Union Of India, Ministry Of Railways,Thru. Divisional Railway Manager/Engineer, And 5 Others vs Gallant Ispat Ltd. Thru. General Manager Navneet Jindal

A.F.R.
Reserved on 13.05.2026
Delivered on 29.07.2026
Uploaded on 30.07.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
APPEAL UNDER SECTION 37 OF ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION ACT 1996 No. - 25 of 2025

Union Of India, Ministry Of Railways,Thru.
Divisional Railway Manager/Engineer, And 5
.....Appellant(s)
Others
Versus
Gallant Ispat Ltd. Thru. General Manager
Navneet Jindal
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Deepanshu Dass
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Akash Mishra, Akash Mishra, Akber
Ahmad, Gaurav Mehrotra, Utkarsh
Vardhan Singh
Court No. - 1
HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.
(Per: Hon'ble Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.)
1. By means of this appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 read along with Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1996') the
appellants-Union of India, through Ministry of Railways have sought
to interdict the impugned order dated 05.06.2025 passed by the
learned Commercial Court, Lucknow in Misc. Civil Case No.51 of
2024 ( Union of India and others Vs. Gallant Ispat Limited) by virtue of
which the objections filed by the Appellants under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the Arbitral Award
dated 08.12.2023, was dismissed on the sole ground of Limitation.
2. Briefly stated, the facts essential for the purposes of adjudication of
the present Appeal would be that the respondent having an
integrated steel plant situated at Tehsil- Sahjanwa, District-
Gorakhpur required a private railway siding for movement of raw
material from railway station- Sahjanwa towards its Unit. The

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
2
Respondent for that purpose required land admeasuring about
7702.07 square meters from the Appellant-railways on lease rent/
license fee.
3. Initially, the appellant-Railway Authorities fixed lease rent for an
amount of Rs.15,87,527/- per year. However, the respondent
realizing that the lease rent allegedly to be excessive, sought
reduction of the same and ultimately the appellant-Railway
Authorities fixed the lease rent taking into account 3660 sq mt. of the
land in village Luchai to be non-agricultural (residential) and 4502 sq.
mt. of the land in village Domhermafi to be agricultural and, as such,
reduced the lease rent to Rs.9,60,684/- per year for use of the
aforesaid land by the respondent-company.
4. Accordingly, an agreement was entered into between the
appellant-Railway Authorities and the respondent-company on
16.06.2010 and an amount of Rs.9,60,684/- was also deposited by
the respondent.
5. On expiry of tenure of the aforesaid agreement, a new agreement
was proposed by the appellant-Railway Authorities on 02.06.2016 in
which lease rent was enhanced to Rs.13,47,409/- with 7% service tax
per year.
6. However, the aforesaid proposed enhancement of lease rent did
not go well with the respondent-company and as such they started
agitating the said enhancement and demanded reduction of the lease
rent, resulting into dispute between the parties. Since the agreement
contained an arbitration clause, the Respondent-company proposed
for resolution of its dispute, primarily seeking for fixing of lease rent
towards the lower end, through the mechanism of Arbitration.
7. Apparently, the parties failed to reach a common ground for
appointment of a Sole Arbitrator and as such on an application filed
under Section 11 of the Act of 1996, this Court intervened and a Sole
Arbitrator came to be appointed by this Court vide an order
07.04.2022 passed in Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. 22 of
2021 ( Gallant Ispat Limited V/s Union of India, Ministry of railways,
New Delhi
).
8. The learned Arbitrator entered into reference and after considering
the claims, counter-claims and documents relied upon by the parties,
passed an Award dated December 08, 2023 wherein the claim of the

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
3
respondent-Gallant was allowed. The learned Arbitrator in the said
Award directed the appellant-Railway Authorities for revision of the
lease rent to Rs.1,23,300/- annually and also directed for refund of
Rs.1,79,26,701/- with 8% interest on the amount already paid in
excess.
9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid Arbitral Award dated December,
08, 2023 the appellant-Railway Authorities filed application U/s 34 of
the Act of 1996 before the competent Commercial Court, which was
registered as Misc. Civil Case No.51 of 2024. Apparently, since there
was a delay of 28 days in filing the said objection, an application for
condonation of delay in terms of proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996 was also filed by the appellant-Railway Authorities.
10. The learned Commercial Court after considering the submission
of the parties, did not find any sufficient cause having been explained
by the Appellant-Railway seeking to condone the delay. Thus, the
said Application under Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 seeking
condonation of delay was dismissed and consequently the objection
itself filed against the impugned Award U/s 34 of the Act of 1996 was
also rejected vide the impugned order dated 05.06.2025.
11. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned order dated
05.06.2025 passed by the learned Commercial Court, the appellant-
Railway Authorities have preferred the present appeal under section
13 of the Commercial Court Act, 2015 r/w Section-37 of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
12. Sri Deepanshu Dass, the learned Central Government Counsel
led the arguments for and on behalf of the Appellant-railways. He
would submit that it was neither legal nor proper for the learned
Commercial Court to not have condoned the delay of only 28 days in
filing the objections to the Award under Section 34 of the Act. He
would submit that the said delay of 28 days was within the
permissible limit of 30 days as has been permitted by the proviso to
Section 34(3) of the Act. According to him, the delay of 28 days was
well explainable and was primarily because of administrative
exigency, which has been particularly explained in the affidavit filed in
support of the Application seeking condonation of delay in preferring
the Objections under Section 34 of the Act. The learned counsel has
also strenuously tried to highlight that the Appellant as being a
government entity may be given concession in Condoning delay in
contrast to a private entity, as government entities are engaged in

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
4
various statutory functionality and administrative delay in processing
of an application is a known procedural bottleneck for causing delay
in all government departments.
13. The learned counsel has further submitted that the appellants
have a good case on merits and the law of limitation cannot eclipse
their meritorious submission in the present Appeal. Mr. Dass went on
to explain that the law of limitation being basically a procedural law
and a hand-maid of substantive law should not be allowed to over
awe the merits of the present case. Highlighting the merits of the
present appeal, the learned Counsel has tried to impress upon this C
ourt that in a given case, on merits, a liberal approach has to be
adopted for condoning the delay.
14. Rival submissions were made by Mr. Gaurav Mehrotra, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent-company. According to
the learned Senior Counsel, no doubt the delay of 28 days is within
the permissible limit of 30 days, however, the law remains that any
delay within this permissible limit of 30 days is allowed only in case of
'sufficient cause' having been explained by the Appellant. Mr.
Mehrotra after reading the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, took
this Court on a voyage to the contents of the Affidavit filed by the
Appellants in support of their Application seeking condonation of
delay, to buttress his submission that neither any plausible nor any
cogent grounds for delay have been mentioned therein, which could
be qualified to be termed as 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of
proviso to section 34(3) of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel has
relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Basawaraj Vs Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC
81; to fortify his stand that the 'sufficient cause' mentioned in Proviso
to Section 34(3) of the Act, would mean that the party ought not to
have acted in a negligent manner. It has been submitted that the
Appellants had miserably failed to explain and provide adequate
reasons which prevented them from approaching this Court within the
period of limitation, so that this Court would take an informed decision
in exercising its discretion in condoning the delay of 28 days within
the permissible limit of 30 days.
15. Thus, according to Mr. Mehrotra, the minimum threshold for
triggering this Court or the learned Commercial Court for
consideration of the delay application of the Appellants having been
not met, the application for delay was rightly rejected vide the

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
5
impugned order. The learned Senior Counsel has vehemently
submitted that merely because the Appellant is a State, no special
concession can be accorded in condonation of delay in commercial
matters on the ground of administrative bottle-necks. He would
submit that the state as a litigating party has to be treated equally
with a private party and put to equal terms while considering
condonation of delay Application. The Learned Sr. Counsel referred
to the judgments passed by the following judgment of the Supreme
Court to buttress his aforesaid submission. (i) Government of
Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by
Executive Engineer V/s M/S Borse Brothers Engineers &
Contractors Pvt. Limited reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460; (ii) State of
Madhya Pradesh V/s Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654; (iii)
The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. V/s Chaitram Maywade,
reported in (2020) 10 SCC 667; and (iv) a judgment dated
14.05.2019 passed in
(Special Appeal Defective No. 188 of 2019)
by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v.
Succha Singh, reported in 2019 SCC OnLine All 7737.
16. Lastly, it has been submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for
the Respondent that considering from any angle, the sole ground of
movement of file from one table to another cannot be construed as a
sufficient cause to condone delay and in that regard, has relied on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh
V/s Satish Chand Shivhare & Brothers, reported in 2022 SCC
Online SC 2151; and a judgment dated 15.03.2024 passed by a
Division bench of this Court in Executive Engineer Drainage
Division V/s M/s Ayush Construction & Another (Special Appeal
Defective No. 89 of 2024).
17. We have patiently heard the learned Counsels for the parties and
perused the material on records. Having given our thoughtful
consideration to the contention raised by the parties, we find that the
core issues falling for our consideration in this present Appeal is two-
fold; (i) What is the scope of interference of this Court under Section
(ii)
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and Whether in
the facts and Circumstances of the present case, a "sufficient cause"
has been made out by the Appellants for exercising discretion of
condoning the delay of 28 days within the permissible limit of 30
days, as is provided with in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act or
in other words whether the impugned order passed by the Learned
Commercial court is unsustainable in the eyes of law and requires

