State Of Maharashtra vs Ramesh Sukrya Mhatre
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 1075
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s).16674 of 2026)
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAMESH SUKRYA MHATRE AND ORS.
….RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The efficacy of medical care is inseparable from
the trust and respect reposed in the doctors and
nurses. This enduring truth finds eloquent
expression in the following verse from the Suśruta
1
Sa ṃ hitā :-
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.10.01
14:54:43 IST
Reason:
1
Suśruta Sa ṃ hitā Sūtrasthāna 29.52/2-53/1.
1
“न स ससध्यसि वैद्यो वा यस्य न ।
गृहे पूज्यिे
भवने पूज्यिे वासप यस्य वैद्यः स ससध्यसि ॥”
4. In its literal sense, the verse conveys that a
physician does not succeed in a house where he is
not respected; where the physician is respected, his
treatment succeeds. Though expressed in the
language of an ancient medical tradition, the
principle underlying the verse retains undiminished
relevance even today.
5. Few responsibilities in a civilised society are as
profound as that entrusted to a doctor. The special
place accorded to the medical profession flows from
the very nature of the service it renders to humanity.
It concerns human life, human dignity and the
alleviation of human suffering. A doctor is, therefore,
required to bring to the discharge of his or her duties
not merely knowledge and technical competence, but
also sound judgment, patience, composure and
compassion. The responsibility is consequently of a
character that extends beyond the mere provision of
a professional service.
2
6. It is this unique character of the profession that
distinguishes the relationship between a doctor and
a patient from an ordinary commercial or service
relationship. A patient does not merely engage a
professional for the performance of a task; he places
his health and, in serious cases, his very life in the
hands of the doctor. The relationship is thus founded
upon a degree of trust that cannot be measured
merely by the professional service rendered or the
remuneration received. The ancient Roman Stoic
philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca aptly expressed
the thought, while the physician is paid for his
professional service, gratitude remains owed for the
2
kindness and care that transcend the service itself.
The observation aptly recognises that the confidence,
reassurance and humanity accompanying medical
care form an integral part of the relationship between
the doctor and the patient.
7. The weight of this responsibility is brought into
sharpest relief in the actual practice of medicine.
Within a hospital, and particularly in an emergency,
a doctor may be required to assess a patient, make
2
Lucius Annaeus Seneca, De Beneficiis (On Benefits), Book VI, available
at : https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3794/3794-h/3794-h.htm .
3
critical decisions and commence treatment within
moments, often without the benefit of complete
information. The decision so taken may bear directly
upon the life and well-being of the patient. The
discharge of such responsibility necessarily requires
the physician to remain composed, focused and free
to exercise independent professional judgment.
8. An environment conducive to the discharge of
such a responsibility is, therefore, not a matter of
convenience for the medical professional. It is a
condition necessary for the proper delivery of medical
care. A doctor cannot reasonably be expected to
exercise sound and independent judgment while
labouring under the apprehension of physical
violence, intimidation or coercion. The safety and
dignity of the medical professional are consequently
not matters of personal privilege. They are the
safeguards which serve the larger public interest in
ensuring that medical care is rendered with the
concentration, composure and judgment that the
profession demands.
9. This does not place medical professionals
beyond scrutiny or accountability. A patient or his
family remains entitled to question the treatment
4
provided, complain of negligence or delay, seek
investigation into an adverse outcome and pursue
such remedies as are available in law. Indeed, the
availability of these lawful avenues is essential to
ensuring accountability within the medical
profession.
10. What the law cannot countenance is the
substitution of these remedies by threat, violence and
coercion. Physical violence, intimidation or coercion
cannot become a means of expressing dissatisfaction
with medical treatment, securing compliance with a
demand or raising grievance for an adverse medical
outcome. A grievance, however genuine, does not
confer a licence to resort to violence. To permit such
conduct would not merely imperil the individual
doctor. It would undermine the very conditions in
which medical professionals are required to make
decisions upon which the life and health of patients
may depend. Any patronage to such activities would
alter the civil society in one run by outlaws.
BRIEF FACTS
11. It is against this backdrop that the present case
assumes significance and falls for our consideration.
