SRI. R SURESH MOHAN vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 6 DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN
WRIT PETITION NO.3597 OF 2018 (SC/ST)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. R SURESH MOHAN
S/O RANGAMURTHY,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
RD
R/AT NO.13, 3 CROSS,
BHARATIYAR ROAD,
CHOLAIMEDU, CHENNAI-600 094
TAMIL NADU.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. V SANJAY KRISHNA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY REVENUE SECRETARY,
M.S. BUILDING,
B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT,
CHAMARAJANAGAR-571 313.
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOLLEGALA SUB-DIVISION,
KOLLEGALA,
CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT-571 115.
Digitally
signed by V
MANJUSHA
BAI
Location:
HIGH COURT
OF
KARNATAKA
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4.
MOLLE CHICKKAIAH
S/O LATE DODDA CHICKKAIAH,
SINDE DEAD
REPRESENTED BY HIS LRS,
SMT. SAAKAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS,
W/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH,
(b). KUM. DODDATAYAMMA
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH,
(c). KUM. D. SHIVAMMA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH,
(d). KUM. BHAGYAMMA
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH,
(e). KUM. KAMALAMMA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH,
RESPONDENT NOS.4(a) TO 4(e)
ARE R/AT MANGALA GRAMA,
KOLLEGAALA TALUK,
CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT-571 115.
(a)
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. I. THARANATH POOJARY, AAG., ALONG WITH
SMT. ANITHA N., AGA., FOR R.1 TO R.3;
VIDE ORDER DATED 02.06.2026 R.4 (b) TO (e) ARE THE
LRS. OF DECEASED R.4 (a);
R.4(b) TO R.4(e) ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED.]
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THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 09.10.2017 IN P.T.C.L NO.6/2011-
12 PASSED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
ND
CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT, THE 2 RESPONDENT HEREIN,
PRODUCED UNDER ANNEXURE-A, ETC.
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
IN 'B' GROUP, THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING/VIDEO
CONFERENCING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN
ORAL ORDER
1. The land which is the subject matter of the writ
petition was granted in favour of respondent No.4-Molle
Chickkaiah, who is presently deceased and is succeeded to
by his legal representatives namely, respondent nos.4(a)
to 4(e). In spite of service of notice, they have remained
absent and unrepresented.
2. The grant was made in the year 1967. Thereafter, in
the same year, the land was alienated in favour of the late
mother of the petitioner. The Karnataka Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain
Lands) Act, 1978 (for short 'PTCL Act') came into force on
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01.01.1979. The alienation that took place in the year
1967 was challenged for the first time in the year 2007 by
respondent no.4. Respondent No.3-Assistant
Commissioner, in exercise of the powers conferred under
Section 5 of the Act, resumed the land and appropriated it
to the Government. In the said proceedings, the
petitioner herein was unrepresented. It is the case of the
petitioner that no notice was served on him. The said
finding is not disputed by the respondents. Thereafter,
respondent Nos.4(a) to (e) filed an appeal before
respondent No.2-Deputy Commissioner, with a prayer to
restore the land so resumed in their favour. The notice
issued by respondent no.2 was served on the petitioner
and the petitioner thereafter filed a cross appeal
challenging the order passed by respondent no.3-Assistant
Commissioner. Respondent No.2, after hearing both the
parties, has passed an order wherein the land was
restored in favour of respondent nos.4(a) to (e) and the
appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Aggrieved by
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the orders passed by respondent no.3 and respondent
no.2, the present writ petition is filed.
3. The case of the petitioner is that the granted land
was purchased by him way back in the year 1967 and
after a lapse of around 40 years, the same was challenged
before respondent Nos.2 and 3 and they have passed the
impugned orders in violation of the ratio laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State
of Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC
232 . On the said ground, it is prayed that the impugned
orders are liable to be set aside.
4. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the State submits that subsequent to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and
Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232 , Section 5 of
the PTCL Act has been amended and the following
amendment has been introduced:
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"(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there
shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of
this Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases
pending before all the competent authorities and all
Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section."
5. It is further submitted that the PTCL Act is a
beneficial legislation and it has to be interpreted in order
to benefit the members of the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe. It is also submitted that the PTCL Act
has been included in 9th Schedule of the Constitution of
India and the validity of the PTCL Act has been upheld.
For the aforementioned reasons, it is submitted that the
impugned orders passed by respondent nos.2 and 3 are
proper and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
6. Admittedly, in the instant case, the alienation has
taken place in violation of terms of the grant. It is also
not in dispute that the alienation took place in the year
1967 and was challenged for the first time in the year
2007.
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7. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
question that arises for consideration is whether the delay
of 40 years in preferring an application before respondent
No.3 under Section 5 of the PTCL Act would be fatal to the
case of the grantee or his legal heirs.
8. Section 4 of the PTCL Act reads as under:
"4. Prohibition of transfer of granted
lands.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law,
agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of
granted land made either before or after the
commencement of this Act, in contravention of the
terms of the grant of such land or the law providing
for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and
void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be
conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by
such transfer.
(2) No person shall, after the commencement of
this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted
land without the previous permission of the
Government.
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2)
shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of
a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or
order of any other authority."
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9. Section 5 of the PTCL Act reads as under:
"5. Resumption and restitution of granted
lands.- (1) Where, on application by any interested
person or on information given in writing by any person
or suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems
necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that
the transfer of any granted land is null and void under
sub-section (1) of section 4, he may,-
(a) by order take possession of such land
after evicting all persons in possession
thereof in such manner as may be
prescribed:
Provided that no such order shall be made except
after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity
of being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original grantee
or his legal heir. Where it is not
reasonably practicable to restore the
land to such grantee or legal heir, such
land shall be deemed to have vested in
the Government free form all
encumbrances. The Government may
grant such land to a person belonging
to any of the Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the
rules relating to grant of land.
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(c) notwithstanding anything contained in
any law, there shall be no limitation of
time to invoke the provisions of this
Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply
to all cases pending before all the
competent authorities and all Courts of
Law adjudicating the cases under this
section."
(1-A) After an enquiry referred to in sub-section (1)
the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that
transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an
order accordingly.
(2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy
Commissioner under Section 5-A, any order passed under
sub-section (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be
questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be
granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken
or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in
pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this section, where any
granted land is in the possession of a person, other than
the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed,
until the contrary is proved, that such person has
acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void
under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4."
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Thus, any transfer of granted land made either before or
after commencement of the PTCL Act in contravention of
the terms of the grant shall be null and void.
10. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manchegowda
and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others
reported in (1984) 3 SCC 301 , while upholding the
constitutional validity of the aforementioned provisions of
the PTCL Act in paragraph 15 has held as under:
"15. Any person who acquires such granted land by
transfer from the original grantee in breach of the
condition relating to prohibition on such transfer must
necessarily be presumed to be aware of the prohibition
imposed on the transfer of such granted land. Anybody
who acquires such granted land in contravention of the
prohibition relating to transfer of such granted land
cannot be considered to be a bona fide purchaser for
value; and every such transferee acquires to his
knowledge only a voidable title to the granted land. The
title acquired by such transfer is defeasible and is liable to
be defeated by an appropriate action taken in this regard.
