Sanjay Tripathi @ Sanjay Kumar Tripathi vs State of U.P. and Another

A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 3764 of 2026
Sanjay Tripathi @ Sanjay Kumar Tripathi
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Ashok Nath Tripathi, Tiwari Abhishek
Rajesh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Pankaj Kumar Rai, Sandeep
Kumar Srivastava
Court No. - 54
HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR-X, J.
1. Heard Shri Ashok Nath Tripathi and Shri Tiwari Abhishek Rajesh,
learned counsel for appellant and Shri Amrit Raj, learned AGA for the
State-respondent as well as Shri Pankaj Kumar Rai, learned counsel for
the private respondent.
2. This criminal appeal under Section 14-A(2) of The Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been
preferred by the appellant with a prayer to allow the appeal, set aside the
bail rejection order dated 7.3.2026 passed by Special Judge (SC/ST Act),
Kanpur Nagar in Second Bail Application No.815 of 2026 and to release
the appellant on bail in Case Crime No. 168 of 2025, under Section-
329(3), 329(4), 352, 351(3), 308(2), 61(2), 318(4), 338, 336(3), 340(2) of
B.N.S. and Sections 3(2)(v), 3(2)(va), 3(1)(da) and 3(1)(dha) of
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
Police Station-Hanumant Vihar, District-Kanpur Nagar.
3. It is to be noted that basically this is the second bail application
preferred by the appellant seeking his bail in the aforesaid Case Crime
No. 168 of 2025. The criminal appeal filed by the appellant for
challenging the earlier bail rejection order of the learned trial court was
dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 12.11.2025 passed in Sanjay
Kumar Tripathi v. State of U.P. and Another, 2025:AHC:201457.

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4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is in jail
for about one year and the prosecution evidence is almost over. All the
witnesses of fact have been examined and the case is likely to be fixed for
recording the statements of the accused and thereafter for defence
evidence. It was contended that the appellant requires a reasonable
opportunity to collect and produce defence evidence before the learned
trial court. Such an opportunity is an essential component of the right to a
fair trial. If the appellant continues to remain in jail, he will face difficulty
in collecting the best available evidence in support of his defence and
effectively presenting the same before the learned trial court.
5. Learned counsel further submitted that the offences alleged against the
appellant are not serious or heinous in nature. According to him, the
allegations essentially arise out of a property dispute and are civil in
nature. The proper remedy for the informant was to approach the civil
court rather than initiate criminal proceedings against the appellant. It was
also contended that the prosecution story does not disclose any monetary
transaction or any fraudulent act on the part of the appellant which caused
financial loss to the informant.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant thereafter placed reliance upon the
judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Asha v. State
, particularly paragraphs 82 to 87 thereof. It
of U.P., 2025:AHC:184205
was submitted that the aforesaid judgment recognises the importance of
granting bail at the stage when the prosecution evidence has concluded or
is nearing conclusion, so that the accused may collect defence evidence
and effectively prepare and conduct the defence. It was further submitted
that, after the examination of the witnesses of fact, the possibility of the
appellant influencing such witnesses or tampering with their testimony
has substantially receded. Learned counsel contended that the aforesaid
judgment is being followed by other coordinate Benches of this Court
and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to the same consideration.
7. Per contra, Shri Amrit Raj, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State, as
well as Shri Pankaj Kumar Rai, learned counsel appearing for the private
respondent, opposed the prayer for bail. They submitted that the trial has
not reached the stage of recording the statements of the appellant under
Section 351 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,

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corresponding to Section 313 Cr.P.C. Rather, the cross-examination of the
investigating officer is still continuing. Although the trial is nearing its
conclusion, the delay cannot be attributed to the prosecution alone. It was
contended that the appellant has taken five to six days for cross-
examining individual prosecution witnesses and have not cooperated in
the expeditious conclusion of the trial.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the first bail
application of the appellant was rejected by this Court after considering
the material collected during investigation, which prima facie indicated
the alleged fabrication of documents and illegal possession of the
informant’s property. No material change in circumstances or any fresh
ground warranting a different conclusion has been demonstrated by the
appellant. It was, therefore, submitted that the second bail application is
liable to be rejected.
9. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material available on record, including the
judgment passed by this Court in the earlier bail proceedings and the
judgment rendered by the coordinate Bench in Asha (supra).
A. Legal principles governing a second bail application:
(i). Before examining the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it
would be appropriate to refer to the legal principles governing successive
bail applications. It is settled law that rejection of an earlier bail
application does not create an absolute bar against filing a subsequent bail
application. However, the Court considering the subsequent application is
required to take into account the grounds on which the earlier application
was rejected and to examine whether any material change in the factual or
legal position warrants a different conclusion.
(ii). In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav,
, the Supreme Court held that the Court considering a
(2005) 2 SCC 42
subsequent bail application must give due weight to the grounds which
prevailed while rejecting the earlier application. Ordinarily, the same
grounds cannot be re-agitated in a subsequent application without any
material change in circumstances. Where a different view is taken, the

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Court must record the fresh grounds which justify such a decision.
(iii). The aforesaid principle is founded upon judicial discipline and the
need for consistency in the administration of justice. Although the
principle of res judicata does not strictly apply to successive bail
applications, an accused cannot seek reconsideration of the same grounds
merely by presenting them in a different form. At the same time, a
subsequent application must be considered on the basis of the
circumstances prevailing on the date of its consideration. The progress of
the trial, the period of incarceration and other relevant developments may
be taken into account, but their significance must be assessed in the
context of the earlier order and the facts of the particular case.
(iv). Thus, the mere fact that a second bail application has been filed after
the passage of time or that the trial has progressed does not, by itself,
entitle an accused to bail. The Court must examine whether the
subsequent circumstances, considered cumulatively with the other
relevant factors, justify release on bail.
B. Consideration of the judgment in Asha v. State of U.P. :
(i). Learned counsel for the appellant has placed considerable reliance
upon paragraphs 82 to 87 of the judgment rendered in (supra). It
Asha
would, therefore, be appropriate to examine the principles laid down
therein in their proper context.
(ii). In the aforesaid judgment, the coordinate Bench considered whether
the need to collect defence evidence, prepare a defence strategy and
effectively conduct the defence during trial could constitute a ground for
granting bail. The Court observed that, after the conclusion of prosecution
evidence or when the same is nearing conclusion, the stage may be
appropriate for considering bail to enable the accused to prepare and
conduct the defence. It further observed that the preparation and
production of defence evidence is an essential component of a fair trial
and not a mere formality.
(iii). The coordinate Bench also indicated the relevant considerations for
examining such a request, including the gravity and nature of the offence,
its impact on society, the criminal antecedents of the accused, his conduct

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5
during investigation and trial, the possibility of tampering with evidence
or influencing witnesses, the nature of the material relied upon by the
prosecution, the nature of the defence evidence proposed to be collected,
and the accused’s ability to obtain legal advice and effectively conduct
the defence while in custody.
(iv). The aforesaid observations cannot, however, be read in isolation or
construed to mean that an accused becomes entitled to bail as soon as the
prosecution evidence concludes or the trial reaches the stage of recording
the statement of the accused. The judgment itself, in paragraphs 89 to 91,
makes it clear that preparation of the defence does not automatically
guarantee release on bail and that such a prayer cannot be considered
mechanically. The Court is required to exercise its judicial discretion on
the basis of a cumulative consideration of the relevant facts and
circumstances of each case.
(v). Therefore, the judgment in (supra) does not lay down an
Asha
inflexible rule that every accused must be released on bail at the stage of
recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. or Section 351 of the
BNSS. It recognises the importance of an effective defence as a relevant
consideration in the exercise of bail jurisdiction. Whether that
consideration warrants release on bail depends upon the facts of the
individual case, including the conduct of the accused and the specific
need for liberty to collect or produce defence evidence.
(vi). The aforesaid interpretation is also consistent with the law laid down
by the Supreme Court in Irfan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another,
. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the grant of
2025 INSC 1012
bail on the ground that continued incarceration would impair the
accused’s ability to prepare an effective defence. The Supreme Court held
that such a ground cannot be applied mechanically and that the facts and
circumstances of the case, particularly the conduct of the accused during
investigation and trial, must be examined. The Supreme Court further
observed that the accused should indicate what defence strategy or
evidence requires liberty and what special circumstances justify such
indulgence.
(vii). The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court makes it clear that the

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right to an effective defence and the right to seek bail are distinct legal
considerations. The need to prepare a defence is relevant, but it does not
dispense with the requirement of examining the other circumstances
governing the grant of bail. A Court cannot grant bail merely on a general
assertion that an accused would be better placed to conduct his defence if
released from custody. The necessity of such release must emerge from
the material and circumstances of the particular case.
(viii). Consequently, this Court does not find any conflict between the
principles laid down in (supra) and those reiterated by the Supreme
Asha
Court in Irfan (supra). The judgment in Asha (supra) itself requires a
case-specific assessment and expressly cautions against granting bail
mechanically. The observations contained in paragraphs 82 to 87 must,
therefore, be read along with paragraphs 89 to 91 of the same judgment
and the binding principles laid down by the Supreme Court.
Application of the aforesaid principles to the present case
10. In the present case, the first bail application of the appellant was
rejected by this Court vide judgment dated 12.11.2025. While rejecting
the earlier application, this Court considered the allegations regarding
fabrication of documents, the disputed Will and the alleged illegal
possession of the informant’s property. The material collected during
investigation was found to prima facie indicate the involvement of the
appellant in the alleged acts. The earlier order was thus passed after
consideration of the nature of the accusations and the material relied upon
by the prosecution.
11. It is true that the trial has progressed since rejection of the earlier bail
application and that the appellant has remained in custody for about one
year. The stage of the trial is a relevant circumstance which deserves
consideration. However, the progress of the trial cannot be examined in
isolation, particularly when the prayer for bail is founded primarily upon
the need to prepare and conduct the defence.
12. The submission that all the witnesses of fact have been examined does
not, by itself, resolve the issue. The learned A.G.A. and learned counsel
for the private respondent have specifically submitted that the cross-

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examination of the investigating officer is still continuing. Thus, the
prosecution evidence has not yet concluded. Even otherwise, the
conclusion of prosecution evidence would only remove or reduce certain
concerns relating to the possibility of influencing prosecution witnesses; it
would not, by itself, establish an entitlement to bail.
13. Another relevant circumstance is the conduct of the appellant during
the trial. The respondents have submitted that the appellant has taken five
to six days for cross-examining individual prosecution witnesses and that
the progress of the trial has been affected by his conduct. At this stage,
this Court is not required to make any final finding on whether the cross-
examination was necessary or whether the time taken by the defence was
justified. Nevertheless, the conduct of the accused during trial is a
relevant consideration while examining a request for bail on the ground
that continued incarceration is preventing effective preparation of the
defence.
14. The appellant has also submitted that he require liberty to collect and
produce defence evidence. The importance of such evidence cannot be
disputed. However, the material placed before this Court, as reflected in
the submissions advanced, does not sufficiently disclose the nature of the
particular defence evidence which the appellant proposes to collect, the
steps required for obtaining it, or the specific difficulty which prevents
them from collecting or arranging such evidence while in custody through
his counsel or persons acting on his behalf. A general assertion that
remaining in jail would make the preparation of the defence difficult
cannot, by itself, be treated as sufficient ground for release on bail.
15. The right to a fair trial requires that the accused be afforded a proper
opportunity to produce defence evidence in accordance with law. The
denial of bail, however, does not dispense with or curtail that right. The
learned trial court remains under an obligation to ensure that the appellant
receives a fair and reasonable opportunity to present this defence. If any
specific difficulty arises in collecting or producing defence evidence, the
same may be brought to the notice of the learned trial court for
appropriate orders in accordance with law. The right to lead defence
evidence cannot be equated with an unconditional right to secure release
on bail for that purpose.

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16. The contention that the dispute is civil in nature and that no financial
loss has been caused to the informant also requires consideration in the
context of the allegations forming the basis of the prosecution. The earlier
order records allegations of fabrication of documents and illegal
possession of the informant’s property. Whether the dispute is ultimately
proved to be civil in nature, whether the documents relied upon are
genuine, and whether the ingredients of the offences alleged against the
appellant are established are matters to be examined in accordance with
law. At this stage, the mere existence of a property dispute or the absence
of an alleged monetary transaction does not, by itself, remove the
seriousness of the accusations recorded in the earlier order.
17. The period of incarceration is undoubtedly a relevant factor. However,
no independent ground of undue delay attributable to the prosecution has
been established merely by referring to the period spent in custody. The
respondents have, in fact, disputed the appellant’s assertion regarding the
progress of the trial and have attributed part of the delay to the manner in
which the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined. In these
circumstances, the period of custody, considered along with the other
relevant factors, does not by itself justify release on bail.
18. This Court is conscious that the trial has reached an advanced stage
and that the appellant must be afforded an effective opportunity to defend
himself. At the same time, the grant of bail at this stage cannot be treated
as an automatic consequence of the trial nearing conclusion. The Court is
required to balance the right of the accused to prepare and present a
defence with the other considerations governing the exercise of bail
jurisdiction.
19. Upon a cumulative consideration of the grounds on which the first
bail application was rejected, the nature of the accusations, the present
stage of the trial, the conduct attributed to the appellant during the
proceedings, the absence of any sufficiently particularised need for liberty
to collect specific defence evidence, and the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (supra) and Irfan (supra),
this Court is not persuaded to take a different view from the one taken
while rejecting the earlier bail application.

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20. The appellant has failed to establish circumstances which, in the facts
of the present case, warrant his release on bail at this stage. The principles
laid down in (supra), properly understood, do not compel a contrary
Asha
conclusion. The right to prepare an effective defence is an important
consideration, but it cannot be applied as a mechanical or independent
ground for granting bail without examining the other relevant
circumstances.
21. Accordingly, the second bail application preferred by the appellant is
rejected. Consequently, the criminal appeal is, therefore, .
dismissed
22. However, considering that the trial is stated to be at an advanced
stage, the learned trial court is expected to proceed with the matter
expeditiously and endeavour to conclude the trial in accordance with law,
without granting unnecessary adjournments to either party.
23. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are confined to
the consideration of the present bail application and shall not affect the
independent assessment of the evidence by the learned trial court.
(Anil Kumar-X,J.)
October 27, 2026
SK
Digitally signed by :-
SUSHEEL KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad