Havells India Limited & Anr. vs Havai Home Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Date of Decision: 13 July, 2026
+ CS(COMM) 778/2024
HAVELLS INDIA LIMITED & ANR. .....Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Sudeep Chatterjee, Mr. Kunal Vats, Mr.
Sanyam Suri, Mr. Shitanshu Abhishek and Ms.
Purnima Vashishta, Advocates.

versus

HAVAI HOME PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. & ORS. .....Defendants
Through: Mr. Arnab Ghosh and Mr. S.P. Singh,
Advocates for D-1 and 2.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH
JUDGEMENT
JYOTI SINGH, J.
I.A. 38970/2024
1. This application is preferred by the Plaintiffs under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking ad interim injunction restraining Defendants and
all others acting on their behalf from using the impugned trademarks HAVAI ,
,
and/or any other mark deceptively
similar to Plaintiffs’ trademarks HAVELLS/
and
and/or their derivative forms. Before proceeding further, be it

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 1 of 32

noted that originally Plaintiffs had impleaded three Defendants, wherein
Defendant No.3 was Bureau of Indian Standards. However, vide order dated
24.12.2025, Defendant No.3 was deleted from the array of parties.
2. To the extent necessary, the factual matrix as brought forth by the
Plaintiffs is that Plaintiff No.1 is an Indian company and both Plaintiffs are
owners and proprietors of HAVELLS trademark for different goods and
HAVELLS also forms part of the corporate name of Plaintiff No.1, which is
a company incorporated in 1983 albeit it has been in the Electrical and
Power Distribution Equipment business since 1942 through its predecessors.
Plaintiff No.1 is a two billion Dollar leading FMEG company having
extensive production and distribution network across India and
internationally, providing wide range of world class industrial and
electrical products. Plaintiff No.1’s products are widely sold under some of
the most prestigious global brands like Havells, Reo, Crabtree etc., and its
state-of-the-art manufacturing plants in India are located in a number of
places such as Haridwar, Noida, Alwar. Plaintiffs have a strong
domestic presence across 45 cities employing more than 6,500 professionals
and have pioneered the concept of exclusive brand showrooms in the
electrical industry with Havells Galaxy Stores. Plaintiffs have also
launched mobile van activity and over 380 exclusive stores with mobile
applications to shop online through e-stores and is one of the first FMEG
companies to offer door step service via its initiative ‘Havells Connect’.
Plaintiffs’ products are of superior quality and are certified by both
national and international quality certification bodies such as Bureau of
Indian Standards, Bureau of Energy Efficiency, KEMA KEUR DEKRA
(Netherlands) Metrology, CB, CE, EDD (Bahrain), ESMA (Emirates
Authority for Standardization and Metrology), GSO (GCC Standardization
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 2 of 32

Organization), SONCAP (Nigeria), Bureau Veritas, TÜV Rheinland
and UL.
3. It is stated that Plaintiffs’ products are sold in India and also exported
to more than 60 foreign countries such as Sri Lanka, Dubai, Egypt, Maldives
etc. Plaintiffs have earned immense reputation and goodwill by sale of vast
array of goods bearing trademark HAVELLS and its formatives including
device marks with artistic works such as
,
.
Plaintiffs have invested substantially in promotion and advertisement of the
products through print and electronic media, advertisements in magazines,
articles as also through social media platforms. The sales figures as also
expenses incurred on promotion from 2016-2017 to 2023-2024 are as
follows:-


Signature Not Verified
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By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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4. It is stated that trademark HAVELLS is an invented/coined word and
the mark along with its device marks
,
have been
used extensively and continuously since their adoption. Plaintiffs’ earliest
registration for device mark
under registration no. 167484 in Class
11 dates back to 1955 and details of the registrations are as follows:-

Signature Not Verified
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Signing Date:17.07.2026
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5. It is stated that Plaintiffs also enjoy registrations in foreign
jurisdictions and many applications for registration of variant marks, are
pending. HAVELLS is an integral part of several domain names owned by
the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have been extremely vigilant in protecting their
intellectual property rights in the HAVELLS trademarks and have filed law
suits and other proceedings, both internationally and in India, against third
Signature Not Verified
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By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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parties attempting to infringe the marks and/or pass off their goods and
many favourable orders of injunction have been granted by various Courts,
as detailed in paragraph 33 of the plaint. Significantly, the trademark
HAVELLS, owing to its widespread, continuous, extensive and
uninterrupted use and immense reputation and goodwill has been recognised
and declared as a well-known mark within the meaning of Section 2(1)(zg)
of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (‘1999 Act’) by judgment dated 08.12.2024
passed by this Court in CS(OS) 3770/2014 titled Havells India Ltd & Anr. v.
M/s TT Plyboard & Ors. and the trademark is included in the list of
well-known trademarks by the Trade Marks Registry.
6. It is stated that Defendant No.1 is a company engaged in the business
of manufacturing and selling various electrical products including air
coolers, pedestrian fans, immersion rods etc. and is additionally selling spare
parts such as cooler covers for various companies as also the Plaintiffs, but
without authorization of the Plaintiffs and are unlawfully using the mark
HAVELLS SPARES on the spare parts. As per search conducted by the
Plaintiffs, trademark HAVAI is registered in favour of Defendant No.1 in
Class 11; mark havai in Class 20; mark HAVAI in Classes 21 and 24. The
applications were filed on ‘proposed to be used’ basis. Defendant No.1 also
filed application dated 23.08.2023 bearing no. 6079038 for registration of
mark havai on ‘proposed to be used’ basis in Class 07, in which Plaintiff
No.1 filed opposition. Plaintiff No.1 has also filed opposition in another
application filed by Defendant No.1 on 23.08.2023 for registration under no.
6079054 in Class 35, where no counter statement has been filed and the
application stands abandoned. Defendant No.2 is the proprietor of the firm
Advance Coolers, which is marketing the products of Defendant No.1.
Defendants are selling the impugned products under the mark HAVAI
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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through the official website https://www.havai.com/ as also through third
party websites such as Amazon.
7. It is stated that in second week of December, 2023, Plaintiffs learnt
that initial trademark application no. 2578982 was filed by Defendant No.2
and the trademark was later assigned in favour of Defendant No.1 vide
Assignment Deed dated 24.06.2023. Defendant No.2 has also filed an
application on ‘proposed to be used’ basis bearing no. 5733513 dated
22.12.2022 for registration of mark HAVAI under Class 11 but objection
has been raised by the Trade Marks Registry. Defendant No.2 had also
earlier filed application bearing no. 2578981 dated 12.08.2013 for
registration of mark HAVAI in Class 08 but the same also stands abandoned
vide order dated 19.07.2024 since counter statement to the opposition filed
by Plaintiff No.1 was not filed. It is thus clear that both Defendants are
mischievously resorting to securing illegal registrations to defeat the
proprietary rights of the Plaintiffs.
8. In order to understand the exact business model of the Defendants,
Plaintiffs purchased one of the products of Defendant No.1 through Amazon
and found that not only were the Defendants using the mark ‘ HAVAI ’, which
is deceptively similar to Plaintiffs’ HAVELLS marks but were also
mentioning incorrect ISI numbers on the products to mislead the authorities
that they were following the mandatory protocols under the Bureau of Indian
Standards Act, 2016 (‘BIS Act’). Further investigation revealed that
Defendants have also adopted two device marks
and
, which are deceptively similar to Plaintiffs’ HAVELLS marks
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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and have gone to the extent of copying the colour scheme, overall get up and
layout to cause confusion amongst members of public, which constrained
the Plaintiffs to approach this Court.
9. Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff argued that Defendants are
selling their products under the impugned mark ‘ HAVAI ’ along with its
formative device marks through their official website https://www.havai.in/
and in order to maximize their reach and unlawfully enrich themselves,
Defendants are also selling impugned products on Amazon, Flipkart,
IndiaMart etc. On an overall comparison of the impugned marks HAVAI /
/
with Plaintiffs’ registered marks
HAVELLS/
and their formative marks, it is
apparent that the rival marks are visually and phonetically, deceptively
similar and the goods being identical and trade channels and consumer base
being common, there is every likelihood of confusion amongst members of
the public. Defendants are thus infringing the registered HAVELLS
trademarks of the Plaintiffs under Section 29 of 1999 Act. There is no
gainsaying that armed with registrations, Plaintiffs have a statutory right to
the exclusive use of the HAVELLS marks as also to restrain third-parties
from infringing them.
10. It was strenuously urged that this is a peculiar case, where Defendant
No. 1 is not using the actual mark HAVAI in which it has registration in
class 11 and the products are being sold in the market using the mark
HAVAI,
with a different font style of last letter ‘I’ in an explicit attempt to have a
close resemblance with Plaintiffs’ registered HAVELLS marks. Deliberate
use of a different font style is to give an impression that the letter ‘I’ is an
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 8 of 32

