M/S Tenon Facility Management India Pvt Ltd vs The Appellate Authority Under Graduity Act 1972 And Anr
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CWP No. 779 of 2023 - 1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(249) CWP No. 779 of 2023
Date of Decision: 17.11.2026
M/s Tenon Facility Management India Pvt. Ltd.
.....Petitioner
Versus
The Appellate Authority under Gratuity Act 1972, Gurugram and another
.....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Mr. Raghav Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Punit Malik, Advocate for respondent No.2.
KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL)
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the order dated 07.10.2022
(Annexure P-13) passed by respondent No.1 in Appeal No.03/PGA/2022,
whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated
02.08.2021 passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was dismissed.
2. Briefly stated, as per the pleaded case, respondent No.2 joined
the petitioner-company on 22.09.2014 as HR Head. She tendered her
resignation through an e-mail dated 02.04.2019, stating that she was
resigning by giving 60 days' notice in terms of her appointment letter. The
resignation was accepted by the petitioner on the same day and her relieving
date was communicated as 30.04.2019. The petitioner accordingly claims
that respondent No.2 stood relieved on the said date and was paid one
month's salary in lieu of the balance notice period. Subsequently, on
28.05.2019, a service certificate and relieving letter were issued to her.
Respondent No.2, however, claimed that, having tendered resignation with a
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notice period of 60 days, her service was liable to be reckoned beyond
30.04.2019 and that she had completed the requisite 240 days during the
fifth year of service. She, accordingly, filed a claim for gratuity before the
Controlling Authority. The said claim was allowed vide order dated
02.08.2021, whereby the petitioner was directed to pay Rs.2,88,462/-
towards gratuity and Rs.63,053/- towards interest, totalling Rs.3,51,515/-,
along with further interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the gratuity
amount from the date of the order till actual payment, in the event of failure
to deposit the amount within the stipulated period. The statutory appeal
preferred by the petitioner against the said order was dismissed by the
Appellate Authority vide impugned order dated 07.10.2022.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the authorities
below have gravely erred in treating respondent No.2 as having completed
five years of continuous service. It is submitted that respondent No.2 had
actually rendered only 4 years and 216 days of service and had admittedly
been relieved on 30.04.2019. Her resignation had been accepted on the very
same day and, in terms of Clause 8 of the appointment letter, the petitioner-
company was vested with the discretion to determine the relieving date. It is
further contended that the amount paid towards notice pay could not have
been treated as actual service rendered by respondent No.2. Learned counsel
submits that resignation is not one of the circumstances contemplated under
Section 2-A(1) of the Act and, therefore, the benefit of the deeming
provision under Section 2-A(2) could not have been extended to her. It is
accordingly argued that the impugned orders suffer from patent illegality
and warrant interference by this Court.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that
the orders passed by the statutory authorities are based upon the material
available on record and the evidence led by the parties. It is contended that
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respondent No.2 had tendered her resignation by giving 60 days' notice in
accordance with the appointment letter and that the petitioner's own witness,
RW-1, admitted during cross-examination that the notice period was 60 days
and that respondent No.2 was to be relieved on 28.05.2019. It is further
submitted that the authorities rightly concluded that respondent No.2 had
completed more than 240 days during the fifth year of service and was,
therefore, entitled to gratuity by virtue of Section 2-A of the Act.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the relevant material on record.
6. The controversy which arises for consideration is whether an
employee who has rendered less than five calendar years of actual service,
but is found to have completed the requisite 240 days during the fifth year of
service, can be deemed to have completed five years of continuous service
for the purposes of Section 4 of the Act by virtue of the deeming provision
contained in Section 2-A(2) thereof, notwithstanding that the cessation of
employment is on account of resignation.
7. A perusal of the order dated 02.08.2021 passed by the
Controlling Authority reveals that, upon consideration of the material on
record, including the relieving documents and the statement of RW-1, it
recorded a finding that respondent No.2 had continued in service up to
28.05.2019 and had thereby rendered 4 years and 249 days of service. The
Controlling Authority noticed that, although the relieving letter reflected
30.04.2019 as the date of relieving, the notice period stipulated under the
appointment letter was 60 days and RW-1 had admitted in cross-
examination that respondent No.2 was to be relieved on 28.05.2019. It also
noticed that an amount of Rs.2,88,827/- had been paid towards one month's
notice pay. On the basis of the aforesaid material, the Controlling Authority
concluded that respondent No.2 had completed more than 240 days during
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the fifth year of service and was, therefore, entitled to gratuity.
8. The aforesaid finding was challenged by the petitioner before
the Appellate Authority, primarily on the ground that respondent No.2 had
actually been relieved on 30.04.2019 and that the payment made thereafter
was merely in lieu of the unserved portion of the notice period. The
petitioner also relied upon the contractual provision empowering it to fix the
relieving date. However, the Appellate Authority, upon consideration of the
rival submissions and the material on record, affirmed the finding of the
Controlling Authority. It noticed the 60-day notice period, the payment
made towards notice pay and the material concerning the relieving date and
concluded that respondent No.2 was entitled to the benefit of gratuity. Thus,
the two statutory authorities have returned concurrent findings in favour of
respondent No.2.
9. The principal question, therefore, is one of interpretation of
Section 2-A of the Act. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that gratuity shall be
payable to an employee on termination of employment after he or she has
rendered continuous service for not less than five years, whether on
superannuation, retirement or resignation, subject to the exceptions provided
therein. Section 2-A of the Act defines the expression 'continuous service'.
10. While sub-section (1) deals with uninterrupted service and
specifies the circumstances in which an interruption does not break
continuity of service, sub-section (2) operates where an employee is not in
continuous service within the meaning of sub-section (1). In such a situation,
the statute creates a deeming fiction and treats the employee as being in
continuous service for a period of one year if, during the preceding twelve
calendar months, the employee has actually worked for the requisite number
of days prescribed therein, which, in the present case, is 240 days. The
language employed in Section 2-A(2) of the Act is significant. The provision
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specifically contemplates a situation where an employee is not in continuous
service within the meaning of sub-section (1). The operation of sub-section
(2), therefore, cannot be made dependent upon the interruption being one of
the circumstances enumerated in sub-section (1). The two provisions operate
in distinct fields. Once the statutory requirement of actual work for the
prescribed number of days is satisfied, the deeming fiction contained in sub-
section (2) becomes operative. Consequently, the mere fact that the
employment came to an end on account of resignation cannot, by itself,
defeat the applicability of Section 2-A(2) of the Act.
11. The aforesaid interpretation finds direct support from the
judgment of this Court in M/s Business Octane Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court-I, Gurgaon and others, CWP-16870-
2016, decided on 17.11.2025. In the said case, the challenge was founded
upon the contention that the employee had not completed five years of actual
service and that the benefit of Section 2-A(2) of the Act could not be
invoked in a case of voluntary cessation of employment. This Court, upon
examining the scheme of Section 2-A, held that sub-sections (1) and (2)
operate in different spheres and that the benefit of the deeming provision is
available where the employee has actually worked for the requisite 240 days
during the preceding twelve calendar months.
12. The aforesaid view is also consistent with the interpretation of
the corresponding deeming provision under Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surendra
Kumar Verma and others v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and another, (1980) 4 SCC 443. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that where the statutory requirement of
240 days of actual work is fulfilled during the preceding twelve months, the
employee is entitled to the benefit of the statutory fiction of continuous
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service for the prescribed period.
13. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, the Controlling Authority recorded a categorical finding that
respondent No.2's service was liable to be reckoned up to 28.05.2019 and
that she had completed 249 days during the fifth year of service, thereby
crossing the statutory threshold of 240 days. The said finding was based
upon the material considered by the Controlling Authority, including the
admission of RW-1 regarding the notice period and the date on which
respondent No.2 was to be relieved. The Appellate Authority, upon re-
examination of the challenge raised by the petitioner, affirmed the said
determination.
14. It is pertinent to observe that the conclusion in the present case
does not rest merely upon the factum of payment of notice pay. The material
circumstance is the factual determination made by the statutory authorities
regarding the period of service, based upon the evidence noticed by them.
The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that the said finding was
recorded in the absence of evidence or that the admission attributed to RW-1
was incorrectly recorded. The mere fact that the petitioner seeks to rely upon
the earlier relieving date reflected in its documents, or upon a different
interpretation of the contractual notice provision, would not, by itself,
warrant substitution of the concurrent factual determination in exercise of
the limited writ jurisdiction of this Court.
15. Once the factual foundation necessary for invoking Section 2-
A(2) of the Act stands established, the deeming fiction contained therein
operates by force of the statute. The qualifying period is consequently
required to be treated as continuous service for the purposes of Section 4(1)
of the Act. The fact that respondent No.2 had not completed five full
calendar years from the date of joining would not, in the circumstances
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noticed above, by itself disentitle her from claiming gratuity.
16. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory and not that of an
appellate court. The Court would not ordinarily substitute its own view for
that of the statutory authorities merely because another view of the evidence
may be possible. Interference would be warranted only where the impugned
orders suffer from a jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity,
violation of principles of natural justice or any other manifest infirmity
warranting exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction.
17. In the present case, the Controlling Authority as well as the
Appellate Authority have considered the rival stands and the material
available on record and have returned concurrent findings in favour of
respondent No.2. The petitioner has failed to establish that the said findings
suffer from perversity or any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference
by this Court. No ground for exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction
is, therefore, made out.
18. Consequently, finding no merit in the present petition, the same
is dismissed.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE
November 17, 2026
Ithlesh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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