STATE OF KARNATAKA vs BALAKRISHNA GURUNATH BHATHKHANDE

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

TH
DATED THIS THE 14 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026


PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT APPEAL NO.100472 OF 2026 (LR)


BETWEEN:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPT. OF REVENUE,
M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE.

2. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BELGAUM,
DIST:. BELGAUM.

3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
BELGAUM DIVISION, BELGAUM.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.RAKESH M. BILKI, GA)

AND:

1. BALAKRISHNA GURUNATH BHATHKHANDE,
AGE: 76 YEARS, HINDWADI, TILAKWADI, BELGAUM.

2. PUNDALIK GURUNATH BHATHKHANDE,
AGE: 78 YEARS, R/AT. SOMWARPETH TILAKWADI,
BELGAUM.

3. DATHA PUNDALIKA BHATKHANDE,
AGE: 50 YEARS, R/AT. SOMWARPETH TILAKWADI,
BELGAUM.

4. PRATAP GURUNATH BHATHKHANDE,
AGE: 64 YEARS, R/AT: HINDUANGAR, KHANAPUR
ROAD, TILAKWADI, BELGAUM.










Digitally signed by
RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

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5. SHARISH ZUNZAR BHATHKHANDE,
AGE: 36 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE.

6. GIRISH ZUNZAR BHATHKHANDE,
AGE: 38 YEARS.
7. MAYUR ZUNZAR BHATHKHANDE,
AGE: 36 YEARS.

8. MRS. RATHANMAL W/O. ZUNZAR BHATHA
KHANDKLE, AGE: 35 YEARS.

R5 TO R8 R/O: KALI AMBRAYA
BEHIND REX STORES, BELGAUM,

9. BELGAUM CITY CORPORATIONM
REPT. BY ITS COMMISSIONER,
RISALDALGALLI, BELGAUM.

10. POONA CATHOLIC EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION PRIVATE LTD.,
2004 BY ITS DIRECTOR GENERALST,
VINCENT STREET POONA – 411 015.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRASHANT F. GOUDAR, ADV. FOR
C/R3, R5 TO R8)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING THIS HONBLE COURT MAY BE
PLEASED TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDE IN WP NO. 18325/2005 DATED. 16.10.2025 AND
ETC.

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FRESH MATTER/S THIS
DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

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ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )

The State is before the Court calling in question an order
passed in Writ Petition No.18325 of 2005 dated 07.12.2021,
whereby the learned Single Judge passed the following order:
“Petitioners claim that they were tenants of lands
bearing Sy.Nos.107 measuring 16 acres 32 guntas,
Sy.No.43/2 measuring 6 acres 36 guntas, Sy.No.44/2
measuring 6 acres and Sy.No.103 measuring 12 acres 35
guntas, Sy.No.105 measuring 14 acres 6 guntas all
situated at Waghvade village, Belagavi taluka.
2. In pursuance of an agreement of sale dated
22/1/1972, petitioners were put in possession of the
lands in question. Thereafter the petitioners filed Form
No.7 for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the lands
in question. The 4th respondent disputed the claim of the
petitioners stating that the petitioners are in possession
by virtue of the agreement of sale executed in their
favour. The tribunal rejected the Form No.7 filed by the
petitioners on 5/11/1979 stating that the Petitioners are
in possession under the agreement of sale and not in the
capacity as tenants.
3. The 4th respondent which is an educational
institution filed declaration in Form No.13 under Section
63 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short
the Act). Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner issued
notification dated 3/8/1998 declaring that the lands in
question among the other lands to an extent of 448 acres
11 guntas 11 anas of land as excess land, by exercising
power under Section 79-B(3) of the Act. Hence, this writ
petition.
4. Learned counsel for petitioners would submit
that the 2nd respondent has passed the impugned order
without holding an inquiry as contemplated under Section
79-B (3) of the Act. He would further submit that the 2nd