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
6
any interference by this Court.
18. Before proceedings any further, it would be apposite for this Court
to refer Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which inter-
alia states as herein under:-
37. Appealable orders .—(1) [Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, an
appeal] shall lie from the following orders (and from no
others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from
original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:—
[(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section
8;] [(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under
Section 9;] [(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an
arbitral award under Section 34.]
(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral
tribunal
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-
section (3) of Section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under
Section 17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal
under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take
away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.
19. First and foremost, we must understand that the primary object of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to provide speedy and
inexpensive dispute resolution through arbitration with minimal Court
intervention, as reflected in Section 5 of the said Act. Further, this
minimal Court intervention is also to be exercised in a restrictive
manner as is apparent from the provisions of Section 34 of the Act,
which provides for limited grounds to challenge an arbitral award,
such as incapacity, invalidity of the agreement, lack of notice, inability
to present the case, award beyond the scope of arbitration, improper
constitution of the tribunal, subject matter not capable of settlement,
or conflict with public policy, patent illegality etc. Admittedly, beyond
these grounds, the law stands settled that an arbitral award is not
open to be challenged under Section 34, and Court intervention is
limited.
No doubt section 37 of the Act provides for an Appeal against any
20.
order passed under section 34 of the Act. However, we find that as
far as the scope of Section 37 juxtaposed to Section 34 of the Act is
concerned, the power is more circumscribed and the recent trends of
the court had been to not travel beyond the impugned order passed

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
7
under section 34 of the Act. A quick survey of the judgments holding
the ground would bring us to the celebrated judgment of MMTC Ltd.
v. Vedanta Ltd., reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163; wherein the Apex
court held that interference under Section 37 cannot go beyond the
restrictions of Section 34. The Court went on to hold that in an Appeal
under section 37, the appellate Court cannot undertake an
independent assessment of the merits of the award. Further,
interference cannot be made under Section 37 of the Act merely
because an alternative view is possible, as has been delineated by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Konkan Railway Corpn.
Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project, reported in (2023) 9 SCC 85;
wherein it was also held that the jurisdiction under Section 37 is akin
to Section 34 of the Act.
21. Furthermore, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bombay
Slum Redevelopment Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Samir Narain Bhojwani,
reported in went on to reiterate its consistent
(2024) 7 SCC 218;
stand that the appellate Court's jurisdiction under Section 37 is more
constrained than under Section 34 of the Act. So, as far as power
under Section 34 of the Act is concerned, there exists limited power
of interference and the said limited power is further restricted and
controlled in the appellate stage under Section 37 of the Act. In the
same genre, we find that in the case of Punjab State Civil Supplies
Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 2632; the Supreme Court held that intervention in arbitral matters
is virtually prohibited except as envisaged under Section 34, and the
appellate power under Section 37 is limited to checking if the Section
34, Court acted within its jurisdiction. The appellate Court cannot
reappraise evidence or substitute its view for that of the court below.
22. A careful & meaningful reading of the aforesaid judgments
passed by the Apex court in Punjab State case (supra) brings us to
fore the evolution of law on interference at the appellate stage under
Section 37 of the Act, as the judgment initially proceeds on the basis
that the scope of appeal, which lies against an order setting aside or
refusing to set aside an arbitral award, is "naturally akin to" and
"limited to" the grounds enumerated under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act. However gradually in the subsequent paragraphs, the
Court went on to hold that the appellate power under Section 37 is
not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the civil Courts
owing to the limited scope of interference of the Courts with arbitral
proceedings or awards which is confined to the grounds set out in

