Raj Kumar Shukla vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:51763
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
th
ON THE 14 OF JULY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 8469 of 2013
RAJ KUMAR SHUKLA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ajay S. Raizada - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Amit Pandey - Panel Lawyer for the State.
ORDER
This petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India challenging the validity of the order dated 22.12.2012 passed by the
Divisional Forest Officer (Production), Forest Range, Betul and seeking the
following reliefs:
"A. To call for the records from the respondents for the satisfaction of
this Hon'ble Court.
B. To direct the respondents to make payments of rent for the land
which has been used by the Forest Department.
C. Any other reliefs which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and
proper in the circumstances of the case may also be granted in favour
of the petitioner along with cost of this petition.
D. to quash the order dated 22.12.2012 with cost."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the facts and grounds
mentioned in the petition, submits that the petitioner is the owner of land
comprising survey numbers 56 and 57 at village - Sohagpur, Dhana. The said land
is adjacent to a depot of Forest Department. The Forest Department encroached
upon 2.299 Hectare of land comprised in survey number 56 and 57 of the
petitioner. The petitioner approached the Forest Department for removal of
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Signed by: PRIYANKA
PITHAWE
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encroachment and payment of rent. The Forest Department initially did not agree

to request and asked the petitioner for demarcation of the land. Learned Counsel
for the petitioner referring to the demarcation report (Annexure P-4 and P-6),
submits that encroachment of the Forest Department on the land of the petitioner
was clearly mentioned in the demarcation report. The petitioner approached
Minister, Department of Forest, Government of MP, who forwarded the
application (Annexure P-5) to the Divisional Forest Officer (Production), Betul.
The Divisional Forest Officer forwarded the application of the petitioner to the
Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), Shahpur v i d e memo (Annexure P-8)
requesting him to assess the amount of rent for the period from 1970 to 1992. The
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Shahpur v i d e letter dated 07.07.2011
(Annexure P-10) determined the rate of rent and forwarded it to Sub-Divisional
Office, (Forest) Bhoura. A Correspondence was sent to Chief Conservator of
Forest requesting allocation of fund of Rs.1,56,600/- for payment of rent to the
petitioner. The Chief Conservator of Forest vide communication dated 03.01.2012
(Annexure P-11) made certain queries. Meanwhile, the petitioner approached this
Court by filing Writ Petition No.14834/2012, wherein a Coordinate Bench of this
Court vide order dated 14.09.2012 passed the following directions:
"Having regard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perusing the
record, it is apparent that the petitioner's claim has been favourably
processed by the revenue as well as the forest authorities and prima
facie it appears to be an undisputed fact that the petitioner's land has
been used by the forest department, however, the matter is not being
finalized o account of lack of documentary evidence being presented
before the higher authorities by the concerned local forest authorities.
In view of the aforesaid, without expressing any opinion on the
merits of the case or the entitlement of the petitioner, the petition filed
by the petitioner is disposed of with a direction to the effect that in case
the petitioner files a fresh representation alongwith a copy of the order
passed today and a copy of the petition before the respondent nos.1A
and 2 within fifteen days, the said authorities shall process and decide
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the petitioner's representation in accordance with law as expeditiously
as possible preferably within a period of three months thereafter."

3. Learned counsel referring to the impugned order dated 22.12.2012
passed by the Divisional Forest Officer (Production), Betul submits that despite
prosecuting the matter for many years, the Divisional Forest Officer rejected the
claim of the petitioner merely on the ground that there was no agreement between
the parties with regard to lease of the land ignoring the previous correspondences
showing encroachment of Forest Department on the land of the petitioner.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Coordinate Bench of
this Court has specifically observed that prima facie, it appears to be an
undisputed fact that the petitioner's land was used by the Forest Department. The
observation of Co-ordinate Bench was based on the material on record. Therefore,
the impugned order suffers from manifest illegality. It is, therefore, prayed that
direction may be issued to the Forest Authorities to pay the rent of the land which
was used by the Forest Department.
5. Per Contra, learned counsel for the State submits that there was no
agreement regarding use of land by the Forest Department. The encroachment by
the Forest Department on the land of the petitioner is not made out. The
Divisional Forest Officer (Production) considered all the aspects of the matter and
correctly concluded that no case is made out for payment of rent to the petitioner.
The petition is meritless.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The copies of the khasra panchsala (Annexure P-1 and P-2) and
demarcation proceeding (Annexures P-4 and P-6) conducted in presence of Forest
Authorities clearly reveal that the land of petitioner in survey numbers 56 and 57
admeasuring 2.299 Hectare was found inside the limit of Forest Depot. Thus, it is
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PITHAWE
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apparent that Forest Depot was using the land of the petitioner comprising in

survey numbers 56 and 57 at village - Sohagpur, Dhana. The Sub-Divisional
Officer, Forest (Production) himself had proposed to pay the rent for the period
1970 to 1992 to the petitioner, Rajkumar Shukla and requested the Sub-
Divisional Officer (Revenue) to assess and determine the amount of rent vide
letter dated 13.05.2011 (Annexure P-8). It goes to show that Forest Authorities
have admitted the factum of use of land of the petitioner and his entitlement for
rent for the period falling between 1970-1992.
8. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Revenue, Shahpur vide communication
dated 07.07.2011 (Annexure P-10) has determined the monthly rent and
forwarded it to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Production). Accordingly, higher
forest officials were approached for allocation of fund of Rs.1,56,660/- for
payment of rent to the petitioner as reflected by Annexure P-11. Thereafter, the
petitioner had to approach the High Court due to inaction on the part of the Forest
Authorities. After direction of this Court, the Divisional Forest Officer
(Production), rejected the representation vide order dated 22.12.2012 on the
ground of delay, laches, acquiescence and for want of rent agreement with the
Forest Department.
9. The State cannot claim implied consent or acquiescence unless there is
a clear written consent or formal statutory acquisition. The occupation of the Govt.
Forest depot on private land remains unauthorized and illegal until the land is
acquired in compliance with due process of law. A farmers' lack of immediate
legal action does not mean that he has surrendered his constitutional right and
gifted his land to the Forest Department of the State Government. The delay or
laches cannot be used as a shield for the Forest officer to evade constitutional
obligation to pay compensation for illegal expropriation when possession over
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private land was taken without following the statutory mandates. The technical

defence of delay and laches cannot be allowed to subvert substantive justice. The
State official's obligation to act within the confines of law does not evaporate
merely due to passage of time. Mere delay or laches on the part of land owner
cannot strip him of the right to fair compensation. In case of Vidya Devi vs. State
of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2020 (2) SCC 569, the State took over the
petitioner's land in the year 1967-68 for construction of road without any formal
acquisition proceedings or payment of compensation. The petitioner approached
the High Court by filing a writ petition after 42 years in 2010, which was rejected.
The Supreme Court observed that the right to property under Article 300-A of the
Constitution is a human right and a constitutional right. The State cannot grab a
citizen's land by trespassing and then pleading passage of time to deny the
compensation. A claim of deprivation of property is a continuing cause of action.
Hence, the plea of laches (delay) cannot defeat it, when no legal process was ever
initiated.
10. In case of Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P. , reported in (2022) 7 SCC
508, the Supreme Court observed as under-
14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of
liberty or property without due process, or authorisation of law. The recognition
of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King's Bench
in Entick v. Carrington [Entick v. Carrington, 1765 EWHC (KB) J98 : 95 ER
807] and by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. [Wazir Chand v. State of
H.P., (1955) 1 SCR 408 : AIR 1954 SC 415] Further, in several judgments, this
Court has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of
lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating that it has
acted within the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic
principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this Court has upheld the
high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their
property, and even more so when done by the State. In Bishan Das v. State of
Punjab [Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, (1962) 2 SCR 69 : AIR 1961 SC 1570]
this Court rejected the contention that the petitioners in the case were
trespassers and could be removed by an executive order, and instead concluded
that the executive action taken by the State and its officers, was destructive of
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the basic principle of the rule of law. This Court, in another case State of
U.P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 held-

“30. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession
extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or
earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the
expression “re-entry” in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial
methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee,
even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and
forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed
otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the
lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the
contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the
requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a “legal pedigree”.”
16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-à-vis their
private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional
right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while
acquiring land, the question remains — can the State, merely on the ground of
delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom
private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we
find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the
grounds of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State's actions, or lack thereof,
have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and
compelled them to approach this Court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of
acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the
High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only
extend the benefit of the Court's directions to those who specifically
approached the courts. The State's lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this
action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the
lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier
proceedings, and not other landowners, pursuant to the orders dated 23-4-2007
(in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC OnLine HP 220) and 20-12-2013
(in Onkar Singh v. State, CWP No. 1356 of 2010, order dated 20-12-2013 (HP)
), respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its
responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed
by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either
way—as contended by both sides in the present dispute—however, the specific
factual matrix compels this Court to weigh in favour of the appellant
landowners. The State cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and
laches in such a situation; there cannot be a “limitation” to doing justice. This
Court in a much earlier case — Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808, held :
“11. … ‘Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary
or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these
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cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would
be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to
a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be
tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a
balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as relates to the remedy’.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a clandestine and
arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required
by law, only to those for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather
than to all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violative
of the appellants' prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause of action),
undoubtedly warranted consideration, and intervention by the High Court,
under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This Court, in Manohar —a similar case
where the name of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading
to his dispossession from the land without payment of compensation held :

“6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied
that the case projected before the court by the appellants is utterly
untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State which professes
the least regard to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the
learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious
enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the
respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in
opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the
respondent.
7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the
citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was
deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-
A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows:
‘300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.
—No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.’
8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for
deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State
authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corpn. (MIDC), (2013) 1 SCC 353, while dealing with a similar fact situation,
this Court held as follows :
“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the
right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades
ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few
authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a
different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of
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law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid
down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this Court finds that the contentions
raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The
State has merely averred to the appellants' alleged verbal consent or the lack of
objection, but has not placed any material on record to substantiate this plea.
Further, the State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land
of the appellants had been taken over or acquired in the manner known to law,
or that they had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was
the State's position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well,
in the other writ proceedings.
23. This Court, in Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569, facing an
almost identical set of facts and circumstances — rejected the contention of
“oral” consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State :

“12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could
not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law.
Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. (MIDC), (2013) 1
SCC 353 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the
procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot
arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC
404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a
constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights
have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to
shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a
multi-faceted dimension.”
24. And with regard to the contention of delay and laches, this Court went on to
hold :
“12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the
appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and
laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of
delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will
depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed,
and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation
prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do
substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a
constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote
justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1
SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22] ”
1 1 . The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated
proposition of law. The Divisional Forest Officer (Production), Betul rejected the
representation of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 22.12.2012 on the
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ground of delay, laches and acquiescence on part of the petitioner. The Divisional

Forest Officer (Production) apparently ignored the material on record, specially
the demarcation proceedings Exhibit-P/4 and P/6 conducted in presence of Forest
authority reporting illegal possession of the Forest depot on 2.299 hectares in
survey no.56 and 57 recorded under the Bhumi-swami right of the petitioner in
Khasra Panchshala Annexure-P/1 and P/2. There is no challenge on the part of the
State that the relevant land does not belong to the petitioner. The absence of rent
agreement between the petitioner and the Forest authorities cannot justify
unauthorized use of land by the Forest depot. The headstrong attitude of
the Divisional Forest Officer (Production), Betul is reflected from the statement in
the impugned order that Rajkumar Shukla did not approach the Forest officers for
grant of rent or execution of the rent agreement. The land in dispute is a non-
agricultural open land therefore, if the Forest depot has collected the forest
produce or timber on this land for sometime, it would be in the interest of
government. Therefore, the demand of rent for such an act is a malacious attempt
which cannot be accepted. The impugned order apparently suffers from malacious
exercise of jurisdiction, gross impropriety and manifest illegality.
12. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the Forest authorities (functionality of the State) were under obligation to pay
the amount of rent determined by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) for the
relevant period to compensate the petitioner for unauthorized used of his land by
the Forest depot.
13. Consequently, the petition is allowed with the following directions-
(1) The impugned order dated 22.12.2012 passed by the Divisional Forest
Officer (Production), Betul is set aside.
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(2) The Divisional Forest Officer (Production), Betul is directed to pay the

ascertained amount of rent i.e, 1,56,660/- along with simple interest @ 12% p.a.
from 1992 till date. The Conservator of Forest shall monitor allocation of funds
for payment of aforestated amount to the petitioner.
(3) The amount so determined shall be paid to the petitioner within a period
of three months.
14. With the aforesaid direction, the petition stands disposed of.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
ks

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRIYANKA
PITHAWE
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