‘L’ so as to deceive an unwary customer to perceive the phonetics of the
mark as ‘Ha-va-L’, in which case there will be a complete phonetic identity
between the rival marks and the goods of the Defendants will be easily
passed off as those of the Plaintiffs, owing to their immense goodwill
and reputation. In fact, in one such instance in the past, a party was
successful in duping the consumers by spoofing a domain name
‘Nilesh.Bhatia@have II s.com’, wherein the alphabet ‘i’ was changed to ‘ I ’ to
look like ‘L’. It is pertinent that the class of consumers purchasing the
products in question i.e., cooler covers, immersion rods, pedestal fans, air
coolers etc. and other electrical goods include inter alia electricians,
electrical contractors, builders and general public for their households, who
may not necessarily be discerning customers and due to high degree of
phonetic similarity between the rival marks when HAVAI is read as
HAVELLS, since the latter is so well known and identity of goods, a man of
average intelligence and imperfect recollection will be confused on the
initial look that the goods of the Defendants are those of the Plaintiffs or
have some association with it.
11. It was argued that the likelihood of confusion between the rival
marks HAVELLS and HAVAI gets enhanced in the present case as the marks
are also structurally and visually deceptively similar. Both marks begin with
the alphabet ‘H’ and the first syllable ‘HAV’ is common. The consumers
belong to tier II and tier III cities of the country, where consumers generally
do not focus on each alphabet critically but go by the overall visual
impression of the mark. It is for this reason that this Court vide order dated
27.05.2025 passed in CS(COMM) No. 519/2025 in Havells India Limited &
Anr. v. Jai Bhagwan Sharma & Ors. restrained the Defendants from using
the mark ‘HAVEIIS’ and on showing of the Plaintiffs that Defendants had
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 9 of 32

simply changed the font style of the letter ‘L’ to the extent that the same
may be read as both ‘L’ and ‘I’, observed that the rival marks were
deceptively similar and clearly an attempt to create an impression that
Defendants were associated with the Plaintiffs. Reliance was placed on the
judgments in Ciba Ltd. Basle Switzerland v. M. Ramalingam and S.
Subramaniam trading in the name of South Indian Manufacturing Co.,
Madura and Another, 1957 SCC OnLine Bom 45 and Pfizer Products Inc.
v. Renovision Exports Pvt. Ltd. and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3140 ,
to buttress the argument of deceptive similarity. In Ciba Ltd (supra) , the
competing marks were ‘Ciba’ and ‘Cibol’ and the Bombay High Court held
that the resemblance between the marks was both visual and phonetic, since
the first syllable was identical and as for phonetic similarity, if the sound or
pronunciation of the last syllable of Cibol is slurred over, there will be close
resemblance in the two marks. In Pfizer Products (supra) , looking into the
rival marks VIAGRA and VIGOURA, this Court held that they exhibit a
high degree of phonetic similarity inasmuch as both marks comprise of three
syllables with ‘Vi’ as a common prefix and ‘Ra’ as a similar suffix,
producing a strikingly similar auditory impression. The rival marks are
therefore phonetically and visually deceptively similar.
12. It was further argued that Plaintiffs have been in the business of
manufacturing and sale of wide range of consumer products such as water
purifiers, hair dryers, geysers etc. including air coolers, fans, immersion rods
under the marks HAVELLS/
/
and perusal
of their website https://havells.com/ evidences the fact that the mark
HAVELLS is an integral part of domain names owned by the Plaintiffs. The
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 10 of 32

goodwill and reputation earned by the Plaintiffs owing to sale of products
under HAVELLS marks can be gauged from the gross revenues earned/sales
turnover, which in the financial year 2023-2024 alone was to the tune of
Rs.18,550 crores. Plaintiffs have expended enormous amounts on
advertisements and promotions and expenses incurred for 2023-2024 were
Rs. 528 crores, which is supported by a CA certificate. Use of the HAVAI
marks by the Defendants is therefore only to misrepresent to the public that
they have an association with the Plaintiffs so as to encash on Plaintiffs’
reputation and goodwill and pass off their goods and this is causing
irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs. The confusion in the instant case is
enhanced by the fact that Defendants are selling their spare parts and cooler
covers for Plaintiffs’ air coolers by prominently displaying the words
‘HAVELLS SPARES’ and photographs depicting the names of Plaintiffs’
products. Any unwary consumer, who will come across the website of the
Defendants will inevitably believe that Defendants are the dealers of
Plaintiffs, authorized by them to sell genuine spare parts and this will also
have a direct link to an association regarding the use of HAVAI marks on
their products. Thus, the Defendants are acting in violation of Section 29(8)
of 1999 Act and contrary to principle of ‘fair use’, envisaged in Section
30(2). Importantly, the fact that Defendants are selling spare parts using
HAVELLS SPARES, also belies the casual stand of the Defendants taken in
the written statement that they were not aware of the Plaintiffs.
13. It was urged that there is no plausible explanation in the written
statement as to why Defendants adopted the marks
HAVAI/
/
and that too way different from their
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 11 of 32

registered mark HAVAI wherein ‘I’ is represented as ‘I’. The only reason
put forth for adopting the mark is that Defendants focus on air-based
HAVAI
products i.e. HAVA, which means air and therefore, the adoption is honest.
This reason cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, it does not explain
the change of the registered trademark to a different font style of ‘I’ and
secondly, Defendants also sell immersion rods, which has nothing to do with
air. During the course of hearing, Plaintiffs endeavored to amicably settle
the inter se disputes, however, Defendants were rigid about not changing the
actually used trademarks including the colour combinations in the device
marks so as to make them distinct from Plaintiffs’ HAVELLS marks.
14. Appearing on behalf of the Defendants, Mr. Arnab Ghosh, learned
counsel argued that the present suit is liable to be dismissed for want of
cause of action in favour of the Plaintiffs. Defendants have never used the
trademark HAVELLS or any mark deceptively similar thereto. Defendant
No. 1 is a rightful owner and registered proprietor of trademarks HAVAI/
havai, registered under No. 2578982 in Class 11; 4637091 in Class 21;
4637092 in Class 24; and 6079039 in Class 22 and there is no similarity in
the rival marks HAVELLS and HAVAI, either visually, structurally or
phonetically. By virtue of registrations, Defendant No. 1 is entitled to use
the mark lawfully and Plaintiffs have no right to question the same.
Trademark HAVAI is a prominent part of the company name Havai Home
Products Private Ltd., which was approved by the Registrar of Companies
after thorough trademark search in all classes.
15. It was argued that Plaintiffs have essentially predicated the suit on
three issues: Defendants do not have BIS registration; Defendants are
infringing Plaintiffs’ mark HAVELLS and its formative marks by use of the
mark HAVAI , substituting the letter ‘I’ of the registered mark in a manner
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 12 of 32

that it can be misread and mispronounced as ‘L’; and Defendants are passing
off their goods as those of the Plaintiffs, encashing on their formidable
goodwill and reputation. Insofar as BIS registration is concerned, Defendant
No. 3 has already filed its report in favour of the Defendants that they are
not violating any law under the BIS Act and based on this stand, Defendant
No. 3 was deleted from array of parties vide order dated 24.12.2025. Insofar
as reference to the words HAVELLS SPARES on spare parts is concerned,
Defendants have removed all references from their website and literature,
pursuant to undertaking given to the Court on 20.12.2025.
16. It was strenuously urged that since the HAVAI mark of Defendant
No. 1 is duly registered, no case for infringement can lie as it is a settled law
that one registered proprietor cannot sue the other registered proprietor.
Without prejudice, even otherwise the two marks are entirely different in all
respects yet during the course of hearing, Defendants made every attempt to
settle the matter and gave many proposals but Plaintiffs insisted on changing
the letter ‘V’ in the mark HAVAI to either ‘W’ or ‘VV', which was rightly
not accepted since Plaintiffs have never set up a case of similarity based on
the syllable ‘HAV’. It is trite that a party cannot travel beyond its pleadings.
[Ref.: Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by LRs v. Bishun Narain Inter College
and Others, (1987) 2 SCC 555 and Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and
Another, (2008) 17 SCC 491] . In any event, syllable HAV is common to
trade and is used by many for goods in the same class as the Plaintiffs and in
law, no monopoly or exclusivity can be claimed on ‘HAV’.
17. It was urged that Plaintiffs’ case of passing off against Defendants is
entirely misconceived and based on mere assumptions, without placing any
cogent material on record demonstrating actual deception, actual confusion
or dishonest adoption. There are no consumer complaints, surveys etc. and
Signature Not Verified
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By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 13 of 32

in the absence of evidence of actual confusion, no case of passing off, which
is a tort in common law based on deceit and misrepresentation, is made out.
To lend support to the arguments, learned counsel relied on the judgments of
this Court in Subway IP LLC v. Infinity Food and Others, 2023 SCC
OnLine Del 150; M/s. South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills
Marketing Inc. & Anr., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1953; and Stiefel
Laboratories, INC & Anr. v. Ajanta Pharma Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Del
3405, highlighting the rule of anti-dissection for comparing conflicting
marks, which essentially means that marks have to be seen as a whole and
not dissected into component parts. In Stiefel Laboratories (supra) , Court
emphasised on applying the anti-dissection rule referring to McCarthy on
Trade Marks and Unfair Competition and more importantly, to the
observations of the Supreme Court that the commercial impression of a
trademark is derived from it as a whole and not from its elements, separated
and considered in detail. Reliance was also placed on S.M. Dyechem Ltd v
Cadbury (India) Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 573 , where the Supreme Court held
that mere possibility of confusion is not sufficient and the likelihood
must be real and tangible and on Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila
Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73 , for the proposition that likelihood
of confusion must be real and must be determined based on several factors
including nature of the marks, degree of resemblance, nature of goods, class
of purchasers and mode of purchasing.
18. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs and counsel for the
Defendants.
19. Plaintiffs are the registered proprietors of trademark HAVELLS and
its formative marks, with the earliest registration dating back to 1955 in
Class 11 bearing registration no. 167484. The use of the mark HAVELLS
Signature Not Verified
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By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 14 of 32

commenced in the year 1942 and since then, the mark has been prominently,
extensively and uninterruptedly used in respect of the goods for which it is
registered. Plaintiffs have been using the marks HAVELLS,
and
for the business of manufacturing
and sale of wide range of consumer electrical product including air coolers,
fans, immersion rods etc. and this is corroborated by the documents on
record, which include screenshots and information of their website
http://havells.com . Documents also evidence that the mark HAVELLS is an
integral part of the domain names owned by the Plaintiffs.
20. From the averments in the pleadings filed by the Plaintiffs and
documents in support thereof, it is demonstrably clear that Plaintiffs have
garnered immense reputation and goodwill by sale of products under the
HAVELLS marks. Sales figures as also expenses incurred on promotion and
advertisement for the period 2016-2017 to 2023-2024 are furnished in the
plaint. Pertinently and illustratively, for the financial year 2023-2024 alone,
the sales turnover was to the tune of Rs.18,550 crores and the expenses
incurred were Rs.528 crores. Plaintiffs have wide social media presence on
renowned and popular social media platforms such as Instagram, X and
Facebook. Plaintiff No.1 is stated to be an almost $2 billion leading FMEG
company and its state-of-the-art manufacturing plants are located in a
number of States. Plaintiffs have also launched mobile van activity and have
over 380 exclusive stores with mobile applications to shop online through
e-stores. Plaintiffs have substantially invested in advertising and promotion
campaigns, both through print and electronic media as also popular
magazines, copies of which are on record. Plaintiffs’ products are sold in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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India and also exported to more than 60 countries such as Dubai, Egypt,
Maldives etc. The distinctiveness of the mark HAVELLS and goodwill and
reputation attached thereto is best indicated from the fact that HAVELLS
has been recognised and declared as a well-known mark by this Court in
Havells India Ltd. (supra), vide judgment dated 08.12.2024 and the mark is
included in the list of well-known marks by the Registry of Trade Marks.
For the sake of record, it be noted that HAVELLS has also earned the
recognition of a well-known mark in Turkey and by WIPO. As brought
forth, Plaintiffs have secured many favourable orders from this Court as also
in foreign jurisdictions restraining the infringers in respect of the mark
HAVELLS including a restraint on mark HAVEIIS, basis the possibility of
‘II’ being misread and mispronounced as ‘LL’.
21. By this application, Plaintiffs seek interim injunction restraining the
Defendants from using the impugned marks HAVAI ,
and
and/or any other mark deceptively similar thereto in
respect of electrical goods, inter alia amounting to infringement of
trademark and/or passing off. Insofar as infringement is concerned,
Defendants assert that one registered proprietor cannot make a claim of
infringement against another registered proprietor and since the mark
HAVAI is registered in favour of Defendant No. 1, no injunction can be
sought under Section 29 of 1999 Act. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, take a
position that the actual marks used by the Defendants are different from the
registered marks and are not registered and therefore, the claim for
infringement is valid and even otherwise, registration is not a defence to an
action against passing off.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 16 of 32

22. In my considered view, there is merit in the submission of the
Plaintiffs that registration of a mark is not a defence to passing off. In
S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683, the Supreme
Court ruled that an owner of a registered trademark can bring an action
against the other party for passing off invoking Section 27(2) of 1999 Act,
even if the other party is a registered proprietor of a deceptively similar
mark. Deciding the interplay between Section 27(2) and Section 28(3) of
1999 Act, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
“28. However, what is stated above is the reflection of Section 28 of the
Act when that provision is seen and examined without reference to the
other provisions of the Act. It is stated at the cost of repetition that as per
this Section owner of registered trade mark cannot sue for infringement of
his registered trade mark if the appellant also has the trade mark which is
registered. Having said so, a very important question arises for
consideration at this stage, namely, whether such a respondent can bring
an action against the appellant for passing off invoking the provisions of
Section 27(2) of the Act. In other words, what would be the interplay of
Section 27(2) and Section 28(3) of the Act is the issue that arises for
consideration in the instant case. As already noticed above, the trial court
as well as the High Court have granted the injunction in favour of the
respondent on the basis of prior user as well as on the ground that the
trade mark of the appellant, even if it is registered, would cause deception
in the mind of the public at large and the appellant is trying to encash
upon, exploit and ride upon on the goodwill of the respondent herein.
Therefore, the issue to be determined is as to whether in such a scenario,
the provisions of Section 27(2) would still be available even when the
appellant is having registration of the trade mark of which he is using.
29. After considering the entire matter in the light of the various
provisions of the Act and the scheme, our answer to the aforesaid question
would be in the affirmative. Our reasons for arriving at this conclusion
are the following.
30. Firstly , the answer to this proposition can be seen by carefully looking
at the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (the Act). Collective
reading of the provisions especially Sections 27, 28, 29 and 34 of the
Trade Marks Act, 1999 would show that the rights conferred by
registration are subject to the rights of the prior user of the trade mark.
We have already reproduced Section 27 and Section 29 of the Act.
30.1. From the reading of Section 27(2) of the Act, it is clear that the right
of action of any person for passing off the goods/services of another
Signature Not Verified
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By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 17 of 32

person and remedies thereof are not affected by the provisions of the Act.
Thus, the rights in passing off are emanating from the common law and
not from the provisions of the Act and they are independent from the rights
conferred by the Act. This is evident from the reading of the opening
words of Section 27(2) which are “Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to
affect rights….”
30.2. Likewise, the registration of the mark shall give exclusive rights to
the use of the trade mark subject to the other provisions of this Act. Thus,
the rights granted by the registration in the form of exclusivity are not
absolute but are subject to the provisions of the Act.
30.3. Section 28(3) of the Act provides that the rights of two registered
proprietors of identical or nearly resembling trade marks shall not be
enforced against each other. However, they shall be same against the
third parties. Section 28(3) merely provides that there shall be no rights of
one registered proprietor vis-à-vis another but only for the purpose of
registration. The said provision 28(3) nowhere comments about the rights
of passing off which shall remain unaffected due to overriding effect of
Section 27(2) of the Act and thus the rights emanating from the common
law shall remain undisturbed by the enactment of Section 28(3) which
clearly states that the rights of one registered proprietor shall not be
enforced against the another person.
30.4. Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides that nothing in
this Act shall entitle the registered proprietor or registered user to
interfere with the rights of prior user. Conjoint reading of Sections 34, 27
and 28 would show that the rights of registration are subject to Section 34
which can be seen from the opening words of Section 28 of the Act which
states “Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a
trade mark shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor….” and also
the opening words of Section 34 which states “Nothing in this Act shall
entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered trade mark to
interfere….” Thus, the scheme of the Act is such where rights of prior user
are recognised superior than that of the registration and even the
registered proprietor cannot disturb/interfere with the rights of prior user.
The overall effect of collective reading of the provisions of the Act is that
the action for passing off which is premised on the rights of prior user
generating a goodwill shall be unaffected by any registration provided
under the Act. This proposition has been discussed in extenso in N.R.
Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn. [N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn., 1995 SCC
OnLine Del 310 : AIR 1995 Del 300] wherein the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court recognised that the registration is not an indefeasible
right and the same is subject to rights of prior user. The said decision
of Whirlpool [N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn., 1995 SCC OnLine Del
310 : AIR 1995 Del 300] was further affirmed by the Supreme Court of
India in N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn. [N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool
Corpn., (1996) 5 SCC 714]
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30.5. The above were the reasonings from the provisions arising from the
plain reading of the Act which gives clear indication that the rights of
prior user are superior than that of registration and are unaffected by the
registration rights under the Act.
31. Secondly , there are other additional reasonings as to why the passing
off rights are considered to be superior than that of registration rights.
31.1. Traditionally, passing off in common law is considered to be a right
for protection of goodwill in the business against misrepresentation
caused in the course of trade and for prevention of resultant damage on
account of the said misrepresentation. The three ingredients of passing off
are goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. These ingredients are
considered to be classical trinity under the law of passing off as per the
speech of Lord Oliver laid down in Reckitt & Colman Products
Ltd. v. Borden Inc. [Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc.,
(1990) 1 WLR 491 : (1990) 1 All ER 873 (HL)] which is more popularly
known as “Jif Lemon” case wherein Lord Oliver reduced the five
guidelines laid out by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink Besloten
Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [Erven Warnink Besloten
Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., 1979 AC 731 at p. 742 :
(1979) 3 WLR 68 : (1979) 2 All ER 927 (HL)] (“the Advocaat case”) to
three elements : (1) goodwill owned by a trader, (2) misrepresentation,
and (3) damage to goodwill. Thus, the passing off action is essentially an
action in deceit where the common law rule is that no person is entitled to
carry on his or her business on pretext that the said business is of that of
another. This Court has given its imprimatur to the above
principle in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah [Laxmikant V.
Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65] .
31.2. The applicability of the said principle can be seen as to which
proprietor has generated the goodwill by way of use of the mark/name in
the business. The use of the mark/carrying on business under the name
confers the rights in favour of the person and generates goodwill in the
market. Accordingly, the latter user of the mark/name or in the business
cannot misrepresent his business as that of business of the prior right
holder. That is the reason why essentially the prior user is considered to
be superior than that of any other rights. Consequently, the examination of
rights in common law which are based on goodwill, misrepresentation and
damage are independent to that of registered rights. The mere fact that
both prior user and subsequent user are registered proprietors are
irrelevant for the purposes of examining who generated the goodwill first
in the market and whether the latter user is causing misrepresentation in
the course of trade and damaging the goodwill and reputation of the prior
right holder/former user. That is the additional reasoning that the
statutory rights must pave the way for common law rights of passing off.
32. Thirdly , it is also recognised principle in common law jurisdiction that
passing off right is broader remedy than that of infringement. This is due
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to the reason that the passing off doctrine operates on the general
principle that no person is entitled to represent his or her business as
business of other person. The said action in deceit is maintainable for
diverse reasons other than that of registered rights which are allocated
rights under the Act. The authorities of other common law jurisdictions
like England more specifically Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade
Names, 14th Edn., Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell South Asian Edition
recognises the principle that where trade mark action fails, passing off
action may still succeed on the same evidence. This has been explained by
the learned author by observing the following:
“15-033. A claimant may fail to make out a case of infringement of a
trade mark for various reasons and may yet show that by imitating the
mark claimed as a trade mark, or otherwise, the defendant has done
what is calculated to pass off his goods as those of the claimant. A
claim in ‘passing off’ has generally been added as a second string to
actions for infringement, and has on occasion succeeded where the
claim for infringement has failed.”
32.1. The same author also recognises the principle that the Trade Marks
Act affords no bar to the passing off action. This has been explained by the
learned author as under:
“15-034. Subject to possibly one qualification, nothing in the Trade
Marks Act, 1994 affects a trader's right against another in an action
for passing off. It is, therefore, no bar to an action for passing off that
the trade name, get up or any other of the badges identified with the
claimant's business, which are alleged to have been copies or imitated
by the defendant, might have been, but are not registered as, trade
marks, even though the evidence is wholly addressed to what may be a
mark capable of registration. Again, it is no defence to passing off that
the defendant's mark is registered. The Act offers advantages to those
who register their trade marks, but imposes no penalty upon those who
do not. It is equally no bar to an action for passing off that the false
representation relied upon is an imitation of a trade mark that is
incapable of registration. A passing off action can even lie against a
registered proprietor of the mark sued upon. The fact that a claimant
is using a mark registered by another party (or even the defendant)
does not of itself prevent goodwill being generated by the use of the
mark, or prevent such a claimant from relying on such goodwill in an
action against the registered proprietor. Such unregistered marks are
frequently referred to as ‘common law trade marks’.”
32.2. From the reading of the aforementioned excerpts from Kerly's Law
of Trade Marks and Trade Names, it can be said that not merely it is
recognised in India but in other jurisdictions also including England/UK
(Provisions of the UK Trade Marks Act, 1994 are analogous to the Indian
Trade Marks Act, 1999) that the registration is no defence to a passing off
action and nor the Trade Marks Act, 1999 affords any bar to a passing off
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action. In such an event, the rights conferred by the Act under the
provisions of Section 28 have to be subject to the provisions of Section
27(2) of the Act and thus the passing off action has to be considered
independent “Iruttukadai Halwa” under the provisions of the Trade
Marks Act, 1999.
33. Fourthly , it is also a well-settled principle of law in the field of the
trade marks that the registration merely recognises the rights which are
already pre-existing in common law and does not create any rights. This
has been explained by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
in Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co. [Century
Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co., 1977 SCC OnLine Del 50 : AIR
1978 Del 250] in the following words : (SCC OnLine Del para 10)
“10. ‘16. … First is the question of use of the trade mark. Use plays an
all-important part. A trader acquires a right of property in a
distinctive mark merely by using it upon or in connection with his
goods irrespective of the length of such user and the extent of his
trade. The trader who adopts such a mark is entitled to protection
directly the article having assumed a vendible character is launched
upon the market. Registration under the statute does not confer any
new right to the mark claimed or any greater rights than what already
existed at common law and at equity without registration. It does,
however, facilitate a remedy which may be enforced and obtained
throughout ‘the State and it established the record of facts affecting
the right to the mark. Registration itself does not create a trade mark.
The trade mark exists independently of the registration which merely
affords further protection under the statute. Common law rights are
left wholly unaffected.’ [ Ed. : As observed in L.D. Malhotra
Industries v. Ropi Industries, 1975 SCC OnLine Del 172, para 16.] ”
(emphasis supplied)
33.1. The same view is expressed by the Bombay High Court in Sunder
Parmanand Lalwani v. Caltex (India) Ltd. [Sunder Parmanand
Lalwani v. Caltex (India) Ltd., 1965 SCC OnLine Bom 151 : AIR 1969
Bom 24] in which it has been held vide AIR para 32 as follows : (SCC
OnLine Bom paras 1 & 2)
“1. A proprietary right in a mark can be [‘Iruttukadai Halwa’]
obtained in a number of ways. The mark can be originated by a
person, or it can be subsequently acquired by him from somebody
else. Our Trade Marks law is based on the English Trade Marks law
and the English Acts. The first Trade Marks Act in England was
passed in 1875. Even prior thereto, it was firmly established in
England that a trader acquired a right of property in a distinctive
mark merely by using it upon or in connection with goods irrespective
of the length of such user and the extent of his trade, and that he was
entitled to protect such right of property by appropriate proceedings
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by way of injunction in a court of law. Then came the English Trade
Marks Act of 1875, which was substituted later by later Acts. The
English Acts enabled registration of a new mark not till then used with
the like consequences which a distinctive mark had prior to the
passing of the Acts. The effect of the relevant provision of the English
Acts was that registration of a trade mark would be deemed to be
equivalent to public user of such mark. Prior to the Acts, one could
become a proprietor of a trade mark only by user, but after the
passing of the Act of 1875, one could become a proprietor either by
user or by registering the mark even prior to its user. He could do the
latter after complying with the other requirements of the Act, including
the filing of a declaration of his intention to use such mark. See
observations of Llyod Jacob, J. in Vitamins Ltd.'s Application, In
re [Vitamins Ltd.'s Application, In re, (1956) 1 WLR 1 : (1955) 3 All
ER 827 : 1956 RPC 1] at RPC p. 12, and particularly the following :
(WLR p. 10)
‘… A proprietary right in a mark sought to be registered can be
obtained in a number of ways. The mark can be originated by a
person or can be acquired, but in all cases it is necessary that the
person putting forward the application should be in possession of
some proprietary right which, if questioned, can be substantiated.’
2. Law in India under our present Act is similar.”
(emphasis supplied)
33.2. We uphold the said view which has been followed and relied upon by
the courts in India over a long time. The said views emanating from the
courts in India clearly speak in one voice, which is, that the rights in
common law can be acquired by way of use and the registration rights
were introduced later which made the rights granted under the law
equivalent to the public user of such mark. Thus, we hold that registration
is merely a recognition of the rights pre-existing in common law and in
case of conflict between the two registered proprietors, the evaluation of
the better rights in common law is essential as the common law rights
would enable the court to determine whose rights between the two
registered proprietors are better and superior in common law which have
been recognised in the form of the registration by the Act.”

23. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment referred to an earlier
decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Century Traders v. Roshan
Lal Duggar & Co., 1977 SCC OnLine Del 50, where it was held that
registration is merely a recognition of pre-existing right in common law and
where a conflict arises between two registered proprietors, the Court should
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evaluate the better right basis the common law rights. Recently, in Vaidya
Rishi India Health Private Limited and Another v. Suresh Dutt Parashar
and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6147, the Division Bench of this Court
once again held that passing off action will lie even against a registered
proprietor of a trademark, since passing off action is predicated on common
law right and is not a statutory tort.

24. It needs no reiteration that the three ingredients of the tort of passing
off are: goodwill; misrepresentation; and damage and harm to the goodwill.
These three ingredients are considered as the classical trinity and in this
context, I may refer to a passage from the landmark judgment in S. Syed
Mohideen (supra), as follows:-
“31.1. Traditionally, passing off in common law is considered to be a right
for protection of goodwill in the business against misrepresentation
caused in the course of trade and for prevention of resultant damage on
account of the said misrepresentation. The three ingredients of passing off
are goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. These ingredients are
considered to be classical trinity under the law of passing off as per the
speech of Lord Oliver laid down in Reckitt & Colman Products
Ltd. v. Borden Inc. [Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc.,
(1990) 1 WLR 491 : (1990) 1 All ER 873 (HL)] which is more popularly
known as “Jif Lemon” case wherein Lord Oliver reduced the five
guidelines laid out by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink Besloten
Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [Erven Warnink Besloten
Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., 1979 AC 731 at p. 742 :
(1979) 3 WLR 68 : (1979) 2 All ER 927 (HL)] (“the Advocaat case”) to
three elements : (1) goodwill owned by a trader, (2) misrepresentation,
and (3) damage to goodwill. Thus, the passing off action is essentially an
action in deceit where the common law rule is that no person is entitled to
carry on his or her business on pretext that the said business is of that of
another. This Court has given its imprimatur to the above
principle in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah [Laxmikant V.
Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65] .”

25. It would be profitable to refer to a recent Division Bench judgment of
this Court in Western Digital Technologies Inc. and Another v. Geonix
International Private Limited, Through its Directors, Gaurav Jain
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Saurabh Jain and Another, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 901, where the three
ingredients of passing off have been elaborated as follows:-
“85. Trade mark rights, in our country, are cabined and confined within
the Trade Marks Act. The “saving clause” with reference to passing off is
contained in Section 27(2), which clarifies that nothing in the Act would
affect the rights of action against “any person for passing off goods or
services as the goods of another person or services provided by another
person, or the remedies in respect thereof”. It is true that the provision
does not read “any person for passing off his goods or services as the
goods of another person or services provided by another person…”
However, we regarded it as implicit, in Section 27(2), that passing off
must be of one's goods or services as those of another. In other words, if
Mr X were to represent the goods of Mr Y as those of Mr Z, it would not,
to our mind, constitute “passing off” as envisaged in Section 27(2).
86. This is also clear from various judicial pronouncements of the
Supreme Court which identify the ingredients of “passing off”.
87. In Kaviraj Pt Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, the Supreme Court observed that “an action for passing off
is a Common Law remedy being in substance an action for deceit, that is,
a passing off by a person of his own goods as those of another”. Similarly,
in Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., the Supreme Court
held that “an action for passing off, as the phrase “passing off” itself
suggests, is to restrain the defendant from passing off its goods or services
to the public as that of the plaintiff's”. We may reproduce, to advantage,
paras 13 to 15 of Satyam Infoway thus:
“13. The next question is, would the principles of trade mark law and
in particular those relating to passing off apply? An action for passing
off, as the phrase “passing off” itself suggests, is to restrain the
defendant from passing off its goods or services to the public as that of
the plaintiff's. It is an action not only to preserve the reputation of the
plaintiff but also to safeguard the public. The defendant must have
sold its goods or offered its services in a manner which has deceived
or would be likely to deceive the public into thinking that the
defendant's goods or services are the plaintiff's. The action is normally
available to the owner of a distinctive trade mark and the person who,
if the word or name is an invented one, invents and uses it. If two trade
rivals claim to have individually invented the same mark, then the
trader who is able to establish prior user will succeed. The question is,
as has been aptly put, who gets these first? It is not essential for the
plaintiff to prove long user to establish reputation in a passing off
action. It would depend upon the volume of sales and extent of
advertisement.
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14. The second element that must be established by a plaintiff in a
passing off action is misrepresentation by the defendant to the public.
The word “misrepresentation” does not mean that the plaintiff has to
prove any mala fide intention on the part of the defendant. Of course,
if the misrepresentation is intentional, it might lead to an inference
that the reputation of the plaintiff is such that it is worth the
defendant's while to cash in on it. An innocent misrepresentation
would be relevant only on the question of the ultimate relief which
would be granted to the plaintiff [Cadbury-Schweppes (Pty)
Ltd. v. PUB Squash Co. (Pty) Ltd.; Erven Warnink Besloten
Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd.]. What has to be
established is the likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public
(the word “public” being understood to mean actual or potential
customers or users) that the goods or services offered by the defendant
are the goods or the services of the plaintiff. In assessing the
likelihood of such confusion the courts must allow for the “imperfect
recollection of a person of ordinary memory” [Aristoc Ltd. v. Rysta
Ltd.].
15. The third element of a passing off action is loss or the likelihood of
it.”
(Emphasis supplied)
These passages stand approvingly cited by the Supreme Court in its
somewhat recent decision in Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt.
Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Moyhite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana.
88. Inasmuch as Section 27(2) saves the “rights of action against any
person” for passing off, the right of action which is saved is, clearly, the
right of action against a defendant for passing off its goods as those of the
plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
98. The requirement of likelihood of confusion permeates both the tort of
infringement as well as that of passing off. The principle of “initial
interest confusion” requires the aspect of likelihood of confusion by the
consumer to be assessed at the point of “initial interest” i.e. when the
consumer first sees the goods of the defendant. This principle applies as
much to passing off as to infringement, as there is no qualitative difference
between confusion in one case and confusion in the other.”

26. This judgment will be incomplete without alluding to a recent
judgment of the Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard India Private Limited
and Another v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701,
wherein it was re-stated and re-affirmed that passing off action is a common
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law remedy which protects a trader’s reputation and goodwill from others,
who misrepresent to the public so as to cause confusion. In Cadila Health
(supra), the Supreme Court laid down parameters for deciding deceptive
similarity of marks in an action for passing off as follows:-
“35. Broadly stated, in an action for passing-off on the basis of
unregistered trade mark generally for deciding the question of deceptive
similarity the following factors are to be considered:
(a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or
label marks or composite marks i.e. both words and label works.
(b) The degree of resembleness between the marks, phonetically
similar and hence similar in idea.
(c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade
marks.
(d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the
goods of the rival traders.
(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the
marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree
of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the
goods.
(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods.
(g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the
extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks.
36. Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid factors depending upon
facts of each case and the same weightage cannot be given to each factor
in every case.”
27. Coming back to the instant case and applying the parameters laid
down in the judgments aforementioned, the first thing that needs to be
exaimined is whether the impugned marks
HAVAI,
and
are deceptively similar to HAVELLS marks. Parties are
ad idem that while comparing rival marks, they have to be seen as a whole
and cannot be dissected and Courts are not expected to adopt a mechanical
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and side-by-side comparison of the rival marks, a proposition laid down by
the Supreme Court way back in 1959 in Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Shangrila Food Products Ltd., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 11, followed by the
judgments in Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. and Co., Mysore, (1972) 1
SCC 618 and Khoday Distilleries Limited (now known as Khoday India
Limited) v. Scotch Whisky Association and Others, (2008) 10 SCC 723, to
refer to a few and re-affirmed recently in Pernod Ricard (supra). The
following passage from Pianotist Co. Ltd.'s application [(1906) 23 RPC

774] is also relevant in the present context:-
“You must take the two words. You must judge of them, both by their look
and by their sound. You must consider the goods to which they are to be
applied. You must consider the nature and kind of customer who would be
likely to buy those goods. In fact, you must consider all the surrounding
circumstances; and you must further consider what is likely to happen if
each of those trade marks is used in a normal way as a trade mark for the
goods of the respective owners of the marks. If, considering all those
circumstances, you come to the conclusion that there will be a confusion,
that is to say, not necessarily that one man will be injured and the other
will gain illicit benefit, but that there will be a confusion in the mind of the
public which will lead to confusion in the goods — then you may refuse the
registration, or rather you must refuse the registration in that case.”


28. Before comparing Plaintiffs’ HAVELLS marks and the impugned
marks which are subject matter of the suit, it is important to pen down that
the registered mark of Defendant No.1 is HAVAI in the relevant class 11,
whereas what the Defendants are actually using on their products in the
market is a stylized variation of the last letter ‘I’ in HAVAI i.e. HAVAI and
its device marks and this really is the bone of contention between the parties.
Plaintiffs take a position that Defendants have mischievously chosen to
adopt a font style, such that the letter ‘I’ is misread and mispronounced as
‘L’, so that an unwary consumer who has a recollection of the mark
HAVELLS, buys the goods of the Defendants under an impression that
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those are the goods of the Plaintiffs. I am in complete agreement with the
Plaintiffs on this aspect.
29. Present case is a classic and textbook case of passing off, wherein
misrepresentation is the founding pillar. Defendants are using the impugned
marks, which are not only deceptively similar to Plaintiffs’ HAVELLS
marks but are also at variance with Defendant No.1’s own registered mark
HAVAI and there is absolutely no explanation for this shift away from
Defendant No.1’s own registered marks. For ready reference, a comparative
table of Plaintiffs’ HAVELLS marks; Defendants No. 1’s registered mark
and the impugned marks is as follows:-
PLAINTIFFS’
REGISTERED
HAVELLS MARKS
DEFENDANT
NO.1’s
REGISTERED
MARK IN
CLASS 11
IMPUGNED MARKS
ACTUALLY USED
ON THE PRODUCTS
HAVELLS
HAVAI
HAVAI






30. A bare perusal of the aforesaid marks shows that the registered word
mark of Defendant No. 1 ends in letter ‘I’ and as can be seen, ‘I’ has a serif.
Owing to this feature, the mark HAVAI will be ordinarily pronounced as
‘ Ha-va-ee ’ or ‘ Ha-vai ’ and may not have a phonetic deceptive similarity
with HAVELLS. However, sans the serif on ‘I’, the same is likely to be
perceived as letter ‘L’ and resultantly, the mark HAVAI will be pronounced
as ‘Ha-va-L’, which will be phonetically deceptively similar to HAVELLS.
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The change in the stylization and font of the letter ‘I’ in the marks actually
used, is indeed a mala fide attempt to sail close to HAVELLS marks and
create confusion amongst members of the public. It is trite that in a passing
off action, likelihood of deception is assessed on the actual representation in
the market place as consumers are not privy to what exists on the Register of
Trade Marks. Defendants have strained every nerve to come close to the
mark HAVELLS, else there is no reason for any registered proprietor to
move away from its own registered mark and it bears repetition to state that
there is not a whisper in the written statement or reply to this application as
to why the Defendants chose this path, save and except, to create an overall
impression that HAVELLS has an association with the Defendants. If one
looks at HAVELLS and HAVAI , the overall commercial impression is one of
deceptive similarity in the two, the foundation being misrepresentation. In
fact, in respect of the device marks where the dominant part is the word
HAVAI which is deceptively similar to HAVELLS marks, Defendants have
also gone an extra mile to copy the get-up as also the colour scheme i.e.
black & white and red & white, calculated to show association with the
HAVELLS device marks, which reinforces the argument of the Plaintiffs
that the intent is only to confuse customers and members of public and trade.
In Slazenger & Sons v. Feltham & Co., (1899) 6 RPC 531, Lord Lindely,
LJ observed ‘One must exercise one's common sense, and, if you are driven
to the conclusion that what is intended to be done is to deceive is possible, I
do not think it is stretching the imagination very much to credit the man with
occasional success or possible success. Why should we be astute to say that
he cannot succeed in doing that which he is straining every nerve to do?’ In
Munday v. Carey, (1905) R.P.C. 273 , Kekewich, J. observed , ‘Where you
see dishonesty, then even though the similarity were less than it is here, you
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ought, I think, to pay great attention to the items of similarity, and less to the
items of dissimilarity. ’ For ready reference, screenshots depicting actual use
of marks in the market by the Defendants are as follows:-
HAVAI


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31. The argument of the Plaintiffs that confusion gets enhanced owing to
identity of the rival goods, also has merit. Defendants are selling goods such
as air coolers, immersion rods, pedestal fans. The large portfolio of the
Plaintiffs includes fans, coolers, immersion rods and thus there is complete
identity of goods. Looking at the deceptive similarity of the rival marks,
identity of rival goods and immense reputation and goodwill of HAVELLS
marks, this is a case where the initial interest confusion test applies on all
four corners. Division Bench of this Court in Under Armour Inc v. Anish
Agarwal and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3784, underscored that
confusion in the minds of customers arises at the stage prior to
consummating the purchase albeit later the consumer may not have any
doubt regarding the origin of the goods. Defendants have endeavoured to
come close to HAVELLS marks and to succeed in this attempt, they have
cleverly changed the letter ‘I’ to be read and pronounced as ‘L’ such that a
consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection believes that
their goods emanate from the house of the Plaintiffs or have some
association or affiliation with them. The objective is to encash on the
formidable reputation and goodwill of the Plaintiffs, garnered over the years,
which adversely impacts the reputation of the Plaintiffs and dilutes the
HAVELLS marks. Therefore, all three ingredients of the tort of passing off:
goodwill of the Plaintiffs; misrepresentation by the Defendants; and damage
and injury to the Plaintiffs’ goodwill, are prima facie satisfied.
32. Plaintiffs have been able to establish a prima facie case for grant of
temporary injunction. Balance of convenience also lies in favour of the
Plaintiffs, who have been using the well-known mark HAVELLS and its
formatives from decades and against the Defendants who have dishonestly
chosen to use a deceptively similar mark HAVAI ( word and device), so as to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
21:56:16
CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 31 of 32

create confusion amongst the members of the public and pass off their
identical goods. In these facts, irreparable harm and injury shall be caused to
the Plaintiffs if the temporary injunction is not granted.
33. In light of the above, Defendants and all others acting on their behalf
are restrained from selling, marketing, advertising and offering for sale the
impugned goods under the impugned trademarks
HAVAI,
and
, which are deceptively similar to Plaintiffs’ trademarks
HAVELLS/
and their formative marks and/or any
other mark deceptively similar thereto, amounting to passing off. The
temporary injunction shall operate during the pendency of the suit and
needless to state the observations and findings in the present judgment are
only tentative and prima facie and shall not affect the final adjudication of
the suit.
34. Application is allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of.




JYOTI SINGH, J.
JULY 13 , 2026 / YA/ S.Sharma
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
Signing Date:17.07.2026
21:56:16
CS(COMM) 778/2024 Page 32 of 32