Sarfraz Ahmed vs Rajjani Kumari & Anr.

$~165
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Date of Decision: 18.05.2026
CONT.CAS(C) 621/2025
+
SARFRAZ AHMED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Satvik Varma (Sr. Adv.) along
with Mr. Shantanu Parmar, Mr.
Navjot Kumar, Mr. Balram, Advs.
versus
RAJJANI KUMARI & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sarfaraz Khan, Ms. Rajrani
Kumari, Advs. for UCO Bank.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

ORAL
SACHIN DATTA, J. ( )

1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner alleging wilful

disobedience/ non-compliance of the directions contained in the judgment/
order dated 24.02.2025 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 16096/2023.
2. The matter has a chequered history. The petitioner’s late father, Sh.
Jalil Ahmed, opened two Fixed Deposits with UCO Bank under its “Kuber
Yojana Deposit Scheme” bearing FDR Nos. 930742 and 932480
respectively. Sh. Jalil Ahmed passed away on 09.10.2004.
3. The petitioner obtained a Succession Certificate dated 18.05.2023,
under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 from the Court of the
Ld. ACJ, Saket Courts, New Delhi vide judgment dated 06.03.2023, passed
in Succession Petition No. 25/2021, explicitly authorising the collection of
these two FDR balances.

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By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
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4. The petitioner submitted the requisite forms and documents to the
Senior Manager. Concededly, while the savings account balance was
disbursed, the bank failed to release the FDR amounts, as a result of which
the petitioner was compelled to issue a legal demand notice and
subsequently file W.P.(C) 16096/2023. The said W.P.(C) 16096/2023 was
disposed of vide judgment/order dated 24.02.2025, of which contempt is
alleged in the present proceedings.
5. In W.P.(C) 16096/2023 the UCO Bank initially took the stand that the
FDRs were of the year 2001-02, the Bank could not find any record
pertaining to those FDRs and an apprehension was also made that there was
every likelihood that the amount under the said FDRs might have already
been released on the date of maturity. The said stand is recorded in
Paragraph-12 of the aforesaid judgment/order dated 24.02.2025 as under:-



6. This Court noticed that the aforesaid stand was inconsistent with the
statement made by the concerned official of the UCO Bank in Succession
Proceedings. The same is recorded in Paragraph-13 of the said judgment
which reads as under:-


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Digitally Signed
By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
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7. Considering the circumstances, the UCO Bank was directed to take
requisite steps in terms of the aforesaid Succession Certificate and permitted
the petitioner to meet with the Branch Head at Nizamuddin (West) branch of
the respondent Bank along with the concerned FDRs.
8. It transpires that even after the aforesaid order was passed, the Bank
did not release the amount and the petitioner was compelled to file the
present contempt petition. It is only after filing of the contempt petition that
certain sums were released to the petitioner.
9. It is the case of the petitioner that the sum released by the bank is
deficient inasmuch as after the original date of maturity only simple interest
@ 6% p.a. has been paid by the bank.
10. Vide order dated 12.03.2026, passed in the present proceedings, the
bank was directed to file its calculation claims setting out the manner in
which the interest payable to the petitioner has been calculated. The bank
was also directed to place on record its policy in terms of which the
petitioner’s entitlement for the period post-maturity date of the FDR has
been computed at the rate of 6% p.a. The said policy has been placed on
record. This Court has perused the policy.
11. Considering the explicit terms of the policy, this Court is not inclined
to interfere with the same. In any event, the same is beyond the scope of the
present proceedings.
12. For the purpose of these proceedings, it is relevant to note that even
after the petitioner obtained the Succession Certificate, the bank was
recalcitrant in expeditiously releasing the amount to the petitioner. The
petitioner had to initiate multiple litigations including W.P.(C) 16096/2023

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By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
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(which culminated in judgment dated 24.02.2025) as also the present
Contempt Petition, for the release of its legitimate dues.
13. Admittedly, the Succession Certificate was granted to the petitioner
on 18.05.2023 whereas the amount was released to the petitioner only on
10.03.2025. There is no justification for the delay between the aforesaid
period i.e. (18.05.2023 to 10.03.2025) for releasing the amount to the
petitioner.
14. It is also quite evident that the delay in releasing the amount during
the said period resulted in infraction/disobedience of the orders passed in
Succession Case No 25/2021, notwithstanding the explicit statement of the
concerned officials of the UCO Bank in the said proceedings.
15. The legal position is well settled that the respondent cannot be
permitted to enjoy the fruits of such wilful disobedience and the petitioner is
required to be compensated for the same. In this regard, reference may be
made to the following judgments:
(i) DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622:
“ 17. The principle that a contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy
and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well settled. In Mohd.
Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji [(1984) 4 SCC 216 : 1984 SCC (Cri)
587 : (1985) 1 SCR 598] this Court held clearly that undergoing the
punishment for contempt does not mean that the court is not entitled to
give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done
in violation of its orders. The petitioners therein had given an
undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A
learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a
sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned
Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of
undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge
was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition
to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was
rejected holding that “the Single Judge was quite right in giving
appropriate directions to close the breach (of undertaking)”.

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Digitally Signed
By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
20:56:32

18. The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation of
orders of injunction issued by civil courts. In Clarke v. Chadburn [(1985)
1 All ER 211] Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed:
“I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of
high importance that orders of the court should be
obeyed. Wilful disobedience to an order of the court is
punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt
that such disobedience may properly be described as
being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons
enjoined claim that they have validly effected some
charge in the rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see
why it should be said that although they are liable to
penalties for contempt of court for doing what they did,
nevertheless those acts were validly done
. Of course, if
an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out
that it was done in breach of the law. If a meeting is held
in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the
meeting has not been held. But the legal consequences of
what has been done in breach of the law may plainly be
very much affected by the illegality. It seems to me on
principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to
be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good,
and not tainted by the illegality that produced them.”
19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High
Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah [AIR 1975 Mad 270 :
(1975) 2 MLJ 54] and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun [AIR 1986 Cal 220
: (1986) 90 CWN 342] . In Century Flour Mills Ltd. [AIR 1975 Mad 270
: (1975) 2 MLJ 54] it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High
Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or
injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right
and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of
the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound
to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case
where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court
refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put
back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to
the service of the interim order.
20. In Sujit Pal [AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1986) 90 CWN 342] a Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the
defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of
injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the
restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court
observed that no technicality can prevent the court from doing justice in

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By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
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exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of
Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given
for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary,
it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law.
(ii) Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai , (2023) 17
SCC 545
“81. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in SBI v. Vijay Mallya [SBI v.
Vijay Mallya, (2024) 12 SCC 85 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 826] , in clear
terms said that apart from punishing the contemnor for his contumacious
conduct, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be
issued by the Court so that any advantage secured as a result of such
contumacious conduct is completely nullified. The approach may require
the Court to issue directions either for reversal of the transactions in
question by declaring said transactions to be void or passing appropriate
directions to the authorities concerned to see that the contumacious
conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the
advantage of the contemnor or anyone claiming under him.
xxx xxx xxx
89. Thus, although Section 52 of the 1882 Act does not render a transfer
pendente lite void yet the court while exercising contempt jurisdiction may
be justified to pass directions either for reversal of the transactions in
question by declaring the said transactions to be void or proceed to pass
appropriate directions to the authorities concerned to ensure that the
contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to
enure to the advantage of the contemnor or anyone claiming under him.
xxx xxx xxx
117. We may summarise our final conclusion as under:….
117.3. Although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite may not be
termed as void ab initio yet when the court is looking into such transfers in
contempt proceedings the court can definitely declare such transactions to
be void in order to maintain the majesty of law. Apart from punishing the
contemnor, for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand
that appropriate directions be issued by the court so that any advantage
secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely nullified.
This may include issue of directions either for reversal of the transactions
by declaring such transactions to be void or passing appropriate
directions to the authorities concerned to ensure that the contumacious
conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to ensure to the

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Digitally Signed
By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
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advantage of the contemnor or any one claiming under him”.
(iii) Anuradha Sharma v. Tis Hazari Courts, 2012 SCC OnLine Del
3881:
“ 17.1 The period of delay in release of money by the District
Court is of eight (8) months and eleven (11) days. Therefore, the
petitioner is granted simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum for the
said period on the sum of Rs. 1,12,50,000/- per annum. This relief is
premised on the rationale that, firstly no litigant can suffer by an act of
court, and secondly, the court even in contempt jurisdiction, in a limited
manner, has the power to reverse the aggravation which takes places
during the period the order of the court, in respect of which, contempt is
initiated, lies unimplemented. The real value of money, having regard to
the state of the economy, is depreciating each day. Therefore, the only
manner in which this wrong can be reversed is by granting interest to the
petitioner
. [See following judgments where status quo ante was restored:
Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (1996)
4 SCC 622; C. Elumalai v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj (2009) 4 SCC 213; Sita Ram
Sahu v. Smt. Lalpari Devi 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 711 and Chiranji Lal v.
Ajay Kumar Sood (1997) 11 SCC 336]. This payment would be made to
the petitioner within four weeks from today. The ultimate burden will of
course be on the State, as this amount would have to be included in the
Court budget.”

16. Considering the circumstances, the following directions are issued:-
i. For the period 18.05.2023 (the date on which the Succession
Certificate was issued) and 10.03.2025 (the date on which the amount
came to be belatedly released by the bank), the respondent shall pay
to the petitioner an additional interest at the rate of 6% p.a. on the
aggregate amount which became payable to the petitioner as of
18.05.2023.
ii. Considering that the petitioner had to initiate multiple
proceedings for realization of the amount, the costs/ litigation
expenses of Rs. 1,00,000/- shall be paid by the respondent to the
petitioner.

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Digitally Signed
By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
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iii. Let the aforesaid amount be disbursed within a period of 15
days from today.
17. In view of the aforesaid directions and subject to compliance thereto,
this Court is refraining from taking action against the concerned officials of
the Bank for committing willful disobedience of judicial orders.
18. The petition is disposed of in the above terms.

SACHIN DATTA, J
MAY 18, 2026/ uk/ss



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Digitally Signed
By:UMANG
Signing Date:26.05.2026
20:56:32