MUKTA PRASAD vs THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPT OF HIGHER AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION

2026:JHHC:15354
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 5637 of 2024
Mukta Prasad, aged about 61 years, wife of Arun Kumar Thakur,
resident of House No. 102, Baba Bhawan, Old A.G. Colony, Kadru,
P.O. Doranda, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, PIN 834002 (Jharkhand).
…….. Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand , through the Principal Secretary,
Department of Higher and Technical Education, Government of
Jharkhand, having its office at Yojna Bhawan, Nepal House, P.O. and
P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, PIN 834004, Jharkhand.
2. The Director, Department of Higher and Technical
Education, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Yojna
Bhawan, Nepal House, P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, PIN
834004, Jharkhand.
3. Ranchi University, Ranchi, through its Vice Chancellor ,
having its office at Shaheed Chowk, Kutchary Road, Ranchi, P.O. -
G.P.O, P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi, PIN 834001, Jharkhand.
4. The Registrar, Ranchi University , Ranchi, having its office at
Shaheed Chowk, Kutchary Road, Ranchi, P.O. - G.P.O, P.S. Kotwali,
District Ranchi, PIN 834001, Jharkhand. ..… Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN


For Petitioner : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate
(Through VC)
Mr. Prakhar Harit, Advocate
Mr. Anis Lal, Advocate
For Resp.-State : Mr. Jai Prakash, A.A.G. I-A
Mr. Amitesh Kr. Geasen, A.C. to AAG-IA
For Ranchi University : Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, Advocate
Mr. Amritanshu Singh, Advocate
CAV on: 12.05.2026 Pronounced on: 15.05.2026

J U D G M E N T
1. The issue for consideration in the instant writ application is as
follows:-

2026:JHHC:15354
‘Whether Petitioner can be denied benefit of re-designation from
post of ‘Laboratory Technician’/‘Laboratory In-charge’ to the post
of ‘Demonstrator’, merely because in the Notification absorbing
services of Petitioner as Laboratory In-charge, a condition was
incorporated that Petitioner will never claim for the post of
Demonstrator?

2. Brief facts of the case are that Petitioner was initially appointed
on the post of Lab. Technician in the Department of Chemistry in
Ranchi Women College, Ranchi under Ranchi University on daily
wages vide Office Order dated 09.11.1987. Admittedly, at the time of
her joining as Lab. Technician/Lab In-charge, Petitioner was
possessing Degree in Bachelor of Science.
3. Respondent-Ranchi University, in its meeting held on
01.08.2001, considered the case of Petitioner for absorption of her
services and recorded, inter alia, that Petitioner’s case is kept in List-
IV as she already worked from 26.04.1989 and has received
payments.
4. Further, on 13.09.2021, Respondent-Ranchi University clearly
recorded, inter alia, that services of Petitioner would be regularized as
and when sanctioned post will be available in the College and,
thereafter, services of Petitioner were absorbed as Lab.
Technician/Lab. In-charge with effect from 01.07.2009 by Ranchi
University, Ranchi vide Memo No. B/460/2010. In said “Absorption
Letter”, it was mentioned that Petitioner shall never claim for the post
of Demonstrator.
5. The dispute relating to re-designation of Lab. In-charge (non-
teaching post) to the post of Demonstrator (Teaching post) cropped up
before this Court, and, vide order dated 07.09.1995, certain persons
who were originally posted as Lab. Assistant/Lab. Technician were
ordered to be re-designated to the post of Demonstrator. Said order
passed in C.W.J.C. No. 387 of 1995(R) was not challenged vide
Letters Patent Appeal and attained finality. Thereafter, second batch
of employees filed writ petition before this Court, and, vide order
th
dated 4 April, 1997, similar directions were given, wherein

2026:JHHC:15354
Petitioners were directed to be re-designated as Demonstrator and to
be considered as ‘Teaching staff’.
6. State of Bihar preferred Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.
th
274 of 199 , which was decided vide order dated 9 December, 1998,
wherein order of the Ld. Single Judge regarding re-designation from
the post of Lab. Technician to the post of ‘Demonstrator’ was upheld,
but second direction regarding treating the post of Demonstrator as
‘Teaching Post’ was interfered with.
7. Both, State of Bihar and the employees preferred Special Leave
Petitions before Hon’ble Supreme Court and said S.L.Ps. were
disposed of vide order of Hon’ble Apex Court, reported in (2002) 6
SCC 308 , wherein it was held that earlier direction of Ld. Single
Judge attained finality and Lab. Assistant/Technician/Lab In-charge
were entitled for being designated as Demonstrator and post of
‘Demonstrator’ was held as ‘Teaching Post’.
8. Consequent upon aforesaid Judgment rendered in the case of
‘Radha Krishna Jha’ reported in (2002) 6 SCC 308 , a general
Notification was issued by State of Jharkhand re-designating ‘Lab.
Assistant’ as ‘Demonstrator’, but, said general Notification contained
various conditions which gave rise to multiple controversy.
9. A Cont. Case (Civil) No. 733 of 2012 was filed before the High
Court, wherein this Court, vide order dated 01.03.2013 passed order
for strict compliance of the Judgment rendered in the case of Radha
th
Krishna Jha (supra) . Further, vide order dated 10 May, 2013 in
Cont. Case (Civil) No. 773 of 2012 , it was noted, inter alia, that State
Government has directed Universities to furnish List of all Lab.
Assistants who are required to be re-designated as Demonstrator and
directed the State Government and Respondent-University not to
arbitrarily discriminate in the matter of re-designation of Lab.
Assistants into Demonstrators and to uniformly re-designate the
employees working as Lab Assistants as Demonstrators.

2026:JHHC:15354
10. Consequent upon such direction being issued by this Court,
Director, Higher Education, vide its Letter No. 4713 dated 30.03.2013
and consequent Letters dated 03.01.2019 and 13.02.2019, directed the
University to furnish List of all eligible persons working as Lab.
Technicians/Lab. In-charges for re-designation as Demonstrators.
11. Consequent thereto, List was furnished by Respondent-
University, and, State of Jharkhand, Department of Higher and
Technical Education (Directorate of Higher Education), vide order
contained in Memo No. 1355 dated 08.12.2020, re-designated the post
of Petitioner from Lab. In-charge to Demonstrator with effect from
01.07.2009. Consequential Notification contained in Memo No.
B/268/21 dated 10.03.2021 was issued by Ranchi University re-
designating the Petitioner to the post of Demonstrator with effect from
01.07.2009.
12. Admittedly, Petitioner was discharging her duties as
Demonstrator and there was no dispute in respect of the same.
13. In the meantime, a proposal was sent by Respondent-University
th th th
vide Letter dated 20 September, 2013 for fixation of 6 and 7
U.G.C. pay-scale of Petitioner on the post of Demonstrator, to
Director, Higher Education. It is at this stage dispute occurred and a
reply was sent by Directorate of Higher Education contained in Letter
No. 2497 dated 14.12.2023, wherein it was pointed out that in
“Absorption Letter” of the Petitioner, being Memo No. B/460/10
dated 01.06.2010, a condition was imposed that Petitioner will never
th
claim for the post of Demonstrator. On the basis of said objection, 6
th
and 7 revised pay-scale of Petitioner was not approved.
14. However, Petitioner continued to discharge her duties on the
post of Demonstrator, but, vide impugned Notification contained in
Memo No. B/458/24 dated 06.06.2024, in a unilateral manner; re-
designation of Petitioner as Demonstrator was withdrawn by
Respondent-Ranchi University and Petitioner was directed to continue
on the post of Lab. In-charge being a non-teaching cadre.

2026:JHHC:15354
15. Since, admittedly, the age of superannuation of Demonstrator
(i.e. teaching cadre), was 65 years and age of superannuation of Lab.
In-charge (non-teaching cadre) was 60 years and Petitioner had
attained the age of 60 years, but not 65 years, she was made to
superannuate from service by the impugned order.
16. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner
argued that impugned order re-designating the Petitioner as Lab In-
charge and retiring the Petitioner on attaining the age of 60 years is
not only in violation of principles of natural justice, but, is contrary to
Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radha Krishna
Jha (supra) and the order passed by this Court in Contempt Case
(Civil) No. 773 of 2012, wherein this Court categorically directed to
implement the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in uniformity and
to re-designate all persons working as Lab. Technician/Lab. In-charge
as Demonstrator.
17. Ld. Counsel further relied upon decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transportation Corporation
Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr., reported in (1986) 3
SCC 156 , to contend that an employee being in an unequal bargaining
position cannot be oppressed by employer and the condition stipulated
in “Absorption Letter” that Petitioner will not be entitled to claim for
re-designation on the post of Demonstrator is not only opposed to
Public Policy, but would also be unenforceable in view of Section 23
of the Contract Act, 1872. In this regard, Petitioner further placed
reliance upon Judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ‘ State of
Punjab and Anr. Vs. Dharam Pal’, reported in (2017) 9 SCC 395 .
18. It was further contended that Petitioner is suffering from
terminal illness i.e. Cancer and, although she has crossed the age of 60
years, but, as yet, she has not attained the age of 65 years and, thus,
impugned order dated 06.06.2024 is liable to be quashed by this Court
and Respondents may be directed to accept joining of Petitioner as
Demonstrator in Ranchi Women’s College, Ranchi and Petitioner

2026:JHHC:15354
should be paid entire arrear of salary for the period when she was
forced not to work, including all consequential benefits accruing
thereupon.
19. Per-contra , Ld. Counsel appearing for the State relied upon
Paras 9 and 12 of Counter Affidavit and has stated that Respondent-
Department constituted a Committee regarding all pending cases
relating to re-designation of Demonstrator and their subsequent
promotion and necessary administrative measure would be taken on
the issue of re-designation and promotion of Lab In-charge to the post
of Demonstrator.
20. Ld. Counsel for Respondent-Ranchi University relied upon
Paras 12 and 13 of its Counter Affidavit and stated that when the
University forwarded proposal of pay-fixation to the Department of
th
Higher Education regarding fixation of pay of Petitioner as per 6 and
th
7 U.G.C. pay-scale, the Department observed, vide Letter No. 2497
dated 14.12.2023, that in Petitioner’s “Absorption Letter” , a clear
condition was incorporated that she would never claim for the post of
Demonstrator. Under the said circumstances, Respondent-University
was left with no option but to withdraw designation of Petitioner as
Demonstrator and re-designate her to her original post of Lab. In-
charge, and, since Petitioner had already attained the age of
superannuation of 60 years for non-teaching cadre, she was
consequently superannuated from service.
21. Having heard Ld. Counsels for the rival parties and upon giving
consideration to the facts of the case, this Court is of the firm opinion
that withdrawal of designation of Petitioner as Demonstrator and
consequentially superannuating the Petitioner from service after
attaining the age of 60 years, merely on the ground that in the
“Absorption Letter” , a condition was incorporated that she would not
claim re-designation as ‘Demonstrator’ , is wholly arbitrary, opposed
to public policy and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

2026:JHHC:15354
22. It is an admitted fact that pursuant to order passed by Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Jha (supra) and subsequent
contempt order passed in Cont. Case (Civil) No. 773 of 2012 , the State
Government itself issued directions to respective Universities to
furnish the name of persons who were working as Lab
Technician/Lab. In-charge and were, otherwise, entitled for re-
designation of their services as ‘Demonstrator’ . Consequent upon
such direction issued by State Government, list was furnished by
Respondent-Ranchi University and services of Petitioner was duly re-
designated as Demonstrator with effect from 01.07.2009 and
Petitioner was, admittedly, working on the said post.
23. It is only at the stage when Respondent-Ranchi University
th th
forwarded proposal for approval of 6 and 7 pay revision of
Petitioner in U.G.C. pay-scale, an objection was raised by State
Government to said revision in pay-scale by stating, inter alia, that in
the “Absorption Letter” of the Petitioner, it was mentioned that
Petitioner will not claim for re-designation on the post of
Demonstrator.
On the said sole basis, designation as Demonstrator of
Petitioner was withdrawn and she was made to superannuate from
service, as, admittedly, she has attained the age of 60 years.
24. In the opinion of this Court, such exercise undertaken by
Respondent-Ranchi University is completely contrary to Judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Pal (supra) . Hon’ble
Apex Court, in the said case, was considering a similar condition
imposed in the order granting and officiating post to an employee,
wherein a condition was stipulated that official will work in its own
pay-scale and will not claim any seniority, etc. Hon’ble Supreme
Court considered its earlier Judgment in the case of Secretary-cum-
Chief Engineer, Chandigarh Vs. Hari Om Sharma, reported in (1998)
5 SCC 87, and, in Paragraphs 21 and 22, held as under:-

2026:JHHC:15354
“21. After so stating, the Court proceeded to opine thus: (Hari Om Sharma
case, SCC pp. 89-90, para 8)
"8. The learned counsel for the appellant attempted to contend that when
the respondent was promoted in stop-gap arrangement as Junior
Engineer I, he had given an undertaking to the appellant that on the
basis of stop-gap arrangement, he would not claim promotion as of right
nor would he claim any benefit pertaining to that post. The argument, to
say the least, is preposterous. Apart from the fact that the Government in
its capacity as a model employer cannot be permitted to raise such an
argument, the undertaking which is said to constitute an agreement
between the parties cannot be enforced at law. The respondent being an
employee of the appellant had to break his period of stagnation although,
as we have found earlier, he was the only person amongst the non-
diploma holders available for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer I
and was, therefore, likely to be considered for promotion in his own
right. An agreement that if a person is promoted to the higher post or put
to officiate on that post or, as in the instant case, a stop-gap
arrangement is made to place him on the higher post, he would not claim
higher salary or other attendant benefits would be contrary to law and
also against public policy. It would, therefore, be unenforceable in view
of Section 23 of the Contract Act. 1872."
(emphasis supplied)
The principle postulated in the said case is of immense significance, for
it refers to concept of public policy and the conception of
unconscionability of contract.
22. In the instant case, the Rules do not prohibit grant of pay scale. The
decision of the High Court granting the benefit gets support from the
principles laid down in P. Grover and Hari Om Sharma". As far as the
authority in A. Francis is concerned, we would like to observe that the
said case has to rest on its own facts. We may clearly state that by an
incorporation in the order or merely by giving an undertaking in all
circumstances would not debar an employee to claim the benefits of the
officiating position. We are disposed to think that the controversy is
covered by the ratio laid down in Hari Om Sharma and resultantly we
hold that the view expressed by the High Court is absolutely
impeccable .”
25. Thus, Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly held that incorporation of
a condition upon an employee of not claiming benefit of higher salary
and other attendant benefits would be contrary to law and also against
public policy and, thus, would be unenforceable in view of Section 23
of the Contract Act, 1872.
26. In the case of Brojo Nath Ganguly (supra), Hon’ble Supreme
Court has considered the effect of unequal bargaining power of an
employee and in Paras 72, 75,76 and 81, has held as under:-
“72. The submissions of the contesting respondents, on the other hand, were that
the parties did not stand on an equal footing and did not enjoy the same
bargaining power, that the contract contained in the service rules was one
imposed upon these respondents, that the power conferred by Rule 9(1) was
arbitrary and uncanalized as it did not set out any guidelines for the exercise of
that power and that even assuming it may not be void as a contract, in any event
it offended Article 14 as it conferred an absolute and arbitrary power upon the
Corporation.

2026:JHHC:15354
xxx xxx xxx

“75. Under Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, when consent to an
agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a
contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. It is
not the case of either of the contesting respondents that there was any coercion
brought to bear upon him or that any fraud or misrepresentation had been
practised upon him. Under Section 19-A, when consent to an agreement is
caused by undue influence, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of
the party whose consent was so caused and the court may set aside any such
contract either absolutely or if the party who was entitled to avoid it has received
any benefit thereunder, upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem
just. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 defines "Undue influence" as follows:

“16. 'Undue influence' defined.-(1) A contract is said to be induced by
'undue influence' where the relations subsisting between the parties are
such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the
other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the
other.”
The material provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 16 are as follows:
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing
principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of
another—
(a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other.... We
need not trouble ourselves with the other sections of the Indian Contract
Act except Sections 23 and 24. Section 23 states that the consideration or
object of an agreement is lawful unless inter alia the court regards it as
opposed to public policy. This section further provides that every
agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.
Under Section 24, if any part of a single consideration for one or more
objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a
single object is unlawful, the agreement is void. The agreement is,
however, not always void in its entirety for it is well settled that if several
distinct promises are made for one and the same lawful consideration,
and one or more of them be such as the law will not enforce, that will not
of itself prevent the rest from being enforceable. The general rule was
stated by Willes, J., in Pickering v. Ilfracombe Ry. Co. (at page 250) as
follows:

The general rule is that, where you cannot sever the illegal from the
legal part of a covenant, the contract is altogether void; but where you
can sever them, whether the illegality be created by statute or by the
common law, you may reject the bad part and retain the good.

76. Under which head would an unconscionable bargain fall? If it falls
under the head of undue influence, it would be voidable but if it falls under the
head of being opposed to public policy, it would be void. No case of the type
before us appears to have fallen for decision under the law of contracts before
any court in India nor has any case on all fours of a court in any other country
been pointed out to us. The word "unconscionable" is defined in the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, Volume II, page 2288, when used with
reference to actions etc. as "showing no regard for conscience; irreconcilable
with what is right or reasonable". An unconscionable bargain would, therefore,
be one which is irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable.
xxx xxx xxx

“81. It would appear from certain recent English cases that the courts in that
country have also begun to recognise the possibility of an unconscionable
bargain which could be brought about by economic duress even between parties
who may not in economic terms be situate differently (see, for instance,
Occidental Worldwide Investment Corpn. v. Skibs A/S Avantis, North Ocean

2026:JHHC:15354
Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd. 26, Pao On v. Lau Yin
Long27 and Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. International Transport
Workers Federation28, and the commentary on these cases in Chitty on
Contracts, Twenty-fifth Edition, Volume I, paragraph 486).”

27. At the cost of repetition, admittedly, the dispute regarding re-
designation of Lab. In-charge as Demonstrator has already been
settled up to Hon’ble Supreme Court and same has also been accepted
by State of Jharkhand, and, similarly situated Lab In-charge/Lab.
Assistant has been re-designated as Demonstrator, which is
considered as teaching post having age of superannuation of 65 years.
Thus, merely on incorporation of a condition in “Absorption order”
would not denude the Petitioner of her legal and accrued vested right
which, otherwise, is available to her in law.
28. In the present case, although Respondents argued that if this
Court, ultimately, directs that Petitioner should be reinstated on the
post of Demonstrator, benefit of arrears of salary for the period when
Petitioner was not working, should not be extended to her on the
principle of ‘No Work No Pay.
29. In the opinion of this Court, for no fault of Petitioner and in
utter violation of principles of natural justice, Respondent-University
withdrew the designation of Petitioner as Demonstrator and compelled
the Petitioner to superannuate from service. Thus, Petitioner was
forced not to work, and, principle of ‘No Work No Pay’ would not
apply in the present case.
30. Further, admittedly, age of superannuation of Demonstrator is
65 years and Petitioner is yet to attain the said age.
31. Accordingly, impugned order contained in Notification bearing
Memo No. B-458/24 dated 06.06.2024, is hereby, quashed and set
aside.
32. The Respondent-Ranchi University and Ranchi Women’s
College is directed to accept joining of Petitioner as Demonstrator
forthwith in Ranchi Women’s College, Ranchi. Petitioner would also
be entitled for arrears of salary with effect from 06.06.2024 i.e. the
date on which she was forced to retire, till the date of her joining as

2026:JHHC:15354
Demonstrator in Ranchi Women’s College, Ranchi including all
consequential benefits accrued therefrom. Petitioner would be allowed
to continue to work as Demonstrator up to the age of her
superannuation i.e. 65 years. Arrears of salary shall be disbursed in
favour of Petitioner within a period of 10 weeks from the date of
receipt/production of copy of this order. In the event, arrear of salary
is not paid to Petitioner within the aforesaid stipulated period,
Petitioner would also be entitled for interest @ 6% per annum on the
arrear amount of salary.
33. In view of above, present writ application is allowed. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Dated:15 /05/2026
Amardeep/
A.F.R
Uploaded on
27.05.2026