If the Legislature under such circumstances seek to
intervene in the interests of these weaker sections of the
community and choose to substitute a speedier and
cheaper method of recovery of these granted lands which
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were otherwise liable to be resumed through legal
process, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that any vested
rights of the transferees are affected. Transferees of
granted lands with full knowledge of the legal position
that the transfers made in their favour in contravention of
the terms of grant or any law, rule or regulation
governing such grant are liable to be defeated in law,
cannot and do not have in law or equity, a genuine or real
grievance that their defeasible title in such granted lands
so transferred is, in fact, being defeated and they are
being dispossessed of such lands from which they were in
law liable to be dispossessed by process of law. The
position will, however, be somewhat different where the
transferees have acquired such granted lands not in
violation of any term of the grant or any law regulating
such grant as also where any transferee who may have
acquired a defeasible title in such granted lands by the
transfer thereof in contravention of the terms of the grant
or any law regulating such grant has perfected his title by
prescription of time or otherwise. We shall consider such
cases later on. But where the transferee acquires only a
defeasible title liable to be defeated in accordance with
law, avoidance of such defeasible title which still remains
liable to be defeated in accordance with law at the date of
commencement of the Act and recovery of possession of
such granted land on the basis of the provisions contained
in Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act cannot be said to be
constitutionally invalid and such a provision cannot be
termed as unconscionable, unjust and arbitrary. The first
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two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are,
therefore, overruled."
Thus, the Apex Court while upholding the validity of the
PTCL Act has created an exception by stating that if the
purchaser has perfected his title by virtue of prescription
of time or otherwise, such a transfer cannot be set aside.
11. In Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of
Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC
232 , the Apex Court has held at paragraph 8 as under:
"8. However, the question that arises is with
regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables
any interested person to make an application for
having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4
of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period
within which such an application can be made. Neither
does it prescribe the period within which suo motu
action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav
v. Hari Kishore Yadav (2018)12 SCC 527 and also in
Ningappa v. Commr. (2020)14 SCC 236 reiterated a
settled position in law that whether Statute provided
for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute
must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held
that action whether on an application of the parties, or
suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.
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That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act
which provided for restoration of certain lands to
farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from
st
which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1
January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief
was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi
River which make agricultural operations impossible.
An application for restoration was made after 24 years
and was allowed. It is in that background that this
Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We
have no hesitation in upholding that the present
application for restoration of land made by
respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably
long period and was liable to be dismissed on that
ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka
High Court namely, R.Rudrappa vs. Commr. 1998 SCC
OnLine KAR 671, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka
(2006)4 Kant. LJ 303 and G. Maregouda vs. Commr.
(2000)2 Kant.L.J.SN 4B holding that there is no
limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any time, are
overruled. Order accordingly."
Thus, the Apex Court has held that, any challenge made to
the alienation in respect of the granted lands under the
provisions of the PTCL Act has to be made within a
reasonable period.
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12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav and
Others v. Hari Kishore Yadav reported in (2018)12
SCC 527 while explaining reasonable time has observed in
paragraphs 10 and 13 of the judgment as under:
"10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar,
rd
3 Edn. "reasonable time" is explained as follows:
“That is a reasonable time that preserves to
each party the rights and advantages he
possesses and protects each party from
losses that he ought not to suffer.”
Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in
order to preserve rights and advantages a party
possesses, but equally to protect each party from the
losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has
been taken within a reasonable time, must also be viewed
from the point of view of the party who might suffer
losses.
11. xxx
12. xxx
13. In our view, where no period of limitation is
prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu
or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable
time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend
on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the
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Statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the
action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable
time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was
transferred several times during this period, obviously, in
the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights."
13. When the Apex Court rendered the judgment in
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and
Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232 , Section 5 of
the PTCL Act was not yet amended and thereafter in the
year 2023, the amendment mentioned in paragraph 4
supra , has been introduced.
14. It is submitted by the parties concerned that the
constitutional validity of the said amendment is challenged
and the same is pending consideration before a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Be that as it may, this
Court in the case of Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma vs.
The Deputy Commissioner and Others in
W.A.No.100101/2024 disposed of on 29.07.2024 ,
while analysing the effect of the amendment to Section 5
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of the PTCL Act, it has been held at paragraph 3 of the
judgment as under:
"3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we
decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons:
(a) The subject land does not answer the definition of
‘granted land’ in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978
Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the
grant was not on account of social status of the
grantee. The said grant was originally made in
1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land
happened vide registered Sale Deed dated
05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the
land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale
Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the
resumption application filed earlier was rejected
vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against
the same also came to be turned down vide order
27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were
resumption orders that were set aside by a learned
Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order
dated 22.11.2000, remitting the matter back for
fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent
application came to be moved; that was rejected
vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the
same fate vide order 23.12.2003.
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(b) When above was the state of things as per record,
it is un understandable as to how persons claiming
under the original grantee could move another
application afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant
Commissioner could not have allowed the said
application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds
strange that even the Deputy Commissioner
dismissed the appeal against the same vide order
dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first
alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated
05.12.1972 and the subject application for
resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the
meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained
since it was a “hereditary land” falling within the
precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition
Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about
thirty two years spanning between alienation and
the filing of resumption application. There is
absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches
that militate on record and against justice. Thus,
the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision
in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of
Karnataka reported in ,
(2020) 14 SCC 232
that tardy and belated claims should not be
favoured. This reasoning has animated the
impugned judgment rightly and therefore, the same
cannot be faltered.
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for
the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the
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provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding
clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said
Section and therefore, the concept of “limitation
and delay” has to remain miles away. These new
clauses read as under:
“(c) notwithstanding anything contained
in any law, there shall be no limitation of time
to invoke the provisions of this Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall
apply to all cases pending before all the
competent authorities and all Courts of Law
adjudicating the cases under this section.”
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of
time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of
limitation for moving application for the
resumption of granted land after it is alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with
retrospective effect is only a duplication of the
existing legal position. Such duplication happened
even in English legislative history, hardly needs to
be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of
limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses
(c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the
Act, do not bring any change in the statutory
scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what
the statute has been all through, so far as the
limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that
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there was no limitation period earlier and there is
no limitation period now too. Laches, which would
involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of
Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation
period” at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of
time between alienation of granted land and the
filing of claim for its resumption. Observations
occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to
this view:
“8. However, the question that arises is with
regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which
enables any interested person to make an
application for having the transfer annulled as
void u nder Section 4 of the Act. This Section
does not prescribe any period within which such
an application can be made. Neither does it
prescribe the period within which suo motu
action may be taken. This Court in the case of
Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav
(D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and
also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy.
Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007,
decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled
position in law that whether Statute provided
for a period of limitation, provisions of the
Statute must be invoked within a reasonable
time. It is held that action whether on an
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application of the parties, or suo motu, must be
taken within a reasonable time. This relief was
granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi
River which make agricultural operations
impossible. An application for restoration was
made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in
that background that this Court upheld that it
was unreasonable to do so. We have no
hesitation in upholding that the present
application for restoration of land made by
respondent-Rajappa was made after an
unreasonably long period and was liable to be
dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the
judgments of the Karnataka High Court,
namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner,
2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523,
Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4)
Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda
vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga
District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr.
L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation
provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore,
an application can be made at any time, are
overruled. …..”
(Emphasis is ours)
Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in
the above case has not been altered by the subject
amendment, even in the least.
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(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might
have taken place about the observations of the
Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while
passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not
lend credence to the contention that the said
amendment intends to invalidate the law declared
by the highest court of the country which it did
after considering all aspects of the matter including
the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature
intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti , it would
have employed a different terminology. We repeat
that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the
period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas
“laches” is decided keeping in view a host of
factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to
delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles
12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is
only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay &
laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation &
delay’ that obtain in law. The following observations
of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs.
N.Murugesan reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25 make
out this point:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However,
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they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus
to which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a
species by name acquiescence. However, there
may be a case where acquiescence is involved,
but not laches. These principles are common
law principles, and perhaps one could identify
that these principles find place in various
statutes which restrict the period of limitation
and create non consideration of condonation in
certain circumstances.… The underlying
principle governing these concepts would be
one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is
also an important issue to be taken note of by
the court.
Laches.