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
8
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Court further holds that the
scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 is restricted and
subject to the same grounds on which an award can be challenged
under Section 34 of the Act and that the powers of an appellate Court
are not beyond the scope of interference under Section 34. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court after tracing the various judgments on the
scope of Section 37, went on to conclude as follows:
" 20. In view of the above position in law on the subject, the
scope of the intervention of the court in arbitral matters is
virtually prohibited, if not absolutely barred and that the
interference is confined only to the extent envisaged under
Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power of Section 37 of
the Act is limited within the domain of Section 34 of the Act.
It is exercisable only to find out if the court, exercising
power under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its
limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to
exercise the power so conferred. The Appellate Court has
no authority of law to consider the matter in dispute before
the arbitral tribunal on merits so as to find out as to whether
the decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or wrong upon
reappraisal of evidence as if it is sitting in an ordinary court
of appeal . It is only where the court exercising power
under Section 34 has failed to exercise its jurisdiction
vested in it by Section 34 or has travelled beyond its
jurisdiction that the appellate court can step in and set
aside the order passed under Section 34 of the Act. Its
power is more akin to that superintendence as is
vested in civil courts while exercising revisionary
powers. The arbitral award is not liable to be interfered
unless a case for interference as set out in the earlier
part of the decision, is made out. It cannot be disturbed
only for the reason that instead of the view taken by
the arbitral tribunal, the other view which is also a
possible view is a better view according to the
appellate court.
21. It must also be remembered that proceedings under
Section 34 of the Act are summary in nature and are not
like a full-fledged regular civil suit. Therefore, the scope of
Section 37 of the Act is much more summary in nature and
not like an ordinary civil appeal. The award as such cannot

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
9
be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive provision
of law; any provision of the Act or the terms of the
agreement. "
(emphasis supplied)
23. Therefore, a plain reading of the Punjab State case (supra) would
bring us to fore that the recent trend of the Courts had been to more
marginalize the power of the Appellate Courts in interfering an Award
and has technically switched over from appellate forum to
superintendence forum. The Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that this
appellate power is more akin to the power of superintendence as is
vested in civil Courts while exercising revisionary powers. Thus, it
appears that the Court has in a way further dwindled the power by
holding that the appellate power under Section 37 is only exercisable
to find out whether the Court exercising power under Section 34 has
acted within its limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or
failed to exercise the power so conferred. It has also in a way
prescribed the condition precedent that it could exercise the power
under Section 37 of the Act only where the court exercising
jurisdiction under Section 34 fails to exercise the jurisdiction vested in
it or travels beyond its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in unequivocal
terms has held that when these conditions are satisfied that the
appellate Court can step in and set aside the order passed under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
24 . Keeping in view the aforesaid limited scope of interference by this
Court under section 37 of the Act, let's examine as to: -
(ii) Whether in the facts and Circumstances of the
present case, a "sufficient cause" has been made
out by the Appellants for exercising discretion of
condoning the delay of 28 days within the
permissible limit of 30 days, as is provided with in
the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act or in other
words whether the impugned order passed by the
Learned Commercial court is unsustainable in the
eyes of law and requires any interference by this
Court.
25. Section 34 (3) relating to the limitation for laying a challenge or
filing an objection to an Arbitral Award says:
An application for setting aside may not be
" (3)
made after three months have elapsed from the
date on which the party making that application had
received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under section 33, from the date on which that