The allegations concern an incident involving brazen
5
assault on doctors and medical staff who were
discharging their professional duties in a municipal
hospital. The questions posed before this Court must
necessarily be considered in the context in which the
incident is alleged to have occurred. Before we
proceed to examine the rival submissions and the
exercise of discretion by the Courts below, it would
be apposite to briefly set out the factual matrix
necessary for the disposal of the present appeal.
th
12. It is the prosecution’s case that, on 6 July,
2026, at about 8:00 p.m., respondent No. 1, Ramesh
3
Sukrya Mhatre , an elected Corporator of the Kalyan
Dombivli Municipal Corporation from Ward No.24,
led respondent Nos.2 to 4, namely, Ramesh Laxman
Pawar, Pramod @ Prakash Uddhav Nikam and
Akshay Sharad Karande, in assaulting and verbally
abusing three doctors, including a lady doctor, who
were on duty in the Labour Ward of Shastri Nagar
Municipal Hospital, Dombivli.
13. The incident arose from a dispute concerning
the shifting of a pregnant patient in labour. The
respondent No.1-Ramesh is further alleged to have
3
Hereinafter, referred to as “respondent No.1-Ramesh”.
6
threatened the informant, Dr. Vaibhav Namdev
4
Salunkhe , thereby causing apprehension and fear,
which, according to the prosecution, resulted in delay
in registration of the First Information Report.
14.
It was in the aforesaid circumstances that FIR
th
No. 195 of 2026 came to be registered on 7 July,
2026 at Vishnu Nagar Police Station, Thane City at
about 8:27 p.m. for offences punishable under
Sections 121(1), 132, 189(2), 190, 191(2), 351(2) and
5
352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 , and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Medicare
Service Persons and Medicare Service Institutions
(Prevention of Violence and Damage or Loss to
Property) Act, 2010.
15. The respondent Nos.2 to 4 were arrested at
th
about 3:48 a.m. on 8 July, 2026. The respondent
No.1-Ramesh, after being served with notice under
Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
6
Sanhita, 2023 , was arrested at about 5:08 p.m. and
was thereafter admitted to Civil Hospital, Thane,
purportedly on account of high blood pressure.
4
Hereinafter, referred to as “informant-Vaibhav”.
5
For short, “BNS”.
6
For short, “BNSS”.
7
th
16. On 9 July, 2026, the request for production of
respondent No.1-Ramesh through video conferencing
came to be rejected. He was accordingly produced
physically before the learned Judicial Magistrate
th th
First Class, 5 Court, Kalyan on 10 July, 2026,
whereupon all the four accused persons were
th
remanded to police custody until 13 July, 2026.
17. Upon completion of the period of police custody,
the accused were remanded to judicial custody by the
th
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, 5 Court,
th
Kalyan vide order dated 13 July, 2026.
18. Notwithstanding the stage of investigation and
the antecedents attributed to respondent No.1-
Ramesh, who was stated to have 17-18 criminal
cases registered against him, the learned Judicial
th 7
Magistrate First Class, 6 Court, Kalyan , by order
th
dated 14 July, 2026, enlarged respondent No.1-
Ramesh on bail.
th
19. By a subsequent order dated 17 July, 2026,
respondent Nos.2 to 4 were also enlarged on bail by
the learned Magistrate, principally on the ground of
parity.
7
Hereinafter, referred to as “the learned Magistrate”.
8
20. In the aftermath of the incident, the lady doctor
who was one of the victims, having suffered trauma,
ignominy and insecurity, resigned from service. The
remaining victim doctors are stated to have refrained
from attending to their duties on account of fear and
apprehension arising from the incident.
21. The incident evoked widespread public concern
and disquiet, whereupon the High Court of
8
Judicature at Bombay took suo moto cognizance of
the matter, bearing Suo Moto Writ Petition No. 1 of
th
2026, on 18 July, 2026. The High Court stayed the
th th
aforesaid orders dated 14 July, 2026 and 17 July,
2026 granting bail to respondent Nos.1 to 4, and
directed respondent No.1-Ramesh to surrender by
th
19 July, 2026. The respondents No.2 to 4 were
already in judicial custody as their formal release
formalities and surety bond procedures were still
pending.