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respondent has not taken into account the transfer of land
in question by 2nd respondent in favour of the petitioners
in terms of explanation to Section 63 (10) of the Act. He
further submits that by the Karnataka Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 2020, Sections 79A, 79B and 79C of
the Parent Act, were omitted with effect from 01.03.1974
and having regard to provisions contained in the
amendment act, all pending proceedings for violation of
Sections 79A, 79B and 79C stand abated.
5. On the other hand, learned HCGP appearing for
the respondent State would submit that the 2nd
respondent after holding an inquiry has rightly held that
the 4th respondent was holding excess land and
accordingly vested the excess land including the land in
question with the Government. Hence, she submits that
the impugned notification issued by the 2nd respondent is
in accordance with the provisions contained in the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.
6. I have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for parties.
7. It is not in dispute that the petitioners had filed
declaration in Form No.7 for grant of occupancy rights.
However, the said application came to be rejected on the
ground that the petitioners were put in possession of the
land in question by virtue of the agreement of sale
executed by the respondent No.4.
8. The 2nd respondent in pursuance of the
declaration filed by the 4th respondent in Form No.13 as
specified under Section 63 of the Act, has issued the
impugned notification holding that the 4th respondent is
holding excess vacant land including the lands in question
and vested the lands with the 2nd respondent by
exercising the power under Section 79-B (3) of the Act.
9. Perusal of the notification discloses that there is
no reference with regard to the conducting of an inquiry
as contemplated under Section 79-B(3) of the Act and
also the Deputy Commissioner has not taken into account
the agreement of sale executed in favour of the
petitioners for determining the ceiling limit of the
respondent No.4. Hence, the impugned notification issued

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by the 2nd respondent is contrary to explanation in
Section 63(10) as well as Section 79-B (3) of the Act.
10. Be that as it may, during the pendency of this
writ petition, the State Government amended the Act by
the Amendment Act, 2020 whereby the Sections 79A, 79B
and 79C of the parent Act were omitted with effect from
01.03.1974 and as such, all pending proceedings relating
to violation of Sections 79-A, B & C stand abated.
11. In view of the preceding analysis, I am of the
view that the impugned notification issued by the 2nd
respondent as well as the order dated 23/3/2005 passed
by the Government allotting the lands in question in
terms of Section 77 of the Act are not sustainable in law.
Accordingly, I pass the following:
ORDER

i) The writ petition is allowed.

ii) The impugned notification dated 3/8/1998
published in the official Gazette dated
13/8/1998 issued by the 2nd respondent at
Annexure D and the order dated 23/3/2005
passed by the 1st respondent at Annexure-S
are hereby quashed insofar as it relates to
land bearing Sy.No.107 measuring 16 acres
32 guntas, Sy.No.43/2 measuring 6 acres 36
guntas, Sy.No.44/2 measuring 6 acres and
Sy.No.103 measuring 12 acres 35 guntas,
Sy.No.105 measuring 14 acres 6 guntas all
situated at Waghvade village, Belagavi
taluka.”


2. Heard the learned Government Advocate Sri.
Rakesh M. Bilki appearing for the appellant and the learned
counsel Sri. Prashant F. Goudar appearing for respondent
Nos.3, 5 to 8.

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3. The appeal is preferred after five years (1200 days
delay). The application seeking condonation of delay reads as
follows:
“1. The above Appeal is filed challenging the order
passed by the leaned Single Judge in W.P.No.
18325/2005 on 07.12.2021.
2. It is submitted that, after passing of the order,
the certified copy was applied and the same is received by
the Advocate General Unit office. Thereafter, the
concerned Case Worker has put up the file for giving
opinion from the concerned Law Officer. Thereafter, the
concerned Law Officer had given opinion on
07/15.02.2022. The said opinion copy was communicated
to the concerned Department.
3. It is further submitted that, the Respondents No.
1 to 8 have given a representation to the concerned
Deputy Commissioner, Belagavi i.e Appellant No. 2.
Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner after going though
the order of this Hon'ble Court dated 07.12.2021 noticing
that, there is no proper direction to the Appellants for
considering the representation of the Respondents No. 1
to 8.
4. It is further submitted, after lapse of four
years the Respondents No. 1 to 8 have filed one more
writ petition in W.P.No. 104238/2025 for considering the
representation of the Respondents No. 1 to 8.
5. It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the
filing of the one more writ petition by the Respondent No.
1 to 8, the concerned Tahasildar has issued a
communication to the Head of Legal Cell, Revenue
Department for taking steps with regarding filling of the
writ appeal on 17.06.2026. Subsequently the appellant
No. 2 has issued a communication to the Addl. Chief
Secretary, Department of Revenue dated 12.06.2026 for
issuing government order for preferring writ appeal.
Pursuant to that, the concerned Tahasildar has issued
communication to the Appellant No. 2 i.e Deputy

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Commissioner, Belagavi for taking steps with regarding
filling of the writ appeal on 17.06.2026. In response to
the said communications, the Head of Legal, Department
of Revenue had issued the Government Order bearing No.
RD/74/TRM/2026, Bengaluru dated 09.07.2026 to prefer
an Appeal against the Judgment and given authorization
to the concerned Law Officer for preferring appeal. The
copy of the said Government Order has been sent to the
Advocate General Office, Dharwad unit for filing Appeal.
The Advocate General Office, Dharwad Unit have received
the said G.O on 15.07.2026. Immediately after receipt of
the Government Order and relevant documents and
Judgment, the concerned case worker has put up the file
for drafting the Appeal against the Judgment on
15.07.2026.
6. On going through the judgment and document,
the law officer immediately drafted the appeal. It is
submitted that there is delay in processing and for
issuance of Government order and the said delay is
neither intentional nor deliberate. Hence, there is delay in
preferring Appeal but the said delay in filing the above
Appeal is not intentional one but it is due to bonafide and
administrative reasons as stated above.
6. It is submitted that, the delay in filing the
present appeal is not intentional but due to the reasons
stated above.
7. It is submitted that, if the accompanying
application is not allowed, the Appellants will be put to
untold hardship and on the contrary, if the accompanying
application is allowed, the same will not cause any
prejudice to the Respondents.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to allow the application for condonation of delay
and condone the delay of ___days in filing the above
appeal in the interest of justice and equity.”


4. The reasons so rendered in the afore-quoted
affidavit seeking condonation of delay are hardly satisfactory as

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they appear to be a lame excuse as observed by the Apex
Court while declining to accept appeals by the States on delay.
The Apex Court in the case of ISRAR AHMAD KHAN v.
1
AMARNATH PRASAD wherein the Apex Court observes as
follows:
“ …. …. …
BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO
DELAY/DEFEAT IMPLEMENTATION:
27.Delayed filing of appeals should be the
exception, but in recent times, the exception has
practically evolved to become the rule. Orders
passed by the Courts are not complied with for a
long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed,
belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are
preferred.
28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious conduct
of the defaulting party is sought to be justified on the
mere production of a Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting
Number showing that an appeal has been preferred, so as
to obtain multiple adjournments in contempt matters.
29.We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate these
practices. It is felt that by such modus operandi,
disobedient litigants act brazenly which has the
further effect of bringing down the authority and
majesty of the Courts and the rule of law,
interfering in the administration of justice. The
same may well, in certain situations, border on
criminal contempt.
30.The High Courts should deal with such
unscrupulous litigants, moreso when they happen
to be ‘State’, within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand.

1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 322

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Unless the High Courts, so also this Court deal with
these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk of
erosion of the unflinching faith that the ordinary
litigants of this country repose in the Judiciary at all
levels. It is the solemn duty of all of us manning the
Courts across the hierarchy to ensure that the
public faith never wavers .”

4. A little earlier to the afore-quoted judgment, the
Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ODISHA v. MANAGING
2
COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL , held as
follows:
“ …. …. ….
7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123
days in filing the special leave petition and a further
delay of 96 days in re-filing the same after curing
defects. In the application for condonation of delay,
the State of Odisha seeks to explain the delay by
pleading as follows:
“3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on
receipt of order of the Hon'ble High Court vide
order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A.
No. 126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the
petitioner considered the matter and sent it to
the law department opined that it is a fit case for
filing the present SLP against the impugned
judgments dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
21.02.2025.
4. That the delay in filing the appeal
was on account of procedural delay in
obtaining approval from the higher
authority. The delay caused is not deliberate
and intentional.”

2
2026 SCC OnLine SC 191

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8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel
appearing for the State of Odisha, submits that the
delay in presenting the special leave petition is not
deliberate and having regard to the long line of
decisions of this Court advocating a liberal
approach when an authority under Article 12 of the
Constitution is the petitioner seeking condonation
of delay, she urges that the delay be condoned and
this Court may direct the High Court to examine the
challenge to the order dated 30th December, 2013 of the
Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the appeal.
9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started
dictating an order of dismissal of the special leave
petition. It was then that she prayed for withdrawal of the
special leave petition. We had so recorded. However,
when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana
prayed for recall of the order of dismissal of the special
leave petition as withdrawn; she also submitted, on
instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a
detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the
special leave petition.
10. We recalled the order dismissing the special
leave petition as withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the
same as time-barred considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of
the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above,
with the observation that reasons would follow.
11. We now proceed to assign our reasons.
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has
been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the
State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in the
application for condonation of delay is such that with
much ado, the proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of
decisions of this Court propounding the law that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice
and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have
considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some
depth.

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14. Almost four decades back, in Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a
coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably liberal
approach which this Court has been adopting in
matters instituted before it is not being followed by
the courts lower in the hierarchy, mandated that a
justice oriented approach is indeed called for when
a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra),
Hon'ble Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for
the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land
Acquisition Officer had referred to Katiji (supra) in
paragraph 14 and quoted the following passage
therefrom:
“When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against
each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-
deliberate delay
…
It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a
party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps,
cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person
is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the
same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant

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must take responsibility for the acts or omissions
of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for
purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High Court,
the conduct of the law officers of the Government
placed the Government in a predicament and that
it was one of those cases where the mala fides of
the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law
officers.
…
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
were consistently followed by this Court until
adoption of a different and seemingly strict
approach while dealing with applications for
condonation of delay during the last decade and a
half became discernible starting with the decision in
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited ,
where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant

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special leave petition was not condoned. University
of Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of
916 days was not condoned. While upholding the
decision of the relevant high court under challenge
refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in
presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a
deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very
recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal
remedy is put to an end so that no litigation
remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the
stage of considering the application for condonation
of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo
Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the judgment for a
coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji
(supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an
order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought
to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that
is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be
adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in presentation
of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal
over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the
case of the former, whether to condone or not
would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of
discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed
in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and
Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the
exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none
other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of
authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax,

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Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and
admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of the
decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than
quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For
quite some time in the past, this Court has been
making observations as to the grave prejudice
caused to public interest by appeals brought on
behalf of the Government being lost on the point
of limitation. Such observations have been made
for over a few years in the past. But there seems
to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent
in the present petition which is filed in November
1993. The explanation for the delay, had better
be set out in petitioner's own words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the
special leave petition drafted from the drafting
Advocate and sent the same for approval to the
Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
(h) The Board returned the case file to the
Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent
the same to the Board on September 20, 1993
requesting that draft SLP was not approved by
the Board. The Board after approving the draft
SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of
furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for
condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several cases
in the past, we hoped that the matters might
improve. There seems to be no visible support for
this optimism. There is a point beyond which
even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having
regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in
the case of the former the decisions to present
and prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down

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by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to
this also. Even with all this latitude, the
explanation offered for the delay in this case
merely serves to aggravate the attitude of
indifference of the Revenue in protecting its
common interests. The affidavit is again one of
the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible
to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem
to attach any importance to the need for
promptitude even where it affects its own
interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay
is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave
petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by
time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and
Amateur Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves
none in doubt that it did not take much time for this
Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the
law was laid down in Ramegowda (supra),
following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that
matters would improve. Their Lordships, however,
found no visible support for such optimism and the
Court's patience having been tested to the extreme
limit, held that there is a point beyond which even
the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be
utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before
the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite
all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown
here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation

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but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up. ”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Apex Court observes that the unscrupulous litigation
must be stopped or dealt with an iron hand. The appellant in
the case at hand is a State and the delay is not a day or a
month or a year but five years. Therefore, there is no warrant
of interference with the order of the learned Single Judge.
5. It is trite that the law protects the diligent and not
the indolent, this equally applies to a State where it files an
appeal. The law does not protect the State if it is not diligent
and remains indolent to prefer appeals.

Accordingly, the writ appeal stands rejected .



Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
RSH/CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 0