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
10
request had been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from
making the application within the said period of
three months it may entertain the application within
a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
"
Apparently, there is no quarrel over the dates and time taken by the
Appellants in preferring the objections to the Arbitral Award dated
08.12.2023. According to this Court the core issue is as to whether
the Appellants had been successful in justifying its delay of 28 days in
preferring their Objection within the extended period of "thirty days"
as contained in proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act.
26. We find that the time period of 'three months" has been ordinarily
prescribed for preferring an application (say objection U/s 34 of the
Act) for setting aside of an Arbitral Award and a discretion has been
provided to the courts to entertain the said Application within a further
period of third days, with a condition that the said court exercising its
discretion ought to be satisfied that the applicant was prevented by
sufficient cause from making the application within the prescribed
period of three months. Therefore, we have three major take-away
from a reading of the Section 34(3) and its proviso;
Firstly, the limit for filing an application for setting
aside an Arbitral Award is three months from the
receipt of a signed copy of the said Award;
Secondly, a further period of thirty days has been
provided for preferring the aforesaid Application.
However, the same is subject to the satisfaction of
the court that the applicant was prevented by
sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months;
Thirdly, the issue boils down to what bundle of
facts could be termed as 'sufficient cause'.
27. According to this Court, the third take-away is the bone of
contention in the present Appeal, wherein on the one hand the
Appellants have contended that there existed sufficient cause to
condone the delay whereas on the other hand the Respondent has
contested that there is no sufficient cause to condone the delay.
Before, we go any further, let us first examine the explanation
appended by the Appellants in support of their contention that
sufficient cause has been made by them in delaying the filing of the
Application. We find that the explanation has been made in four
paragraphs of the Affidavit filed in support of the Application seeking

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
11
condonation of delay. The said relevant paragraphs are being
extracted herein below:
" 4. That after passing of the award dated 08-12-2023, the
Learned Counsel for the Respondents/Petitioners Mr. Anuj
Dayal duly informed the concerned department of the
Railways that Railways has loosed the case and submitted
the copy of the award with a Legal opinion dated 29-01-
2024. True photocopy of the legal opinion dated 29-01-
2024 is being annexed herewith as Annexure No. 1.
5. That after that the Concerned authority of DRM
Engineering sent on 12-02-2024 the whole file with copy of
award to Law Department of the Railway, Lucknow so that
a legal opinion may be for further action.
6. That after that on 29-2-2024 the concerned authority of
the Legal Department submitted his opinion that there is
need to challenge the impugned order of the award before
the Hon'ble Commercial Court. A true photocopy of the
decision of the Legal officer dated 29-02-2024 is being
annexed herewith as Annexure No.2.
7. That after that the whole file with the opinion of the Legal
Officer submitted before the Competent authority who
nominated on 13-03-2024 to present counsel Mr. Rajesh
Kumar Singh on 14-03-2024. After that the Learned
Counsel Mr. Rajesh Kumar Singh the collect the whole file
on 18/03/2024 go to whole file and read and prepare the
same so that this petition may be filed before Hon'ble
Commercial Court. A true photocopy of the nomination
dated 14-03-2024 is being annexed herewith as Annexure
No.3.
"
28. Thereafter, we find that even in the present memo of Appeal, the
Appellant has tried to explain the condonation of delay in preferring
the Objections under section 34 of the Act from paragraph 16 to 20 of
the Appeal. Paragraphs 18 and 19 makes for an interesting read,
inter-alia
which states:
" 18. That the application under section 34 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 was prepared by the concerned
counsel and the entire paper book was sent to the
authorities for signing on 18/03/2024.
That the duly signed paper book of application under
19.

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
12
section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 was
received by the concerned counsel who filed the same on
05/04/2025. "
(emphasis supplied)
29. Apparently, the Arbitral Award dated 08.12.2023 was received on
the same date as we do not find any submission or averment to the
effect that the signed copy or otherwise the Award was not received
on the said date or any later date. In the absence of any such
contention, it has to be construed that the Award was received on the
same date as on 08.12.2023 and the prescribed three months period
stands ticking from the said date, which according to this Court
lapses on 07.03.2024. From the averment of the aforesaid Affidavit,
which has been quoted herein above, we find that it took almost more
than 51 days for the learned Counsel, Anuj Dayal to form an opinion
and send a legal opinion dated 29.01.2024 for challenging the said
Award. Thereafter, it took almost 14 days for the concerned
department to send the entire case file to the legal department,
Lucknow on 12.02.2024, wherein the department took almost 16/17
days to form a second opinion to challenge the award on 29.02.2024.
Admittedly, the department took over more than two weeks to
nominate a counsel, namely Mr. Rajesh Kr. Singh, on 14.03.2024 to
file the objections/Application, which got prepared on 18.03.2024 and
was sent to the authorities for their signing. These time-gaps between
non-
the events sufficiently exhibits the casual approach and
seriousness attitude to challenge the arbitral award dated 08.12.2023.
30. However, the most sterling time-gap and negligence on the part
of the authority is still to come, wherein this Court finds that although
the objection was sent for signing to the competent authority at
Lucknow on 18.03.2024, however the said authority took almost 17
days to sign and send the signed papers to the concerned Counsel,
as we see that the application came to be filed only on 05.04.2024
before the commercial court at Lucknow. Thus, it took 17 days for
movement of file in the same city and there has been no explanation
what so ever from the end of the Appellant for such a lackadaisical
attitude, especially when this Court finds that admittedly the
prescribed three months had already lapsed on 07.03.2024 and the
appellants ought to have sprinted for filing of the said Application
within the shortest available time. It is rather deliberate and negligent
on the part of the Appellant that when they had full knowledge of the

