RONALD JAMES ALVARES vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

2026:BHC-KOL:1753-DB
902-WP-4544-2025 (CR).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 4544 OF 2025
Ronald James Alvares
Age : 65 years, Occu : Convict,
R/o C4, Kiran Apartment,
Sampada Nalasopda,
West, Dist. Thane ...Petitioner
VERSUS
1) The State Of Maharashtra
Through Secretary,
Home Department (Prison),
Mumbai -400005.
2) Inspector General of Prisons,
Yerwada, Pune.
3) D. I. G. Prisons,
West Division, Yerwada, Pune.
4) Superintendent of Jail,
Central Jail Kalamba, Kolhapur. ...Respondents
——————
Mr. Rupesh a. Jaiswal a/w Ramnik Pawar, Advocate for petitioner.
Mr. Shrikant Yadav, APP, for the Respondent-State.
M. M. More & S. H. Kumbhar, Liaison Oicers, Jail, present.
——————
Coram: Madhav J. Jamdar &
Pravin S. Patil, JJ.
Date: March 7, 2026
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ORAL JUDGMENT (PER MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.) :
1. Heard Mr. Jaiswal, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr.
Shrikant Yadav, learned APP for the respondents - State.
2. By the present writ petition iled under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the legality and validity
of the order dated 19th September 2025 passed by the Under
Secretary, Home Department, State of Maharashtra in exercise of
powers under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short, “ CrPC ”). By the said order, it has been directed that the
petitioner be released after completion of 14 years of actual
imprisonment and 30 years of imprisonment with remission and the
petitioner was directed to further undergo imprisonment for 10 years
and to pay a ine of Rs.200/-, in default to undergo imprisonment for
one month, for the ofence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “ IPC ”).
3. It is the submission of Mr. Jaiswal, the learned Advocate for the
petitioner, that the Supreme Court imposed punishment of life
imprisonment upon the petitioner and further directed that the
sentences for the ofences for which the petitioner was convicted,
except under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, shall run concurrently and
the sentence under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC shall run consecutively,
after serving the sentences for the other ofences. It is submitted that
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the Supreme Court directed that after completion of the life
imprisonment, the petitioner shall undergo the sentence of 10 years’
of imprisonment imposed under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC.
4. Mr. Jaiswal, learned Advocate for the petitioner, relied upon the
decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of
Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State represented by Inspector of Police ,
reported in (2016) 8 SCC 313. He invited attention to paragraphs 30
and 31 of the said decision and submitted that the view that life
sentences can run consecutively does not lay down the correct law and
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Petitioner stands
overruled to that extent.
5. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order dated 19th
September 2025 passed by the State Government directing the release
of the petitioner after completion of 30 years of imprisonment with
remission by exercising powers under Section 433A of the CrPC is
erroneous. According to him, the petitioner cannot be directed to
undergo an additional sentence of 10 years under Section 376(2)(g) of
the IPC after completion of life imprisonment.
6. He further submitted that the petitioner has already undergone
actual imprisonment of 30 years, 6 months and 20 days and with
remission he has completed 36 years, 5 months and 27 days of
imprisonment. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order
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deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner be directed to
be released forthwith.
7. On the other hand, Mr. Yadav, learned APP, submitted that the
Government Resolution dated 10th January 2006 deals with convicts
who have attained the age of 65 years and are treated as senior
citizens. He submitted that in terms of the said Government Resolution
dated 10th January 2006, the State Government is required to
constitute a Committee and take a fresh decision in the matter. He
further submitted that the State Government has already passed an
order under Section 433A of the CrPC, directing that the petitioner
shall be released after completion of 30 years of imprisonment
including remission and, in addition thereto, he shall undergo 10 years
of imprisonment under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC. According to him,
the said order has been passed in view of the directions issued by the
Supreme Court in the case of the petitioner and, therefore, no
interference with the impugned order is warranted.
8.
He further submitted that the petitioner had absconded for a
period of 1150 days and, therefore, Category 6(a) of the 1992
Guidelines would apply to him. According to him, the said conduct has
been taken into consideration while directing that the petitioner shall
be released after completion of 30 years of imprisonment including
remission. He therefore submitted that interference with the
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impugned order is not warranted.
