M/S Gian Chand Kedar Nath vs D.D.A. And Anr
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Reserved on: 19 May, 2026
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Pronounced on: 31 August, 2026
+ W.P.(C) 12275/2004
M/S ALFA GARDENS (ALFA SPICE) .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, Sr. Adv, with
Mr. Ashwani Kr. Dhatwalia, Ms. Iti
Sharma, Advs.
(M: 9811356366)
versus
UOI & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Meera Bhatia & Mr. Anubhav
Tyagi, Advs. for UOI
M: 9810076748
Email:
[email protected]
Mr. Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv. & Mr.
Sanjay Katyal, SC with Ms. Chand
Chopra, Mr. Umrao Singh Rawat, Ms.
Neomi Vasdev, Mr. Punishk Handa,
Ms. Anushka Mamgain, Ms. Shivani
Sethi, Advocates for DDA
Mr. Vikas Chopra, SC with Mr.
Neeraj Kumar, Adv. for MCD
M: 9212036118
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Anubhav Gupta, Panel Counsel–
GNCTD with Mr. Kartik Sharma,
Advocate for R-2
M: 9910623535
Email: [email protected]
+ W.P.(C) 2217/2013 & CM APPL. 20053/2025, CM APPL.
20054/2025
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12275/2004 & W.P.(C) 2217/2013 Page 1 of 90
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
10:54:29
M/S GIAN CHAND KEDAR NATH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, Sr. Adv, with
Mr. Ashwani Kr. Dhatwalia, Ms. Iti
Sharma, Advs.
(M: 9811356366)
versus
D.D.A. AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv. & Mr.
Sanjay Katyal, SC with Ms. Chand
Chopra, Mr. Umrao Singh Rawat, Ms.
Neomi Vasdev, Mr. Punishk Handa,
Ms. Anushka Mamgain, Ms. Shivani
Sethi, Advocates for DDA
Ms. Meera Bhatia & Mr. Anubhav
Tyagi, Advs. for UOI
M: 9810076748
Email:
[email protected]
Mr. Deepak Sharma and Mr. Manish,
Advs. for applicant, along with
applicant in person
Mob: 7011136510 & 9212286014
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
JUDGMENT
MINI PUSHKARNA, J.
INDEX
S. NO. CONTENTS PARAGRAPH NOS.
I INTRODUCTION 1 – 4
II FACTUAL MATRIX 5 – 5.35
III SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES 6 – 10.16
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i Submissions by the petitioners 6 – 6.48
ii Submissions by the respondents 7 – 9.29
a Submissions by Excise Commissioner,
7 – 7.3
New Delhi
b Submissions by Health Officer, Health
8 – 8.14
Department, MCD
c Submissions by DDA 9 – 9.29
iii Submissions by applicant in CM APPL.
10 – 10.16
20053/2025 in W.P.(C) 2217/2013
IV FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 11 - 95
i Procedural History 12 – 24
ii Dispute Between the Parties 25 – 30
iii Scope of Interference by Court in
31 – 33
Administrative Decisions
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iv Decision Dated 08 September, 2011, by
34 – 43
Director-Lands, Well-Reasoned
v Decision of LG Communicated vide
44 – 46
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Letter Dated 11 February, 2013, Not
Arbitrary
vi Uncommunicated Internal Noting, Not
47 – 51
Final Decision
vii Decisions of DDA, As Per Applicable
52 – 54
Policy
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viii No Perversity in the Decision Dated 03
55 – 57
February, 2016
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ix Policy of DDA Dated 21 January, 2011,
58 – 62
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and Office Memorandum Dated 11
March, 2011
x Petitioner an Unauthorized Occupant
63 – 74
Upon Expiry of Lease by Efflux of Time
xi Petitioner’s Claim for Parity,
75 – 79
Misconceived
xii Violation of Terms of Lease Deed Dated
80 – 81
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13 January, 1950
xiii Grant of Perpetual Lease, Not A Matter
82 – 87
of Right
xiv Present Petition Barred by Delay and
88 – 91
Laches
xv No Prayer Made for Restoration of the
92 – 94
Expired Lease
xvi Internal Dispute between Petitioner and
95
Applicant in CM APPL. 20053/2025 , Not
To Be Decided in Present Proceedings
V CONCLUSION 96 – 98
INTRODUCTION:
1. W.P.(C) 12275/2004 has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (“Constitution”) , seeking quashing of the orders
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dated 24 June, 2004, and 16 July, 2004, issued by the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (“MCD”) and the Collector of Excise, Government of
NCT of Delhi (“GNCTD”) , respectively. The petitioner further seeks
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restoration of the ad-hoc registration and the bar licence granted earlier to
M/s Alfa Spice by the respondent – MCD and GNCTD respectively, as well
as directions restraining the respondents from taking any action to evict and
dispossess the petitioner from plot bearing no. 4A, Pusa Road, New Delhi –
110005 (“subject property”) .
2. W.P.(C) 2217/2013 has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution seeking directions to the respondents to convert the term lease
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dated 13 January, 1950, of the petitioner into a perpetual lease deed with
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regards to the subject property, in view of policy dated 21 January, 2011,
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and Office Order dated 11 March, 2011. There is a further prayer of
conversion of the user of the subject property to commercial/permissible
user, and direction to the respondent not to dispossess and interfere with the
petitioner’s use of the subject property.
3. It is further to be noted that CM APPL. 20053/2025 , filed under Order
I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) , in W.P.(C)
2217/2013, seeking impleadment of the applicant, i.e., Sh. Chandan Chadha
as respondent no. 3 in the present case, has also been heard at the time of
final arguments.
4. At the outset, it is to be noted that the petitioners have submitted
before this Court that the outcome in W.P.(C) 12275/2004 is dependent on
the outcome of W.P.(C) 2217/2013 , and that, in case, no relief is granted to
the petitioner in W.P.(C) 2217/2013 , no relief would be available to the
petitioner in W.P.(C) 12275/2004 as well. Thus, W.P.(C) 2217/2013 is
treated as the lead matter.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
5. The relevant facts for the adjudication of the present matters, as culled
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from the record, are as follows:
5.1. The Delhi Improvement Trust (“DIT”) executed a lease deed dated
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13 January, 1950, in respect of the subject property, on a premium of Rs.
85,132/- for an ice factory in favour of Sh. Bhag Ram Handa. The said lease
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was for a term of 20 years which was to commence from 01 June, 1948,
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and end on 31 May, 1968. Clause IV(c) of the said lease provided for an
option for renewal of the lease for a further period of 20 years.
5.2. The lessee, i.e., Sh. Bhag Ram Handa, shortly after the execution of
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the lease deed, executed a registered sale deed dated 01 February, 1950, in
favour of the petitioner in W.P.(C) 2217/2013 , i.e., M/s Gian Chand Kedar
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Nath. Further, by way of a registered release deed dated 15 March, 1954,
M/s Gian Chand Kedar Nath surrendered 0.4 acres of the subject property to
the DIT for the purposes of widening roads. Thus, the subject property now
measures 1.55 acres.
5.3. Upon enactment of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (“DD Act”) ,
DIT was succeeded by the Delhi Development Authority (“DDA”) . The first
Master Plan for Delhi was notified in 1962 (“MPD–1962”) ,
which changed the prescribed use of the subject property to ‘residential’,
and the subject property was earmarked for a ‘higher secondary school’.
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5.4. DDA vide notice dated 15 December, 1967, informed the petitioner
that the lease would not be renewed, and offered to shift the petitioner to an
alternative site, in view of MPD – 1962.
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5.5. The petitioner vide letter dated 15 January, 1968, refused the offer of
the DDA for alternative land, and requested for renewal of the lease for a
further period of 20 years. The petitioner had also made payment of the
ground rent and premium till the year 1975. However, the same was refused
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and returned by the DDA. DDA again vide letter dated 25 May, 1970,
informed the petitioner that the lease was not renewed.
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5.6. The petitioner issued a legal notice dated 10 December, 1975, to
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DDA, calling upon them to accept the ground rent w.e.f. 01 June, 1968, on
the ground that the lease stood renewed.
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5.7. By way of the letter dated 16 December, 1982, DDA again offered
an alternative site to the petitioner in Patparganj Industrial Complex.
However, the said offer was rejected by the petitioner.
5.8. Apprehending forcible dispossession from the subject property, the
petitioner in the year 1983 filed a writ petition bearing no. C.W. 2002/1983
before this Court. The said writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn vide
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order dated 22 May, 1984, upon the submission of DDA that resumption
of the subject property shall be done in accordance with law.
5.9. Subsequently, in the year 1987, DDA initiated eviction proceedings
against the petitioner under Section 4 (1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“Public Premises Act”) , which
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culminated in an Eviction Order dated 02 May, 1991, passed against the
petitioner.
5.10. Upon an appeal by the petitioner, the said Eviction Order was set
aside by the Additional District Judge, Delhi (“ADJ”) vide judgment dated
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19 October, 2000, in P.P.A. 209/2000 , holding that the petitioner was not
an unauthorized occupant of the subject property. As per the orders passed
by the ADJ, the petitioner deposited Rs. 80,000/- as ground rent vide challan
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nos. 048164 and 048165 on 13 November, 1997. Aggrieved thereby, DDA
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filed C.W. 1295/2001, challenging the said judgment dated 19 October,
2000.
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5.11. The petitioner filed representations dated 13 July, 1998, 03 May,
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1999, and 06 July, 1999, with DDA, Lieutenant Governor, Delhi (“LG”) ,
Ministry of Urban Development, respectively, seeking conversion of the
term lease into a perpetual lease.
5.12. In the meantime, the petitioner also started a banquet hall and a
restaurant-cum-bar under the name and style of Alfa Spice in the subject
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property. Pursuant thereto, DDA issued a Show Cause Notice dated 29
August, 2001, to the petitioners seeking reasons as to why action should not
be taken under Sections 14 and 29 (2) of the DD Act for running a banquet
hall in contravention of the Master Plan for Delhi (“MPD”) and the Zonal
Development Plan (“ZDP”).
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5.13. The MCD vide letters dated 23 May, 2003, and 26 April, 2004,
sought clarification from DDA qua the ownership of the subject property.
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DDA vide letter dated 12 May, 2004, informed MCD that eviction
proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner, and an appeal in this
regard is pending before this Court.
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5.14. Accordingly, MCD issued a Show Cause Notice dated 11 June,
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2004, and ultimately, vide order dated 24 June, 2004, the ad-hoc
registration of eating house license of the petitioner-M/s Alfa Spice was
revoked. The petitioner replied to the Show Cause Notice by way of
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representations dated 02 July, 2004, and 16 July, 2004.
5.15. The Office of Collector of Excise, GNCTD (“Excise
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Commissioner”) , also issued a Show Cause Notice dated 06 July, 2004, to
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the petitioner-M/s Alfa Spice, who sent a reply dated 15 July, 2004,
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thereto. However, the Excise Commissioner vide order dated 16 July, 2004,
suspended the L-4 license of the petitioner.
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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5.16. Moreover, DDA also issued a Show Cause Notice dated 12 July,
2004, to the petitioner-M/s Alfa Spice seeking to know why action under
Section 14 and 29 (1) of the DD Act should not be taken for misuse of the
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subject property. On 19 July, 2004, the petitioner-M/s Alfa Spice
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responded to the Show Cause Notice dated 12 July, 2004, issued by the
DDA.
5.17. The Monitoring Committee of the Supreme Court, pursuant to
W.P.(C) 4677/1985 , submitted a report in respect of the subject property,
inter-alia, stating that no sanction plans were obtained for construction of
the restaurant and bar, and while MCD sealed the premises pursuant to
directions of the Committee, the seals were tampered with. The subject
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property was re-sealed on 02 November, 2006; however, the seals were
again tampered with, and the restaurant and bar were found to be running by
the petitioner.
5.18. The petitioner-M/s Alfa Spice filed two applications before the
Supreme Court for de-sealing of the subject property, however, the same
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were dismissed vide order dated 14 May, 2007, in W.P.(C) 4677/1985 , with
direction to this Court to expeditiously dispose of C.W. 1295/2001 .
5.19. Subsequently, the said petitioner filed another writ petition being
W.P.(C) 3813/2010 seeking de-sealing of the subject property. This Court
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vide order dated 31 May, 2010, directed MCD to treat the said petition as a
representation, and pass a speaking order. Consequently, MCD vide order
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dated 09 July, 2010, stated that it is permissible to use the subject property
as a banquet hall as per the Master Plan for Delhi, 2021 (“MPD–2021”) ,
subject to payment of conversion and parking charges to MCD.
5.20. In the interregnum, petitioner – M/s Gian Chand Kedar Nath sent a
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representation dated 01 February, 2010, to DDA seeking conversion of the
term lease of the subject property to perpetual lease. Additionally, the
petitioner filed a writ petition, being W.P.(C) 3728/2010, seeking conversion
of the term lease to a perpetual lease on the ground of parity with other
similarly situated leases. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order
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dated 06 October, 2010, with directions to DDA to decide the
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representation of the petitioner dated 01 February, 2010, within four
months.
5.21. Accordingly, Director (Lands), DDA (“Director-Lands”) accorded
personal hearing to the petitioner on multiple dates, and subsequently
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recorded an internal note dated 03 December, 2010, recommending the
renewal of the lease with respect to the subject property on grounds of
equity. However, the said internal note was never communicated to the
petitioner.
5.22. Due to non-receipt of any final order from DDA, the petitioner filed
application being CM 7103/2011 in W.P.(C) 3728/2010 as well as a
contempt case being CONT.CAS(C) 647/2011 against DDA. In both the said
cases, this Court directed DDA to expeditiously decide the petitioner’s
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representation dated 01 February, 2010.
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5.23. Thereafter, the Director-Lands vide order dated 23 August, 2011,
sought certain documents from the petitioner, pursuant to which, the
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petitioner filed an Affidavit dated 01 September, 2011.
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5.24. Finally, the Director-Lands vide order dated 08 September, 2011,
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rejected the petitioner’s representation dated 01 February, 2010, on the
grounds that the petitioner’s term lease had not been extended for a further
period of 20 years; the case of the petitioner was not similarly placed to
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other lessees; the activity of running an ice factory was no longer
permissible under the MPD-1962; the subject property has been earmarked
for a senior secondary school. The said order also noted misuse of the
subject property and unauthorized construction therein.
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5.25. The petitioner challenged the said order dated 08 September, 2011,
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by filing a representation dated 26 September, 2011, before the LG.
5.26. During the pendency of such representation before the LG, this Court
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vide judgement dated 21 November, 2011, allowed the C.W. 1295/2001
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filed by the DDA, and therefore, upheld the Eviction Order dated 02 May,
1991. Since the claim of the petitioner for grant of perpetual lease and
change of land use was negated by the DDA, and the same had been
challenged by petitioner on account of discrimination, therefore, purely as
an interim measure, the petitioner was granted 12 weeks to vacate the
subject property.
5.27. The petitioner filed a Review Petition bearing no. 742/2011 in respect
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of the aforesaid judgment dated 21 November, 2011. Since the question of
entitlement of the petitioner to conversion from term lease to perpetual lease
was left open, and was being actively considered by LG, the time to retain
the subject property was extended by 08 weeks by way of the order dated
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14 February, 2012, passed in the said review petition.
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5.28. With respect to the representation dated 26 September, 2011, filed
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by the petitioner, the LG on 02 May, 2012, in an internal noting recorded
that the lease of the petitioner should be renewed from the standpoint of
equity, and misuse charges may be recovered. The internal noting was never
communicated to the petitioner, who became aware of the same through an
RTI application.