22. Pursuant to the said direction, respondent
No.1-Ramesh surrendered and was remanded to
magisterial custody.
8
Hereinafter, referred to as “the High Court”.
9
23. During the subsequent proceedings, the High
Court impleaded the Indian Medical Association as
9
respondent No.6 and the Kalyan Dombivli Municipal
10
Corporation as respondent No. 7 .
24.
The High Court thereafter transferred the
investigation to the Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Zone-III, Kalyan. It further directed that the
statement of the informant- Vaibhav, be recorded
under Section 183 of the BNSS.
st
25. By order dated 31 July, 2026, the High Court
took note of the progress of the investigation and
directed respondent No.7-KDMC not to accept the
resignations tendered by the victim doctors.
th
26. By the impugned order dated 7 August, 2026,
the High Court modified its earlier order staying the
th
orders granting bail as well as orders dated 14 July,
th
2026 and 17 July, 2026, passed by the learned
Magistrate, granting bail to respondent No.1-
Ramesh, and respondent Nos.2 to 4, respectively and
directed that said respondents be enlarged on bail,
subject to certain conditions.
9
Hereinafter, referred to as “respondent No.6-IMA”.
10
Hereinafter, referred to as “respondent No.7-KDMC”.
10
27. The conditions so imposed included, inter alia ,
a direction requiring respondent Nos.1 to 4 to reside
outside the State of Maharashtra until
commencement of the trial; to report thrice a week at
Anjuna Police Station, North Goa; to surrender their
passports; and to refrain from contacting the
witnesses.
28. The High Court further proceeded to issue
extensive directions concerning the conduct and
timeline of the trial, including directions for
11
assignment of the case to a Special Judge ;
appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor;
submission of forensic reports and filing of the
chargesheet; besides directing that the proceedings
be taken up on a fast-track basis.
29. Aggrieved by the impugned order, respondent
Nos.1 to 4 approached this Court by way of separate
12
Special Leave Petitions assailing the conditions
imposed by the High Court while enlarging them on
bail.
11
Hereinafter, referred to as “the trial Court”.
12
SLP(Crl) Nos. 16040-16041/2026; 16235-16236/2026; 16260-
16261/2026; 16293-16294/2026.
11
30. The said Special Leave Petitions came to be
th
dismissed as withdrawn on 7 September, 2026. In
the meantime, the State had preferred the present
appeal assailing the impugned order, and this Court,
on the same day, took the present appeal on board
and issued notice to the respondents.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-
STATE, INFORMANT AND INDIAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION
31.
Mr. Shrirang Verma, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant-State, submitted that the impugned
order suffers from patent perversity and is vitiated by
non-consideration of material facts and
circumstances having a direct bearing upon
respondents’ entitlement to bail.
32. Learned counsel submitted that, by its order
th
dated 18 July, 2026, the High Court had, prima
facie , found that the orders passed by the learned
Magistrate granting bail were unreasoned and
suffered from serious infirmities. Having recorded
such a finding and, on that basis, having stayed the
operation of the said bail orders, the High Court while
subsequently permitting respondent Nos.1 to 4 to
enjoy the liberty of bail, was required to disclose
12
cogent and discernible reasons for departing from the
very basis on which it had earlier exercised
jurisdiction. It was submitted that the impugned
order, however, does not disclose any fresh, material
or compelling circumstance which could justify such
departure from the earlier prima facie view taken by
the High Court.
33. It was further submitted that the High Court,
while permitting respondent Nos.1 to 4 to remain on
bail, failed to accord due consideration to the nature
and gravity of the allegations, the antecedents of
respondent No.1-Ramesh, the apprehension of
intimidation of the witnesses and other material
circumstances forming part of the record.
34. Learned counsel contended that the period of
custody undergone by the respondent Nos.1 to 4,
being approximately 27 days, could not, by itself,
have outweighed the nature and gravity of the
allegations, status of the victims, stage of
investigation, antecedents attributed to respondent
No.1-Ramesh, and the apprehension of intimidation
or interference with the victims and witnesses.
Significantly, the impugned order does not record any
reasoned assessment as to how the custody of mere
13
27 days had materially altered, diluted or otherwise
neutralised the circumstances which had earlier
weighed with the High Court in staying the orders
granting bail.
35.
Learned counsel appearing for the informant-
Vaibhav, submitted that the High Court failed to
accord due consideration to the allegations regarding
the threats extended to the informant. It was
contended that the said circumstance was material
to the assessment of the apprehension of
intimidation or interference with the informant and
other witnesses and, consequently, could not have
been overlooked while confirming the order granting
bail to respondent Nos.1 to 4.
36. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.
6-IMA submitted that the conduct attributed to
respondent Nos.1 to 4 has caused considerable
distress and apprehension amongst the medical
fraternity. It was contended that medical
professionals entrusted with the responsibility of
attending to the health and well-being of citizens were
being required to discharge their duties in an
atmosphere of fear and insecurity. The victim doctors
have refrained from attending to their duties owing to
14
the fear and apprehension arising from the incident.
According to the learned counsel, these
circumstances were directly relevant to the
apprehension of intimidation or interference with the
victims and witnesses and, therefore, warranted due
and specific consideration while exercising discretion
in the matter for grant of bail.
37. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon
Section 13(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Municipal
13
Corporations Act, 1949 (reproduced hereinbelow for
ease of reference) and submitted that the said
provision contemplates removal of a Councillor from
office upon his being found guilty of misconduct in
the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful
conduct during his current term or the immediately
preceding term of office:-
“ 13. Liability of Councillors to
removal from office.— (1) (a) The
State Government may, on its own
motion or on the recommendation of
the Corporation, remove any
Councillor from office, if such
Councillor has been guilty of any
misconduct in the discharge of his
duties, or of any disgraceful conduct,
during his current term of office or
13
For Short, “MMCA, 1949”.
15
immediately preceding term of office
as a Councillor.”
38. It was contended that, having regard to the
mandatory consequences contemplated under the
said provision in respect of conduct attributable to a
Councillor, the position held by respondent No.1-
Ramesh and the allegations arising out of the
incident are relevant circumstances which ought to
be considered in their proper perspective while
exercising judicial discretion in favour of respondent
Nos.1 to 4 for their enlargement on bail.
39. It was submitted that a fresh incident of alleged
assault and intimidation of doctors and hospital staff
at a hospital in Palghar assumes significance,
particularly as the persons allegedly involved therein
are stated to belong to the same political party as
respondent No.1-Ramesh. It was thus contended that
the said occurrence lends further credence to the
apprehension of continued threat expressed by the
medical professionals, an aspect which assumes
particular significance in the present case.
40. On these grounds, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant-State, informant-Vaibhav, and
16
respondent No. 6-IMA implored the Court to set aside
the impugned order and allow the appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
ACCUSED
41. Per contra , Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned senior
counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent No.1-
Ramesh, and learned counsel representing
respondent Nos.2 to 4, vehemently and fervently
opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the
appellant-State, informant-Vaibhav, respondent
No.6-IMA and supported the impugned order insofar
as it enlarged the said respondents on bail.
42. Shri Dave submitted that the allegations
contained in the FIR are false, distorted and
exaggerated. It was contended that the version set
out in the FIR had been considerably influenced by
the intense media coverage and the resultant public
outrage sparked because of the incident, and that the
allegations, as presented, are not borne out by the
objective material collected during the course of
investigation.
43. Learned senior counsel submitted that the
injuries allegedly sustained by the victim-doctors
were simple in nature. It was contended that all the
17
offences invoked in the FIR are triable by the learned
Magistrate and carry a maximum punishment of
imprisonment up to five years. According to the
learned senior counsel, the nature of the injuries and
the statutory scheme governing the offences are
material considerations in assessing the necessity of
continued custodial detention and the respondents’
entitlement to bail.
44. Learned senior counsel submitted that the
prosecution proposes to examine as many as 64
witnesses and that, having regard to the number of
witnesses required to be examined and the nature of
the evidence to be recorded, the trial is likely to
consume considerable time, despite the High Court
setting out a fixed timeline, thereby necessitating
that respondent No.1 to 4 should be held entitled to
remain on bail during the pendency of the trial.
45. It was submitted that, out of the 17-18 cases
relied upon by the prosecution as antecedents of
respondent No.1-Ramesh, 16 had culminated either
in acquittal or discharge, while only one case
remained pending.
46. In backdrop of the submissions made
hereinabove, learned counsel for the respondent
18
Nos.1 to 4 supported the impugned order insofar as
it enlarged the said respondents on bail and urged
that the appeal be dismissed as devoid of merit.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
47.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at bar and have carefully
gone through the impugned order and the material
placed on record.
48. Democracy confers power through the ballot,
but the exercise of that power remains subject to the
discipline of law. It is, therefore, a matter of serious
concern when persons occupying elected office begin
to perceive the mandate of the people as a source of
personal authority and unbridled power and, in the
process, assume for themselves a position to
command, intimidate or even enforce their own will.
49. The constitutional order draws a clear line
between authority conferred by law and influence
exercised by an individual. An elected representative
is entrusted with the responsibility of serving the
public and strengthening the institutions through
which grievances are addressed and justice is
administered. He/She cannot supplant those
institutions by assuming the role of the police, the
19
administrator or the Court. The use of personal
influence to secure compliance through fear or
intimidation has consequences extending beyond the
immediate victim and carries the potential to erode
public confidence in the rule of law itself.
50. The concern assumes greater significance when
the persons subjected to such conduct are medical
professionals entrusted with the care of the health
and well-being of citizens. These professionals
discharge onerous duties in circumstances which
frequently involve vulnerable patients, medical
emergencies and decisions requiring instantaneous
professional judgment and composure. An
atmosphere of fear or insecurity within a healthcare
institution can have consequences extending beyond
the individual medical officer concerned, by
impairing the safe and effective delivery of medical
care. Those entrusted with protecting the health of
others cannot themselves be placed in a position
where they are compelled to discharge their
professional responsibilities under fear, intimidation
or apprehension.
51. In the conspectus of the aforesaid
circumstances, we have no hesitation in observing
20
that any attempt to intimate or assault medical
professionals, while discharging duties entrusted to
them in the interest of public health, cannot be
tolerated, much less at the hands of persons holding
elected office or for that matter any other person. An
elected representative, by virtue of the office
entrusted to him, bears a heightened responsibility
to uphold the authority of law and to conduct himself
in a manner that reinforces public confidence in
public institutions. Resort to violence against medical
professionals by a person occupying such office is,
therefore, particularly grave, as it not only imperils
the safety and dignity of those entrusted with the care
of patients, but also undermines the very
responsibility attached to public office to uphold,
rather than undermine, the rule of law. The authority
conferred by an elected office can never furnish a
basis for disregarding the legal restraints that bind
every citizen.
52. Incidents such as the one at hand inflict
deleterious effects on the peace and tranquility of the
society at large and also create disruption of public
order. The fact remains that pursuant to respondent
Nos.1 to 4 having been granted indulgence of bail,
21
one more incident of similar nature happened in
Palghar, Maharashtra, where doctors and hospital
staff were subjected to high-handedness and assault
at the hands of political functionaries. It is asserted
that when the hospital staff attempted to intervene,
one of the perpetrators slapped a receptionist and
threatened a woman employee. Crucially, the alleged
assailants also belong to a political organization.
Though constituting an independent cause of action
on its own facts, this occurrence fortifies the
apprehension regarding the sense of insecurity
prevailing in medical fraternity.
53. It is against the foregoing backdrop that we are
called upon to examine the exercise of discretion by
the Courts below in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 4.
The question before us is not merely whether
respondent Nos.1 to 4 ought to remain at liberty
pending trial, but whether the favourable exercise of
discretion, given the totality of the material available
on record, suffers from perversity or non-application
of mind.
54. We find considerable force in the submission
that the approach adopted by the High Court in its
th th
orders dated 18 July, 2026 and 7 August, 2026,
22
reflect an irreconcilable approach on key
considerations crucial to exercising discretion in the
th
matter of bail. In its suo moto order dated 18 July,
2026, the High Court had, prima facie , observed that
the learned Magistrate could not have granted bail to
the respondent Nos.1 to 4 having regard, inter alia , to
the nature of the allegations and the brazen assault
upon doctors while they were discharging their
duties. It was on the basis of such prima facie
assessment that the High Court stayed the operation
of the orders granting bail.