9. Before considering the rival contentions, it would be necessary
to set out certain factual aspects.
i. The petitioner and the other co-accused were convicted by the
learned District and Sessions Judge at Pune in Sessions Case No.574 of
1992 inter alia for the ofences punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the IPC and were awarded the death sentence subject to
conirmation by the High Court. Insofar as the ofence punishable
under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC is concerned, the petitioner and the
co-accused were directed to sufer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years
and to pay a ine of Rs.200/-, in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one month each.
ii. This Court, by judgment and order dated 9th, 12th and 15th
February 1996 passed in Criminal Appeal No.225 of 1995 and
connected matters, conirmed the conviction and sentences awarded
by the Trial Court except the conviction under Section 201 read with
Section 34 of the IPC.
iii. The Supreme Court, in Criminal Appeal Nos.1064, 1065 and 1066
of 1997 iled inter alia by the present petitioner, modiied the sentence
awarded by the Sessions Court and conirmed by this Court under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC from death to
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imprisonment for life. It was further directed that the sentences for
the ofences for which the appellants were convicted, except under
Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, shall run concurrently and that the
sentence under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC shall run consecutively
after completion of the sentences for the other ofences. Paragraph 48
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the petitioner is
relevant, which reads thus:
“48. Considering the cumulative efect of all the factors, it
cannot be said that the ofences were committed under the inluence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for, the whole thing was
done in a pre-planned way; having regard to the nature of ofences and
circumstances in which they were committed, it is not possible for the
Court to predict that the appellant would not commit criminal act of
violence or would not be a threat to the society. A-1 is 35 years' old, A-2
is 35 years' old and A-3 is 25 years' old. The appellants cannot be said
to be too young or too old. The possibility of reform and rehabilitation,
however, cannot be ruled out. From the facts and circumstances, it is
not possible to predict as to who among the three played which part. It
may be that role of one has been more. culpable in degree than that of
others and vice versa. Where in a case like this it is not possible to say
as to whose case falls within the "rarest of the rare" case, it would
serve the ends of justice if the capital punishment is commuted into life
imprisonment. Accordingly, we modify sentence awarded by Courts
below under Section 302 read with Section 34 from death to life
imprisonment. The sentences for the ofences for which the
appellants are convicted, except under Section 376(2)(g), I.P.C.,
shall run concurrently; they shall serve sentence under Section
376(2)(g), I.P.C. consecutively, after serving sentence for other
ofences. ”
(Emphasis added)
iv. At this stage, it is relevant to note that, as per the prosecution
case, the petitioner and the co-accused committed the murder of three
persons, namely Mohan Ohal, his wife Ruhi Ohal and their son Rohan
Ohal. They also committed robbery and also committed rape upon Ruhi
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Ohal. The manner in which the crime was committed and the
seriousness and brutality involved therein have been noted by the
Supreme Court in paragraph 47 of its judgment, which reads thus:
“47. Now reverting to the facts of this case, the mitigating
circumstances in favour of the appellants are that A-1 is a qualiied
Civil Engineer and a married person having a son of four years old, his
parents are serving at Spiritual Life Centre, Narsapur for the last thirty-
six years. A-2 is 'Thaneshri' and 'Vasaishri', titles conferred on him for
his body building; his marriage is a love marriage performed against the
will of his parents as well as the volition of the parents of the wife and
there is nobody to look after his wife and their two daughters and two
sons of whom one is 11/2 years' old; A-3 pleaded that he is having a
sick father and that he is only 27 years' old and an unmarried person.
They are having no adverse antecedents in the sense of being habitual
criminals. The aggravating circumstances are that A-1 is no other than
the nephew (daughter's son) of the deceased Mr. Mohan Ohol.
Because of the relationship, he gained access inside the house for
him and for his friends; they enjoyed the hospitality of Ohols'
family as it was found that there were ive used plates in the sink
which indicate that ive had food; may be, all the three appellants
and the couple or two of them. The victims were unarmed; the
heinous crime was committed for gains, namely to rob the
valuables of the Ohols family; to give efect to their nefarious
plans the unholy alliance of the appellants not merely robbed the
family of the valuables but killed all the three members of the
family then in the house and above all committed sexual assault on
Mrs. Ruhi Ohol. It cannot but be a dastardly act for A-1 to commit
rape of Mrs. Ohol, who is none other than the wife of his maternal
uncle and perhaps as old as his mother. ”
(Emphasis added)
v. Thus, paragraph No.48 of the judgment of the Supreme Court
clearly shows that the Supreme Court modiied the sentence of death
awarded by the learned Trial Court and conirmed by this Court to
imprisonment for life, however, it was directed that although the
sentences for the other ofences, including the sentence of life
imprisonment, shall run concurrently, the sentence imposed under
Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC shall run consecutively and shall be
undergone after completion of the sentence for the other ofences. In
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efect, what the Supreme Court has directed is that the petitioner shall
irst undergo imprisonment for life and thereafter undergo the
sentence imposed under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC.
vi. In view of the said direction, the State Government, by the
impugned order, has directed that the petitioner shall undergo 30
years of imprisonment including remission to serve life imprisonment
and thereafter undergo 10 years of imprisonment imposed under
Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC by the learned Trial Court, which has been
conirmed up to the Supreme Court.
10. Thus, in view of the above factual aspects, it is necessary to
consider the rival contentions.
11. It is the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner
that the Guidelines dated 11th May 1992 (“ 1992 Guidelines ”) would
apply to the case of the petitioner and that his case would fall either
under Category 1(e) or Category 5(a). It is further submitted that even
considering the fact that the petitioner had absconded for 1150 days,
at the most Category 6(a) would apply. For the sake of convenience,
Categories 1(e), 5(a) and 6(a) of the 1992 Guidelines are set out herein
below :-
“ GUIDELINES FOR PREMATURE RELEASE OF PRISONERS SENTENCED TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT OR TO DEATH PENALTY COMMUTED TO LIFE
TH
IMPRISONMENT AFTER 18 DECEMBER 1978.
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Category Sub CATEGORISATION PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT
No. category OF CRIMES TO BE UNDERGONE
INCLUDING REMISSION
SUBJECT TO A MINIMUM
OF 14 YEARS OF ACTUAL
IMPRISONMENT
INCLUDING SET OFF
PERIOD
1 …..
a) ….. …..
b) ….. …..
c) ….. …..
d) ….. …..
e) Where the crime is
committed with
exceptional
violence or with
perversity.
28 Years
2 …..
a) ….. …..
b) ….. …..
3 …..
a) ….. …..
b) ….. …..
c) ….. …..
d) ….. …..
4 …..
a) ….. …..
b) ….. …..
c) ….. …..
5 …..
a) Murders
committed by
dacoits and
robbers in the act
of committing
dacoities and
robberies.
26 Years
b) ….. …..
6 …..
a) Prisoners who
have escaped from
lawful custody
while undergoing
imprisonment or
who has
absconded while
on parole or
furlough.
28 Years
7 …..
a) …..
8 …..
a) ….. …..”
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12. However, it is required to note that these categories are
prescribed by the State Government under Section 433 A of the CrPC,
which reads as under :-
“433A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in
certain cases.-- Notwithstanding anything contained in section 432,
where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a
person for an ofence for which death is one of the punishments
provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has
been commuted under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life,
such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at
least fourteen years of imprisonment.”
13. It is contemplated under Section 433A of the CrPC that where a
sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on a convicted person for
an ofence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law,
such person shall not be released from imprisonment unless he has
served at least 14 years of actual imprisonment.
14. The Guidelines dated 11th May 1992 regarding premature
release after completion of 14 years categorize various ofences.
However, it is required to be noted that the said categories are not
exhaustive. In this regard, Clause (2) and Clause (3) of the said
Guidelines are relevant. The said clauses indicate that the categories
prescribed therein provide only a broad classiication of the pattern of
crimes for the purpose of premature release of prisoners sentenced to
imprisonment for life and do not cover all categories of prisoners
convicted for various ofences. The criteria laid down in the said
Guidelines refer to normal cases, i.e., cases of prisoners having normal
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features and good conduct in prison.
15. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner had absconded for
a period of 1150 days. Apart from that, the manner in which the
ofence was committed has already been noted hereinabove.
16. Thus, taking into consideration the overall aspects of the matter,
the order passed by the State Government directing that the petitioner
shall be released after completion of 30 years of imprisonment
including remission does not warrant any interference. However,
insofar as the further direction of the State Government that the
petitioner shall undergo 10 years of imprisonment under Section
376(2)(g) of the IPC, purportedly in view of the directions issued by the
Supreme Court, is concerned, it is required to be noted that the
Supreme Court has speciically considered this aspect in the case of
Muthuramalingam (supra) inter alia with respect to the decision of the
Supreme Court concerning Petitioner. Paragraph Nos.8, 9, 30 and 31 of
the said decision in the case of Muthuramalingam (supra) are relevant,
which read thus:
“ (8) To the same efect is the decision of a two-Judge Bench of
this Court in Duryodhan Rout case [Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa,
(2015) 2 SCC 783 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 306] in which this Court took the
view that since life imprisonment means imprisonment of full span of
life there was no question of awarding consecutive sentences in case of
conviction for several ofences at one trial. Relying upon the proviso to
sub-section (2) of Section 31, this Court held that where a person is
convicted for several ofences including one for which life sentences
can be awarded the proviso to Section 31(2) shall forbid running of
such sentences consecutively.
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(9) It would appear from the above two pronouncements
that the logic behind life sentences not running consecutively lies
in the fact that imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the
end of the normal life of the convict. If that proposition is sound, the
logic underlying the ratio of the decisions of this Court in O.M. Cherian
[O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)
123] and Duryodhan Rout [Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2
SCC 783 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 306] cases would also be equally sound.
What then needs to be examined is whether imprisonment for life
does indeed imply imprisonment till the end of the normal life of
the convict as observed in O.M. Cherian [O.M. Cherian v. State of
Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 123] and Duryodhan Rout
[Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783 : (2015) 2 SCC
(Cri) 306] cases. That question, in our considered opinion, is no longer
res integra, the same having been examined and answered in the
airmative by a long line of decisions handed down by this Court. We
may gainfully refer to some of those decisions at this stage.
(30) We are not unmindful of the fact that this Court has in
several other cases directed sentences of imprisonment for life to
run consecutively having regard to the gruesome and brutal nature
of the ofence committed by the prisoner. For instance, this Court has
in Ravindra Trimbak Chouthmal v. State of Maharashtra [Ravindra
Trimbak Chouthmal v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 4 SCC 148 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 608] , while commuting death sentence penalty to one of
imprisonment for life directed that the sentence of seven years'
rigorous imprisonment under Section 207 IPC shall start running after
life imprisonment has run its due course. So also in Ronny v. State of
Maharashtra [Ronny v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 3 SCC 625 :
1998 SCC (Cri) 859] this Court has while altering the death
sentence to that of imprisonment for life directed that while the
sentence for all other ofences shall run concurrently, the sentence
under Section 376(2)(g) IPC shall run consecutively after running of
sentences for other ofences. To the extent these decisions may be
understood to hold that life sentence can also run consecutively do
not lay down the correct law and shall stand overruled.
(31) In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative.
We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life
can be awarded for multiple murders or other ofences punishable
with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot
be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however,
be superimposed over each other so that any remission or
commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not
ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the
prisoner for the other. ”
(Emphasis added)
17. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Duryodhan
Rout v. State of Orissa , reported in (2015) 2 SCC 783, which has been
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referred to in paragraph 8 of the judgment in Muthuramalingam
(supra), is also relevant. In particular, paragraphs 19, 26 and 28 of the
said judgment read thus:
“19. Imprisonment for life is not conined to 14 years of
imprisonment. A reading of Section 55 IPC and Sections 433 and
433-A CrPC would indicate that only the appropriate Government
can commute the sentence of imprisonment for life for a term not
exceeding fourteen years or accedes to the release of such person
unless he has served at least fourteen years' of imprisonment. ”
“26. This Court reiterated that life imprisonment was not
equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Mohd.
Munna v. Union of India [(2005) 7 SCC 417 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1688] .
The Court held that life imprisonment means imprisonment for
whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural
life. There is no provision either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal
Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment could be treated as
either 14 years or 20 years without there being a formal remission
by the appropriate Government. ”
“28. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it is
clear that a sentence of imprisonment for life means a sentence for
the entire life of the prisoner unless the appropriate Government
chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either the whole or a
part of the sentence under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code. ”
(Emphasis added)
18. Thus, what has been held by the Supreme Court is that
imprisonment for life is not conined to 14 years of imprisonment. A
reading of Section 55 of the IPC and Sections 433 and 433A of the CrPC
indicates that only the appropriate Government has the power to
commute a sentence of imprisonment for life to a term not exceeding
14 years or to grant remission. However, a person sentenced to
imprisonment for life cannot be released unless he has served at least
14 years of actual imprisonment as contemplated under Section 433A
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of the CrPC. It has been further held that life imprisonment is not
equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or any other ixed term. The
expression “imprisonment for life” means imprisonment for the whole
of the remaining natural life of the convicted person. There is no
provision either in the Indian Penal Code or in the Code of Criminal
Procedure whereby a sentence of life imprisonment can automatically
be treated as imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years without formal
remission granted by the appropriate Government.
19 . Thus, a sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment
for the entire natural life of the prisoner unless the appropriate
Government chooses to exercise its power to remit or commute the
sentence under the provisions of the CrPC, however, subject to
restriction imposed by Section 433A of CrPC.
20. In view thereof, it has been speciically held, that while multiple
sentences of imprisonment for life can be imposed in cases involving
multiple murders or ofences punishable with life imprisonment, such
life sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences
would operate simultaneously or be superimposed over each other so
that remission or commutation granted in one sentence does not ipso
facto result in remission of the other sentences awarded to the
prisoner.
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21. In view of these observations, the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in Muthuramalingam (supra) speciically considered
the judgment in Ronny v. State of Maharashtra , reported in (1998) 3
SCC 625 i.e. the decision in the case of the Petitioner. In the said
judgment, while setting aside the death sentence and while awarding
imprisonment for life, it was directed that although the sentences for
the other ofences shall run concurrently, the sentence under Section
376(2)(g) of the IPC shall run consecutively after completion of the
sentences for the other ofences. The Constitution Bench in
Muthuramalingam (supra) held that to the extent the said judgment in
Ronny (supra) can be understood to mean that life sentences can run
consecutively, it does not lay down the correct law and stands
overruled to that extent.
22. Thus, it is clear that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
has speciically overruled that part of the judgment in the case of the
petitioner by which it has been in efect directed that sentence under
Section 376(2)(g) of IPC shall run consecutively after completion of life
imprisonment. Therefore, although the order of the State Government
directing that the petitioner shall be released after completion of 30
years of imprisonment including remission does not warrant
interference, the further direction that the petitioner shall undergo 10
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years of imprisonment under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC cannot be
sustained in law, as the same is based on the directions contained in
the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the Petitioner’s case
which stand overruled by the subsequent Constitution Bench judgment
in Muthuramalingam (supra). The said crucial aspect is not taken into
consideration by the State Government while taking decision of
granting remission.
23. Thus, the writ petition is partly allowed.
th
(i) Although the challenge to the order dated 19 September
2005, insofar as it directs that the petitioner shall be released
after completion of 30 years of imprisonment including remission,
the same is maintained, however, the further direction that the
petitioner shall undergo 10 years of imprisonment under Section
376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code is quashed and set aside.
(ii) The impugned Order dated 19th September 2025 stands
conirmed, however modiied to the above extent.
24. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands disposed of in the above
terms.
[Pravin S. Patil, J.] [Madhav J. Jamdar, J.]
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