21. The word “laches” is derived from the
French language meaning “remissness and
slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay
or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an
equitable relief while causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on the part of a party
to do an act which law requires while asserting
a right, and therefore, must stand in the way
of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the
length of the delay and the nature of acts done
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during the interval. As stated, it would also
involve acquiescence on the part of the party
approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would
be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer
a remedy on a party who knocks its doors
when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a
right. By his conduct, he has put the other
party in a particular position, and therefore, it
would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge
before the court. Thus, a man responsible for
his conduct on equity is not expected to be
allowed to avail a remedy.”
(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment
has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023
and that, matter is pending consideration. We
make it clear that construction of a statute is one
thing and its validity is another. We do not want to
say even a word about the validity, that is being
examined by the learned Single Judge before whom
the matter is pending. We have only placed our
interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act
and nothing beyond.
(i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to
observe that, legislative process is not simple and
easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care,
caution & expertise. Law speaks through language.
If language is not properly employed what is said is
not what is meant; if what is said is not what is
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meant, what needs to be done remains undone or
misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the
intent of legislation. More is not necessary to
specify."
15. It is submitted that the State preferred a Special
Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court against the
aforementioned judgment in W.A.No.100101/2024;
however, the same has been dismissed at the threshold
itself. Thus, by virtue of the aforesaid decision of this
Court in W.A.No.100101/2024, in spite of the amendment
carried out to Section 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2023,
still a person is required to challenge an alienation under
the provisions of Section 4 of the PTCL Act within a
reasonable period. The said reasonable period has to be
considered by taking into consideration various factors
under the given facts and circumstances of each case.
16. In the present case, admittedly, there is a delay of
around 40 years in challenging the alienation.
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17. In the present case, the original grantee himself
alienated the land in the year 1967. Admittedly, he
received a valuable consideration equivalent to the market
value as on the date of the sale. After a lapse of around
40 years, when the value of the land has increased
multifold, he challenges the same.
18. A beneficial legislation is enacted to help the
downtrodden, uneducated and the deprived classes to be
insulated from the exploitation that they may be subjected
to by others. However, such beneficial legislation is not
intended to enable a person belonging to the deprived
class to use it as a tool to exploit others. Under the given
facts and circumstances of the case, the challenge to the
sale which has taken place in the year 1967 cannot be
considered to have been done within a reasonable period.
The impugned orders under challenge have put the
purchaser to a great loss that he should not suffer and
causes serious injustice to him.
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19. Further, Section 6 of the PTCL Act reads as under:
" 6. Prohibition of registration of transfer of
granted lands.- Notwithstanding anything in the
Registration Act, 1908 on or after the commencement of
this Act, no registering officer shall accept for
registration any document relating to the transfer of, or
to the creation of any interest in, any granted land
included in a list of granted lands furnished to the
registrating officer except where such transfer is in
accordance with this Act or the terms of the grant of
such land or the law providing for such grant."
20. In spite of the aforementioned provision, learned
Additional Advocate General candidly admits that the
revenue documents in respect of the lands concerned do
not highlight the fact, whether the land is a granted land
in favour of persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe or not and whether the same can be
alienated or not. He also admits that due to lack of proper
information to the concerned Sub-Registrar, the deeds of
conveyance in respect of the granted lands are being
registered. It is an unfortunate situation wherein due to
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callousness of the State, a bona fide purchaser for
valuable consideration is put to peril.
21. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to pass
the following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is hereby allowed;
(ii) The impugned orders dated 09.10.2017
passed by respondent No.2-Deputy
Commissioner (vide Annexure-A to the writ
petition) and 18.10.2011 passed by
respondent No.3-Assistant Commissioner
(vide Annexure-B to the writ petition)
respectively are hereby set aside;
(iii) A direction is hereby issued to the State to
mention in the revenue records, wherever
the land is a granted land for the purposes
of the PTCL Act, which shall put the
purchaser on guard.
SD/-
(M.I.ARUN)
JUDGE
hkh.List No.: 1 Sl No.: 42