that they were not complicit with accused
No.1/husband in commission of the offence of bigamy. Further, there has been
no overt act attributed to them in the chargesheet, without which they cannot
be made liable for conspiring with accused No.1/husband for the commission
of bigamy.
9. Accused No.4/second wife, in her rejoinder affidavit, has claimed that
she was not aware about the first marriage of accused No.1/husband. Further,

9
For short, ‘CPC’
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 6 of 18

she relies upon the foreign decree of divorce to contend that at the time of her
marriage with accused No.1/husband, he was already divorced.
10. Per Contra, it was argued on behalf of the respondent No.2/first wife that
since the marriage between accused No.1/husband and respondent No.2/first
wife, was solemnized in India, the dissolution of it could only take place in
accordance with the provisions of Hindu Matrimonial Laws.
11. It was also submitted on behalf of respondent No.2/first wife that she did
not voluntarily or unconditionally submit to the jurisdiction of the Cambridge
County Court rather submitted her objections to the jurisdiction of the
Cambridge County Court.
12. Further, respondent No.2/first wife also disputes the validity of the decree
of divorce granted by the Cambridge County Court so far as it was founded on
the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage which is not a statutory
ground for the dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,
thus violating the conditions laid down under Section 13 of the CPC. Reliance
is accordingly placed on Y. Narasimha Rao and Others v. Y. Venkata
10
Lakshmi and Another .

13. Further, respondent No.2/first wife also places reliance on the decision of
11

this Court in Satya v. Teja Singh to contend that a foreign decree obtained
from a Court lacking jurisdiction or wherein the jurisdiction is obtained by
misrepresenting the facts cannot bind the Indian Courts.

10
(1991) 3 SCC 451
11
(1975) 1 SCC 120
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 7 of 18

14. The rival submissions now fall for our consideration.

C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
15. Keeping in view the facts and the submissions of the parties, the issue
that arises to be determined by us is twofold – firstly, whether the decree of
divorce granted by the foreign court on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of
marriage is entitled to recognition in India under Section 13 of the CPC, and if
not, whether accused No.1/husband can shield behind such decree to escape
liability under Section 494 of the IPC and secondly, whether exercise of inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC could have been exercised against
any of the appellants.

FOR ACCUSED NO.1/HUSBAND: FOREIGN DECREE CANNOT SHIELD THE
SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE

16. The statutory framework governing the recognition of the foreign
judgments is laid down under Sections 13 and 14 of the CPC. These provisions
largely are an extension of the principle of res judicata , wherein a judgment
delivered by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction can be enforced by an
Indian Court and will ultimately operate as res judicata between the parties,
provided except in the cases as mentioned in Section 13 of the CPC. The larger
policy behind these provisions is to further the principle of comity of nations
subject to the general principles of justice, equity and good conscience.


S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 8 of 18

17. Before we proceed, it is appropriate to have a look at Sections 13 and 14
of the CPC which read as under:
“ 13. When foreign judgment not conclusive .—A foreign
judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly
adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties
under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same
title except—
( a ) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent
jurisdiction;
( b ) where it has not been given on the merits of the case;
( c ) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be
founded on an incorrect view of international law or a
refusal to recognise the law of India in cases in which
such law is applicable;
( d ) where the proceedings in which the judgment was
obtained are opposed to natural justice;
( e ) where it has been obtained by fraud;
( f ) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any
law in force in India.

14. Presumption as to foreign judgments .—The Court shall
presume upon the production of any document purporting to be
a certified copy of a foreign judgment, that such judgment was
pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, unless the
contrary appears on the record; but such presumption may be
displaced by proving want of jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)

18. Section 14 of the CPC makes the foreign judgment as conclusive once it
has passed the threshold of Section 13 and other requisites such as principles
of natural justice, equity and good conscience. Once these requirements are
fulfilled, the executing court cannot enquire into the validity, legality or
otherwise of the foreign judgment.
19. Similar principles apply when the Courts are dealing with private
international law, more particularly recognition of foreign matrimonial decrees.
Thus, a foreign matrimonial decree itself would not assume recognition unless
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the same is tested on the anvil of Section 13 of the CPC, law governing marriage
and jurisdictional principles recognized by that particular country.
20. This Court in the case of Y. Narasimha Rao (supra) interpreted Section
13 of the CPC and laid down the conditions under which a foreign decree of
divorce would be recognised in India. It was held as follows:
“ 20. From the aforesaid discussion the following rule can be deduced
for recognising a foreign matrimonial judgment in this country. The
jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on
which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial
law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule
may be as follows: ( i ) where the matrimonial action is filed in the
forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and
permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground
available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are
married; ( ii ) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively
submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and
contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the
matrimonial law under which the parties are married; ( iii ) where
the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the
jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions
of the matrimonial law of the parties.

21. The aforesaid rule with its stated exceptions has the merit of being
just and equitable. It does no injustice to any of the parties. The parties
do and ought to know their rights and obligations when they marry
under a particular law. They cannot be heard to make a grievance
about it later or allowed to bypass it by subterfuges as in the present
case. The rule also has an advantage of rescuing the institution of
marriage from the uncertain maze of the rules of the Private
International Law of the different countries with regard to
jurisdiction and merits based variously on domicile, nationality,
residence — permanent or temporary or ad hoc, forum, proper law
etc. and ensuring certainty in the most vital field of national life
and conformity with public policy . The rule further takes account
of the needs of modern life and makes due allowance to accommodate
them. Above all, it gives protection to women, the most vulnerable
section of our society, whatever the strata to which they may belong.
In particular it frees them from the bondage of the tyrannical and
servile rule that wife's domicile follows that of her husband and that it
is the husband's domiciliary law which determines the jurisdiction and
judges the merits of the case.”
(emphasis supplied)

21. Further, this Court in the case of Satya (supra) laid down that principles
governing the validity of the foreign decrees cannot be divorced from the law
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 10 of 18

governing the matrimonial status of the parties. Any divergence from the law
governing the parties would ultimately result in an anomalous situation which
the Court regarded as a “limping marriage”. This Court observed thus:
“ 9. We cannot therefore adopt mechanically the Rules of Private
International law evolved by other countries. These principles vary
greatly and are moulded by the distinctive social, political and
economic conditions obtaining in these countries. Questions relating
to the personal status of a party depend in England and North America
upon the law of his domicile, but in France, Italy, Spain and most of
the other European countries upon the law of his nationality.
Principles governing matters within the divorce jurisdiction are
so conflicting in the different countries that not unoften a man
and a woman are husband and wife in one jurisdiction but treated
as divorced in another jurisdiction. We have before us the problem
of such a limping marriage.
*
18. In determining whether a divorce decree will be recognised in
another jurisdiction as a matter of comity, public policy and good
morals may be considered. No country is bound by comity to give
effect in its courts to divorce laws of another country which are
repugnant to its own laws and public policy . Thus, where a “mail-
order divorce” granted by a Mexican court was not based on
jurisdictional finding of domicile, the decree was held to have no
extraterritorial effect in New Jersey [ State v. Najjar , 2 NJ 208].
American courts generally abhor the collusive Mexican mail-order
divorces and refuse to recognise them [ Langner v. Langner , 39 NYS 2d
918] . Mail-order divorces are obtained by correspondence by a spouse
not domiciled in Mexico. Latey, in his well known book on divorce says
that “The facilities afforded by the Mexican courts to grant divorce to
all and sundry whatsoever their nationality or domicile have become
even more notorious than those in Reno, Nevada” [ Latey : The Law
and practice in Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, 15th Edn., (1973) p.
461]. Recognition is denied to such decrees as a matter of public
policy.”
(emphasis supplied)

22. In the case before us, accused No.1/husband initially approached the
Court of the learned Civil Judge, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh seeking dissolution
of marriage with respondent No.2/first wife and having failed to obtain the
required relief, he preferred an appeal before the High Court, but chose to
withdraw it later. Instead of contesting his appeal here in India, accused
No.1/husband chose to file for divorce proceedings before a foreign court after
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 11 of 18

