PRINCY N.V. vs UNION OF INDIA

Court
Kerala High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE PREETA A.K.
TH
WEDNESDAY, THE 19 DAY OF AUGUST 2026/28TH SRAVANA, 1948
W.A.NO.1407 OF 2026
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.06.2026 IN W.P(C).NO.8801 OF 2025
OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT(S)/PETITIONER:
PRINCY N.V.
AGED 32 YEARS
D/O VARGHESE, NIRANNANILATH HOUSE MATTULAYALAM P.O.,
KOROM VILLAGE THONDERNADAMSOM & DESOM, MANANTHAVADY
TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN - 670731
BY ADV.SMT.JAYNA KOTHARI (SR.)
BY ADV.KUM.THULASI K. RAJ
BY ADV.SMT.CHINNU MARIA ANTONY
BY ADV.SMT.MANJIMA
BY ADV.SRI.TARUN PHILIP
BY ADV.SRI.SARATH K.P.
RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENTS:
1 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE
4TH FLOOR A-WITH, SHASTRI BHAVAN NEW DELHI, PIN - 110001
2 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
3 SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001


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4 JOSE
AGED 37 YEARS
S/O.ULAHANNAN, KUZHIKATTUKUNNEL HOUSE, KAMMADAM,
MANDAPAM P O KASARGODE DISTRICT - 671 326
NOW RESIDING AT KUZHIKATTUKUNNEL HOUSE,
NEELESHWARAN VIA, PERIYANGANAN P.O.,
KURUJERI, KASARGODE, PIN - 671314
BY SRI.M.JAYAKRISHNAN, CGC, HCLSC PANEL ADVOCATE
BY SRI.T.P.SAJID, SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
13.08.2026, THE COURT ON 19.08.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:


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“C.R.”
J U D G M E N T
Dr. A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J.
The p etitioner in W.P.(C).No.8801 of 2025 is the appellant before
us, aggrieved by the judgment dated 30.06.2026 of a learned Single
Judge, dismissing her writ petition.
2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this writ appeal are as
follows:
The appellant/writ petitioner had approached this Court through
the writ petition aforementioned aggrieved by the rejection by the
Family Court at Kalpetta of an application submitted by her for
dissolution of her marriage. The Family Court had placed reliance on
Section 3(3) of the Divorce Act, 1869 [hereinafter referred to as the
“Act”] to reject the application on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the application. The pleadings in the instant
case would reveal that the appellant had left her matrimonial home at
Kasaragod consequent to suffering severe domestic violence and is
presently residing with her parents at Wayanad. Her marriage was
conducted at Kasaragod, and she has three children in the said
marriage, and since they last resided together at their matrimonial
home at Kasaragod, the jurisdiction as per the Statute was only at


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Kasaragod. It was the case of the appellant/writ petitioner before the
writ court that although amendments were made to the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955, as well as to the Special Marriage Act, 1954, providing
jurisdiction to the place where the wife was residing, a corresponding
amendment was not brought to the Divorce Act, 1869, and hence, the
provisions of Section 3(3) of the Divorce Act demonstrated a
discrimination against women, which required to be corrected at the
instance of this Court through a declaration that a wife is also entitled
to maintain a petition for dissolution of marriage before the Family
Court having jurisdiction over her place of residence. The learned
Single Judge, who considered the writ petition, took note of the
st
averments in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1 respondent
and taking note of the fact that the appellant/writ petitioner had not
challenged the statutory provisions, found as follows at paragraphs 10
to 16:
“10. The provision as it presently stands, stipulates three jurisdictions
under which a petition under the Act can be filed i.e.,
(i) the District Court (Family Court) within whose jurisdiction where the
marriage was solemnised, or
(ii) the District Court (Family Court) within whose jurisdiction where the
husband and wife reside, or,
(iii) the District Court (Family Court) within whose jurisdiction the husband and
wife last resided together.
11. Applicants are entitled to choose the jurisdiction of any of the three
courts mentioned above. The statutory provision defining the District Court is
simple, plain and unambiguous. There is no absurdity or ambiguity, warranting
a different interpretation to be adopted. No disastrous situation will ensue by
ascribing the plain meaning to the provision. When the statute is plain, clear
and simple, the provisions as enacted, cannot be read down. The contention
that words not otherwise included in the statute must be added, is not a legally
tenable argument in the present context.


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12. It is an elementary principle of interpretation that, when the words
of a statute are plain or unambiguous i.e., they are susceptible to only one
meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to such a meaning, irrespective of
the consequences that may ensue. This principle has its roots in the concept
that the intent of the law giver is expressed by the words used in a statute and
when it is precise or does not lead to any ambiguous interpretation, the
outcome of such a construction should not be a concern for the court. Recently,
the Supreme Court reiterated the principle in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [2025 INSC 1249] that “...........It is a settled position of law that
the intention of the legislature should be construed from the plain text of the
statute, and if the plain interpretation does not result into any absurdity or is
not unworkable, then the courts should not depart from the meaning which is
manifest from the plain text. It is only in cases where the text does not speak for
itself, or more than one interpretation is possible, that the courts should resort
to tools of statutory interpretation...............” The same proposition was laid
down in the decision in Raghunath Rai Bareja (supra).
13. Further, when the words of a statute are capable of only one
construction, it is not open for the courts to adopt any other interpretation on
the ground that such a construction would be more in tune with provisions of
other statutes. Moreover, when the words are plain and are capable of only one
meaning, the duty of the court is to give effect to that meaning and not to
construe the statute in a manner which would otherwise have been an ideal
situation in the opinion of the litigating parties.
14. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that
the court must read into section 3(3) of the Act the words “or wife resides”
before the words “or last resided together” is not a method of interpretation or
construction of a statute, but a mode of legislative exercise which does not fall
within the realm of the Court's jurisdiction. The contention raised on behalf of
the petitioner is to persuade this Court to incorporate a special provision for
women under the Act, by giving an extended jurisdiction for women alone. Of
course, the Constitution of India permits special provisions to be made for
women, but that is a matter of legislative exercise and not for the courts to
indulge in. Adding words to a statute is a legislative function. Courts are not
permitted to enter into the field of legislation. Apart from it, the language of the
section being clear, it does not require any interpretation or construction. The
court's function of ascertaining the legislative intention arises only if there is
any ambiguity in the provision or the literal construction of a provision may be
contrary to the legislative purpose or objective or may result in disastrous or
absurd consequences.
15. Further, amendments brought into the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in 2003, enabling a wife, to whom those
statutes are applicable, can file a petition before the court within whose
jurisdiction she resides, cannot be a reason for this Court to add words into the
Act. It is relevant to note that, despite being aware about the special provisions
brought into the Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act by
amendment, the Parliament did not deem it fit to bring in such a provision in
respect of divorce petitions under the Act for Christian women. As rightly
contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, when it comes to
personal laws, the principle of equality, cannot be attracted between the
different statutes governing those falling within different communities. Every
legislative differentiation need not be necessarily discriminatory, especially
when it relates to personal laws of different communities. Parliament
undoubtedly possesses a wide power of classification and can legally enact laws
operating differently for different categories of persons or groups of persons, to
give effect to its policies. Reference to the decisions in Nazeer @ Oyoor


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Nazeer v. Shemeema [(2016) SCC OnLine Ker 41064] and that of the Full
Bench of Andhra Pradesh High court in Gogireddy Sambireddy V. Gogireddy
Jayamma and Another [AIR 1972 AP 156] are appropriate in this context.
16. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the
petitioner, that the provision as it stands now is harsh on Christian women, is
also not a ground to add words to the statute. Even if it is assumed, to
appreciate the said contention, that section 3(3) of the Act as it stands is harsh,
nevertheless principles of interpretation of statute does not permit harshness of
a provision to be a reason to read it down or add words, when the plain
meaning is unambiguous and perfectly valid. Further, inconvenience caused by
a statute or a rule framed thereunder, can never be a ground for annulling the
same. Reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Authorised Officer,
Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu [(2024) 6 SCC 641] as well as that
of a Division Bench of this Court in S arala Baby v. State of Kerala and
Others [2010 (2) KLT 66] are relevant in this context.”
3. In the appeal before us, Smt.Jayna Kothari, the learned senior
counsel, instructed by Smt.Thulasi K. Raj, the learned counsel for the
appellant, while reiterating her contentions before the writ court,
submits that Section 3(3) of the Act has to be read in a manner that
would enable the jurisdictional District Court, where the wife was
residing on the date of presentation of the petition for annulment of
marriage, to entertain the same for otherwise, it would result in serious
prejudice to Christian women, who intend to file for divorce. It is her
submission that the provision, as it presently stands, ignores the reality
of Christian women who are thrown out of their matrimonial home and
who do not have the resources to file cases before the court having
jurisdiction over the place they last resided together as husband and
wife or where their marriage was solemnized. It was her further
contention that the non-inclusion of the court where the wife resides as
one of the jurisdictional courts under Section 3(3) of the Act, effectively


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ignores the social reality and deprives a Christian woman of equal
treatment with women of other religions.
4. Per contra, it is the submission of Sri.M.Jayakrishnan, the
st
learned Central Government Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1
respondent that, as rightly observed by the learned Single Judge, in the
absence of a challenge to the statutory provisions, it was not permissible
for this Court to read words into a Statute and effectively amend the
Statute. It is pointed out that although the Parliament had substantially
amended the Divorce Act through the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act,
2001, it had deliberately retained the language of clause 3 of Section 3
of the Act without alteration, and hence, changes to matrimonial
jurisdiction cannot be made through judicial expansion of the statutory
language, when the express provisions of the Statute clearly indicate a
contrary intention.
5. We have considered the rival submissions and also examined
the relevant statutory provisions. Section 3(3) of the Act reads as
follows:
“ 3. Interpretation-clause :- In this Act, unless there be something
repugnant in the subject or context,-
xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(3) “District Court” means, in the case of any petition under this Act,
the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose
ordinary jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act the


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marriage was solemnized or, the husband and wife reside or last
resided together.”
6. As already noticed by the learned Single Judge in the
impugned judgment, the provision, as it presently stands, stipulates
three courts before which a petition under the Act can be filed, namely,
(i) the District Court (Family Court) within whose jurisdiction the
marriage was solemnised or
(ii) the District Court (Family Court) within whose jurisdiction the
husband and wife reside, or,
(iii) the District Court (Family Court) within whose jurisdiction the
husband and wife last resided together.
7. It is not in dispute that the applicants may choose any of the
three courts aforementioned for filing the application for dissolution of
marriage. On the facts of the instant case, we find that the marriage of
the appellant was solemnized in Kasaragod and she and her husband
last resided together at Kasaragod. However, ever since she left her
matrimonial home, she has been residing with her parents at Wayanad,
whereas her husband continues to reside at Kasaragod. Thus, while for
the purposes of the first and third limbs of the definition of 'District
Court' under Section 3(3) of the Act, the jurisdictional family court
would be the court at Kasaragod, the question that arises for
consideration here is whether the second limb of the definition can be
seen as separately conferring an option to both the husband and the
wife to approach the family court having jurisdiction over the place of
their separate residence?


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8. In the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge
understood the arguments of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant as seeking a declaration that the word “and” appearing in the
second limb of the definition under Section 3(3), should be read as “or”,
so as to enable both the husband and the wife to separately approach
the respective family courts having jurisdiction over the place of their
separate residence in connection with their matrimonial grievances.
Keeping in mind the principle of separation of powers envisaged under
the Constitution of India, and finding that courts ought not to embark
upon a legislative exercise that was within the exclusive domain of a
legislative body, the learned judge found that the clear statutory
provisions could not be amended through a process of judicial
interpretation.
9. In the appeal before us, however, the learned senior counsel
points out that a vital aspect of her arguments before the writ court was
not appreciated by the learned Single Judge. She clarifies that the
prayer in the writ petition was not for a declaration that the word “and”
appearing in the second limb of the definition under Section 3(3), should
be read as “or” but rather for a declaration that Section 3(3) of the Act
must be read in a manner that the jurisdictional District Court for filing
petitions under the Act would include “ where the wife is the petitioner,
the jurisdictional District Court where she is residing on the date of


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presentation of the petition ”. The said declaration, she argues, does not
require the court to engage in a legislative activity of amending the
Statute, but simply requires the court to interpret the statutory
provision in a manner consistent with constitutional precepts and the
objects of the Statute in question. She points out that when the
Constitution of India envisages special provisions to be made for women
to achieve substantive gender equality, and the pari materia provisions
in other matrimonial statutes have been suitably amended to enable the
wife, where she is the petitioner, to file a petition before the
jurisdictional District Court where she is residing on the date of
presentation of the petition, an interpretation of the second limb of the
definition in Section 3(3) in a restrictive manner that prevents a
christian woman from so approaching the jurisdictional District Court
where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition, has to
be avoided.
10. We find force in the arguments of the learned senior counsel.
It is trite that an interpretation of a statutory provision must be in a
manner that avoids legislative surplusage or an unconstitutional result.
If the jurisdictional District Court under the second limb of Section 3(3)
is taken to be the same as the District Court within whose jurisdiction
the husband and wife last resided together, then the second limb would
have to be treated as an instance of legislative surplusage. It is a
settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the court must always