55. Having thus intervened and taken the view that
the orders of the learned Magistrate suffered from
serious infirmity, the High Court while passing the
impugned order proceeded to enlarge respondent
Nos.1 to 4 on bail, though subject to conditions,
principally on the consideration that they had
furnished details of their place of residence outside
the State of Maharashtra, the period of custody
undergone by them, the substantial progress made
in the investigation and the likelihood of completion
of forensic analysis shortly.
56. What is conspicuously absent from the
impugned order is any finding as to what intervening
23
circumstance had occurred between the two orders
so as to displace the prima facie view earlier taken by
the High Court. The mere passage of time in custody,
progress in investigation or the anticipated
completion of forensic analysis, without anything
further, does not explain how the circumstances
which had earlier weighed with the High Court had
ceased to operate or had otherwise lost their
significance. The impugned order does not undertake
any such assessment.
57. The position that emerges on a holistic view is
that the two orders, despite being rendered in quick
succession in the same cause and concerning the
same respondents, proceed upon fundamentally
conflicting principles bearing upon the entitlement to
bail.
58. In our considered view, once the High Court had
itself found sufficient prima facie evidence to stay the
orders granting bail and to require respondent No.1-
Ramesh to surrender, any subsequent departure
from that position necessarily called for cogent and
discernible reasons. The impugned order, in our view,
falls short of such an examination.
24
59. This assumes greater significance in view of the
criminal antecedents attributed to respondent No.1-
Ramesh. The criminal antecedents of an accused
assume particular significance while considering an
application for bail, especially where the material on
record indicates a pattern of repeated involvement in
criminal activities. In the case of habitual offenders,
such antecedents constitute a material circumstance
which cannot be disregarded while exercising judicial
discretion in the matter of bail. Failure to take such
antecedents into consideration, where they bear
upon the assessment of the likelihood of repetition of
criminal conduct, interference with the course of
justice or intimidation of witnesses, renders the
exercise of discretion vulnerable to interference by
the courts. This Court in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv
14
Raj Singh & Anr. , underscored that the criminal
antecedents of an accused are a relevant
consideration while deciding an application for bail
and observed as follows:-
“30. We may usefully state that when the
citizens are scared to lead a peaceful life and
this kind of offences usher in an
impediment in establishment of orderly
society, the duty of the court becomes more
14
(2012) 9 SCC 446.
25
pronounced and the burden is heavy. There
should have been proper analysis of the
criminal antecedents. Needless to say,
imposition of conditions is subsequent to
the order admitting an accused to bail. The
question should be posed whether the
accused deserves to be enlarged on bail
or not and only thereafter issue of
imposing conditions would arise. We do
not deny for a moment that period of
custody is a relevant factor but
simultaneously the totality of
circumstances and the criminal
antecedents are also to be weighed. They
are to be weighed in the scale of
collective cry and desire. The societal
concern has to be kept in view in
juxtaposition of individual liberty.
Regard being had to the said parameter we
are inclined to think that the social concern
in the case at hand deserves to be given
priority over lifting the restriction on liberty
of the accused.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
60. In the present case, the Courts below have failed
to accord due consideration to the criminal
antecedents of accused respondents, in particular
respondent No.1-Ramesh, against whom 18 criminal
cases are stated to have been registered, including
cases involving serious offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Such antecedents were a material circumstance
bearing upon the exercise of discretion in the matter
26
of bail and could not have been brushed aside
without due consideration.
61. We are conscious that respondent No.1-Ramesh
has secured acquittal/discharge in 16 criminal
proceedings. At the same time, the nature of the
allegations levelled against him and the overall
circumstances in which his involvement has been
alleged cannot be lost sight of. The apprehension that
the influence exercised by him may have had a
bearing upon the course of such trials cannot be
wholly ruled out. This circumstance assumes vital
importance in the present case, particularly when
material witnesses are required to testify against him.
62. Furthermore, this Court cannot lose sight of the
statutory consequences contemplated under Section
13(1)(a) of the MMCA, 1949, which provides for
removal of a Councilor from office upon his being
found guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his
duties or of any disgraceful conduct during his
current term or the immediately preceding term of
office. The statutory consequences that may ensue
from the conduct attributed to respondent No.1-
Ramesh constitute a relevant circumstance which
27
cannot be divorced from the overall consideration of
the case.
63. The respondent No.1-Ramesh continued to
remain admitted in the prison ward of the District
Civil Hospital, Thane, throughout his police custody
th th
remand from 10 to 13 July, 2026 and thereafter
during his judicial custody, thereby substantially
avoiding confinement in prison. Significantly,
immediately upon issuance of the release memo
th
pursuant to the order granting bail on 15 July,
2026, he sought discharge from the hospital. The
aforesaid conduct, viewed in its entirety, raises a
serious concern regarding the manner in which the
influence attached to his position was utilised to
circumvent the effective operation of the custodial
process.
64. The order granting bail to respondent Nos. 2 to
4 proceeds substantially on the principle of parity
with respondent No.1-Ramesh. Once the very
foundation upon which respondent No.1-Ramesh
was granted the indulgence of bail is found to be
unsustainable, respondent Nos.2 to 4 cannot claim
an independent entitlement to the same relief merely
on the ground of parity.
28
65. We also find that the High Court while restoring
the order(s) granting bail to respondent Nos.1 to 4,
though subject to conditions, did not accord due
consideration to the wider impact of the conduct
attributed to respondent Nos.1 to 4 upon the medical
fraternity.
66. The material on record indicates that the
incident had caused such fear and apprehension
amongst the victim doctors that they were
constrained to tender their resignations. This
circumstance was not merely incidental to the
individual allegations; it was directly relevant to the
apprehension of intimidation and the ability of
medical professionals to discharge their duties
without fear or insecurity. The effect of the prejudicial
conduct of the accused upon the functioning of the
healthcare institution and the confidence of medical
professionals, therefore, warranted due
consideration while exercising discretion in the
matter of bail.
67. This Court is further of the considered opinion
that, notwithstanding that respondent Nos.1 to 4 are
currently in judicial custody, the facts and
circumstances of the case warrant an evaluation by
29
the State Government, in accordance with law, as to
whether the provisions of the applicable preventive
detention laws are attracted. The competent
authority shall independently examine the matter on
its own merits, having due regard to the statutory
requirements governing preventive detention and the
material circumstances bearing upon the necessity
for such action, so as to instil a sense of security and
confidence amongst the medical fraternity and to
ensure that medical professionals are able to
discharge their duties without fear or apprehension.
68. In view of the aforesaid, we find that the High
Court erred in exercising its discretion in favour of
respondent Nos.1 to 4. By ignoring material
circumstances vital to the adjudication of bail,
specifically the criminal antecedents of the
respondents, the influence wielded by respondent
No.1-Ramesh, and the profound impact of the offence
on the medical fraternity, the civil servants and the
society at large, the impugned order enlarging them
on bail cannot be sustained.
69. We clarify that none of the observations made
hereinabove shall be construed as according any
sanction to members of the medical fraternity to
30
indulge in dereliction or negligence in the discharge
of their duties. Any such instance, however, shall be
dealt with strictly in accordance with law and the
extant guidelines governing the same.
70.
Before parting with the matter, we may note
that the present incident cannot be viewed in
isolation from the larger concern which arises when
persons occupying elected office resort to force,
intimidation or other extra-legal means in dealing
with citizens or public functionaries. Instances of
such conduct have been reported from different parts
of the country. While each such incident must
necessarily be examined on its own facts and in
accordance with law, the recurrence of allegations
involving elected representatives assuming, or
seeking to assume, authority beyond that conferred
by law is a matter which cannot be viewed with
indifference. An elected office carries with it a
corresponding obligation to respect the rule of law
and the institutions through which grievances are to
be addressed. The authority derived from the
electoral mandate cannot be permitted to become a
substitute for the authority of law. No person,
howsoever high the office held, can claim supremacy
31
over the discipline of law. The legitimacy of public
authority ultimately rests not upon the power to
command, but upon the obligation to remain within
the bounds of law and serve the nation. It is this
distinction that must remain inviolable in a
constitutional democracy.
CONCLUSION
71. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, we are
of the considered view that the present case warrants
exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The
impugned order, accordingly, cannot be sustained
and is hereby set aside insofar it restores the order(s)
granting bail to respondent Nos.1 to 4, subject to the
conditions stipulated therein.
72. Consequently, the bail granted to respondent
Nos.1 to 4 stands cancelled. The respondent Nos.1 to
4 shall surrender before the trial Court concerned
th
before 5 October, 2026, failing which the trial Court
concerned shall be at liberty to cancel their bail
bonds and take all necessary steps, in accordance
with law, to secure their custody for the remainder of
the trial. It is, however, clarified that in the event of
any material change in circumstances, respondent
32
Nos.1 to 4 would be at liberty to renew their prayer
for bail before the appropriate forum, in accordance
with law.
73. The directions issued by the High Court in
paragraphs 9 to 13 of the impugned order shall
remain undisturbed, save and except the direction
requiring the trial Court to conclude the trial within
three months from the date of framing of charges. We
direct the Special Fast Track Court, constituted
pursuant to the directions of the High Court, shall
endeavour to conclude the trial as expeditiously as
possible and, in any event, not later than six months
from the date of presentation of the present order.
74. We also direct the prosecution to carefully
assess the list of witnesses proposed to be examined
and, wherever permissible in law, to curtail or
dispense with the examination of such witnesses
whose evidence may not be essential for the just
adjudication of the case, so as to ensure that the trial
proceeds expeditiously without compromising the
fairness of the proceedings.
75. In the overall factual matrix of the present case,
and having regard to the fact that the prosecution
case rests substantially upon the testimony of
33
doctors and hospital staff, we direct the trial Court
concerned to ensure that all material witnesses are
afforded adequate protection throughout the trial.
The trial Court shall, in terms of Section 9 of the
Maharashtra Witness Protection and Security Act,
2017, and the law laid down by this Court in
Mahender Chawla & Ors. v. Union of India &
15
Ors. , remain vigilant to any apprehension of threat,
intimidation or coercion and, wherever the
circumstances so warrant, pass appropriate orders
directing the District Administration/Superintendent
of Police to extend requisite protective measures, so
as to ensure that the witnesses are able to depose
freely and without fear or external influence.
76. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
77. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 28, 2026.
15
(2019) 14 SCC 615
34
ITEM NO.5 COURT NO.2 SECTION II-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 16674/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 07-08-2026
in SMWP No. 1/2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay]
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
RAMESH SUKRYA MHATRE & ORS. Respondent(s)
IA No. 267987/2026 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT
IA No. 267990/2026 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
Date : 28-09-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA
For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.
Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande- 3259, AOR
Mr. Harshavardhan V. Ghadge, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :Mr. Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv.
R.No.1 Mr. Chirag J Shah, Adv.
Mr. Utsav Trivedi, Adv.
Mr. Sameer Nangare, Adv.
Mr. Anudatt Dubey, Adv.
Mr. Shubh Jain, Adv.
Mr. Nayan Dham, Adv.
M/S. Tas Law, AOR
R.Nos.2 to 4 Mr. Shubham Saigal, AOR
Mr. Siddharth Jain, Adv.
Ms. Shruti Priya Mishra, Adv.
Ms. Bhavika Mehta, Adv.
Ms. Ishani Kaushik, Adv.
R.No.5 Mr. Rajeev Kumar Panday, Adv.
Mr. Vivek Singh, AOR
Mr. Ayush Gupta, Adv.
35
Ms. Saumya Saraswat, Adv.
Ms. Astha Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. Shailendra Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Vikas Bansal, Adv.
Mr. K.k.Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Abhinay Ravindra Adsul, Adv.
R.No.6 Mr. Prabhas Bajaj, AOR
Mr. Priyanshu Tyagi, Adv.
Mr. Harsh Chauhan, Adv.
Mr. Rithvik Mathur, Adv.
Mr. Rishabh Yadav, Adv.
Ms. Priyanka Bhatt, Adv.
R.No.8 Mr. Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, AOR
Mr. Nishant Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Ankur Savadikar, Adv.
Mr. Kartik Sharma, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in the terms of the signed
reportable order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
(NEETU KHAJURIA)
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR-CUM-PS
(RANJANA SHAILEY)
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file.)
36