Public Works Department, Govt Of Nct Of Delhi vs M/S Shyam Sunder Tyagi
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~17
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 & I.A. 25876/2025
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT,
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anubhav Gupta, Panel
Counsel, GNCTD.
versus
M/S SHYAM SUNDER TYAGI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ashish Mohan, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Samarth Choudhary,
Ms. Adhya Singh Tomar and
Ms. Vaishali Gupta, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMMENT(ORAL)
% 20.07.2026
I.A. 25875/2025 (Delay in Filing) & I.A. 25878/2025 (Delay in
refiling) in O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 34 of the
1
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 assailing the Arbitral Award
dated 15.01.2025 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator, whereby the
claim preferred by the Respondent was partly allowed.
2. Along with the said petition, the Petitioner has also filed an
application (I.A. 25875/2025) seeking condonation of delay of 41
days in filing this petition. However, as per the record, the petition
was initially filed on 11.05.2025, which means there is a delay of 26
days beyond the prescribed period of 90 days. The petition is also
accompanied by an application (I.A. 25878/2025) seeking
1
“the Act”, hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 1 of 11
condonation of 122 days (inadvertently written as 155 days) delay in
re-filing.
3. The incorrect computation of days in the applications itself
reflects the casual manner in which the present proceedings have been
pursued by the Petitioner.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits that the
delay was neither deliberate nor intentional. He submits that the same
occurred on account of circumstances beyond the control of the
Petitioner and therefore, deserves to be condoned in the interest of
justice.
5. He further submits that after receipt of the arbitral award dated
15.01.2025, the matter was placed before the concerned authorities for
their consideration. According to the Petitioner, some time was taken
in obtaining legal opinion and the necessary departmental approvals
before the petition could be filed.
6. As regards to the delay in re-filing, he submits that the same
occurred on account of the voluminous record as well as the change of
the Executive Engineer in the concerned Division.
7. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has opposed both the
applications for filing as well as re-filing. He submits that the
Petitioner has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of
the delay in filing and re-filing.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 2 of 11
8. He submits that the reasons being put forward by the Petitioner
are merely administrative in nature and hence, cannot be treated as
“sufficient cause”. He also points out that the Petitioner has not
explained the delay for the entire period of delay of 122 days period
taken in re-filing.
9. He further submits that the Petitioner is not pursuing the matter
with due diligence and therefore, no case is made out for condonation
of delay either in filing or re-filing.
10. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record.
11. Before examining the explanation offered by the Petitioner, it
would be apt to lay down the legal position with regard to the timeline
given for filing an objection under Section 34 of the Act.
12. Under Section 34(3) of the Act, a petition challenging an
arbitral award is required to be filed within 90 days. After the said
period, this Court can condone a delay of further thirty days and that
too, only if sufficient cause is shown for not approaching the Court
within time.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the expression
“sufficient cause” in several decisions including Shivamma (Dead)
2
through LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board , whereby it was held that
while the Court must adopt a justice-oriented approach, the
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 3 of 11
explanation offered for being a “sufficient cause” must be genuine and
should show that the party acted with due diligence. Mere negligence
or a casual approach cannot be accepted as a “sufficient cause”.
3
Similar is the view taken in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India ,
wherein it was held that what is material is not the length of the delay
but whether the explanation inspires confidence.
14. Since the Petitioner is a Government Department, the following
observations made by the Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra) in the
context of delays by Government authorities assume relevance:
“210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where
the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant
shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State,
premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has
now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants.
The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing
governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and
responsibility in the conduct of public litigation.
211. The earlier decisions of this Court, particularly in K.V.
Ayisumma (supra), Chandra Mani (supra), Lipok AO (supra) and Indian Oil
Corpn (supra) insofar as they favoured a liberal approach towards the State or
any of its instrumentality in matters of condonation of delay,and showed
indulgence in condoning the same on ground of impersonal and slow-moving
nature of these entities, no longer reflects the correct position in law. No
litigant, be it a private party or a State or any of its functionaries, is entitled to a
broader margin of error, falling in the category of inaction, negligence or
casualness, in matters of limitation.
212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision of Postmaster
General(supra), is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain
an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties,
must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such
justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of
the applicant.
213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj
Singh(supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra)
is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be
accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same
standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would not only compromise
the sanctity of limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal
approach towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct
position of law. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government
3
(2023) 10 SCC 531
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 4 of 11
departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or
administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay
cannot always, invariably accepted as a “sufficient cause” for the purpose of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a
matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of
limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation.
214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision
of Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on
bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there
may nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though
involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for
the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation
demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the
delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are
established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay.
215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on
condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic processes.
The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of gross
negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State, and a case
where delay has occurred despite sincere efforts, owing to the inherent
complexities of governmental decision-making. While the former category must
necessarily be rejected to uphold the discipline of limitation, the latter can still
attract judicial indulgence where public interest is at stake and the cause is
shown to be reasonable.
216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be employed, wherever
“sufficient cause” is sought to be demonstrated on the ground of bureaucratic
inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the same is an “explanation” or
an “excuse”. Although the two may appear to be one and the same, yet there
exists a fine but pertinent distinction between an “excuse” and an
“explanation”.
15. From a reading of the aforesaid decision, it is clear that no
different yardstick can be applied merely because the Petitioner is a
State or one of its instrumentalities. The Government is expected to
satisfy the same test of diligence as any other litigant seeking
condonation of delay.
16. It is equally clear that while examining the delay, this Court has
to examine whether the explanation placed before it is genuine and the
delay occurred despite due diligence being undertaken, or whether
such explanation is only an attempt to justify the delay by referring to
any excuse.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 5 of 11
17. The principles assume added importance in proceedings under
the Act. The Act has been enacted with the object of ensuring
expeditious resolution of disputes and giving finality to arbitral
awards. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which confers
an unfettered power to condone delay, Section 34(3) permits only a
limited extension upon “sufficient cause” being shown. When the
above is read with the mandate of equal treatment of parties provided
in Section 18 of the Act, the statutory scheme leaves little room for
condoning delay on routine administrative grounds.
18. Therefore, while considering an application for condonation of
delay under Section 34, the Court has to satisfy itself that the reasons
put forward constitute a real and convincing explanation for the delay
and are not merely an excuse founded on departmental procedures or
bureaucratic delays.
19. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, I am of the view that the Petitioner has failed to furnish a
satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing.
20. It is not disputed that the legal opinion recommending challenge
to the arbitral award was received on 30.01.2025, i.e., within 15
days of the passing of the arbitral award. However, despite receipt of
the legal opinion, the file was forwarded by the Executive Engineer to
the Superintending Engineer only on 11.02.2025, after a gap of
about 12 days. Thereafter, although the file was returned
on 19.02.2025, it was resubmitted only on 01.03.2025, after
another 10 days delay.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 6 of 11
21. This pattern is seen thereafter as well. Although the opinion of
the concerned legal department was received on 09.04.2025, the file
remained under consideration at different levels of the Department till
23.04.2025, without realisation that statutory period of 90 days was
already over.
22. I am conscious of the fact that a Government Department is
required to obtain legal opinion and the necessary approvals before a
decision is taken to challenge an arbitral award. Such a process is
often unavoidable. However, at the same time, once the statutory
period of limitation is running, every authority dealing with the matter
is expected to act with a sense of urgency. Routine movement of the
file from one level to another cannot justify periods of inactivity,
particularly when the statute itself prescribes a strict timeline.
23. The affidavit filed by the Petitioner merely chronicles the
movement of the file from one office to another. It neither explains
why the matter remained pending at each stage nor discloses any
circumstance beyond the Petitioner’s control which prevented the
petition from being filed within the timeline.
24. In my opinion, a mere narration of administrative movement
cannot, by itself, constitute “sufficient cause”. Administrative
procedures and departmental approvals may account for some time
being consumed, but they do not justify the delay unless it is also
shown that the matter was pursued with reasonable promptitude at
every stage. If such explanations were to be accepted as a matter of
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 7 of 11
course, the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act would
stand substantially diluted, particularly in cases involving Government
Departments.
25. However, there is another aspect to the present matter. Even
after the petition was filed, it remained under objections for a
considerable period. The delay in re-filing also, therefore, requires a
satisfactory explanation.
26. The reasons put forward by the Petitioner are that the arbitral
record was voluminous and that there was a change in the office of the
Executive Engineer. In the opinion of this Court, neither of these
reasons satisfactorily explains the delay.
27. As regards to the change of the Executive Engineer, the
Petitioner has not disclosed when the earlier Executive Engineer was
transferred or how the transfer prevented the defects pointed out by
the Registry from being removed.
28. On the other hand, the Respondent has pointed out that while
the petition filed in May, 2025 was signed by the then Executive
Engineer, Mr. Anshul Bakliwal, the application seeking condonation
of delay in re-filing, filed in August, 2025, bears the signatures of the
new Executive Engineer, Mr. Hari Om Singh. This would show that
the change in the incumbent had already taken place by August, 2025.
29. Even if some time was lost on account of the change in the
office of the Executive Engineer, that circumstance could explain only
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 8 of 11
a part of the delay. It does not explain why the objections remained
unattended thereafter or why the petition came to be re-filed only in
October, 2025. The Petitioner appears to have slept over the matter
during this intervening period, and no sufficient explanation has been
furnished for such prolonged inaction. It reflects nothing but a casual
and grossly negligent attitude on the part of the Petitioner in pursuing
the present proceedings.
30. The plea that the arbitral record was voluminous is equally
unpersuasive. No particulars have been furnished as to which
documents required additional time. Apart from making a blanket
assertion, the Petitioner has not explained how the volume of the
record prevented timely removal of the Registry’s objections.
31. More importantly, although it was stated that typed copies of
dim and illegible documents were being prepared and took time, no
such copies were ultimately filed. Instead, the Petitioner sought
exemption from filing them. This factual assertion has not been
disputed. The plea, therefore, appears to be nothing more than an
excuse and does not satisfactorily explain the delay.
4
32. In Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that delays arising merely because the matter
remained under departmental process or administrative consideration
do not, by themselves, constitute “sufficient cause”. If such
explanations are readily accepted, the legislative intent of ensuring
expeditious finality of arbitral awards would be seriously undermined.
4
(2019) 2 SCC 455
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 9 of 11
33. A similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of this
5
Court in DDA v. Integrated Techno Systems (P) Ltd. , whereby it was
held that even in case of re-filing, the entire period has to be explained
and if part of it remains unexplained, no case for condonation is made
out. The Division Bench also observed that in commercial matters,
delay in re-filing must be viewed with almost the same seriousness as
delay in the initial filing. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced
hereinafter-
“15. In so far as the delay in re-filing the appeal is concerned,
the application has set out various personal exigencies which faced
the counsel for the appellant and which, therefore, impeded the re-
filing of the appeal. Even as per the application, these exigencies
came to an end on 20-5-2025. There is no Explanation worth the
name for the delay between 20-5-2025 and 20-8-2025, for re-
filing the appeal.
16. It is also settled that, in commercial matters, delay in re-
filing has also to be treated with nearly with same seriousness as
delay in filing.”
34. When I view the conduct of the Petitioner as a whole, I am
satisfied that it reflects gross negligence and complete lack of due
diligence, therefore, leaving no ground for me to exercise discretion in
favour of the Petitioner. Right from the incorrect computation of delay
in the application to the repeated delays at every stage thereafter,
including the delay in removing the objections, the matter was allowed
to move at the Department’s own pace.
35. Even after the petition was signed on 21.08.2025, it was re-filed
5
2026 SCC OnLine Del 4214
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 10 of 11
only in October, 2025. The intervening period remains wholly
unexplained. Nothing has been placed on record to indicate that the
matter was pursued with any sense of urgency.
36. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
sufficient cause to condone either the delay in filing or the inordinate
and unexplained delay in re-filing the present petition. Accordingly,
the applications seeking condonation of delay are dismissed.
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025
37. Accordingly, the present petition under Section 34 of the Act is
also dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
JULY 20, 2026/ gunn
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:22.07.2026
13:36:35
O.M.P. (COMM) 428/2025 Page 11 of 11