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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5.29. The counsel for the petitioner informed the Court in Review Petition
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742/2011 on 09 November, 2012, that the renewal of the lease already
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stands approved by the LG on 02 May, 2012. Thus, the Court directed that
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the interim order dated 14 February, 2012, would continue till the review
petition is disposed of.
5.30. Upon representations made on behalf of the petitioner, the LG, on
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12 October, 2012, and 30 October, 2012, sought a Status Report from the
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DDA officials on the internal noting dated 02 May, 2012, and sought
information as to whether the same has been communicated to the Court.
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5.31. Subsequently, DDA issued a letter dated 11 February, 2013,
informing the petitioner that the LG has directed that the directions of this
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Court in judgement dated 21 November, 2011, be implemented strictly.
5.32. The Review Petition 742/2011 was disposed of vide judgment dated
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18 July, 2013, holding that the internal noting dated 03 December, 2010,
is a mere recommendation and it stands superseded by the LG’s decision
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communicated vide letter dated 11 February, 2013.
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5.33. The petitioner again sent representations dated 02 January, 2014,
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and 29 September, 2014, to the DDA seeking restoration of the term lease
in respect of the subject property.
5.34. The petitioner also preferred an LPA 966/2013 challenging the
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judgments dated 21 November, 2011, and 18 July, 2013, passed in C.W.
1295/2001 and Review Petition 742/2011, respectively . The said LPA was
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disposed of vide order dated 04 February, 2014, with a direction that the
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Eviction Order dated 02 May, 1991, shall be kept in abeyance till the
adjudication of the present writ petitions.
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5.35. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court vide orders dated 07
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July, 2015, and 12 October, 2015, to decide the petitioner’s representations
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dated 02 January, 2014, and 29 September, 2014, in a time bound
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manner, DDA rejected the said representations vide letter dated 03
February, 2016.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES:
SUBMISSIONS BY THE PETITIONERS:
6. The submissions made by the petitioners have been condensed as
under:
6.1. The representation of the petitioner for conversion of the term lease
into perpetual lease has been denied by the DDA in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner, in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
6.2. Despite the case of the petitioner being recommended for conversion
in various internal noting of DDA, and the LG directing the renewal of the
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petitioner’s lease from the standpoint of equity by way of order dated 02
May, 2012, DDA has refused renewal/conversion of the petitioner’s lease.
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6.3. The said order dated 02 May, 2012, passed by the LG has already
allowed the representation of the petitioner for conversion of lease, and the
same having not been challenged or set aside is binding on DDA, which
cannot refuse compliance thereof.
6.4. The action of DDA is further vitiated by the unfair treatment meted
out to the petitioner, particularly, when the leases of other similarly situated
lessees have been renewed and converted from term leases to perpetual
leases. All the other leases were granted to ice factories on identical terms
and conditions, as is evident from the internal noting of DDA, and the
petitioner is also entitled to the same treatment on the principle of parity. It
is settled law that similarly situated individuals cannot be treated differently.
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6.5. The order dated 02 May, 2012, as passed by the LG, the note of
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opinion, and the opinion of the ASG dated 28 August, 2015, all
recommended the renewal/conversion of the petitioner’s lease on grounds of
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equity and parity. The Principal Commissioner of DDA vide note dated 08
December, 2010, has also admitted that the DDA has converted term lease
into perpetual lease in various cases, and the petitioner is identically placed
to them. Further, it was discussed that use of subject property as ice factory
was permissible in residential area.
6.6. Petitioner has been in possession of subject property for several
decades under a valid government grant, and has made substantial
investments in the subject property. Thus, the action of the respondent-DDA
in dispossessing the petitioner while extending benefits to similarly situated
entities is violative of Article 14 read with Article 300A of the Constitution.
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6.7. In terms of Clause IV(c) of the lease deed dated 13 January, 1950,
the petitioner exercised the option for renewal of lease by way of letter dated
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15 January, 1968, and the respondent-DDA had no right to refuse
extension. Therefore, even if no formal approval was granted by the
respondent, the lease was automatically renewed till the year 1988.
However, DDA arbitrarily initiated proceedings for eviction against the
petitioner in the year 1987, i.e., during the currency of the lease.
6.8. The petitioner has also deposited lease rent up to the year 2030 under
the directions of the ADJ in P.P.A. 209/2000 . In the Note of Opinion by
DDA, the factual position depicted shows that the lease stood extended till
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15 September, 1988, and that the said fact had been concealed in the
eviction proceedings. The DDA had accepted lease premium up to the year
2030, paid by the petitioner under the order of the Court in P.P.A. 209/2000
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proceeding under Section 9 (1) of the Public Premises Act.
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6.9. This Court in order dated 06 October, 2010, in W.P.(C) 3728/2010
had directed the Director-Lands to decide the representation of the
petitioner. Although the petitioner was given a detailed hearing, the
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Director-Lands passed two contradictory orders, i.e., order dated 03
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December, 2010 and order dated 08 September, 2011. By way of order
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dated 03 December, 2010, the Director-Lands allowed the representation of
the petitioner for conversion of the lease. However, dehors any change in
material circumstances or a fresh hearing, and without referring to the order
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dated 03 December, 2010, the Director-Lands rejected the representation of
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the petitioner by way of the order dated 08 September, 2011. Thus, the two
inconsistent orders by the same officer demonstrates complete arbitrariness
and non-application of mind. Furthermore, the Director-Lands had no power
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to recall his earlier order dated 03 December, 2010, particularly, without
affording a fresh hearing.
6.10. The conduct of respondent-DDA is also evident from the fact that
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even though order dated 03 December, 2010, had been passed by the
Director-Lands finally deciding the representation of the petitioner,
however, the same was never disclosed to the High Court in W.P.(C)
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3728/2010 on the hearing dated 19 May, 2011. Rather, the respondent-
DDA on the said date of hearing, obtained further time to decide the
representation of the petitioner herein.
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6.11. The order dated 08 September, 2011, as passed by the Director-
Lands was challenged before the LG, who allowed the representation of the
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petitioner by way of order dated 02 May, 2012.
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6.12. The LG on 12 October, 2012, and 30 October, 2012, had sought
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Status Report from the DDA as to whether the Court has been informed
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about the order dated 02 May, 2012, and thus, recognized the same to have
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been served upon the petitioner. Further, on passing of the order dated 02
May, 2012, the eviction proceedings could not have been continued as the
conversion of the petitioner’s lease stood allowed.
6.13. However, instead of implementing the said order, the DDA issued a
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letter dated 11 February, 2013, to the petitioner, stating that the LG has
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directed that the judgment dated 21 November, 2011, passed in C.W.
1295/2001 has to be strictly implemented.
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6.14. The said letter dated 11 February, 2013, is ex facie illegal and
unsustainable because at the time of issuance of the said letter, the operation
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of judgment dated 21 November, 2011, passed in C.W. 1295/2001 had
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already been stayed by order dated 14 February, 2012, in Review Petition
742/2011 and the possession of the subject property with the petitioner had
been protected.
6.15. It is evident that the respondent-DDA misled the LG by concealing
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the factum of a stay operating on the judgment dated 21 November, 2011,
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and obtained the letter dated 11 February, 2013, by misrepresentation.
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6.16. Even otherwise, the letter dated 11 February, 2013, does not set-
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aside/recall the earlier order dated 02 May, 2012, which has attained
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finality. The letter dated 11 February, 2013, merely directs compliance of
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judgment dated 21 November, 2011, which had already been stayed.
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6.17. The contention of the respondent-DDA that the order dated 02
May, 2012, was never communicated to the petitioner is also liable to be
rejected as the said order was communicated to the petitioner under the
Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”) .
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
10:54:29
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6.18. Thus, after passing of the said order dated 02 May, 2012, the only
surviving aspect was quantification of charges and execution of lease deed.
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6.19. The DDA has ignored its own policy of 21 January, 2011, on
renewal of term leases of Old Scheme Branch (“OSB”) properties, since the
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petitioner applied for renewal of lease on 15 January, 1968, i.e., prior to
expiry of the lease, and lease in question is a premium lease, which stands
paid. The petitioner is covered under the said policy, and is entitled to
benefits thereunder.
6.20. The denial of renewal of the lease by the respondent-DDA on account
of misuse of subject property is factually incorrect and wholly misconceived
as there has been no misuse of the subject property.
6.21. The action of the respondent-DDA in declaring the use of ice factory
as non-conforming to the MPD-1962 is violative of Articles 14 and 300A of
the Constitution. The subject property has been used as an ice factory since
the year 1950, which predates the MPD-1962. Therefore, the said use stands
statutorily protected by virtue of the proviso to Section 14 of the DD Act,
which allows continuance of any use of land/building which was lawfully in
existence or in usage on the date of enforcement of a Master Plan. Thus, the
use of subject land as ice factory cannot be defeated by subsequent change
in land use classification. Further, as per MPD-1962, the ice factory, being a
service industry, was permissible in a residential area.
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6.22. Although DDA had issued a Show Cause Notice dated 29 August,
2001, under Section 14 read with Section 29(2) of the DD Act for running a
banquet hall in violation of ZDP, however, no further action has been taken
by the DDA pursuant thereto, in view of the reply filed by the petitioner.
6.23. Ice factory being a service industry is not a pollutive industry, and is
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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therefore allowed in a residential area. Moreover, the area in which the
subject property is situated in, i.e., the Karol Bagh Zone (D-6 Zone), is a
special area under the MPD, where mixed land use is allowed under certain
circumstance. As per MPD-2001, the Karol Bagh Zone is a special area,
which cannot be developed on the basis of normal regulations. Rather,
special regulations have been worked out for this area and incorporated into
the development code.
6.24. In a special area, the ground floor is allowed to be used for
commercial purposes, while the floor above can be used for office and
residential purposes, as per Floor Area Ratio (“FAR”) rules, subject to
payment of conversion charges. The subject property has a single storey
building except in the extension of main building, which is a double storey
building. The petitioner has been and still is willing to pay the conversion
charges. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to use the subject property for
commercial purpose.
6.25. The alternate land offered by DDA was rejected by the petitioner as
the said area was under-developed and had no local demand for ice. It was
also located far away from the subject property. The petitioner had requested
for allotment of an alternative land either in Karol Bagh or in Pitampura,
Delhi, however, the same was also declined by DDA.
6.26. The respondent’s plea that the subject land was required for a higher
secondary school is untenable, as the minimum area prescribed for a higher
secondary school is 4 acres, whereas, the subject property is only 1.55 acres.
The said plea of respondent-DDA has also been questioned by the Ministry
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by way of letter dated 05 July, 1996.
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6.27. DDA filed C.W. 1295/2001 against the order dated 19 October,
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2000, seeking directions to the petitioner to use the subject property for the
original purpose of allotment, i.e., use as an ice factory. However, on
account of change of land use under MPD-1962 and the controversy raised
by DDA, the petitioner started a banquet hall in the subject property. A
banquet hall is permissible in a residential area if the area of the plot is more
than 219 square meters, and the subject property exceeds these
measurements.
6.28. The use of the property for banqueting activity is also permissible
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under the MPD-2021. MCD has issued the Office Order dated 07 June,
2010, for conversion of properties from industrial to commercial/banquet
hall and also determined the applicable charges for the same. Additionally,
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the MCD vide Office Order dated 09 July, 2010, specifically held that the
subject property can be used as a banquet hall under Clause 7.8 of Chapter 7
(Industry), MPD-2021 and it does not attract Clause 15.7.4 of MPD-2021.
6.29. Thus, the MPD-2021 permits the user of the subject property for
mixed land use, including banqueting activity, upon payment of charges.
Moreover, the required conversion and parking charges have already been
deposited by the petitioner.
6.30. The respondent-DDA has ignored the policy framework governing
conversion and regularization. Even otherwise, assuming any
deviation/misuse existed, the same was covered under the
misuse/regularization policy of DDA and could be regularized upon
payment of charges, as has been done in the case of similarly situated
lessees, where even land usage was converted by DDA from industrial to
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commercial. Further, the LG vide order dated 02 May, 2012, has already
held that misuser charges may be recovered.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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6.31. The user of the premises and conversion of term lease into perpetual
lease are distinct issues, and the refusal to regularization/renewal of lease
despite such misuse/regularization policy is wholly arbitrary. Thus, the
vested right of the petitioner cannot be rejected on account of false ground
of misuse of the property.
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6.32. In the judgment dated 18 July, 2013, in the review petition filed
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against the judgment dated 21 November, 2011, it was specifically noted
that the Eviction Order will not come in the way of the concerned
authorities, if they choose to reconsider the petitioner’s case and if the plea
of discrimination finds favour with them. The Division Bench vide order
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dated 04 February, 2014, passed in LPA 966/2013 clarified that eviction
proceedings shall not come in the way of adjudication of the present writ
petitions on merits, and the Eviction Order was kept in abeyance.
6.33. Moreover, since the lease was granted under the Government Grants
Act, 1895 (“Government Grants Act”) , and the provisions of the Public
Premises Act are not applicable, and therefore, the Eviction Order passed by
the Estate Officer is a nullity.
6.34. The petitioner has a vested, accrued and enforceable right for
renewal/conversion of the lease, as the petitioner exercised renewal rights in
time. The entire lease premium stands paid, ground rent has been
continuously accepted, and similarly situated lessees have been granted
renewal/conversion. Since the LG has already directed renewal and judicial
protection has operated in favor of the petitioner, the right of the petitioner
cannot be defeated by arbitrary administrative action.
6.35. It is settled law that once a decision has been officially made, any
internal official noting, that formed part of the decision-making process, can
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By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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be looked into by Court for the purpose of judicial review to satisfy the
impeccability of the decision. In the present case, the official noting disclose
that the petitioner’s case was repeatedly recommended for
renewal/conversion, and the DDA itself accepted that petitioner stood
identically placed with other lessees.
6.36. The conduct of respondent-DDA is marked with suppression of
material facts and contradictory stands. The respondent deliberately failed to
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disclose the order dated 03 December, 2010, passed by Director-Lands, the
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subsequent order dated 02 May, 2012, by the LG and the repeated internal
recommendations supporting renewal/conversion of the lease in favor of the
petitioner. The respondent sought to defeat the legitimate rights of the
petitioner, despite favorable recommendations from its own officers and
legal advisors, and the same demonstrates clear arbitrariness and mala-fides
in decision making process by the respondent-DDA.
6.37. The contention of the respondent-DDA that since the lease expired in
1968, or even with extension, by 1988, the petitioner had no right to occupy
the subject property and is an authorized occupant, is patently wrong. This is
because since the year 1984, the subject property was under various
litigations between the parties, and the occupation of the petitioner has been
protected by various Court orders.
6.38. Further, petitioner had paid the premium in respect of the lease till the
year 2030, and DDA having accepted the said premium, cannot allege that
the petitioner was an unauthorized occupant.
6.39. The objection of the respondent-DDA that the petitioner has neither
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sought implementation of order dated 02 May, 2012, nor quashing of the
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letter dated 11 February, 2013, is hyper-technical and must be rejected. In
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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the entire writ petition, the petitioner has sought implementation of the order
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dated 02 May, 2012, passed by the LG for renewal/conversion of the lease
deed. The real nature of the controversy and the substantive relief sought by
the petitioner is explicit, unequivocal and borne from the pleadings as a
whole. Merely because the prayer clause does not have elaborate drafting
cannot defeat the substantive right of the petitioner. It is trite law that
procedural technicalities cannot override substantive justice.
6.40. Since the respondent-DDA had knowledge that the petitioner seeks
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enforcement of the order dated 02 May, 2012, no prejudice shall be caused
to it.
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6.41. The Revocation Notice dated 24 June, 2004, by MCD is a non-
speaking order, passed in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice.
6.42. The ice factories are service industries, and are located in the Karol
Bagh Zone (D-6 Zone) under the MPD-1962, which was considered as
special zone as being commercial-cum-residential. Therefore, the allottee,
i.e., the petitioner is entitled to use the subject property for commercial use.
A banquet hall is permitted in a residential area if the plot is of more than
219 square meters.
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6.43. At the time of issuance of the letter dated 12 May, 2004, by DDA to
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MCD, there were no eviction proceedings pending and the order dated 19
October, 2000, by the ADJ was in force, which stated that the petitioners are
not unauthorized occupants in the subject property. Thus, the DDA has
misused and abused the services of other government services.
6.44. While on one hand, DDA till year 2001 maintained that use of the
subject property for a purpose other than residential/institutional was a non-
conforming use and refused to allow the petitioner to use it for a commercial
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W.P.(C) 12275/2004 & W.P.(C) 2217/2013 Page 22 of 90
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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purpose, while on the other hand, DDA itself filed C.W. 1295/2001 seeking
directions to the petitioner to use the subject property for the purpose
for which it was allotted, i.e., for an ice factory.
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6.45. The judgment dated 16 February, 2006, passed by the Supreme
Court in W.P.(C) 4677/1985 , is not applicable to the petitioner, as in the
present case there is no misuse of residential premises. Admittedly, the
subject property was allotted for industrial purposes.
6.46. The petitioner was persuaded by the MCD in view of the aforesaid
judgment to file the Affidavit undertaking to close its eating house and
banquet hall, to which the petitioner conceded in order to avoid sealing of
the subject property.
6.47. The petitioner resumed its commercial activities after the
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Government of India issued a notification dated 20 May, 2006, granting
moratorium for a period of one year against the demolition and sealing of
misuse of residential premises for commercial purposes. Even otherwise, the
petitioner is entitled to regular registration of eating house, as the ad-hoc
registration certificate issued by the MCD, was without considering the land
use and development rules prescribed for Karol Bagh Zone.
6.48. DDA tried to achieve indirectly what it could not achieve directly by
misusing and abusing the services of other government agencies in Delhi to
harass the petitioner with a view to get the subject plot vacated. The MCD
and Excise Collector, acted without verifying the information given by the
DDA and in violation of Principles of Natural Justice.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS:
Submissions by Excise Commissioner, New Delhi:
7. The submissions made on behalf of respondent no. 2 in W.P.(C)
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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12275/2004 , i.e., Excise Commissioner, New Delhi, are as follows:
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7.1. It is a matter of record that the Show Cause Notice dated 06 July,
2004, was issued to the petitioner with a direction to appear before the
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Collector of Excise on 15 July, 2004, at 03:00 PM. The Show Cause Notice
was issued on account of non-filing of documents, i.e., MCD Trade Licence.
7.2. However, instead of appearing, the petitioner, i.e., the bar licence
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holder, vide letter dated 15 July, 2004, requested for an adjournment.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and the direction of the
Deputy Health Officer, MCD, to close down the business of the eating house
and other establishment within three days, the bar licence could not
continue.
7.3. The bar licence of the petitioner was suspended with immediate
effect under Section 36 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (“Punjab Excise
Act”) , which is extended to NCT of Delhi, till such time the licencee
produces a valid MCD eating house licence.
Submissions by Health Officer, Health Department, MCD:
8. The submissions made by respondent no. 3 in W.P.(C) 12275/2004 ,
i.e., MCD, are summarised as under:
8.1. The petitioner has come before this Court with unclean hands, on
account of suppressing material facts.
8.2. The petitioner had been granted ad-hoc registration in the name of Sh.
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Harish Bhasin on 08 September, 2000, for operating an eating house with
seating capacity of 45 seats. The ad-hoc registration did not provide any
protection to the occupant, i.e., the petitioner, against any action by any
government agency.
8.3. For the grant of the ad-hoc registration, the petitioner executed an
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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Affidavit, Indemnity Bond, and proof of occupancy, thereby, undertaking
that the registration so granted for trade in non-conforming areas is liable to
be withdrawn/revoked/cancelled at any time by the Commissioner, MCD,
without any notice. Further, in terms of the Indemnity Bond, the petitioner
undertook not to hold the MCD liable for any action against the petitioner by
the MCD, DDA, Delhi administration, or any other authority, arising from
or out of the ad-hoc registration granted to the petitioner.
8.4. After multiple reminder letters by the MCD, the DDA replied vide a
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Letter dated 12 May, 2004 stating that the petitioner’s occupancy is
doubtful, and the DDA has started eviction proceedings against the
petitioner. It was further stated that the matter is under inquiry/investigation
by the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) and the relevant files are in
custody of the CBI.
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8.5. The Health Inspector, MCD, inspected the subject property on 11
June, 2004, and found that the petitioner had shifted the eating house from
the registered portion to an unregistered portion in the subject property. The
petitioner was found operating an unauthorized eating house, at the
unauthorized portion, with the capacity of 78 seats along with kitchen under
unhygienic conditions, while the prescribed capacity was of 45 seats. The
petitioner had also started a bakery manufacturing unit in the subject
property without any municipal licence, and was carrying out sale of the
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same. The Health Inspector, MCD issued a challan dated 11 June, 2004,
under Sections 397, 417, and 421 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,
1957 (“DMC Act”) .
8.6. Subsequently, the Health Department, Karol Bagh Zone, MCD,
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issued a Show Cause Notice dated 11 June, 2004, to the petitioner on
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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account of change of site for which the ad-hoc registration was originally
granted, i.e., an eating house with the capacity of 45 seats in non-
conforming area in the subject property.
8.7. The MCD has revoked the petitioner’s ad-hoc registration vide
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Revocation Order dated 24 June, 2004, after the occupancy of the eating
house was held to be illegal by DDA, and no satisfactory explanation was
given by the petitioner. However, the petitioner did not stop operation of the
eating house as well as the manufacturing and sale of bakery products.
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8.8. Subsequently, MCD issued the Closure Notice dated 23 July, 2004,
under Sections 423 and 419(5) of the DMC Act, as per law and by providing
adequate opportunities to the petitioner. However, this Court vide order
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dated 29 July, 2004, in W.P.(C) 12275/2004, stayed the Revocation Order
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dated 24 June, 2004, pursuant to which, the petitioner has continued to run
the eating house with impunity.
8.9. The petitioner has failed to meet the statutory requirements as
enumerated in ‘Technical Instructions and Bye Laws for Trade Licences’
issued by the Health Department, MCD, which provides for the grant of
registration for running an eating house. The aforesaid have been duly
adopted and implemented by MCD under Section 417 and 421 of the MCD
Act.
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8.10. The petitioner had filed an application dated 30 May, 2005, under
Sections 417 and 421 of the DMC Act, seeking renewal of the Registration
Certificate for the year 2005-2006 to run the eating house. However, MCD
is not in a position to allow the grant of ad-hoc registration to the petitioner
as the petitioner has miserably failed to comply with the pre-requisite
statutory requirements till date. Furthermore, in accordance with the site
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
10:54:29
inspection conducted by MCD, there has been no change in circumstances
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since 24 July, 2004, when the revocation of Registration Certificate was
issued.
8.11. The petitioner, under the garb of the stay issued by this Court, has
been running the eating house in the form of a banquet hall in violation of
various provisions of the DMC Act. Such use is impermissible as it still
exists in a non-conforming area and in view of the mandate of the judgment
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dated 16 February, 2006, passed by the Apex Court in W.P.(C) 4677/1985,
titled as M.C. Mehta Versus Union of India & Ors., holding that all ad-hoc
registrations are liable to be cancelled. The Apex Court in the order dated
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10 August, 2006, in W.P.(C) 263/2006, titled as Delhi Pradesh Citizen
Council Versus Union of India & Anr. , has directed various activities,
including banquet halls, shall not be carried out in residential areas.
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8.12. In compliance of the judgement dated 16 February, 2006, the
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petitioner filed an application dated 16 March, 2006, undertaking to close
the eating house and other commercial activities in the subject property.
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8.13. However, when MCD carried out another inspection on 02
September, 2006, a huge gathering inside the subject property was found.
The said gathering indicates that the subject property was being used as a
banquet hall. Additionally, two kitchens were found to be running at the
subject property in absolute unhygienic conditions, thereby violating the
technical norms of the health department of DMC. The food so prepared in
the kitchens is injurious to health of people at large.
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8.14. MCD vide a Public Notice dated 25 August, 2006, published in the
Times of India and other leading newspapers, had already notified that the
activities as mentioned in the said notice, including the running of banquet
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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halls in residential areas, should be removed by 31 August, 2006.
Therefore, the commercial activities carried out by the petitioner are liable
to be stopped with immediate effect. In view thereof, the petitioner is not
entitled to any relief.
Submissions by the DDA:
9. The submissions made on behalf of the respondent-DDA, are
condensed as under:
9.1. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief as the present petition has
been filed by Sh. Harish Bhasin, purporting to be partner of the petitioner,
However, Sh. Harish Bhasin is a stranger to the firm, and is not a partner in
the records of DDA. Further, any reconstitution of the petitioner firm is
contrary to the policies of the DDA, and no right can be thus asserted.
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9.2. This Court vide judgment dated 21 November, 2011, in C.W.
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1295/2001 , and judgment dated 18 July, 2013 in Review Petition 742/2011,
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has held that the lease deed dated 13 January, 1950, stands expired in the
year 1968 itself, on account of its non-renewal. Further, the Eviction Order
has been upheld in the LPA 966/2013 . Therefore, the petitioner is an
unauthorized occupant and trespasser qua the subject property. In the
absence of any lease in existence, the petitioner cannot seek conversion from
fixed term lease to perpetual lease or any other relief.
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9.3. The lease deed commenced from 01 June, 1948, and in terms of
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Clause IV(c) therein, the lease expired after a period of 20 years, i.e., 31
May, 1968. Although Clause IV(c) provides option for renewal of the lease
for a further period of 20 years, the decision not to renew the lease was
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communicated to the petitioner by notice dated 15 December, 1967.
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9.4. The petitioner vide letter dated 15 January, 1968, requested for
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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renewal of the lease, and refused to apply for an alternative site, despite
DDA stating that the existence of the ice factory amounts to non-conforming
use in terms of the MPD-1962, and therefore, the lease would not be
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renewed. Meanwhile, the lease expired on 31 May, 1968, due to efflux of
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time, and DDA once again vide letter dated 25 May, 1970, informed
the petitioner that the lease was not renewed.
9.5. The DDA had returned the cheques for ground rent deposited by the
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petitioner, against which, the petitioner had sent a legal notice dated 10
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December, 1975, to accept ground rent with effect from 01 June, 1968.
9.6. The contention of the petitioner that the lease stood automatically
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renewed has already been rejected by judgment dated 18 July, 2013 in
Review Petition 742/2011 , which has now attained finality. Thus, the said
contention cannot be re-agitated in the present proceedings under the
principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata .
9.7. Once the lease stood expired, and was never renewed, the petitioner
had no right, title, or interest in the subject property, and cannot seek
conversion. Be that as it may, the petitioner has neither prayed for
restoration of the expired lease nor for execution of a fresh lease in their
favor. The petitioner has merely sought conversion of a term lease into a
perpetual lease, on the assumption that there is a lease in favor of the
petitioner, when none exists. However, once the lease deed has expired, any
claim to conversion made thereafter, is void ab initio .
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9.8. The petitioner has also neither challenged the order dated 08
September, 2011, passed by the Director-Lands rejecting the representation
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of the petitioner, nor impugned the letter dated 11 February, 2013, by the
LG directing implementation of the Eviction Order.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12275/2004 & W.P.(C) 2217/2013 Page 29 of 90
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
10:54:29
9.9. Thus, the petitioner having failed to seek the necessary foundational
relief cannot seek consequential relief. Reliefs that have not been sought
cannot be granted in writ proceedings.
9.10. In W.P.(C) 3728/2010 , the petitioner had sought a direction to DDA
to convert the user of the subject property from commercial to any
permissible use. However, the said prayer was given up by the petitioner in
the said proceedings and only continued to contest conversion from term
lease to perpetual lease.
9.11. The contention of the petitioner that contradictory orders were passed
by the Director-Lands is misconceived. Director-Lands, after giving a
hearing to petitioner, submitted for approval the petitioner’s representation
for conversion of the lease to perpetual lease by way of internal file noting
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dated 03 December, 2010. The same is only an internal file noting, and
it was admittedly never communicated to the petitioner.
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9.12. DDA vide letter dated 23 August, 2011, informed the petitioner that
there were reports of unauthorized construction, misuse of subject property
due to running of a banquet hall and bar, and sealing of the subject property
by the Monitoring Committee for misuse. DDA asked the petitioner for
sanction plans, details on extent of unauthorized construction and steps
taken by the petitioner to regularize the same, details on use of property
from the date of possession to date of representation, and status and interest
of Alfa Garden operating from the property.
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9.13. However, the affidavit filed by the petitioner in response, on 01
September, 2011, actively concealed details of unauthorized construction
and misuse of the subject property. No details as to deviations from
sanctioned plan were mentioned, nor steps taken for regularization.
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W.P.(C) 12275/2004 & W.P.(C) 2217/2013 Page 30 of 90
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
10:54:29
Although the petitioner states in the said Affidavit that the use of land is
commercial, the petitioner in the present petition has sought directions to the
DDA for converting user of land to commercial.
9.14. Admittedly, the ad-hoc registration of M/s Alfa Spice was cancelled
by MCD, and is under challenge in the present proceedings. There is also
overwhelming evidence of unauthorized construction and misuse of the
property.
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9.15. Therefore, by way of order dated 08 September, 2011, the Director-
Lands rejected the representation of the petitioner. Instead of challenging the
said order in accordance with law, the petitioner made a representation to the
LG, styling the same as an appeal.
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9.16. The LG vide an internal file noting dated 02 May, 2012, directed
that misuse charges be recovered and lease deed be renewed from the
standpoint of equity. Subsequently, the LG was apprised of certain facts, and
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by way of letter dated 11 February, 2013, the petitioner was informed that
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the LG had directed strict implementation of the judgment dated 21
November, 2011, and rejected the petitioner’s representation.
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9.17. The internal file noting dated 02 May, 2012 has admittedly never
been communicated to the petitioner, who received its knowledge only
through reply to an RTI application filed by the petitioner.
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9.18. The note dated 03 December, 2010 was a mere recommendation
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and the same stands superseded by the LG’s communication dated 11
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February, 2013, as categorically held in the judgment dated 18 July, 2013
in Review Petition 742/2011 .
9.19. It is a settled law that until and unless the decision taken on file is
converted into a final order and is communicated and duly served upon the
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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concerned party, no right accrues to the said party. Admittedly, none of the
two internal noting were formalized as a decision and communicated to the
petitioner.
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9.20. No reliance can be placed on the internal noting dated 03
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December, 2010 and 02 May, 2012, when they have culminated into order
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dated 08 September, 2011 and letter dated 11 February, 2013,
respectively, which have been communicated to the petitioner and have
finally rejected the prayer of the petitioner for conversion of term lease into
perpetual lease.
9.21. The petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same issues by
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making repeated representations dated 02 January, 2014, and 29
September, 2014, and the same do not confer any legal right nor vest any
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equity in favor of the petitioner. In terms of directions dated 07 July, 2015
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and 12 October, 2015 of this Court in the present proceedings, after a
detailed consideration of all facts and circumstances, the LG rejected the
aforesaid representations of the petitioner, and the same was communicated
rd
to the petitioner by the Director - Land vide letter dated 03 February, 2016.
rd
This letter dated 03 February, 2016 has not been challenged by the
petitioners.
9.22. The petitioner’s claim for parity is misconceived. In the case of DLF
Universal Ltd., there was a pre-existing and continuing lease in favor of the
lessee, and the conversion was permitted by the Court as the DDA did not
have any objection to the same. However, in the present case, the lease of
the petitioner already stood expired by the efflux of time, and the petitioner
is a rank trespasser on public land.
9.23. Further, the other ice factories situated in non-conforming areas were
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provided alternative plots by the DDA during the currency of their
respective leases. The petitioner refused to accept the offer of the DDA to
th
shift to an alternative site way back on 15 January, 1968.
9.24. It is a well settled law that conversion of leasehold to freehold is not
a matter of right/statutory entitlement, and a policy permitting conversion of
leasehold rights to freehold does not confer a vested or indefeasible right to
conversion. Various representations of the petitioner have been duly
considered and rejected by the DDA.
th
9.25. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the Office Order dated 11
March, 2011, issued by the Old Scheme Branch (DDA), is of no help to the
petitioner, whatsoever, as the said Office Order only applies to cases where
the allotees of land applied for renewal/conversion of lease before its expiry.
DDA never consented to the renewal of the lease in 1968 itself, on account
of change in land use in terms of the MPD-1962, and the same had been
th
communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 15 December, 1967 itself.
Although the land was initially allotted for the purpose of an ice factory, the
same became non-conforming use after the notification of the DD Act and
the MPD-1962. Further, even as per MPD-2001 and MPD-2021, the use of
the land is residential.
9.26. Additionally, conversion of lease depends upon a number of
considerations, such as land use as per Master Plan, unauthorized
occupation, re-entry, expiry/determination of temporary/term lease, and
approval by the Ministry of Finance Division. However, in the present case,
there is overwhelming evidence of misuse of the subject property by the
petitioner by running a banquet hall, which was sealed by the Monitoring
Committee, and thereafter, running a restaurant-cum-bar.
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rd
9.27. It is evident from a bare perusal of the letter dated 03 February,
2016 issued by DDA to the petitioner in response to their representation that
th
misuse was found as late as 26 October, 2015 after a field inspection.
9.28. The Monitoring Committee constituted by the Supreme Court found
15 alterations in the subject property, even though no sanction plan was
obtained for construction. Despite sealing of the subject property, the
petitioner tampered with the seals twice in November, 2006, leading to
registration of FIRs. The gross misuse of public land disentitles the
petitioner from seeking any conversion of the lease.
9.29. Thus, the petitioner’s case has been given ample consideration by
DDA, and it has been rejected by way of two separate and detailed order and
th rd
letter, dated 08 September, 2011, and 03 February, 2016, respectively.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPLICANT IN CM APPL. 20053/2025 IN
W.P.(C) 2217/2013:
10. The submissions put forth by the applicant are as follows:
10.1. One Late Sh. Bhim Sen Chadha and his brother Late Sh. Brindra
Bhan Chadha established a firm in the name and style of “M/s Gian Chand
Kedar Nath & Co”, which was a proprietorship firm incorporated for
running business of ice factories in Lahore, Pakistan.
10.2. After partition, the partners of the said firm migrated to Delhi and
made claims for ice factories to the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government
of India. Pursuant thereto, shares of the claim were given to all partners
individually, including, Late Sh. Kushal Chand Chadha, i.e., son of Late Sh.
Bhim Sen Chadha.
10.3. All said shareholders accumulated their shares and made a single
corpus thereof. As the Constitution was not in force and lease could not be
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executed in the name of migrants, the shareholders approached Sh. Bhag
Ram Handa, maternal cousin of Late Sh. Kushal Chand Chadha, a resident
of Delhi, to buy land for the shareholders for starting the business of ice
factory.
st
10.4. On 01 October, 1955, all the said shareholders incorporated a fresh
partnership under the same name, i.e., M/s Gian Chand Kedar Nath & Co.,
with head office at the subject property. Subsequently, a Shops and
th
Establishment Certificate dated 29 March, 1957, was issued.
10.5. With the passage of time, the older partners of the petitioner firm
th
were succeeded by their children through inheritance. Therefore, on 16
st
July, 1962, another indenture pertaining to the partnership deed dated 01
October, 1955, was executed, which included the name of Late Sh. Santosh
Kumar Chadha, i.e., the grandfather of the applicant.
st
10.6. As per Clause 10 of the partnership deed dated 01 October, 1962, no
partner shall be entitled to sell, pledge, mortgage, assign or otherwise
dispense with the share in the partnership.
10.7. In 1967, the DDA without any prior information to the petitioner-
firm intended to allot the subject land to St. Michel’s Church, even though at
that time the lease of the petitioner-firm was still subsisting.
10.8. The interest of the DDA was always adverse in the subject property
as evident from the lease only for a period of 20 years, even though the said
property was given to the petitioner in lieu of the land and ice factory which
the shareholders of the petitioner had left behind in Lahore, Pakistan.
10.9. In the year 1987, before the expiry of the lease, the DDA
corresponded with the petitioner firm treating it as a lessee, and offered it
alternative sites in the year 1982.
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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10.10. The lease in favour of the petitioner firm was executed in terms of
the Government of India Grants, wherein, the lease overrides provisions of
any other Act, and thus the Public Premises Act is not applicable on the
lease of the petitioner.
10.11. The issues in the present writ petition are the same as raised in the
st
petitioner’s representation dated 01 February, 2010, which already stands
decided as per the directions contained in W.P.(C) 3728/2010 , filed by the
petitioner firm for conversion of the lease to perpetual lease deed, and the
nd
final order dated 02 May, 2012, passed by the LG.
th
10.12. Late Smt. Kamla Chadha expired on 28 October, 2011, and
bequeathed her share in the petitioner firm to the minor son of the applicant
th
vide Will dated 12 September, 2011.
10.13. The petitioner has no locus to file the instant petition and he has no
right to file any claim in any court on behalf of the petitioner-firm. The
petitioner herein has illegally and unauthorizedly claimed himself as the
partner and authorized representative of the petitioner-firm.
10.14. The petitioner fails to disclose as to how he stepped into the shoes of
a partner in the petitioner firm. The petitioner came in possession of the
subject property as a licencee through a General Power of Attorney without
any such authority from the petitioner-firm having parted with the
possession of the subject property to the petitioner herein.
10.15. The applicant has made repeated requests with the respondents by
way of RTI applications qua the subject property, but has not received
satisfactory answers to his queries.
10.16. The applicant thus prays for the grant of perpetual lease as per the
prayers of the present petition.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
10:54:29
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS:
11. I have heard learned counsels for both the parties and have perused
the record.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
th
12. At the outset, it is to be noted that by way of interim order dated 29
July, 2004 in W.P.(C) 12275/2004 , operation of the impugned order dated
th th
24 June, 2004 passed by the MCD and the order dated 16 July, 2004
passed by GNCTD were stayed. Further, directions were issued to the
Collector (Excise) to remove the seal affixed on the bar.
13. DCP (Licensing), Delhi Police was impleaded as respondent no. 4 in
rd
W.P.(C) 12275/2004 . Further, on 03 August, 2006, counsel for the
petitioner sought time to seek instruction to file an undertaking that the
banquet hall has been closed and the subject property will not be used for
running the banquet hall in future, subject to any rights determined in future.
However, no such undertaking was filed by the petitioner.
14. MCD was also permitted to file additional affidavit with plans and
photographs to show unauthorized construction made by the petitioner in the
th
subject property vide order dated 13 September, 2006.
th
15. The interim order dated 29 July, 2004 was made absolute by the
rd
Court in W.P.(C) 12275/2004 on 23 April, 2009, on the condition that in
case the banquet hall sealed by the Monitoring Committee was de-sealed,
the petitioner shall use the same strictly in accordance with the provisions of
law.
th
16. In W.P.(C) 12275/2004, by way of order dated 08 August, 2013,
MCD was directed to produce the record at the time of hearing of the writ
petition, whereas, the right of petitioner therein to file rejoinder stood
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th
forfeited vide order dated 12 December, 2018.
17. It is also pertinent to be note that W.P.(C) 2217/2013 had initially
th
been disposed of vide order dated 08 April, 2013, and the order of the LG
th
dated 11 February, 2013, was kept in abeyance till disposal of the Review
Petition bearing no. 742/2011 . Upon dismissal of the aforesaid Review
th
Petition, the W.P.(C) 2217/2013 was revived on 11 November, 2013.
th
18. By way of order dated 12 August, 2013, the parties were directed to
maintain status quo with respect to the subject property, and the said interim
th
directions were made absolute vide order dated 25 February, 2014.
th
19. On 07 July, 2015, DDA was directed to dispose of petitioner’s
representations for restoration of lease, and also produce the original file
th
pertaining to the petitioner’s case. Further, vide order dated 12 October,
2015, the Court directed the Vice Chairperson, DDA to convene a meeting
of all responsible officers and after taking a considered decision,
communicate the same to the petitioners within three weeks.
20. It is essential to note that in terms of the aforesaid directions of this
nd
Court, DDA considered the petitioner’s representations dated 02 January,
th
2014, and 29 September, 2014, and rejected the same by way of letter
rd
dated 03 February, 2016.
th
21. By way of order dated 05 December, 2016, the petitioner was
permitted to file an amended writ petition stating that DDA’s order dated
rd st
03 February, 2016, was contrary to policy dated 21 January, 2011, and
th
Office Order dated 11 March, 2011.
th
22. On 12 January, 2024, additional documents filed by the petitioner
th
were taken on record. Further, order dated 07 July, 2025 records the
submission made by DDA that it has no relation to the inter-se dispute
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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between the petitioners and the applicant in CM APPL. 20053/2025 .
th
23. In terms of order dated 04 August, 2025 passed by this Court, the
petitioner has inspected and placed documents from the original file of DDA
before this Court, along with an affidavit.
24. CM APPL. 20053/2025 filed in W.P.(C) 2217/2013 has been heard
during final arguments in the petition.
DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES:
25. The petitioner seeks direction to the respondent-DDA to convert the
petitioner’s expired term lease into a perpetual lease. The claim of the
petitioner rests principally on an internal noting recorded by the Director-
rd nd
Lands on 03 December, 2010, internal noting recorded by LG on 02 May,
st
2012, DDA’s policy dated 21 January, 2011, and the Office Order of DDA
th
dated 11 March, 2011, and parity with other lessees, in particular, M/s DLF
Universal Limited.
26. On the other hand, the respondent-DDA resists the petition on the
st
ground that the petitioner’s original lease expired by efflux of time on 31
May, 1968, and was never formally renewed. Further, the internal noting
relied upon by the petitioner never matured into communicated orders and
were in any event, superseded by reasoned decision of the Director-Lands
th
dated 08 September, 2011; decision of the LG as communicated to the
th
petitioner vide letter dated 11 February, 2013, followed by DDA’s formal
rd
order dated 03 February, 2016, rejecting the petitioner’s representations.
nd
27. First and foremost, it is to be noted that the Eviction Order dated 02
May, 1991, against the petitioner herein passed by the Estate Officer has
st
been upheld in judgment dated 21 November, 2011, passed in C.W.
th
1295/2001, and judgment dated 18 July, 2013 in Review Petition 742/2011 ,
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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th
as well as order dated 04 February, 2014, in LPA 966/2013 . As noted in the
aforesaid judgments and orders, the lease stood expired in the year 1968
itself.
th
28. As per the facts on record, the lease deed dated 13 January, 1950,
was executed in favour of proprietor of Handa Ice Factory, who
subsequently transferred the said lease in favour of the petitioner.
st
29. The lease deed in favour of the petitioner-firm expired on 31 May,
1968, due to efflux of time. It is undisputed that the said lease was thereafter
never formally renewed.
30. The main dispute in the present petition is whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to a conversion of term lease into perpetual lease on the
grounds of parity. This necessarily entails enquiry into whether the decision
taken by the DDA of rejecting the application of the petitioner, in this
regard, is arbitrary or based on sound reasons.
SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE BY COURT IN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS:
31. It is a well settled principle of law that the Writ Court does not sit as
an Appellate Court over the administrative decisions taken by statutory
authorities. The Court cannot supplant its own reasoning, and its
interference is not warranted in case of two possible perspectives, and the
authority having taken one.
32. It is not permissible for the Court to examine the validity of the
decision but only the correctness of the decision-making process. The Court
undertakes an examination into whether the impugned decision is vitiated by
an apparent error of law. Thus, in the case of Municipal Council, Neemuch
Versus Mahadeo Real Estate and Others, (2019) 10 SCC 738 , it was held
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as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
13. In the present case, the learned Judges of the Division Bench
have arrived at a finding that such a sanction was, in fact,
granted. We will examine the correctness of the said finding of
fact at a subsequent stage. However, before doing that, we
propose to examine the scope of the powers of the High Court
of judicial review of an administrative action. Though, there
are a catena of judgments of this Court on the said issue, the
law laid down by this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of
India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] lays
down the basic principles which still hold the field . Para 77 of
the said judgment reads thus: (SCC pp. 677-78)
“77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the
question of legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its
powers?
2. Committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would
have reached or,
5. abused its powers .
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a
particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment
of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in
which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty
to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds
upon which an administrative action is subject to control by
judicial review can be classified as under:
(i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must
understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-
making power and must give effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out
addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact,
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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in R. v. Secy. of State for Home Department, ex p
Brind [R. v. Secy. of State for Home Department, ex p Brind,
(1991) 1 AC 696: (1991) 2 WLR 588 (HL)], Lord Diplock refers
specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition
of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases, the test to
be adopted is that the court should, ‘consider whether
something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which
requires its intervention ’.”
14. It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review of an
administrative action is very limited. Unless the Court comes to
a conclusion that the decision-maker has not understood the
law correctly that regulates his decision-making power or when
it is found that the decision of the decision-maker is vitiated by
irrationality and that too on the principle of “Wednesbury
unreasonableness” or unless it is found that there has been a
procedural impropriety in the decision-making process, it
would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere in the
decision-making process. It is also equally well settled that it is
not permissible for the Court to examine the validity of the
decision but this Court can examine only the correctness of the
decision-making process .
15. This Court recently in W.B. Central School Service
Commission v. Abdul Halim [W.B. Central School Service
Commission v. Abdul Halim, (2019) 18 SCC 39: 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 902] had again an occasion to consider the scope of
interference under Article 226 in an administrative action:
“31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the
Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated
by an apparent error of law. The test to determine
whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the
face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on
the face of the record or whether the error requires
examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to
be established by a process of reasoning, on points where
there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to
be an error on the face of the record , as held by this Court
in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC
137]. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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capable of two or more constructions and one
construction has been adopted, the decision would not be
open to interference by the writ court. It is only an
obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory
provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision
founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law,
which can be corrected by the writ court by issuance of
writ of certiorari .
32. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be
wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is
so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck
down by a writ court. If the decision cannot rationally be
supported by the materials on record, the same may be
regarded as perverse.
33. However, the power of the Court to examine
the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not
enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the
grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of
the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. The
test is not what the Court considers reasonable or
unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that
no reasonable person could have taken, which has led to
manifest injustice. The writ court does not interfere,
because a decision is not perfect .
16. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High Court
would be warranted only when the decision impugned is vitiated
by an apparent error of law i.e. when the error is apparent on
the face of the record and is self-evident. The High Court would
be empowered to exercise the powers when it finds that the
decision impugned is so arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person would have ever arrived at. It has been
reiterated that the test is not what the Court considers
reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court
thinks that no reasonable person could have taken. Not only this
but such a decision must have led to manifest injustice .
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
33. Likewise, delving on the aspect that the scope of judicial review in
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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administrative decisions of statutory authorities is limited, Supreme Court in
the case of Om Kumar and Others Versus Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC
386 , held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
24. We agree that the question of the quantum of punishment in
disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority
and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is
confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known
principles known as Wednesbury principles, (See Associated
Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn. [(1948) 1 KB
223:(1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)]). This Court had occasion to lay
down the narrow scope of the jurisdiction in several cases. The
applicability of the principle of “proportionality” in
administrative law was considered exhaustively in Union of
India v. Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463:1997 SCC (L&S) 1806]
where the primary role of the administrator and the secondary
role of the Courts in matters not involving fundamental
freedoms, was explained.
25. We shall therefore have to examine the cases of Shri Om
Kumar and of Shri Virendra Nath from the standpoint of basic
principles applicable under administrative law,
namely, Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of
proportionality. It has, therefore, become necessary to make
reference to these principles and trace certain recent
developments in the law.
I (a) Wednesbury principles
26. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the Wednesbury case [(1948) 1
KB 223:(1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] that when a statute gave
discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of
judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference
was not permissible unless one or the other of the following
conditions was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law,
or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors
were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable
person could have taken. These principles were consistently
followed in the UK and in India to judge the validity of
administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983,
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Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of
Civil Service [(1984) 3 WLR 1174: 1985 AC 374: (1984) 3 All
ER 935 at 950j] (called the GCHQ case) summarised the
principles of judicial review of administrative action as based
upon one or other of the following viz., illegality, procedural
irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that
“proportionality” was a “future possibility”.
(b) Proportionality
27. The principle originated in Prussia in the nineteenth
century and has since been adopted in Germany, France and
other European countries. The European Court of Justice at
Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights at
Strasbourg have applied the principle while judging the validity
of administrative action. But even long before that, the Indian
Supreme Court has applied the principle
of “proportionality” to legislative action since 1950, as stated in
detail below .
28. By “proportionality”, we mean the question whether, while
regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or
least-restrictive choice of measures has been made by the
legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of
the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the
case may be. Under the principle, the court will see that
the legislature and the administrative authority “maintain
a proper balance between the adverse effects which the
legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights,
liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose
which they were intended to serve”. The legislature and the
administrative authority are, however, given an area of
discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice
made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the court.
That is what is meant by proportionality.
29. The above principle of proportionality has been applied by
the European Court to protect the rights guaranteed under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and in particular, for considering
whether restrictions imposed were restrictions which were
“necessary” — within Articles 8 to 11 of the said Convention
[corresponding to our Article 19(1)] and to find out whether the
restrictions imposed on fundamental freedoms were more
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excessive than required. (Handyside v. UK [(1976) 1 EHR 737]
). Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention contain provisions similar
to Article 21 of our Constitution relating to life and liberty. The
European Court has applied the principle of proportionality also
to questions of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention
(corresponding to Article 14 of our Constitution). (See European
Administrative Law by J. Schwarze, 1992, pp. 677-866)
(II) Proportionality and Legislation in UK and India
xxx xxx xxx
32. So far as Article 14 is concerned, the courts in India
examined whether the classification was based on intelligible
differentia and whether the differentia had a reasonable nexus
with the object of the legislation. Obviously, when the courts
considered the question whether the classification was based
on intelligible differentia, the courts were examining the
validity of the differences and the adequacy of the differences.
This is again nothing but the principle of proportionality.
There are also cases where legislation or rules have been
struck down as being arbitrary in the sense of being
unreasonable [see Air India v. Nergesh Meerza [(1981) 4 SCC
335:1981 SCC (L&S) 599] (SCC at pp. 372-373)]. But this latter
aspect of striking down legislation only on the basis of
“arbitrariness” has been doubted in State of A.P. v. McDowell
and Co. [(1996) 3 SCC 709].
xxx xxx xxx
42. While the courts' level of scrutiny will be more in case of
restrictions on fundamental freedoms, the courts give a large
amount of discretion to the administrator in matters of high-level
economic and social policy and may be reluctant to interfere:
(R. v. Secy of State for the Environment, ex p Nottinghamshire
County Council [1986 AC 240:(1986) 1 All ER 199:(1986) 2
WLR 1 (HL)]; R. v. Secy. of State for Environment, ex p
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [(1991) 1
AC 521:(1990) 3 All ER 589:(1990) 3 WLR 898] (AC at p.
597). Smith speaks of “variable margin of appreciation”. The
new Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1999 permits the courts
to apply “proportionality” but taking into account the financial
issues, complexities of the matter and the special facts of the
case.
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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(v) Post-Smith and the Human Rights Act, 1998
xxx xxx xxx
66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where
administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being
discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are
treated equally, the question is for the Constitutional Courts as
primary reviewing courts to consider correctness of the level of
discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it
has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the
administrator. Here the court deals with the merits of the
balancing action of the administrator and is, in essence,
applying “proportionality” and is a primary reviewing authority.
67. But where an administrative action is challenged as
“arbitrary” under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa [(1974) 4
SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] (as in cases where punishments
in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be
whether the administrative order is “rational” or “reasonable”
and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The courts would then
be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see
whether the administrator has done well in his primary role,
whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors
from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into
consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable
person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these
rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary . [In G.B.
Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council [(1991) 3 SCC 91] (SCC
at p. 111).] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that
“reasonableness” of the administrator under Article 14 in the
context of administrative law has to be judged from the stand
point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of
India [(1994) 6 SCC 651] (SCC at pp. 679-80), Indian Express
Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1985) 1 SCC
641:1985 SCC (Tax) 121] (SCC at p. 691), Supreme Court
Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [(1989) 4 SCC 187:
1989 SCC (L&S) 569] (SCC at p. 241) and U.P. Financial
Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P). Ltd. [(1993) 2 SCC 299] (SCC at
p. 307) while judging whether the administrative action is
“arbitrary” under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise than being
discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to
a Wednesbury review always.
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68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as
discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary review
is for the courts by applying proportionality. However, where
administrative action is questioned as “arbitrary” under Article
14, the principle of secondary review based on Wednesbury
principles applies.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
TH
DECISION DATED 08 SEPTEMBER, 2011 BY DIRECTOR-LANDS,
WELL-REASONED:
st
34. In the present case, the petitioner had sent a representation dated 01
February, 2010, seeking conversion of the term lease deed into perpetual
th
lease. By way of the final decision dated 08 September, 2011, the Director-
Lands rejected the representation of the petitioner on the following grounds:
th
i. Although there was a submission of the petitioner’s counsel on 06
October, 2010, before this Court in W.P.(C) 3728/2010 , stating that
the dispute qua the user of the property has been resolved. However,
the records of DDA do not show any evidence about resolution of
dispute regarding user of the property between DDA and the
petitioner. Thus, the statement of the counsel for the petitioner was
unsubstantiated, unilateral, and without any evidence.
th
ii. In terms of order dated 06 October, 2010, in W.P.(C) 3728/2010 ,
only the question of renewal of term lease into perpetual lease is being
considered.
iii. The lease was not renewed mainly on the ground that when the lease
became due for renewal, the MPD-1962 had come into operation, as
per which, the subject property was demarcated as a residential area,
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and the subject property was earmarked for a higher secondary
school.
iv. As per legal opinion received from the Legal Department of DDA,
proviso to Section 14 of the DD Act has to be read harmoniously with
the MPD and ZDPs. The words “use upon such terms and conditions
as may be prescribed” in the proviso enable the Authority to restrict
by regulations the use of any land or building for a purpose for which
it was being previously used. In other words, subsequent to framing of
regulations and notification of MPD and ZDP, any land or building
can neither be used nor be permitted to be used otherwise than in
conformity with such regulations and provisions of MPD and ZDP.
Therefore, the present case will be governed according to the MPD
and ZDP.
v. The argument of petitioner that their term lease be extended for
another 20 years is devoid of merits.
vi. The argument of petitioner w.r.t similarly placed cases, viz., M/s
Raisina Ice Factory and M/s Imperial Ice Factory, was rejected as the
facts of those cases were different. In the above two cases, land use of
the property was not under question.
vii. However, in the present case, the Planning Department of DDA has
informed that as per MPD-2021, the subject property remained part of
residential land use, and its use as an ice plant is not permissible in
residential areas. As per MPD-1962 and MPD-2001 also, the subject
property was part of residential land use. Further, a higher secondary
school is a residential land use. Thus, land use of land allotted to
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petitioner is different from land use under the MPD, the other cases
become distinguishable.
viii. Comparison of present case with the case of the lease of M/s DCM
Limited is not justifiable to seek conversion to perpetual lease, as in
M/s DCM case, lease has not been renewed in perpetuity as yet.
ix. The case of DLF Universal Limited was also distinguished. The said
th
case was based on letter dated 08 June, 1984, of the Ministry of
Works & Housing, as per which, conversion of term lease into
perpetual lease has to be in accordance with MPD/ZDP, subject to
certain factors such as unauthorised occupation, re-entry,
determination of temporary lease, land use shown in ZDP/MPD, date
of application requesting for conversion of temporary lease into
permanent lease, etc. In such cases, approval of Ministry of Finance
Division is also obtained.
x. As per the office records of DDA, there is unauthorised construction,
misuse (ice factory in residential area), misuse by running restaurant-
cum-bar as well as banquet hall, which has been sealed by Monitoring
Committee. These violations would disqualify the petitioner to be
considered for conversion of period lease into perpetual lease.
rd
xi. Vide order dated 23 August, 2011, petitioner was given opportunity
to clarify about the unauthorised construction and misuse in the
interest of natural justice. But the reply by the petitioner does not
furnish the information sought.
35. Thus, it is seen that the case of the petitioner was considered
st
comprehensively upon the representation dated 01 February, 2010,
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submitted by the petitioner, and the said representation was disposed of by a
th
detailed Speaking Order dated 08 September, 2011.
th
36. The contention of the petitioner that the aforesaid order dated 08
September, 2011, is arbitrary as the Director-Lands had earlier passed a
rd
contradictory order dated 03 December, 2010, is misconceived and is liable
to be dismissed. The present is not a case where the Director-Lands passed
two contradictory orders, one allowing the representation of the petitioner
rd
and another disallowing the same. The order dated 03 December, 2010, is
merely an internal noting which records the preliminary opinion/
recommendation of the Director-Lands, and not the final adjudication of the
representation of the petitioner. It is pertinent to note, that the said noting
was never officially communicated to the petitioner.
rd
37. Pursuant to the aforesaid internal noting dated 03 December, 2010,
rd
the Director-Lands vide order dated 23 August, 2011, noted that as per
th
guidelines issued by the Government of India by way of letter dated 08
June, 1984, conversion of term lease into perpetual lease is to be decided on
merits, on factors such as unauthorised occupation, re-entry, determination
of temporary lease, land use shown in MPD/ZDP, date of application
requesting for conversion of temporary lease into permanent lease, etc.
Further, perusal of the file of the subject property disclosed number of
reports about unauthorised construction, misuse of premises by running
banquet hall as well as a bar, and sealing of the subject property by the
Monitoring Committee.
38. Thus, in order to consider the representation of the petitioner, and to
take a decision on issue of conversion of term lease into perpetual lease, the
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rd
Director-Lands vide order dated 23 August, 2011, called upon the
petitioner to furnish the following information:
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
st
39. The petitioner vide Affidavit dated 01 September, 2011, denied any
unauthorised construction in the property, however, mentioned that the
subject property was being used for commercial purpose. It was indicated by
the petitioner that the property was rented out to M/s Alfa Bhoj Ltd., of
which M/s Alfa Gardens is a unit. Further, Sh. Harish Bhasin was stated to
be the director of M/s Alfa Bhoj Ltd. The petitioner also furnished
th
documents, viz., lease deed dated 13 January,1950; building permit dated
th th
16 February, 1950; Completion Certificate and letter dated 15 January,
1968.
rd
40. Thus, it is evident that the note dated 03 December, 2010, was only
an internal note, whereafter, the DDA sought additional information from
the petitioner, which was given an opportunity to file the requisite
information in compliance of Principles of Natural Justice. The final order
th
dated 08 September, 2011, passed by the Director-Lands took cognizance
of the said Affidavit of the petitioner, and found that it did not furnish the
requisite information. Thus, the said final order came to be passed by DDA
thereby, rejecting the representation of the petitioner.
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41. In view of the additional information sought by DDA, and the
Affidavit provided by the petitioner in response, the contention of the
th
petitioner that the final order dated 08 September, 2011, was passed
without any material change in circumstances from the internal noting dated
rd
03 December, 2010, is completely bereft of merits. It is apparent that a
th
detailed order was passed on 08 September, 2011, after seeking opinion
from the legal department as well as the planning committee.
th
42. It is also pertinent to note that this Court in the judgment dated 18
July, 2013, in Review Petition bearing no. 742/2011, filed in C.W.
rd
1295/2001 , has already held that the note dated 03 December, 2010, of
Director-Lands was a mere recommendation.
43. Accordingly, it is held that the petitioner’s contention that the
th
Director-Lands’ final order dated 08 September, 2011, is vitiated by
arbitrariness and perversity, is contrary to the facts on record and is bereft of
any merits. It is manifest that after recording the internal noting, the
Director-Lands had called upon the petitioner to present its case by
submitting documents, and passed the final order after consideration of the
documents so submitted by the petitioner. Thus, an opportunity was granted
th
to the petitioner to present its case, and the final order dated 08 September,
2011, came to be passed only after consideration of the facts and documents
on record.
TH
DECISION OF LG COMMUNICATED VIDE LETTER DATED 11
FEBRUARY, 2013, NOT ARBITRARY:
44. This Court also notes that the petitioner had filed before the LG, the
th th
representation dated 26 September, 2011, against the final order dated 08
September, 2011, passed by the Director-Lands.
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45. The decision taken by the LG on the said representation of the
petitioner was communicated to the petitioner by the DDA vide letter dated
th st
11 February, 2013. The LG directed that the judgment dated 21
November, 2011, in C.W. 1295/2001 , by which the Eviction Order dated
nd
02 May, 1991, had been upheld, be implemented strictly. The LG
therefore, did not interfere with the Director-Lands’ decision rejecting the
petitioner’s request for conversion.
nd
46. It is the contention of the petitioner that the LG vide order dated 02
May, 2012, had held that the lease of the petitioner should be renewed from
the standpoint of equity, and misuse charges may be recovered. However,
subsequently, the LG issued a contrary order, which was communicated to
th
the petitioner vide letter dated 11 February, 2013.
UNCOMMUNICATED INTERNAL NOTING, NOT FINAL DECISION:
47. However, the aforesaid contention of the petitioner is without any
merits, and therefore, warrants dismissal on the following grounds:
nd
47.1. On 02 May, 2012, the LG merely recorded an internal noting.
47.2. There has been no official communication of the said noting,
therefore, it is not an order. The said noting had only been received by the
st
petitioner vide reply dated 31 May, 2012, issued by the DDA to the RTI
application by the petitioner.
47.3. At the time of passing of the aforesaid noting, deliberations were still
ongoing qua the representation of the petitioner.
47.4. There is no contradiction between the final direction of the LG and
the said internal noting. Though the final order passed by the Director-Lands
was challenged before the LG, the said internal noting was not the final
adjudication upon the final order passed by the Director-Lands.
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47.5. The LG had sought a Compliance Report from DDA qua the internal
noting only, and to know what steps were undertaken thereto.
47.6. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the internal noting of DDA,
nd
particularly, the internal note dated 02 May, 2012, passed by the LG, the
th
note of opinion, the consequent opinion of ASG dated 28 August, 2015,
th
and the note dated 08 December, 2010, by the Principal Commissioner of
DDA, would be of no assistance to the petitioner. Although there were few
internal noting which recommended the case of the petitioner for conversion
of lease, the same did not fructify into any final decision on the rights of the
petitioner. Such notings by officers are only expression of their viewpoints
on subjects for internal use, and for consideration by other officials. Even if
some recommendations favorable to the petitioner were floated at certain
stages of the decision-making process, the same would be of no
consequence. Such internal noting or legal opinions do not confer any right
on the petitioner nor bind DDA.
48. It is a well-established principle of law that an internal noting does not
translate into approvals or decisions, unless communicated to the party. The
Supreme Court has held in categorical terms that a noting on the
departmental file is no more than the expression of a provisional view of an
officer. Only when it is authenticated in the manner required and
communicated to the person concerned, it becomes an order of the
government, and thereby, capable of binding anyone or creating any right or
obligation.
49. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment in the case of
Sethi Auto Service Station and Another Versus Delhi Development
Authority and Others, (2009) 1 SCC 180 , wherein, it was held as follows:
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“xxx xxx xxx
14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not
have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by an
officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no
more than an opinion by an officer for internal use and
consideration of the other officials of the department and for
the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to
add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure.
Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting
the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final
decision-making authority in the department, gets his approval
and the final order is communicated to the person concerned .
15. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395 :
1962 Supp (3) SCR 713], a Constitution Bench of this Court
had the occasion to consider the effect of an order passed by a
Minister on a file, which order was not communicated to the
person concerned. Referring to Article 166(1) of the
Constitution, the Court held that order of the Minister could
not amount to an order by the State Government unless it was
expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh, as required by the
said article and was then communicated to the party
concerned. The Court observed that business of State is a
complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through
the agency of a large number of officials and authorities.
Before an action is taken by the authority concerned in the
name of the Rajpramukh, which formality is a constitutional
necessity, nothing done would amount to an order creating
rights or casting liabilities to third parties. It is possible,
observed the Court, that after expressing one opinion about a
particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the
Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion
which may be opposed to the earlier opinion. In such cases,
which of the two opinions can be regarded as the “order” of
the State Government? It was held that opinion becomes a
decision of the Government only when it is communicated to
the person concerned.
16. To the like effect are the observations of this Court in
Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 5
SCC 413], wherein it was said that a right created under an
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order of a statutory authority must be communicated to the
person concerned so as to confer an enforceable right .
17. In view of the above legal position and in the light of the
factual scenario as highlighted in the order of the learned Single
Judge, we find it difficult to hold that the recommendation of the
Technical Committee of DDA fructified into an order conferring
legal right upon the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
22. From the afore-extracted notings of the Commissioner and
the order of the Vice-Chairman, it is manifest that although
there were several notings which recommended consideration
of the appellants' case for relocation but finally no official
communication was addressed to or received by the appellants
accepting their claim. After the recommendation of the
Technical Committee, the entire matter was kept pending; in
the meanwhile a new policy was formulated and the matter was
considered afresh later in the year 2004, when the proposal
was rejected by the Vice-Chairman, the final decision-making
authority in the hierarchy. It is, thus, plain that though the
proposals had the recommendations of the State Level
Coordinator (Oil Industry) and the Technical Committee but
these did not ultimately fructify into an order or decision of
DDA conferring any legal rights upon the appellants. Mere
favourable recommendations at some level of the decision-
making process, in our view, are of no consequence and shall
not bind DDA. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with
the High Court that the notings in the file did not confer any
right upon the appellants as long as they remained as such. We
do not find any infirmity in the approach adopted by the
learned Single Judge and affirmed by the Division Bench,
warranting interference.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
50. Likewise, holding that mere noting and in-principle approvals do not
confer a vested right, the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development
Authority Versus Hello Home Education Society, (2024) 3 SCC 148 , held
as follows:
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“xxx xxx xxx
19.7. The issue relating to internal notings as to whether it
would confer any right or not has been adequately dealt with
and settled by series of judgments of this Court. It is well settled
that until and unless the decision taken on file is converted into
a final order to be communicated and duly served on the party
concerned, no right accrues to the said party. Mere notings and
in-principle approvals do not confer a vested right. Relevant
extracts from judgments of this Court in this regard are being
reproduced hereunder.
(a) Bachhittar Singh [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab,
1962 SCC OnLine SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395]:(AIR p. 398,
paras 9-10)
“9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact
make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does
not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order
of the State Government two things are necessary. The order
has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by
clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated.
As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of
the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is
drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be
regarded as bound by what was stated in the file . …
10. … Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be
communicated to the person who would be affected by that
order before the State and that person can be bound by that
order. For, until the order is communicated to the person
affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to
consider the matter over and over again and, therefore, till its
communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more
than provisional in character .”
(emphasis supplied)
(b) Sethi Auto Service Station [Sethi Auto Service Station v.
DDA (2009) 1 SCC 180] (SCC pp. 185-87, paras 14 & 22)
“14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file
do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A
noting by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the
subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for internal
use and consideration of the other officials of the department
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and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority.
Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside
exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable
order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches
the final decision-making authority in the department, gets his
approval and the final order is communicated to the person
concerned .
22. From the afore-extracted notings of the
Commissioner and the order of the Vice-Chairman, it is
manifest that although there were several notings which
recommended consideration of the appellants' case for
relocation but finally no official communication was addressed
to or received by the appellants accepting their claim. After the
recommendation of the Technical Committee, the entire matter
was kept pending; in the meanwhile a new policy was
formulated and the matter was considered afresh later in the
year 2004, when the proposal was rejected by the Vice-
Chairman, the final decision-making authority in the
hierarchy. It is, thus, plain that though the proposals had the
recommendations of State Level Coordinator (Oil Industry)
and the Technical Committee but these did not ultimately
fructify into an order or decision of the DDA, conferring any
legal rights upon the appellants. Mere favourable
recommendations at some level of the decision-making process,
in our view, are of no consequence and shall not bind DDA . We
are, therefore, in complete agreement with the High Court [Sethi
Auto Service Station v. DDA, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 162] that
the notings in the file did not confer any right upon the
appellants, as long as they remained as such. We do not find any
infirmity in the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge
and affirmed by the Division Bench [Sethi Auto Service
Station v. DDA, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 162], warranting
interference.”
(emphasis supplied)
(c) Mahadeo [Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi, (2023) 10 SCC 807],
(SCC pp. 813-14, para 15)
“15. It is well settled that inter-departmental
communications are in the process of consideration for
appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis to
claim any right. This Court examined the said question in a
judgment reported as Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan [Omkar
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Sinha v. Sahadat Khan, (2022) 12 SCC 228: (2023) 2 SCC
(L&S) 391]. Reliance was placed on Bachhittar Singh v. State of
Punjab [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine
SC 11: AIR 1963 SC 395] to hold that merely writing something
on the file does not amount to an order. Before something
amounts to an order of the State Government, two things are
necessary. First, the order has to be expressed in the name of
the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and
second, it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no
formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary
was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the State
Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by
what was stated in the file.”
(emphasis supplied)
19.8. Reference can also be made to another judgment of this
Court in Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan &
Co. [Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co.,
(2023) 14 SCC 786: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 376], wherein this
Court took a similar view.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
51. Applying the aforesaid principle, it is undisputed that neither the note
rd nd
dated 03 December, 2010 of the Director-Lands, nor the noting dated 02
May, 2012 of the LG, was ever formally communicated to the petitioner.
rd
The petitioner learnt of the note dated 03 December, 2010, upon inspection
nd
of DDA’s file, and of the noting dated 02 May, 2012, through an RTI reply
issued by DDA. The said internal noting were superseded, Firstly, by way of
th
order dated 08 September, 2011 issued by the Director-Lands; Secondly,
th
by the communication dated 11 February, 2013, issued by DDA informing
the petitioner that the LG had directed implementation of the judgment of
st
this Court dated 21 November, 2011; Thirdly, by DDA’s subsequent
rd
communication dated 03 February, 2016, thereby, rejecting the petitioner’s
nd th
representations dated 02 January, 2014, and 29 September, 2014, for
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restoration of the lease in respect of the subject property. The
orders/decisions passed by the DDA are comprehensive and well-reasoned,
and address all the aspects of the matter, including, the prevalent ground
situation existing in the property and the material facts and circumstances of
the case.
DECISIONS OF DDA, AS PER APPLICABLE POLICY:
52. Furthermore, the decisions of the Director-Lands and the LG cannot
be said to be in contravention of the applicable policy at the time. While no
formal policy was present which dealt with conversion of leases, a letter
th
dated 08 June, 1984, of the Ministry of Works & Housing, provided that
conversion of term lease into perpetual lease has to be done in accordance
with MPD/ZDP and subject to certain factors such as unauthorised
occupation, re-entry, determination of temporary lease, land use shown in
Zonal/Master Plan, date of application requesting for conversion of
temporary lease into permanent lease, etc.
53. The detailed discussion herein brings forth that the petitioner is an
unauthorised occupant of the subject property. Besides, there is
overwhelming evidence of the petitioner grossly misusing the subject
property by running a banquet hall, a bar and a restaurant. This Court notes
the submission of the DDA that apart from the fact that the lease has already
expired by efflux of time, such misuse of the subject property by the
petitioner also disentitles the petitioner from seeking conversion of lease in
respect of the subject property. It is evident from a bare perusal of the letter
rd
dated 03 February, 2016, issued by the DDA to the petitioner that misuse
th
was found in the subject property as late as 26 October , 2015, after a field
inspection.
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st
54. In the present case, the application dated 01 February, 2010 for
conversion of the lease has been made only after the expiry of the term lease
itself. Further, after the expiry of the term lease, the possession of the
petitioner had become that of an unauthorised occupant. The Eviction Order
passed against the petitioner has also been upheld in the litigations between
the parties. Additionally, the term lease could not be converted into a
perpetual lease in contravention of the MPD/ZDP, as per which, the land use
of the subject property was now “residential” and earmarked for building a
higher secondary school. The functioning of an ice factory would be
impermissible in terms of the provisions of the MPD/ZDP. While
considering the aforesaid representation, the Director-Lands also took note
of the report of the Monitoring Committee with respect to misuse of the
th
subject property. Thus, the decision of the Director-Lands dated 08
st
September, 2011 rejecting the representation dated 01 February, 2010
cannot be regarded as being wholly arbitrary or so irrational, that no
reasonable person would come to the said conclusion.
RD
NO PERVERSITY IN THE DECISION DATED 03 FEBRUARY, 2016:
55. It is also to be noted that after the rejection of the earlier
th th
representations vide aforesaid order dated 08 September, 2011 and 11
nd
February, 2013, the petitioner again sent representations dated 02 January,
th
2014, and 29 September, 2014, to DDA seeking restoration of the term
lease in respect of the subject property. DDA, upon directions of this Court
th th
vide orders dated 07 July, 2015, and 12 October, 2015, considered the
said representations of the petitioner.
nd
56. Upon consideration, the aforesaid representations dated 02 January,
th rd
2014 and 29 September, 2014 were rejected. Thus, vide letter dated 03
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February, 2016, issued by the DDA, it was stated that the LG has rejected
the aforesaid representations on the following accounts:
i. The recorded lessee Sh. Bhag Ram Handa committed breach of lease
conditions and transferred the leased land through his attorney Sh. Ved
st
Pal Syal vide registered sale deed dated 01 February, 1950, in favour
of petitioner within 2 days of execution of the lease deed, without
construction of ice factory as mandated under Clause II (vii) of the
th
lease deed dated 13 January, 1950, which reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
ii. The lease deed required the lessee to erect an ice factory within a
st
period of 12 months from 01 June, 1948. The building constructed
could not be used for any other purpose except for an ice factory,
without written consent of lessor. Lease rights could not be permitted to
be transferred until ice factory was complete. All these conditions were
violated.
rd
iii. Lease expired by efflux of time on 03 May, 1968, and there was no
formal renewal of the lease.
th
iv. By way of the letter dated 16 December, 1982, an alternative site was
offered to the ex-lessee for equivalent area but the same was not
availed by the ex-lessee. Therefore, petitioner cannot contend
discrimination.
nd
v. The Eviction Order dated 02 May, 1991, has not been set aside.
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vi. Report of the Monitoring Committee appointed by Supreme Court
gives detailed account of the illegal and unauthorized construction,
misuse, tampering of seals and FIRs in respect of the subject property
on account of tampering of seals.
th
vii. Field Inspection Report dated 26 October, 2015, shows running of
bar-cum-restaurant having sitting capacity of 100 persons, which is
misuse of the subject property.
57. This Court finds no perversity with the aforesaid decision as
rd
communicated vide letter dated 03 February, 2016 by DDA. The said
decision is detailed and well-reasoned. The said decision has been passed
th
after the Vice Chairman, DDA, convened a meeting on 16 October, 2015,
which was attended by the Principal Commissioner (LD) and the Chief
Legal Advisor, DDA, who put up a detailed note for perusal of the
competent authority, i.e., the LG, who then passed the direction.
ST
POLICY OF DDA DATED 21 JANUARY, 2011, AND OFFICE
TH
MEMORANDUM DATED 11 MARCH, 2011:
58. The petitioner’s contentions that DDA has ignored their own policy
st th
dated 21 January, 2011, and the Office Memorandum dated 11 March,
2011 is not tenable, as the policy of DDA is only applicable in the cases,
wherein, the application for conversion of the lease has been made during
the currency of a lease, and while the application is being processed, the
lease ceases to operate.
st
59. The policy as contained in the Resolution dated 21 January, 2011 of
the DDA, reads as under:
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“
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
th
60. The Office Order dated 11 March, 2011, incorporating the policy of
DDA, reads as under:
“
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”
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61. However, in the present case, the representation for conversion was
subsequent to the expiration of the term lease. The first representation in this
th
regard was given only on 13 July, 1998, followed by representations dated
rd st
03 May, 1999, and 01 February, 2010, i.e., way beyond the expiration of
the lease deed in 1968. Even assuming that the lease deed was extended, it
could only be till year 1988, and not beyond.
th
62. The order dated 08 September, 2011, passed by the Director-Lands,
th
as well as the communication dated 11 February, 2013, informing about
the decision passed by the LG, have not been challenged, and therefore have
attained finality. This Court finds no perversity or arbitrariness in the letter
rd
dated 03 February, 2016, as it is well-reasoned decision, and therefore,
there is no occasion for this Court to intervene in the same.
PETITIONER AN UNAUTHORISED OCCUPANT UPON EXPIRY OF
LEASE BY EFFLUX OF TIME:
th
63. Another factor to be noted is that the lease deed dated 13 January,
1950, stood terminated by the efflux of time, and the same was never
renewed by DDA. The lease was set to commence from the year 1948 for a
term of 20 years, and subsist till the year 1968.
st
64. This Court in the judgment dated 21 November, 2011, in C.W.
1295/2001, has held that the lease in respect of the subject property has
come to an end by the efflux of time, and admittedly, there was no renewal
of lease.
th
65. Furthermore, in the judgment dated 18 July, 2013, in the review
petition bearing no. 742/2011, filed in C.W. 1295/2001 , it was held that the
th
reading of Clause IV (c) of the lease deed dated 13 January, 1950, does not
indicate that there is automatic renewal of the lease upon an option being
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exercised by the lessee. Significantly, the words “if the lease is extended”
used in Clause IV (c) of the lease deed in question, conferred discretion
upon DDA whether or not to extend the lease.
th
66. Clause IV (c) of the lease deed dated 13 January, 1950, reads as
under:
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
67. Upon perusal of the aforesaid Clause, it is evident that the said Clause
only provides for allowance of an option to the petitioner for renewal of the
lease for a further period of 20 years. Thus, the said Clause only provides for
an option to be granted to the petitioner, and not for the lease to be
mandatorily renewed after expiration of the first term.
68. The said position becomes all the more clear upon reading of the
words “if the lease is extended” in the said Clause. It provides for a
possibility of the lease getting extended, and not a mandate for the same. It
is provided that only if the lease is extended, then the same shall be subject
to enhancement of the rent up to 50% of the original rent by DDA.
69. The petitioner’s contention of automatic renewal of lease deed is
liable to be rejected as the said Clause provides for discretion to the DDA. It
is further to be noted that no formal lease was executed after the expiry of
the initial lease period in the year 1968.
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70. Once the lease stood expired, there is no vested right of the petitioner
in the subject property and the petitioner is a rank trespasser. Thus, holding
that in the absence of renewal of the lease, the status of the original lessee is
that of an unauthorised occupant, in the case of Delhi Development
Authority Versus Anant Raj Agencies Private Limited, (2016) 11 SCC 406 ,
it was held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
29. Section 3(2) of the DD Act says the Authority shall be a body
corporate by the name Delhi Development Authority (DDA).
Section 21 of the DD Act empowers DDA in respect of the
disposal of the land and sub-section (3) of Section 21 makes it
very clear that nothing in the aforesaid Act shall be construed as
enabling the Authority or the local authority concerned to
dispose of the land by way of gift, mortgage or charge but
subject to certain reference in the DD Act with regard to the
disposal of land shall be construed as reference to the disposal
thereof in any manner, whether by way of sale, exchange or
lease or by creation of any easement right or privilege or
otherwise. Since the power conferred by the DD Act upon DDA
to grant lease includes renewal of lease and in the absence of
such a renewal of lease of the property in question in favour of
the original lessee, as required in law, there cannot be an
automatic renewal of the same in his favour. The non-grant of
renewal of lease in favour of the original lessee is very clear
from the fact that the original lessee failed to remedy the
breaches pointed out by DDA in its show-cause notices dated 9-
2-1968 and 16-2-1968 and further made very clear from the
issuance of termination notice dated 1-9-1972, whereby DDA
has conveyed its clear intention of non-renewal of the lease of
the property in question. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
termination notice reads thus:
“7. And whereas since you have failed to observe,
perform and comply with the terms and covenant,
conditions of the above lease the said breaches still
continue. It has been decided not to renew the lease for
further period.”
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30. Thus, it is abundantly clear from the aforesaid legal
statutory provisions of the DD Act and terms and conditions of
the lease deed and the case law referred supra that there is no
automatic renewal of lease of the property in question in
favour of the original lessee. Therefore, the concurrent
findings of the courts below on the contentious issue in the
impugned judgment are not only erroneous but also error in
law and hence, the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law
and liable to be set aside .
31. From the above discussion, it is clear that in the absence of
renewal of lease, the status of the original lessee, in relation to
the property in question, is that of an unauthorised occupant as
he had continued in occupation of the property in question as
an “unauthorised person” in terms of Section 2(g) of the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971 , which reads as under:
“ 2. (g) “ unauthorised occupation ”, in relation to
any public premises, means the occupation by any person
of the public premises without authority for such
occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by
any person of the public premises after the authority
(whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer)
under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has
expired or has been determined for any reason
whatsoever.”
32. In the absence of renewal of lease after 10-8-1968, the
pleadings of the original lessee that DDA is estopped from
taking the plea that there is no renewal of lease after having
accepted the rent after 10-8-1968, in respect of property in
question and after accepting certain sums in respect of the same,
subsequently, for change of the property in question from
leasehold to freehold are all irrelevant aspects for the reason
that the same are contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the DD
Act, the Nazul Land Rules applicable to the fact situation and the
terms and conditions of the lease deed. Further, it is clear from
the contents of the termination notice dated 1-9-1972 served
upon the original lessee by DDA that it has not only refused to
renew the lease of the property but also asked the original lessee
to hand over the possession of the property in question within 30
days, which is absolutely in consonance with Section 5 of the
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Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971.
33. Without examining the case in the proper perspective that the
property in question being a public premises in terms of Section
2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971 and that after expiry of lease period the
original lessee has become unauthorised occupant in terms of
Section 2(g) of the said Act in the light of relevant statutory
provisions and rules referred to supra and law laid down by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. [Ashoka
Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (1990) 4 SCC 406], the
concurrent findings of the courts below on the contentious issue
is not only erroneous but also suffer from error in law and
therefore, liable to be set aside.
34. The grant of perpetual injunction by the trial court in favour
of the original lessee, restraining DDA from taking any action
under the said termination notice dated 1-9-1972, on the ground
that the termination notice dated 1-9-1972 being illegal,
arbitrary and without jurisdiction and the affirmation of the
same by both the first appellate court i.e. by the learned ADJ and
further by the High Court by its impugned judgment and order
[DDA v. Balraj Virmany, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2507] are not
only erroneous but also suffers from error in law.
35. Thus, Point (i) is answered in favour of the appellant.
Answer to Point (ii)
36. The High Court's order dated 3-11-2009 [DDA v. Balraj
Virmany, RSA No. 6 of 1983, order dated 3-11-2009 (Del)]
whereby the respondent was substituted in place of the original
lessee on its application under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC for the
reason of execution of sale deed dated 14-10-1998 by the
original lessee in favour of the respondent by entering into
compromise between them in Suit No. 601 of 1984 is also bad in
law. The sale of the property in question to give effect to the
compromise decree in the aforesaid suit is void ab initio in law
for the reason that the original lessee, in the absence of
renewal of lease in his favour, himself had no right, title or
interest, at the time of execution of sale deed, in respect of the
property in question. It is well-settled position of law that the
person having no right, title or interest in the property cannot
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transfer the same by way of sale deed. Thus, in the instant case,
the sale of the property in question by the original lessee in
favour of the respondent is not a valid assignment of his right
in respect of the same. For the aforesaid reasons, the sale deed
is not binding on DDA. The High Court has failed to appreciate
this important factual and legal aspect of the case.
37. The contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent that it has deposited a sum of Rs 96,41,982 as
conversion charges of the property in question from leasehold to
freehold right of the same is also of no relevance and lends no
support to the respondent for the reason that in the absence of
renewal of lease of the property by DDA, the original lessee
himself becomes an unauthorised occupant of the property in
question. The deposition of conversion charges in respect of
the same to the office of DDA cannot help the respondent in
claiming any right with respect to the property in question . The
question whether such a procedure in respect of the public
property is permissible in law or not is not required to be
decided in this case. The instant case having peculiar facts and
circumstances, namely, after 10-8-1968 the lease stands
terminated by efflux of time, which is further evidently clear from
the termination notice dated 1-9-1972 and thereafter, the
original lessee becomes an unauthorised occupant in terms of
Section 2(g) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971 and consequently, not entitled to deal with
the property in question in any manner. The very concept of
conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights is not
applicable to the fact situation.
Answer to Point (iii)
38. The original lessee has been in unauthorised occupation of
the property in question for around 30 years (till he executed a
sale deed in favour of the respondent) and the respondent has
been illegally inducted in possession of the same, by the original
lessee, who himself was in unauthorised possession of the
property. For around 17 years the respondent has been enjoying
the property in question without any right, title or interest. Thus,
both are liable to pay the damages for unauthorised occupation
and DDA is empowered under Section 7 of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 to claim
damages from them. We record this finding in exercise of our
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appellate power in view of our finding and reasons assigned in
this judgment holding that the concurrent finding is not only
erroneous but also suffers from error in law in granting decree
of permanent injunction in favour of the respondent who is not
entitled in law for the same. There is a miscarriage of justice in
granting the relief by the courts below in favour of the
respondent. Further, keeping in view the public interest involved
in this case and particularly having regard to the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case we have to allow this appeal of
DDA.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
nd
71. It is essential to note that the Eviction Order dated 02 May, 1991,
has been upheld across the various litigations between the parties. In LPA
966/2013, the Eviction Order has merely been put in abeyance till the
determination of the present writ proceedings. Thus, the said Eviction Order
has attained finality.
st
72. As noted above, the petitioner’s lease expired by efflux of time on 31
st
May, 1968. In the judgment dated 21 November, 2011, in C.W. 1295/2001,
rendered in a lis between DDA and the petitioner before this Court, it was
st
reaffirmed that the petitioner’s lease expired by efflux of time on 31 May,
1968, and that no renewal was granted in favour of the petitioner. It was,
thus, held that the petitioner was an unauthorized occupant liable to eviction
under the Public Premises Act. The said finding was neither disturbed in the
th
judgment dated 18 July, 2013 in the review filed against the aforesaid
th
judgment, nor by the Division Bench in judgment dated 04 February, 2014,
in LPA 966/2013.
73. As noted above, the application/representation by the petitioner for
conversion was subsequent to the expiration of the term lease. Thus, when it
stands established that no renewal of the lease was ever granted in favour of
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the petitioner, the reliance by the petitioner upon the policy of DDA dated
st th
21 January, 2011 and 11 March, 2011, is misplaced. The policy of DDA
as aforesaid, addresses conversion of subsisting leases, and was never
intended to revive claims already extinguished by non-renewal.
74. Thus, the petitioner cannot certainly seek to place reliance on the
st th
policy dated 21 January, 2011, and the Office Order dated 11 March, 2011
of DDA for seeking conversion of its lease, when there is no subsisting lease
in favour of the petitioner. The aforesaid policy of DDA is not shown to be
unreasonable or perverse in any manner.
PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR PARITY, MISCONCEIVED:
75. Another issue under consideration of this Court is the claim of the
petitioner for parity with other similarly situated leases for ice factories, on
the basis of internal noting of DDA.
76. It is unequivocal that Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees
equality among equals. It does note entitle a party to claim, as of right, a
benefit extended to another, unless the party claiming parity is shown to be
similarly situated in all material aspects. In this regard, the Supreme Court in
State of Kerala and Another Versus N.M. Thomas and Others, (1976) 2
SCC 310, held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
31. The rule of parity is the equal treatment of equals in equal
circumstances . The rule of differentiation is enacting laws
differentiating between different persons or things in different
circumstances. The circumstances which govern one set of
persons or objects may not necessarily be the same as those
governing another set of persons or objects so that the question
of unequal treatment does not really arise between persons
governed by different conditions and different sets of
circumstances. The principle of equality does not mean that
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every law must have universal application for all persons who
are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same
position and the varying needs of different classes of persons
require special treatment . The legislature understands and
appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed
to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based upon adequate grounds. The rule of
classification is not a natural and logical corollary of the rule of
equality, but the rule of differentiation is inherent in the concept
of equality. Equality means parity of treatment under parity of
conditions. Equality does not connote absolute equality. A
classification in order to be constitutional must rest upon
distinctions that are substantial and not merely illusory. The
test is whether it has a reasonable basis free from artificiality
and arbitrariness embracing all and omitting none naturally
falling into that category.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
77. In the case of State of Punjab and Others Versus Davinder Singh
and Others, (2025) 1 SCC 1, the Supreme Court has held that parity of
treatment must be under parity of conditions. Therefore, laws are enforced
equally amongst equals, and equality does not entail sameness. The relevant
excerpt of the said judgment, reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
(a) The contours of Article 14
84. Article 14 employs two expressions — equality before the
law and equal protection of the laws. Both different in content
and sweep [Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3)
SCC 217 (Reddy, J., SCC para 643)]. “Equality before the
law”, an expression derived from the English Common law,
entails absence of special privileges for any individual within
the territory. It does not mean that the same law should apply
to everyone, but that the same law should apply to those who
are similarly situated. [Gauri Shanker v. Union of India,
(1994) 6 SCC 349:AIR 1995 SC 55] The expression “equal
protection of the laws” means that among equals, laws must be
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equally administered. It enjoins the State with the power to
reasonably classify those who are differently placed . The
mandate of “equal protection of laws” casts a positive
obligation on the State to ensure that everyone may enjoy equal
protection of the laws, and no one is unfairly denied this
protection. In essence, the guarantee of equality entails that all
persons in like circumstances must be treated alike. That there
must be a parity of treatment under parity of conditions. [Indra
Sawhney case, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 (Thommen, J., SCC
para 260)] Equality does not entail sameness. The State is
allowed to classify in a manner that is not discriminatory. The
doctrine of classification gives content to the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. [H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of
India, 4th Edn., Vol. I, p. 439.] Under this approach, the focus is
on the equality of results or opportunities over equality of
treatment. [Sandra Fredman, “Substantive Equality Revisited”,
2016 International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, Issue
3, pp. 712-738.]
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
78. In this regard, reference may also be made to the judgment in the case
of Union of India and Others Versus M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 ,
wherein, it has been held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
26. A claim on the basis of guarantee of equality, by reference
to someone similarly placed, is permissible only when the
person similarly placed has been lawfully granted a relief and
the person claiming relief is also lawfully entitled for the same .
On the other hand, where a benefit was illegally or irregularly
extended to someone else, a person who is not extended a similar
illegal benefit cannot approach a court for extension of a similar
illegal benefit. If such a request is accepted, it would amount to
perpetuating the irregularity. When a person is refused a benefit
to which he is not entitled, he cannot approach the court and
claim that benefit on the ground that someone else has been
illegally extended such benefit. If he wants, he can challenge the
benefit illegally granted to others. The fact that someone who
may not be entitled to the relief has been given relief illegally, is
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not a ground to grant relief to a person who is not entitled to the
relief.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
79. Applying the law, as aforesaid, to the present case, it is clear that the
petitioner’s claim for parity is misconceived. The petitioner cannot claim
parity with other ice-factories on account of the following:
i. In the cases of other ice-factories, there were pre-existing and
continuing leases in their favor, and they had applied for conversion
to perpetual lease during the currency of their respective leases.
However, the petitioner only applied for conversion of the lease post
th
the expiration of their lease deed dated 13 January, 1950.
ii. The other ice factories, which were situated in non-conforming areas
were provided alternate plots by DDA during the currency of their
respective leases. However, the petitioner chose not to accept the
same despite being offered by the DDA. Hence, now the petitioner
cannot be permitted to claim that hostile discrimination was meted out
to them.
iii. In the case of M/s DLF Universal Ltd., there was a pre-existing and
continuing lease in favor of the lessee, and the conversion was
permitted by the Court as the DDA did not have any objection to the
same. However, in the present case, the lease of the petitioner already
stood expired by the efflux of time when the application for
conversion was moved by the petitioner, and the petitioner is a rank
trespasser on public land.
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iv. In the case of M/s DLF Universal Ltd., DDA had resolved to
recommend conversion of the lease, and there was no dispute on the
principle of conversion, but only on its terms. In contrast, in the
present case, DDA has consistently reiterated its position that the
petitioner’s claim for conversion has not been accepted for stated and
substantial reasons, as recorded therein. In the present case, there is no
comparable undisputed admission by DDA that it agreed in principle
that the lease should be converted.
v. In the case of M/s DLF Universal Ltd., no adverse or final finding of
unauthorized occupation had been recorded. However, the case of the
petitioner herein stands on a materially different footing, having been
held to be in unauthorized occupation of the premises in various
judgments passed by this Court.
vi. Instances in the present case like final adverse Eviction Order and
unauthorized commercial misuse, clearly bring forth distinguishing
features, thereby, negating the claim of the petitioner to equal
treatment being ‘similarly situated’.
vii. Thus, the case of the petitioner is materially different from that of the
other lessees, and no parity can be sought between un-likes.
viii. It is pertinent to note that the internal noting of DDA do not
communicate any official decision taken by the department, and they
are mere deliberations done on part of the Authority. Furthermore, the
legal opinion sought of the ASG is also not binding upon DDA.