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assume that a legislature will not use words or phrases that are
unnecessary or result in surplusage. Thus, the second limb must be
seen as conferring a jurisdiction on other District Courts, different from
that within whose jurisdiction the husband and wife last resided
together, if as a matter of fact, they are residing separately in places
within the jurisdiction of those courts. To treat the same District Court
as the one referred to in both - the second and third limbs of Section
3(3) - would tantamount to treating the phrases “ within whose
jurisdiction the husband and wife reside ” and “ within whose jurisdiction
the husband and wife last resided together ” as meaning the same thing,
which would be impermissible. For instance, in the present case, the
marriage of the appellant was solemnized in Kasaragod and she and her
husband last resided together at Kasaragod. However, ever since she
left her matrimonial home, she has been residing with her parents at
Wayanad, whereas her husband continues to reside at Kasaragod. If the
second limb is seen as conferring jurisdiction only on the District Court
within whose jurisdiction the husband continues to reside, then it will
tantamount to ignoring the District Court within whose jurisdiction the
wife actually resides in the backdrop of the statutory provision that
confers jurisdiction on the District Court within whose jurisdiction “the
husband and wife reside”.
11. We are also of the view that when confronted with an
ambiguous provision such as the above, we must resort to a purposive


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interpretation of the provision so as to give it a meaning that would
make it align with the object of the Divorce Act and also render it
compatible with the provisions of our Constitution. As was observed by
the Supreme Court in Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India –
[(1999) 2 SCC 228] , “if on one construction a given statute will
become unconstitutional whereas on another construction, which may
be open, the statute remains within the constitutional limits, the court
will prefer the latter on the ground that the legislature is presumed to
have acted in accordance with the Constitution and courts generally
lean in favour of the constitutionality of the statutory provision”. In the
instant case, the meaning to be given to the phrase “ within whose
jurisdiction the husband and wife reside ” in the second limb of Section
3(3) of the Act has to be determined by placing the said provision in the
context of the objects sought to be achieved by the said Act as also in
the backdrop of the constitutional guarantee of gender equality
envisaged for women under our Constitution. When doing so we have to
bear in mind that Article 15(3) of the Constitution envisages the making
of special provisions for women and children so that the ideal of
substantive gender equality is realised. Acting on the mandate of
Article 15(3) many amendments have also been carried out in other
matrimonial statutes. Axiomatically, therefore, when the pari materia
provisions in other matrimonial statutes have been suitably amended to
enable the wife, where she is the petitioner, to file a petition before the
jurisdictional District Court where she is residing on the date of


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presentation of the petition, an interpretation of the second limb of the
definition in Section 3(3) of the Act in a restrictive manner that prevents
a christian woman from so approaching the jurisdictional District Court
where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition, would
be discriminatory to christian women and has to be avoided.
12. The same would be the result if we apply the interpretation
technique that requires us to treat a statute as “always speaking”. As
observed by the Supreme Court in Dharani Sugars and Chemicals
Limited v. Union of India and Others – [(2019) 5 SCC 480] ,
whenever a change in social conditions produces a novel situation,
which was not in contemplation at the time when the statute was first
enacted, the court must not assume that the enactment does not apply
to the new circumstances. Proceeding thus, we cannot ignore the
parallel developments under our constitutional law while interpreting
the statutory provisions under the Divorce Act. To treat a statute as
always speaking, we have to take the statutory provisions as adhering to
constitutional ideals and concepts as interpreted dynamically by the
courts from time to time.
13. The upshot of the above discussions is that we are of the view
that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, to the extent it
dismisses the writ petition of the appellant herein without granting the
declaration as sought for by the appellant, to read Section 3(3) of the


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Act as enabling her to file petitions under the Act in the court within
whose jurisdiction she presently resides, ought to be set aside, and we
do so.
Resultantly, we allow this Writ Appeal, by declaring that Section
3(3) of the Act, and in particular, the second limb to the definition of
“District Court” that clarifies that “the District Court (Family Court)
within whose jurisdiction the husband and wife reside”, shall be seen as
enabling a wife, when she is the petitioner, to present a petition under
the Act before a District Court (Family Court) having jurisdiction over
the place where she resides at the time of presenting the petition,
notwithstanding that the said place may be different from the place
where her marriage was solemnized or where she and her husband last
resided together or where her husband presently resides.
Sd/-
D R . A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
JUDGE
Sd/-
PREETA A.K.
JUDGE
prp /