allegedly obtaining the citizenship of United Kingdom in the interregnum. The
foreign court thereafter made the decree of divorce final on 29.01.2014, on the
ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage; a ground not statutorily
recognized under the Hindu Laws under which the accused no.1/husband and
respondent No.2/first wife, were married. Such a decree cannot automatically
be accorded recognition in India. In our view, the foreign divorce decree was
passed in contravention of the existing matrimonial law in India and on a
ground that is not even recognized statutorily. This not only violates the legal
threshold of Section 13 of the CPC, which every foreign decree has to pass
through, but also the observations made by this Court in Y. Narasimha Rao
(supra) as to the conditions required to be fulfilled by a foreign decree to be
enforceable in India.
23. Here we would also like to advert to a recent judgment of this Court in
12
Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale wherein this Court was
called to examine a decree of divorce granted by a foreign court on the ground
of irretrievable breakdown of marriage wherein the marriage was solemnized
under the Indian law. This court while refusing the recognition to such decree
held as follows:
“ 9. In the present case, the US Court granted a decree of divorce
on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This ground
is not recognized under the HMA, which is the matrimonial law
applicable to the parties. Further, while the appellant-husband
was duly served, he only filed a written statement by post
expressly contesting the jurisdiction of the US Court, and did not
participate in those proceedings any further. It cannot therefore be
said that he voluntarily or effectively submitted to the jurisdiction of
the foreign forum, or that he was afforded a meaningful opportunity

12
2026 SCC OnLine SC 448
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 12 of 18

to contest the matter. The foreign decree accordingly does not satisfy
the conditions laid down in Y. Narasimha Rao (supra), and the
principles of natural justice cannot be said to have been complied
with.

10. In light of the foregoing, we find that the foreign decree is not
conclusive and cannot be sustained as a valid decree of divorce
between the parties. Consequently, the question of which Court,
whether the Family Court, Pune or the Circuit Court for the County of
Oakland, had jurisdiction to entertain the divorce proceedings, need
not be conclusively decided in the present proceedings. We do,
however, find it necessary to bring a quietus to this matter. The parties
have been separated since 2008, nearly eighteen years now, and it is
manifest that no matrimonial bond subsists between them. In such
circumstances, this Court finds it appropriate to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and to
grant the parties a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage.”
(emphasis supplied)
These observations may hold importance for us to decide that if the foreign
decree does not satisfy the requirements of Section 13 of the CPC, whether
accused No.1/husband while relying on such a decree contend that his first
marriage stood dissolved in the eyes of matrimonial laws of India and, thus,
escape the rigours of Section 494 of the IPC, in our view, this cannot be
permitted.
24. Further, on the contention raised on behalf of accused No.1/husband
that respondent No.2/first wife had, in fact, submitted to the jurisdiction of the
foreign court and, hence, the foreign decree would be applicable to her, the
proceedings before the foreign court prime facie do not support this conclusion.
Proceedings before the foreign court would indicate that respondent No.2/first
wife did raise an objection to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Therefore, her
participation cannot, at this stage, be equated with an unconditional
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 13 of 18

submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and make the foreign decree
binding on her.
25. Now coming to the argument of accused No.1/husband that since he was
a British citizen when the second marriage with accused No.4/second wife was
solemnized and since the second marriage took place outside India, keeping in
view the mandate of Section 4 of the IPC, he cannot be held liable. We cannot
accept this submission in the manner canvassed as accused No.1/husband
was married to respondent No.2/first wife in India under the Hindu rites,
rituals and customs, thus, even if the second marriage took place outside India,
the allegations under Section 494 of the IPC cannot be said to be diluted since
enquiry for the offence of bigamy cannot be confined to the place of second
marriage but must necessarily take into account the subsisting matrimonial
relationship. Even otherwise, legal consequences flowing from the subsisting
marriage cannot be defeated by a subsequent change in the nationality of
accused No.1/husband.
26. Further, the submission on behalf of accused No.1/husband that
criminal proceedings qua him are liable to be interdicted on the ground of delay
in lodging of the FIR cannot be accepted at this stage considering that bigamy
is a continuing offence. Thus, on every occasion the disobedience or non-
compliance occurs, the offence is committed.
27. We also clarify that the aforesaid conclusions are only confined to the
limited scrutiny permissible at the present stage. Nothing contained in this
judgment shall be construed as a final expression on the merits of the case.
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 14 of 18

FOR ACCUSED NOS.2 AND 3 — PARENTS OF ACCUSED NO.1/HUSBAND:
CRIMINAL LIABILITY CANNOT MERELY FLOW FROM RELATIONSHIP

28. Now coming to the Appeal preferred by accused Nos.2 and 3, the parents
of accused No.1/husband. It has been alleged that accused Nos.2 and 3
conspired with accused No.1/husband for commission of the bigamy. The bare
perusal of the allegations against accused Nos.2 and 3 do not point to any overt
act on their part to conspire with accused No.1/husband for commission of
bigamy. In the chargesheet, it is recorded that accused Nos.2 and 3 made
criminal conspiracy against respondent No.2/first wife for execution of certain
properties in favour of accused No.1/husband and thereby encouraging second
marriage of accused No.1/husband with accused No.4/second wife. This, in
our opinion, cannot be held as sufficient material to hold allegations against
accused Nos.2 and 3. There is no material to show the existence of any
agreement between the parties for commission of the offence of bigamy.
29. Additionally, even if accused Nos.2 and 3 were aware about the existence
of second marriage, that itself cannot make them liable for conspiracy to commit
bigamy. Here, we would like to advert to the findings of this Court in the case of
13
Sivaraman Nair and Others v. State of Kerala and Another while referring
to the judgment of this Court in S. Nitheen and Others v. State of Kerala
14
and Another held that in the absence of evidence showing active

13
2026 INSC 412
14
(2024) 8 SCC 706
S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.7708/2019 ETC. Page 15 of 18

participation, facilitation, or overt acts in the second marriage cannot make the
in-laws liable. This Court observed thus:
“ 26. Coming to the allegations under Section 494 of the IPC, it has
been held in S. Nitheen (supra) [ S. Nitheen and Others v. State of Kerala
and Another, (2024) 8 SCC 706 ] that in order to bring home the said
charge, the complainant is required to prima facie prove the overt
act or omission of the accused persons in the second marriage
ceremony. The prosecution has failed to provide any cogent
evidence to establish such overt act or intention on part of the
accused-appellants.

27. The High Court relied upon the statement of a witness to infer
knowledge on the part of the accused-appellants. However, such
inferential knowledge, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the
threshold established in S. Nitheen (supra), which requires
evidence of an overt act or omission. While it has been alleged
that the accused-appellants were aware of the second marriage,
mere knowledge that an act is being or has been committed by
another person does not, by itself, establish the requisite common
intention. Even proceeding on the basis that the accused-appellants
were aware of the second marriage, there is no allegation, let alone any
material, to suggest that they actively participated in, facilitated, or
encouraged the solemnisation of that marriage.”
(emphasis supplied)

FOR ACCUSED NO.4/SECOND WIFE : MATRIMONIAL STATUS AND
CRIMINAL LIABILITY MUST BE EXAMINED SEPARATELY

30. Coming to the Appeal preferred by accused No.4/second wife, respondent
No.2/first wife has stated in her complaint that she travelled to United Kingdom
in 2013 and made enquiry in Electoral Directory of Cambridge County Council,
Mandela House, Cambridge CB2 1BY, United Kingdom, wherein she obtained
the information that accused nos.1 and 4 were living as husband and wife
secretly since 2012, when respondent No.2/first wife confronted about the same
with accused No.4/second wife, she stated that she was only a companion of
accused No.1, living under the same roof.
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31. In the chargesheet, however, the investigating agencies did not find
sufficient material against accused No.4/second wife and, thereafter, closed the
case against her and deleted her name from the chargesheet. However, vide
order dated 22.12.2018, the learned I Additional Junior Civil Judge,
Sattenapalli, rejected the closure of the case against accused No.4/second wife
and, in fact, decided to take cognizance against her without assigning any
reason.
32. At this stage, this Court is not required to take a meticulous examination
of the allegations levelled against accused No.4/second wife. The question,
however, is that whether the material on record establishes a prime facie case
of conspiring her with accused No.1/husband to enter into a second marriage
despite knowing the existence of accused No.1’s first marriage. In the present
case, apart from accused No.4’s alleged cohabitation or marriage with accused
No.1, no other overt act demonstrates that she participated in the alleged
commission of the offence knowingly or even had the conscious knowledge that
the first marriage of accused No.1 was still subsisting. In our view, criminal
liability must be established qua each accused separately and, thus,
continuance of the criminal proceedings against accused No.4 would result in
an abuse of the process of law.
D. CONCLUSION
33. In view of the above discussions, we hold as follows:
i. The criminal proceedings against accused No.1/husband for the
offence under Section 494 of the IPC is sustained. Accordingly,
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Criminal Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No.7708 of 2019
stands dismissed; and
ii. Criminal proceedings qua accused Nos.2 and 3, the parents of
accused No.1/husband and in-laws of respondent No.2/first wife,
and accused No.4/second wife, are quashed. Accordingly, Criminal
Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos.7812 of 2019 and 7793
of 2019 are allowed.

…..………………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)



…..………………………………………J.
(SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR)

NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 03, 2026.

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