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TH
VIOLATION OF TERMS OF LEASE DEED DATED 13 JANUARY,
1950:
80. Another important point to be considered is that perusal of the
documents and facts on record, clearly point out that the petitioner has
th
violated the terms of the lease deed dated 13 January, 1950, on three
counts.
80.1. Sh. Bhag Ram Handa, the earlier lessee, just within a short period
th
from execution of lease deed dated 13 January, 1950, transferred the lease
rights of the subject property to the petitioner in W.P.(C) 2217/2013 , i.e.,
st
M/s Gian Chand Kedar Nath vide the registered sale deed dated 01
February, 1950. However, transfer of lease rights in respect of the subject
property was prohibited under Clause II (vii) of the lease deed, until the
construction of the ice-factory on the subject property was completed.
80.2. Subsequently, the petitioner in W.P.(C) 2217/2013 , i.e., M/s Gian
Chand Kedar Nath, admittedly, parted with possession of the subject land as
they leased/rented it to M/s Alfa Spice, which is a unit of M/s Alfa Bhoj Ltd,
of which Sh. Harish Bhasin is the Managing Director, who is also a partner
in M/s Gian Chand Kedar Nath. However, Clause II (vii) also restricts
parting with possession from the subject property, without prior consent of
the lessor, i.e., DDA. Therefore, the petitioner violated Clause II (vii) of the
lease deed on another count.
80.3. The petitioner, at one point, started running a banquet hall and
restaurant-cum-bar. It is important to note that Clause II (vi) of the lease
deed prohibits the use of the subject property for any other purpose than an
ice-factory. Running a banquet hall is a new use of the subject property, and
the permission of the lessor, i.e., DDA was required to be sought. However,
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the same was not sought by the petitioner. The relevant sub-clause reads as
under:
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
81. In view of the above stated violations, DDA was well within its rights
th
to exercise its discretion for non-renewal of the lease deed dated 13
January, 1950, in favour of the petitioner, i.e., M/s Gian Chand Kedar Nath.
GRANT OF PERPETUAL LEASE, NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT:
82. Grant of a perpetual lease over government land, in supersession of an
expired term lease, is a matter that lies within the policy discretion of DDA
and the LG. It is not a right that a lessee, regardless of however long in
occupation, can claim as a matter of entitlement.
83. This has recently been affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in
relation to materially similar government lease of cold storage/industrial
land containing a resumption clause. It was held that length or renewability
of a lease does not transform it into ownership. Furthermore, conversion
under a leasehold to freehold policy confers at most, a right to have an
application considered under that policy, and not a right to obtain
conversion.
84. Thus, the position that emerges is that conversion of leasehold rights
into freehold or grant of perpetual lease is not a matter of statutory
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entitlement, and a policy permitting conversion does not confer a vested or
indefeasible right to conversion. Accordingly, in the case of Union of India
and Others Versus National Cold Storage & Refrigeration Pvt. Ltd., 2026
SCC OnLine Del 141 , Division Bench of this Court has held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
49. This issue goes to the heart of the present batch of matters. It
concerns the legality of the order dated 05.04.2010 passed in
W.P.(C) 1278/2007, whereby the learned Single Judge quashed
the order dated 27.12.2006 rejecting the request of NCSRPL for
conversion of the remaining leasehold land into freehold and
directed the L&DO to effect such conversion subject to payment
of requisite charges.
50. At the outset, it is necessary to note that conversion of
leasehold rights into freehold, under the policy framed by the
Government in 2003, is not a matter of statutory entitlement.
The policy is an executive measure intended to extend a facility
or concession to eligible lessees, subject to fulfilment of
prescribed conditions and subject to administrative discretion.
It does not, by its own force, confer a vested or indefeasible
right to conversion .
51. The legal character of such a policy has been consistently
recognised as conferring, at the highest, a right to apply for
conversion and to have such application considered in
accordance with the policy. It does not create a mandamus-
enforceable right to obtain conversion, particularly where the
foundational eligibility conditions are absent or where
overriding public interest considerations intervene .
52. When the terms of the lease deed dated 06.09.1951 are
examined, certain features assume central importance. The
lease was granted for a defined purpose, namely the
establishment and operation of a cold storage, with a clear
prohibition against user for any other purpose. The lease
further contained an express and unqualified resumption
clause, Clause (xi), which reserved to the Government the right
to take back the land, together with buildings and structures, at
any point during the currency of the lease if the land was
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required for a public or administrative purpose .
53. The existence of a renewal clause permitting extension for
two further periods of 30 years does not dilute the legal effect
of the resumption clause. Renewal only prolongs the tenure of
the lease; it does not convert the nature of the interest into
ownership nor does it negate the overriding right of the lessor
to resume the land for public purposes. The lease, therefore,
even though long in duration, remained a lease subject to
stringent conditions and defeasible at the instance of the
Government .
54. It is in this context that the rejection of the conversion
application on the ground that the allotment was “temporary”
must be understood. The expression “temporary” cannot be
read in a purely arithmetical sense of duration alone. A lease
may endure for several decades and yet remain temporary in
character if it is purpose-specific, conditional, and expressly
resumable at any time for public purposes. The substance of
the rights conferred, rather than the length of tenure, is
determinative .
55. By the time the application for conversion came to be
considered, significant developments had already occurred.
Substantial portions of the leased land had been resumed for
public purposes, first for the Delhi Metro Rail Project and
thereafter for traffic streamlining. These resumptions were not
speculative or hypothetical; they were actual, implemented, and
irreversible. The remaining portion of land was also stated to be
required imminently for public purposes, a fact which
subsequently culminated in statutory acquisition proceedings.
56. In such a situation, directing conversion of the residual land
into freehold would have the effect of fundamentally altering the
legal relationship between the parties. Conversion would
extinguish the Government's reversionary interest and
resumption rights and would convert a defeasible leasehold
interest into absolute ownership, only to be followed by
compulsory acquisition and payment of full market value
compensation.
57. Such a course would result in a consequence which the
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policy was never intended to achieve, namely, the creation of
ownership rights in favour of a lessee in respect of public land,
immediately prior to acquisition, thereby obligating the State to
pay compensation as if it were acquiring private property. This
would amount to converting a policy-based concession into a
vehicle for unjust enrichment.
58. The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that, under the
lease deed, the lessee never possessed an unfettered right in the
land. The land at all times remained Government land, subject
to a limited right of use, and subject to resumption without
payment of compensation for land. To compel conversion in
such circumstances would be to rewrite the contract between
the parties and to defeat the express terms of the lease .
59. The learned Single Judge, while directing conversion,
appears to have proceeded primarily on the premise that the
lease was a long-term lease and therefore could not be
characterised as temporary. With respect, such an approach
places undue emphasis on duration and insufficient emphasis on
the decisive features of the lease, namely purpose restriction,
Government ownership, and unconditional right of resumption.
60. Equally significant is the fact that the conversion policy itself
contains exclusions and safeguards. Clauses barring conversion
where disputes relating to Government dues subsist, or where
litigation between the lessor and lessee is pending, are not empty
formalities. In the present case, multiple litigations concerning
resumption, compensation, valuation, and entitlement were
pending at the time when conversion was sought and directed.
Grant of conversion in the midst of such disputes runs counter to
the express policy framework.
61. This Court is therefore unable to accept the proposition
that NCSRPL had an enforceable right to conversion of the
leasehold land into freehold, or that rejection of its application
was arbitrary or illegal. The direction for conversion effectively
compelled the Government to part with ownership of land
which it required, and was entitled to resume, for public
purposes .
62. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that the order
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dated 05.04.2010 directing conversion of the leasehold land into
freehold is legally unsustainable and warrants interference. The
said order is set aside. Once the order directing conversion is set
aside, the legal character of the residual land remains that of
Government land held under lease, subject to Clause (xi).
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
85. The principal concepts as elucidated by the learned Division Bench in
the aforesaid case, would also apply to the issues of conversion from term
lease to perpetual lease, as involved in the present case. Accordingly, it is
evident that grant of a perpetual lease is a matter of policy discretion and not
an enforceable right.
86. The petitioner has failed to establish that it is similarly situated with
st
other ice-factories. Further, the benefits under the policy dated 21 January,
th
2011, or the Office Order dated 11 March, 2011, issued by the DDA, are
not available to the petitioner in the absence of a subsisting renewal of the
lease.
87. Another important aspect to be noted herein is that even at the time of
filing the writ petitions, the petitioner did not have any right, title or interest
in the subject property, as the lease in its favour had stood expired by efflux
of time. The petitioner has already been held to be a rank trespasser in the
proceedings under the Public Premises Act. The said findings against the
petitioner have attained finality and the petitioner, by way of the present
petitions, cannot seek to undo the effect in law of the same. Thus, when
there is no lease in existence, the petitioner has no right to seek conversion
from fixed term lease to perpetual lease. The petitioner is an unauthorised
occupant and a trespasser in the subject property.
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:01.09.2026
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PRESENT PETITION BARRED BY DELAY AND LACHES:
88. The present petition is also hopelessly barred by delay and laches. It
has come to the fore that the petitioner’s lease expired by efflux of time on
st
31 May, 1968. However, the petitioner made representation for conversion
of the term lease to perpetual lease for the first time vide representation
th rd
dated 13 July, 1998, followed by representations dated 03 May, 1999, and
th
06 July, 1999. Merely on account of the fact that there were directions to
consider the representation of the petitioner, would not furnish a fresh cause
of action in reviving a stale claim. Mere continued writing of representation
would not condone delay in invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of
this Court.
89. It is settled law that making repeated representations cannot confer
any legal right or vest any equity in favour of the petitioner. Particularly, the
same can in no manner come to the aid of the petitioner or explain the delay
by the petitioner in exercising its legal remedies. The said position has been
settled in a series of judgments. Thus, in the case of Union of India and
Others Versus M.K. Sarkar (Supra) , the Supreme Court held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or
“dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance
with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such
decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of
action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The
issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered
with reference to the original cause of action and not with
reference to the date on which an order is passed in
compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction
to consider a representation issued without examining the
merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction,
will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches .
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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16. A court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a
claim or representation should examine whether the claim or
representation is with reference to a “live” issue or whether it
is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue. If it is with
reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue or dispute, the
court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not
direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal
deciding to direct “consideration” without itself examining the
merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be
without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or
delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so,
that would be the legal position and effect .
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
90. Likewise, in the case of Sudhir Bhatia Trading AS V. Bhatia
International Versus Central Government of India and Others, 2022 SCC
OnLine Del 1491 , this Court while holding that mere writing of letters or
representations cannot furnish an adequate explanation for delay, held as
follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
35. Although in view of the above finding, the issue of delay on
behalf of the Petitioner in approaching the Court does not require
any adjudication, however, even on that score, the petition must
fail. Petitioner admittedly took no steps to challenge the
registration of the trademark between 2005 to 2008 or at least
from 2006, when according to the Petitioner, he learnt of the
registration. The only explanation rendered is that the Petitioner
was writing letters to the Registrar, followed by a legal notice, for
redressal of his grievance. It is a settled principle of law that in a
writ jurisdiction, which is an extraordinary jurisdiction of the
High Court, Court would not ordinarily assist those who are
lethargic and indolent. If there is a delay on the part of the
Petitioner, which is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court
may decline to exercise the writ jurisdiction . This principle
applies with a greater rigour, when the Petitioner on account of
its lethargy permits time to lapse and in the meantime, third party
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rights are created. It is equally well-settled that mere writing of
letters or representations cannot furnish an adequate
explanation for delay . This principle was settled way-back in KV
Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 993, and
was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1
SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470. The judgments, in my view, squarely
apply to the present case, where the Petitioner took no action,
except to correspond with the Registrar and admittedly in the
meantime, statutory rights have accrued in favour of Respondent
No. 3. Court is thus not persuaded to exercise the writ jurisdiction
in favour of the Petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
91. Accordingly, on this score also, the present petition is liable to be
dismissed.
NO PRAYER MADE FOR RESTORATION OF THE EXPIRED LEASE:
92. Furthermore, pertinently the petitioner has not even prayed for
restoration of the expired lease, nor has it prayed that a fresh lease be
executed in its favour. The petitioner has merely sought conversion of a term
lease into a perpetual lease, and has proceeded on the basis that there is a
lease in its favour, although there is none. Thus, in the absence of any relief
for restoration of the lease, and in the absence of any subsisting lease, no
relief can be granted for conversion of the lease from term lease to perpetual
lease. This Court while considering the prayer of the petitioner for
conversion to perpetual lease, cannot grant the relief of restoration/renewal
of the lease, when such relief has not even been prayed for.
93. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in case of Bharat Amratlal Kothari and Another Versus Dosukhan
Samadkhan Sindhi and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 234 , wherein, it was held as
follows:
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“xxx xxx xxx
29. The approach of the High Court in granting relief not prayed
for cannot be approved by this Court. Every petition under Article
226 of the Constitution must contain a relief clause. Whenever
the petitioner is entitled to or is claiming more than one relief, he
must pray for all the reliefs. Under the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, if the plaintiff omits, except with the leave
of the court, to sue for any particular relief which he is entitled to
get, he will not afterwards be allowed to sue in respect of the
portion so omitted or relinquished.
30. Though the provisions of the Code are not made applicable to
the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the general
principles made in the Civil Procedure Code will apply even to
writ petitions. It is, therefore, incumbent on the petitioner to claim
all reliefs he seeks from the court. Normally, the court will grant
only those reliefs specifically prayed for by the petitioner. Though
the court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the court,
however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and
principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed
for by the petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
33. Though a High Court has power to mould reliefs to meet the
requirements of each case, that does not mean that the draftsman
of a writ petition should not apply his mind to the proper relief
which should be asked for and throw the entire burden of it upon
the court .
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
94. Furthermore , this Court in the case of Dilkhus Meena and Others
Versus Union of India and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5541 , while
holding that no relief can be granted which has not been prayed by the
petitioners, concluded as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
21. On perusal of the aforesaid judgments, it is evident that even
though the scope of mandamus is very wide, Courts cannot
ignore the principles governing grant of relief. It is a well settled
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principle of law that the Courts should not delve into the aspects
which are related to reliefs not prayed by the petitioner and it is
fundamental that a relief can be granted in a case when it is
prayed by the petitioner. Therefore, any relief, not prayed by the
petitioners, cannot be granted by this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution .
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
INTERNAL DISPUTE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND APPLICANT IN
CM APPL. 20053/2025, NOT TO BE DECIDED IN PRESENT
PROCEEDINGS:
95. As regards CM APPL. 20053/2025 , this Court is of the considered
view that the internal dispute of the petitioner company as to who validly
represents the petitioner firm cannot be resolved by this Court in the present
proceedings. The succession/authority dispute between the applicant in CM
APPL. 20053/2025 and Shri Harish Bhasin are disputed questions of facts,
which would essentially have to be decided in independent appropriate
proceedings. Even otherwise, said dispute as raised in the present
application, has no concern with the reliefs actually claimed in the present
petitions.
CONCLUSION:
96. For the reasons as set out above, no merit is found in the prayer of the
petitioner in W.P.(C) 2217/2013 for conversion of the term lease into a
perpetual lease. In view of the findings in W.P.(C) 2217/2013 , the reliefs as
claimed in W.P.(C) 12275/2004, are rendered infructuous.
97. In case, any amount deposited by the petitioner towards lease rent is
lying with DDA, the same shall be returned forthwith.
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By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
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98. The present writ petitions, along with the pending applications, are
dismissed, in the aforesaid terms.
MINI PUSHKARNA
(JUDGE)
AUGUST 31, 2026/SK/KR
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
10:54:29