STATE vs DR.PARSURAM SAHU

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.137 of 2013

CNR No. ODHC010059182013
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 (1) & (3) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Dr. Parsuram Sahu Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : None

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 01.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 18.05.2013 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Cuttack, in T.R. Case No. 77/2007, arising out of Cuttack
Vigilance P.S. Case No. 29 of 1997. By the impugned judgment, the

learned trial Court acquitted the opposite party, Dr. Parsuram Sahu, of
the charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 24.04.1997, the
complainant, Dilip Sahoo, lodged a written report before the Vigilance
authorities alleging that his maternal grandfather, Giridhari Sahoo, had
been admitted to the District Headquarters Hospital, Kendrapara, for
treatment of a fracture injury. The opposite party, who was then working
as an Orthopaedic Specialist in the said hospital, allegedly demanded
illegal gratification for providing treatment to the patient. According to
the prosecution, the initial demand was for Rs.1,000/-, which was
subsequently reduced to Rs.500/-. The complainant allegedly agreed to
pay the said amount and approached the Vigilance authorities, pursuant
to which Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 29 of 1997 was registered for
the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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4. During the course of investigation, a trap was arranged on
25.04.1997. The prosecution case is that the complainant produced six
currency notes amounting to Rs.500/-, consisting of four notes of
Rs.100/- each and two notes of Rs.50/- each. The serial numbers of the
currency notes were recorded, and the notes were treated with
phenolphthalein powder after the demonstration of its reaction with
sodium carbonate solution. The complainant was instructed to hand over
the tainted money to the opposite party upon demand, while P.W.1, Asis
Kumar Swain, was selected as the overhearing witness and instructed to
observe the transaction and relay the prearranged signal. The trap party
thereafter proceeded to the residence of opposite party at Kendrapara.
The prosecution alleged that the opposite party accepted the tainted
money from the complainant and kept it in the left chest pocket of his
wearing shirt. Upon receipt of the signal, the Vigilance officials
intervened, recovered the tainted currency notes and conducted the hand-
wash test, which allegedly resulted in the sodium carbonate solution
turning pink. The tainted money, the wearing shirt and other relevant

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articles were seized, and, upon completion of investigation and obtaining
the requisite sanction for prosecution, the charge-sheet was submitted.

5. The prosecution examined five witnesses during trial. P.W.1 was
the overhearing witness, P.W.2 was the Deputy Secretary in the General
Administration Department who dealt with the sanction for prosecution,
P.W.3 was the independent witness associated with the trap, and P.Ws.4
and 5 were Vigilance officials, the latter being the trap-laying officer-
cum-investigating officer.
6. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
the prosecution had established that the opposite party was a public
servant and that the tainted money of Rs.500/- had been recovered from
his possession. Nevertheless, the learned trial Court found that the
prosecution had failed to establish the demand for illegal gratification
beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in view of the non-examination of
the complainant and the absence of any explanation from the
investigating officer as to why the complainant could not be examined.
The learned trial Court also noticed discrepancies in the evidence of the
witnesses concerning the place where the trap preparations had been

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made and found that P.W.1 had not heard the conversation between the
complainant and the opposite party. With regard to the defence, the
learned trial Court accepted the explanation offered by the opposite party
during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. concerning the
payment towards car expenses and held that the burden resting upon him
under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act had been
discharged. Accordingly, the opposite party was acquitted of the charges
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the said Act.
The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for
ready reference:-
20. P.W.1 has specifically stated in his evidence that during
“
the process of detection he accompanied the complainant and
the complainant went inside the house of the accused and he
stood at the door and he saw the complainant giving the
tainted money to the accused, but the conversation in between
the complainant and the accused was not audible to him. In
such circumstances and in view of the principle of law settled
in the case of State of Kerala and another (supra) as cited
above, it cannot be held that the prosecution has able to prove
the alleged demand of bribe of Rs.500/- from the complainant
by the accused beyond reasonable doubt and as such the
accused cannot be convicted for the alleged offence
U/s.13(1)(d) r/w.13(2) of the P.C. Act.
21. Coming to the offence U/s.7 of the Act, P.Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 5
have categorically stated about the recovery of the tainted
money of Rs.500/- from the possession of the accused which
was given by the complainant to the accused. The accused has
also not disputed the said recovery. But the specific plea of the

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accused is that on 23.4.1997 the complainant had come to his
residence and told him to go to village Kusunpur for the
treatment of his maternal grandfather and he (accused) told
him (complainant) that he (accused) will go by his private car
and Rs.500/- is required for the expenses and the complainant
agreed to give the same. The further plea of the accused is
that he himself and his assistant Alok Ranjan Khuntia went to
village Kusunpur in his private car and during the treatment
of the said patient, he found that the patient needs indoor
treatment and he gave preliminary treatment to the patient
and advised the complainant to admit the patient on 24.04.97
in the Hospital. The further plea of the accused is that on the
same day the complainant had not paid the said amount of
Rs.500/- and on 24.4.97 the complainant admitted his
maternal grandfather in the District Headquarter Hospital,
Kendrapara and went to his (accused's) residence and told
that the patient has been admitted and then the accused asked
him to give Rs.500/- for the expenses of his car incurred on
23.4.97 and the complainant did not give and on the other
hand made exchange of hot words with the assistant of the
accused and on 25.4.97 the complainant came and gave
Rs.500/- towards the car expenses which he incurred on
23.4.97 and the same was recovered from him by the vigilance
police. The accused also stated the same during his
examination U/s.313 Cr.P.C. In view of the law settled in the
case of State of Maharashtra (supra) by stating the aforesaid
plea during his examination U/s.313 Cr.P.C the accused has
discharged the onus lies on him under Section 20 of the Act
and as such no conviction can be warranted against the
accused for the offence U/s.7 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act.
22. From the aforesaid discussion, I came to a conclusion that
the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, the accused is
found not guilty of offence punishable U/s.13 (1)(d)
r/Av.13(2)/7 of the PC Act 1988 and acquitted U/s.248(1)
Cr.P.C. and set at liberty forthwith.”

7. Assailing the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel appearing
for the State submitted that the learned trial Court erred in attaching

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undue importance to the non-examination of the complainant without
properly appreciating the evidence of P.W.1 and the other members
of the trap party, who supported the prosecution case regarding
acceptance and recovery of the tainted currency notes. It was
contended that the serial numbers of the recovered currency notes
tallied with those recorded in the preparation report and that the
hand-wash of the opposite party with sodium carbonate solution
turned pink, thereby corroborating the circumstances of acceptance.
The learned trial Court ought to have considered the cumulative
effect of these circumstances and drawn an appropriate inference by
applying the principles of prudent reasoning and the statutory
presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, in respect of the charge under Section 7 of the said Act.
Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in T. Shankar Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh , reported in
AIR 2004 SC 1242 .
8. He further contended that the learned trial Court failed to
properly scrutinise the explanation offered by the opposite party that

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the amount of Rs.500/- was received towards car expenses incurred
for travelling to village Kusunpur for the treatment of the
complainant’s maternal grandfather. According to the State, the said
explanation ought to have been assessed in the light of the recovery
of the tainted money, the positive hand-wash test and the other
circumstances established by the prosecution, instead of being
accepted without adequate scrutiny. The State submitted that the
s explanation was not supported by independent
opposite party’
evidence and that the learned trial Court failed to consider whether it
was sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption, if attracted.
Accordingly, it was argued that the findings of acquittal suffered
from erroneous appreciation of the evidence and warranted appellate
examination.
9. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal

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and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State at
length.

10. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-

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“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so.
If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible. ”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets

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strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to
rebut the same in appeal.”

11. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi

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@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

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12. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 13 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.

13. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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