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
13
said time-period having lapsed, to have behaved in a very lackluster
manner as it took 17 days to send the signed papers across to the
Counsel for filing, although the Competent Authority and the
Commercial Court were located in the same place i.e. Lucknow. We
are afraid this indifferent attitude of the concerned officials in delaying
the signing and sending it across for filing and taking almost 17 days
cannot be termed to be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay
and has to be termed nothing short of negligent.
31. Further, we have also tested the explanation offered by the
Appellant in their condonation of delay application as well as the
memo of appeal, on the anvil of the recent decision of Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs.
Karnatka Housing Board and another, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine 1969; we do not find any reason to condone the said delay.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma
that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a
(Dead) (supra)
loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The
expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not
to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control.
Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or
casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation
law seeks to secure. The expression 'sufficient cause' must be
construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while
preserving the discipline of limitation. The Courts are not to be
swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious
appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in
pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and
consistent with ordinary human conduct, Courts have leaned towards
condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual
approach is discernible, condonation has to be refused. In the
present case, the appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence
nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with
ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and
casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-
above in taking 17 days for signing and filing an application, which
was already delayed.
32. The summation of our aforesaid discussion is that the proof of
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercising of the
discretionary jurisdiction as provided under proviso to Section 34(3)

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
14
of the Act. If sufficient cause is not proved the matter should rest,
then and there. It is only when sufficient cause is shown then only the
Court enquires into the various competing factual matrix to satisfy
itself in exercising its discretion of condoning the delay. Alas, in the
present facts and circumstances, the Appellants have failed to bring
the explanation into the realms of sufficient cause, so as to enable
this Court or the learned Commercial Court in exercising its judicial
discretion of condoning the delay.
33 . There is another aspect of the matter, in as inasmuch the learned
Counsel for the Appellant has strenuously tried to highlight that the
Appellant as being a government entity may be given concession in
Condoning delay, in contrast to a private entity as government
entities are engaged in various statutory functionality. We are afraid
that we cannot accord any attention to the aforesaid submission of
the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Different yard-sticks cannot be
employed for a government entity and a private body for deciding an
application for condonation of delay. The law of limitation applies in
equal force to both the litigating parties. Whether it is a government
body or a private, the parties have to show existence of "sufficient
cause" in their favour, before the discretionary power of the court
could be triggered for condoning the delay. The said understanding of
this court gathers specific significance in the wake of section 18 of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, which mandates for equal treatment of
the parties.
34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by
LRS (Supra) has also considered as to whether there was any room
for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the
subject, ultimately, the Supreme Court opined that prior to the
decision of Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.,
reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563; the approach was characterized by
judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in
matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their
functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such
as State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, reported
in (1972) 1 SCC 366; and Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs.
State of A.P. and ors., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363; which held
that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a
private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly,
and any leeway shown by the Courts would also remain the same.

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
15
The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster
General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is
to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less
than private parties, must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and
cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be
condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant.
Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined
reading of State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead)
through Legal Representative, reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592; and
Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531;
Postmaster General (supra)
it is equally manifest that the ratio of is,
in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities
cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State
must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do
otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that
the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red
tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as
grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably
accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of
course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of
limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in
litigation.
35 . This court also finds that the learned Counsel for the Appellant
Mr. Depanshu Dass has tried to persuade and also make a last-ditch
effort to convince us by submitting that the Appellant has a very good
case on merits and as such the discretionary power of this Court in
condoning the delay may be exercised liberally. We are clear in our
minds that every objection predicated on limitation raises, in one
sense, is pertinently a question anterior to the merits. However, the
Court is called upon, not to examine whether the challenge is well-
founded or not, but whether it is one which the statute permits within
the permissible limitation. The Supreme Court in M/s Borse Brothers
Engineers & Contractors (Supra) clearly held that merely because
the government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of
delay cannot be laid down. The aforesaid proposition had been vividly
held by the Supreme Court in the case of Post Master General
(Supra) , wherein it was held as follows:

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
16
" 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this Court.
They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government or
a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack
of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few. "
36. Echoing the same principle, recently the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the aforesaid Shivamma (Dead) by LRS (Supra) has also
observed that the Courts must be mindful that strong case on merits
is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for
condonation of delay is placed before the Court, the inquiry is
confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not
filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of
limitation or not. The merits of the underlying case are wholly
extraneous to this inquiry. If Courts were to look into the merits of the

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
17
matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary
procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating
two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose is not to
determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only
whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.
Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of
the case on merits.
37. Further, if merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case
may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a
weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out.
This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the
law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is
designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered
at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind
of the Court against one party even before the matter is substantively
heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the Court may
inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent
adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands
that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more.
Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.
38. Thus, now the issue remains as to whether the impugned order is
unsustainable in the eyes of law and requires any interference by this
court.
39. As aforesaid, we have ourselves taken the arduous task of
examining the case on the aspect as to whether the appellants were
able to explain a 'sufficient cause", which prevented them in filing the
Application for setting aside the Award or not. Unfortunately, we could
not subscribe to the cause of taking more than 17 days by the
Appellants authority in signing and sending the Application for filing,
wherein both the authority and the Court meant for filing were located
in the same place i.e. Lucknow. Obviously, the said delay cannot be
encompassed within the meaning of "sufficient cause" in view of the
aforesaid provisions of law propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) . The affidavit filed by
the appellants explaining the delay is inadequate and insufficient. No
effort has been made to explain the delay of 28 days, so as to come
within the periphery of "sufficient cause". The explanation offered is
nothing but a lame excuse. The Appellant were negligent in

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
18
approaching the court and their explanation of delay seems to not
bonafide and does not meet the minimum threshold required for this
court to exercise its discretion in condoning the delay of 28 days
within the extended period of 30 days.
40 . We find that the learned Commercial Court has also returned a
finding that the delay caused cannot be condoned as it fell foul of
being a "sufficient cause'. The learned Commercial Court nowhere
missed the woods for the tree in returning a finding that the discretion
available in view of proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act cannot be
exercised in the given facts and circumstances. Additionally, the
cavalier attitude of the Appellants was highlighted further by noting
that the objection to the Award were filed with a delay of 28 days and
was also inadequately stamped and since the requisite stamp came
to be paid only on 15.02.2025 i.e. after more than 10 months and 10
days, the Objections came to be heard and decided only thereafter.
Keeping in view the limited scope of its interference under Section
41.
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the deficient
explanation in seeking condonation of delay in filing the Application
for setting aside the Award under Section 34 of the Act, we are in
complete agreement with the order dated 05.06.2025 passed by the
learned Commercial Court, Lucknow.
42. Before we part with, we must also understand that any court while
exercising its discretion to condone a delay on the ground of having
shown a "sufficient cause" by a party not only takes into consideration
the diligence and genuineness of the cause explained by the said
party, but also balances the same with the right accrued in favour of
the contesting party. The aforesaid view was taken by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 wherein the Court
held that:
"23. What needs to be emphasised is that even
though a liberal and justice oriented approach is
required to be adopted in the exercise of power
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other
similar statutes, the courts can neither become
oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant
has acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time is
consumed at various stages of litigation apart
from the cost.
24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause"

ARPL No. 25 of 2025
19
would get in the factual matrix of a given case
would largely depend on bona fide nature of the
explanation. If the court finds that there has been
no negligence on the part of the applicant and the
cause shown for the delay does not lack bona
fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the
other hand, the explanation given by the
applicant is found to be concocted or he is
thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause,
then it would be a legitimate exercise of
discretion not to condone the delay."
. As a sequel to our discussion made herein above and for all the
43
reasons, the present Appeal fails and as such the same being devoid
of any merit is accordingly dismissed .
44. There shall be no order(s) as to cost.
July 29, 2026
MVS/-
(Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
MANOJ VIKRAM SINGH CHAUHAN
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench