SANJIB DEY @ SANJIB KUMAR DEY AND OTHERS vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

CRR 2771 of 2025

CRAN 2 of 2025, CRAN 5 of 2026

Sanjib Dey @ Sanjib Kumar Dey & Ors.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.


For the Petitioners : Mr. Navanil De
Mr. Rajeshwar Chakraborty
Mr. Srinjan Ghosh
Ms. Monami Mukherjee
Mr. Shoumilya Majumder


For the Opposite Party No.2 : Mr. Abhishek Halder
Mr. Debabrata Halder
Ms. Pritha Chatterjee


For the State : Mr. Kallol Mondal Ld. APP
Mr. Imran Siddiqui


Heard on : 03.08.2026


Judgment on : 03.09.2026


Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. The instant revisional application has been preferred seeking
quashment of the criminal proceeding arising out of Sonarpur P.S. Case No.
874 of 2025 under section 318 (4)/316 (2)/351(2) /74 of the BNS
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corresponding to GR Case no. 4367 of 2025, presently pending before
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Baruipur.
2. The allegations that gave rise to the said criminal proceeding, in short,
is that in October, 2024 , petitioner 2 engaged OP no.2 and her husband for
a Home Interior Project, which was initially estimated at Rs. 23, 49, 033/-.
It is alleged at the instance of the petitioner no.3, the work was undertaken
on credit without any advance payment. During execution, the scope of
work was allegedly expanded resulting in revised estimates of Rs.
29,17,274/- and finally Rs. 38,91,961/-. Although payments aggregating
Rs. 23,40,000/- were made, it is alleged that a sum of Rs. 15,42,928/-
remained outstanding. It is alleged that the petitioners cheated the OP no.2
of Rs. 15,42,928/-, inducing the OP to spend money and resources to the
unlawful benefit of the petitioner. It is further alleged that petitioner no.2
abused and assaulted OP no.2 and that the petitioners humiliated her
during the housewarming ceremony on May 12, 2025 and thereafter ceased
communication and that petitioner no.3 criminally intimidated her by
referring political and criminal connections, and that the petitioners had
intended to cheat her from the very inception.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid proceeding learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners submits that petitioner no.1 is a government
servant having unblemished service record, and petitioner no.2 is an
engineer and petitioner no.3 is a practicing advocate who are the sons of
petitioner no.1. He submits that the petitioners after purchasing a flat came
in contact with OP no.2 and her husband for undertaking the Interior
Decoration and during discussion, it was held that the initial budget was
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Rs. 15,00,000/- excluding electronic appliances. Upon their assurance, the
parties ultimately agreed upon an all-inclusive budget of approximately
25,00,000/- covering the entire interior work with the delivery of the fully
st
completed flat by 31 March, 2025.
4. It is alleged by the petitioner that despite repeated request by
petitioner no.3, OP no.2 and her husband refused to execute a written
agreement citing tax-related issues. However, relying on their
representation, the petitioner no.3 paid an initial sum of Rs. 5 lakhs by
st th
cheque on 1 November, 2024, whereupon the work commenced on 5
November, 2024. Thereafter petitioner no. 3 paid a further sum of Rs.
18,40,000/- aggregating Rs. 23, 40,000/-, which has been admitted in the
FIR, itself against the agreed consideration of Rs. 25 lakhs
5. It is further alleged by the petitioners that despite receiving Rs. 23,
40,000/-, OP no.2 and her husband failed to complete the work by the
st
agreed deadline of 31 March, 2025 or even before the scheduled
th
housewarming ceremony on 12 May 2025, leaving several agreed items
incomplete, missing or substandard. It is further alleged that when
petitioner No.3 sought completion of the pending work after taking the
balance amount of RS. 1,60,000/-, OP No.2 and her husband instead of
fulfilling their obligations, demanded an additional sum of Rs. 12 Lakhs and
threatened petitioner no.1 with dire consequences in case of non-payment.
6. Mr. Dey learned counsel for the petitioner therefore argued that the
impugned criminal proceeding is a gross abuse of the process of law as the
allegation contained in the FIR even if taken at their face value do not
disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. The dispute is purely civil
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and contractual in nature, arising out of alleged disagreements regarding
the scope of work and payment under an oral agreement for interior
decoration. The petitioners had no fraudulent or dishonest intention at the
inception of the transaction which is evident from the continuous execution
of work and substantial payment made by the petitioners. The complainant
herself admitted through WhatsApp messages that the petitioners’
maximum budget was Rs. 25 lakhs and it establishes that there is no
consensus ad idem regarding any enhanced budget and consequently no
concluded contract for the higher amount. He therefore submits that the
present case imminently warrants the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of
this court under section 528 of the BNSS, to secure the ends of the justice
by quashing the impugned First Information Report together with all
proceedings consequential thereto.
7. Per contra Mr. Halder learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Opposite party No.2 argued that at this stage of considering the prayer for
quashment, the court is not required to meticulously examine whether every
ingredients of offences have been stated with mathematical precision. If the
factual foundation of the offence exists criminal proceeding ought not to be
scuttled at the threshold. The High Court cannot analyse the prosecution
case in the light of probabilities or assess the evidentiary value of the
materials or determine whether conviction is likely. Therefore, the
petitioners attempt to demonstrate innocence by relying upon their own
version of facts, WhatsApp communications, alleged quotations and
disputed documents is wholly impermissible at this stage.
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8. Mr. Halder further argued on behalf of complainant that petitioner
no.3 represented himself as an influential advocate, having powerful
connections, which induced the complainants to undertake the interior
project, entirely on credit without any advance. Repeated assurances were
given throughout the execution of the work and the scope of work was
continuously enlarged at the instance of the petitioners. The payments were
strategically made only to keep the work progressing and to induce further
expenditure and thereafter obtaining complete benefit of the work, the
petitioners refused to clear the dues and instead resorted to threats and
intimidation. Therefore, if such allegations are taken at face value, it
unmistakably disclose deception, inducement resulting wrongful loss to the
complaint.
9. Mr. Halder in this context further argued that part performance or
partial payment does not automatically erase criminality, specially when the
complainant alleges that the accused never intended to honour the entire
obligation and had merely made payments to keep the complainant acting to
his detriment. Relying upon the judgment of Indian Oil Corporation Vs.
NEPC India Ltd. and others, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736, learned
counsel for the petitioners submits that the existence of a civil remedy is not
a ground to quash a criminal proceeding, where the complaint discloses
ingredients of criminal offence. The petitioners reliance on partial payment
is therefore misplaced. The specific allegations of the complainant is not that
no payment was made but that the payments were strategically made only
towards material costs, so that the complainant would continue to invest
labour, supervision, designs services and further resources on credit.
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Whether such allegation could be ultimately proved is a matter of evidence
and investigation and it cannot be adjudicated in a quashment proceeding.
10. He further argued that the FIR specifically alleges threats involving
political influence, police influence and even criminal elements when the
complainant demanded payment. There are allegations that the complainant
and persons associated with her were threatened with consequences, if
payment was pursued. Now whether such threats would be ultimately
proved, is a matter for investigation and trial but at this stage the court
must proceed taking the allegations as true. Therefore, the disputed factual
assertions relied by the petitioners requires appreciation of evidence and
that disputed questions of fact cannot be treated as established, merely
because it has been asserted in the revisional application. The present case
does not fall within any of the seven categories laid down in Bhajanlal’s
Case reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 . When the FIR discloses a
continuous course of conduct involving inducement deception, expansion of
work on assurances of payment and refusal to honour obligations after
obtaining the benefit of the work and in the presence of allegation of
criminal intimidation and use of criminal force by the petitioners, the
instant revisional application deserves to be dismissed with cost.
11. Learned counsel for the state opposes the prayer made by the
petitioners and placed the case diary for perusal of the court.
12. I have considered submissions made on behalf of all the parties.
13. Needless to reiterate that the petitioners herein are booked under
section 318(4)/316(2)/351(2)/74 of the BNS. On perusal of the complaint
and materials collected during investigation, including the statement of
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witnesses recorded by IO, it appears that the complaint does not disclose
any credible allegation in respect of any fraudulent or dishonest intention on
the part of the petitioners at the inception of the transaction, which is the
sine qua non for constituting the offence of cheating. The only contention of
the O.P. No.2 is that petitioner no.3 induced the complainant representing
himself as an influential person, which led to undertaken of the work on
credit from the inception. Complainant/OP in this context has further taken
a plea that the payments were strategically made by the petitioners only
towards materials costs so that the complainant would continue to invest
labour and further resources on credit.
14. Even if such allegation is taken as a gospel truth, it does not ipso
facto lead to an inference that there was an intention to deceit, from the very
inception. Petitioners specific case is that against all-inclusive budget of
approximately 25 lakhs covering the entire interior work with the delivery of
st
the fully completed flat by 31 March, 2025, the petitioner no.3 paid Rs. 5
st th
lakh on 1 November, 2024 and the work was commenced on 5
November, 2024 and thereafter petitioner no.3 paid a further sum of Rs.
18,14,000/- comprising of Rs 15,14,000/- by cash and Rs. 3,00,000/- by
cheque which has been admitted in the FIR and it does not suggest that the
payments were made strategically to induce the complainant to continue
with the investment, nor does it suggest that the payments were made only
towards material costs to deprive him from other costs in order to make an
illegal gain. On the contrary it is not disputed that the parties entered into a
consensual oral agreement for interior decoration, pursuant to which the
complainant and her husband voluntarily undertook the work and received
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payment aggregating Rs.23,40,000/- from the petitioners. The complaint
depicts that dispute arose only at a subsequent stage over the alleged
enhancement of the work, project cost, completion of the remaining work
and also over the balance amount payable, all of which are purely
contractual issues giving rise at best to civil consequences. In the absence of
any material demonstrating that the petitioners had deceived the
complainant or dishonestly induced her to deliver any property from the
very inception of the transaction, the foundational requirement of cheating
is absent in the present proceeding.
15. So far as the allegation under section 316 A of the BNS is concerned
‘entrustment’ is the essential ingredient of the offence. A person, who
dishonestly misappropriates property entrusted to him contrary to the terms
of an obligation imposed, can be roped with the allegation of criminal breach
of trust. In the present case the indispensable ingredients of ‘entrustment’ of
property or dominion over property is conspicuously absent. The allegations
contained in the FIR, if accepted in their entirety, it discloses that the
complainant and her husband had undertaken interior decoration work at
the petitioners flat pursuant to a verbal agreement and may have brought
certain materials to the site for the execution of the said work. Such
materials were never entrusted to the petitioners in any fiduciary capacity,
nor did the petitioners assumed dominion over the same. No allegation has
been levelled in the complaint that the petitioners dishonestly mis
appropriated, converted or disposed of any property belonging to the
complainant in violation of any legal obligation or contract. The dispute
pertains to the alleged non completion of the work, the quality thereof and
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the amount allegedly payable, all of which arises out of a contractual
agreement and are purely civil in nature. Therefore, the ingredients to
constitute offence under section 316(2) of the BNS is completely lacking in
the present case. Furthermore, it is now settled principle of law in view of
the judgment passed in Delhi Race Club Ltd. case reported in (2024) 10
SCC 690 that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal
breach of trust as defined under section 405 IPC, punishable under section
406 IPC is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be
said that the accused is also committed the offence of cheating as defined
and explained in section 415 IPC punishable under section 420 IPC.
16. Similarly the allegations demonstrated in the FIR which pertains to
criminal intimidation under section 351 (2) facts and circumstances of the
case are to be considered in the light of essential ingredients to constitute
such offence which are as follows:-
(a) Threatening a persons with any injury:-
(i) to his person reputation or property or
(ii) to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is
interested

(b) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which is not legally bound
to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person
is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat.
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17. It is trite law that every expression of anger, abusive language or
vague threat uttered during commercial or contractual dispute does not ipso
facto lead to criminal intimidation. To constitute an offence under section
351 (1) of the Sanhita, there must be a specific, real and credible threat
intended to cause alarm to the complainant or to compel her to do or omit to
do an act which she is legally entitled to do. In the present case the
allegation that the petitioner no.3 threatened the complainant by referring to
the name of an alleged antisocial is vague and omnibus. No particulars
regarding the exact words used, the circumstances in which they were
allegedly uttered or any consequential conduct indicating that the
complainant was put under genuine alarm has neither been pleaded nor
materials available in the record discloses such. Therefore, bald and general
allegations, bereft of material particulars are insufficient to constitute the
offence of criminal intimidation under section 351 of BNS. The allegations at
their behest merely reflect a heated exchange arising out of a contractual
dispute which cannot be given a colour of criminality invoking the
provisions relating to criminal intimidation.
18. A careful reading of section 74 of the BNS it appears that the
ingredients of an assault or use of criminal force to women with intent to
outrage her modesty are as follows:-
(i) That the persons assaulted was a female
(ii) That the accused assaulted or used criminal force to her
(iii) That he intended thereby to outrage her modesty or that he
knew it to be likely that he would thereby outrage her modesty.
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19. In the instant case even if the allegations contained in the FIR are
accepted in their entirety it does not disclose the ingredients of the said
offence. To constitute an offence under the said provision, there must be a
clear allegation of assault or use of criminal force against a woman with the
intention to outrage or with the knowledge that such act is likely to outrage
her modesty. The complaint does not disclose any overtact on the part of
any of the petitioners involving assault or use of criminal force nor does it
attribute any intention or knowledge to outrage the modesty of OP no.2. At
best the allegations disclose a verbal altercation arising out of a commercial
dispute relating to interior decoration work and payment of arrear amount ,
if any. Mere use of abusive language exchange of heated words or a
confrontation in the course of such dispute however unpleasant, does not
ipso facto constitute an offence under section 74 of the BNS
20. Supreme Court has time and again comes down heavily on the
attempts of the over-zealous litigant in trying to settle their civil disputes by
resorting to criminal proceeding. O.P relied upon a three Judges Bench of
the Apex Court in Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. Vs. State of
Uttaranchal and Ors. reported in (2007) 12 SCC 1 but it also involved
contractual dispute among the parties, wherein part payment had been
made to the complainant by the accused, the proceeding was quashed. It is
well settled that a mere breach of contract does not give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction. Even if the allegations that the
petitioners failed to keep up their promise in respect of extended work or
extra cost, it is not enough to initiate criminal proceeding with mere
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allegation that the part payments were made strategically to induce the
complainant to continue with the work, in the absence of any prima facie
proof of alleged strategy.
21. In Mohammad Ibrahim and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. ,
reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751 the Supreme Court has made clear
observation that Criminal Court should ensure that proceedings before it
are not used for settling scores or to pressurize parties to settle civil
disputes.
22. In view of aforesaid discussion I have no other alternative but to
conclude that further continuance of impugned proceeding against the
petitioners would be mere abuse of the process of the court and therefore it
is a fit case where the proceeding is to be quashed invoking this court’s
jurisdiction under section 528 of the BNSS.
23. CRR 2771 of 2025 is allowed .
24. The impugned proceeding being GR Case no. 4367 of 2025 presently
pending before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baruipur is
hereby quashed. The connected applications also stand disposed of.
Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given
to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.

(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)
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