MOHD AKBAR AND ANOTHER vs UT OF J AND K TH COMMISSIONER SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, JAMMU AND OTHERS

Serial No. 23
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

AT JAMMU



WP(C) No. 2509/2024
CM No. 6110/2024

Mohd. Akbar and anr. …..Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)


Through: Mr. R.P Sharma, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Rohit Gupta, Advocate


vs


UT of J&K and ors. .…. Respondent(s)

Through: Ms. Sageera Jafar, Advocate vice
Mrs. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG
Mr. Ashish Sharma, Advocate



CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SHAHZAD AZEEM, JUDGE


JUDGMENT
27.10.2026



ORAL
01. The petitioners have approached this Court seeking quashing
of the order dated 30.09.2024 passed by respondent No. 2
(Additional Deputy Commissioner, Poonch, exercising powers
of Commissioner under the Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976), in
an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. By the
said order, a delay of more than 30 years in preferring an
appeal against the attestation of mutations under Sections 4
& 8 of the Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 (Act of 1976), came to
be condoned.
02. The brief facts are that ownership rights under Section 8 of
the Act of 1976 were conferred upon the father of the

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petitioners, namely Din Mohd. In this regard, mutation Nos.
128 under Section 4 was attested on 29.08.1982 and
Mutation No. 129 under Section 8, was attested on
20.03.1984 by the Tehsildar, Haveli, in respect of land
measuring 09 kanals falling in Survey No. 299/224 situate at
village Atoli.
03. Respondent No. 3, feeling aggrieved of the said Mutations
preferred an appeal before respondent No. 2 in the year 2013.
By the impugned order dated 30.09.2024, respondent No. 2
condoned the delay of more than 30 years in filing the appeal.
04. The Impugned order is assailed primarily on the ground that
it has been passed in violation of the settled principles of law
and natural justice, without properly examining whether the
appellant (respondent No. 3) had made out a sufficient cause
for condonation of such inordinate delay. Though the
petitioners have raised several grounds, learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners while restricting his submissions,
contended that respondent No. 2 erred in reversing the
burden of proof. It was argued that the authority wrongly
concluded that the petitioners (respondents in the appeal)
had failed to prove that the appellant had knowledge of the
mutations prior to 27.07.2013.

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05. Respondent No. 3, in the objections, has largely raised factual
contentions regarding his claim to ownership over the land in
question. Insofar as the challenge to the impugned order is
concerned, it is defended on the ground that the delay was
condoned after due consideration of the facts and
circumstances.
06. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted that once a
plea was taken that knowledge of the mutations was acquired
only in the year, 2013, the respondent No. 2 was justified in
holding that the petitioners had failed to prove otherwise, and
that no error of law or fact was committed.
07. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
08. It is not in dispute that the mutations in question were
attested in the years, 1982 and 1984, whereas, the appeal
came to be preferred by respondent No. 3 only in the year,
2013 involving a delay of approximately thirty one years. A
perusal of the impugned order reveals that while condoning
the delay, respondent No. 2 proceeded on the premise that
the petitioners (respondents in the appeal) had failed to prove
that the appellant (respondent No. 3) was aware of the
mutations prior to 27.07.2013. The reasoning is not founded
upon a finding that the appellant had established sufficient

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cause for the delay; rather, it rests on a reversal of the burden
of proof.
09. Section` 22 of the Act of 1976 prescribes a period of sixty days
for preferring an appeal against an order of the concerned
authority. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to such
appeals and the delay can be condoned only if sufficient
cause is shown to the satisfaction of the appellate authority.
10. It is settled principle of law that burden to establish
“sufficient cause” for condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act rests squarely upon the party seeking
condonation. The applicant must satisfactorily explain the
delay and demonstrate that it was occasioned by sufficient
cause, free from negligence or inaction. This burden is real
and bonafide. While the evidential onus may shift during the
course of evaluation once a prima-facie case is made out, the
primary responsibility remains with the party approaching
the Court or the appellate forum. There cannot be a shifting
of the initial burden upon the opposite party. A mere denial of
knowledge or a plea that the other side has not proved earlier
knowledge does not reverse this fundamental position.
11.
The appellate forum is under a duty to examine the question
of limitation. An appeal filed beyond the prescribed period
cannot be entertained unless the delay is condoned upon

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satisfaction of sufficient cause. Challenges to mutations
attested in 1982 and 1984, raised after a lapse of more than
thirty years, ordinarily do not warrant interference unless the
party seeking condonation discharges the initial burden of
showing sufficient cause. The conduct of the applicant and
any prejudice caused to the opposite party are also relevant
considerations.
12. In the present case, respondent No. 2 has condoned the delay
of more than thirty years by reversing the burden of proof,
contrary to the established canons of law. It was for the
appellant to satisfy the appellate forum by projecting
sufficient cause for filling the belated appeal. The reasoning
for condonation cannot be founded upon any perceived
weaknesses in the case of the opposite party.
13. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the respondent No. 2
has erroneously shifted the burden of proof while passing the
impugned order dated 30.09.2024, whereby the inordinate
delay of more than thirty years came to be condoned. The said
order, therefore, does not sustain in the eye of law and is
hereby set aside.
14.
The respondent No. 2 is directed to reconsider the application
for condonation of delay afresh after hearing the parties and
by applying the settled principles governing the burden of

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proof under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. An appropriate
order shall be passed in accordance with law. Since the main
appeal remains pending on account of the pendency of the
present petition, the application shall be heard and decided
expeditiously, preferably within a period of four weeks, from
the date of receipt of this order.
15.
The petition is disposed of in the above terms.
(Shahzad Azeem)
Judge

Jammu
27.10.2026
Tarun /PS

Whether the judgment is speaking? Yes

Whether the judgment is reportable? Yes
Tarun Kumar Gupta
2026.10.28 13.44
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document