Bharat Lal vs Surender & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
st
% Reserved on: 31 August, 2026
th
Pronounced on: 19 November, 2026
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Uploaded on: 20 November, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC013395232017
+ RSA 214/2017 & CM APPL. 22063/2024, CM APPL. 6606/2025
CM APPL. 18952/2025
BHARAT LAL
S/o Late Shri Puran Mal,
R/o 52/50B, Gali No.17,
Nai Basti, Anand Parbat,
New Delhi .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Deepak Khadaria, Ms. Bhawna,
Ms. Anita Kumari, Mr. K.L Singla,
Advs.
versus
1. Sh. SURENDER
Son in Law of Late Sh. Babu Lal
R/o 407/Z4A, Than Singh Nagar, Anand Parbat,
New Delhi 110005 ....Respondent No.1.
2. Mr. Dharmesh
W/o Sh. Surender
R/o 407/Z4A, Than Singh Nagar, Anand Parbat,
New Delhi 110005 ....Respondent No.2.
3. Mr. Naveen
S/o Sh. Surender,
R/o 407/Z4A, Than Singh Nagar, Anand Parbat,
New Delhi 110005 ....Respondent No.3.
Through:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:VIKAS ARORA
Signing Date:20.11.2026
17:05:31
RSA 214/2017 Page 1 of 31
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred under Section
100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the
“CPC”) against the Judgment dated 19.05.2017, passed by the learned
Senior Civil Judge in RCA No. 328/2016, whereby the Judgment dated
31.01.2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge dismissing the Appellant's suit
for Mandatory and Permanent Injunction, mesne profits and damages, was
upheld.
2. The Plaintiff/Appellant, Bharat Lal had filed Civil Suit No. 121/2012
seeking a Mandatory Injunction for directing the Defendants/Respondents to
remove their locks and belongings from Shop No. 48, Than Singh Nagar,
Anand Parbat, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the "suit property") and
hand over its possession to him. He had also sought mesne profits and
Damages and Permanent Injunction for restraining them from selling,
subletting, assigning, parting with possession of, or creating any third-party
interest in the suit property.
3. The facts, in brief, as pleaded in the Plaint, were that the suit property
initially stood in the name of Smt. Kundania Devi. Thereafter, late Shri Ram
Singh , the brother of the Plaintiff, acquired all rights therein by virtue of the
Mutation Letter dated 19.09.2003 issued by the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi (MCD), whereby the suit property was mutated in his name.
4. The Plaintiff further submitted that he used to sit with his brother, late
Shri Ram Singh at the suit property and assist him in managing its affairs.
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RSA 214/2017 Page 2 of 31
The House Tax was also paid by the Plaintiff through late Shri Ram Singh.
In support thereof, he relied upon the House Tax Receipt dated 18.01.2008
for the year 2003-2004, and receipt dated 22.01.2008 for the years 2004-
2005 to 2007-2008.
5. Shri Ram Singh had remained in possession of the suit property for
more than 50 years and unfortunately died intestate on 05.12.2007. His wife
had predeceased him and they had no children and he left behind no Class I
legal heir.
6. The Plaintiff, Bharat Lal, being the brother of late Shri Ram Singh,
was his sole surviving Class II legal heir, and consequently, all rights in the
suit property devolved exclusively upon him. Accordingly, the Plaintiff
claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit property.
7. It was averred that late Shri Babu Lal, predecessor-in-interest of the
defendants, earned his livelihood as a vegetable vendor from a rehri (thela ).
Being in poor financial circumstances with no proper place to work from or
store his goods, he requested late Shri Ram Singh , sometime after 2000, to
allow him to park his rehri partially in front of the suit property. Out of
compassion, Shri Ram Singh permitted him to do so on a strictly temporary
basis, with the clear understanding that he could be directed to remove the
rehri at any time.
8. Subsequently, Shri Babu Lal requested Shri Ram Singh , in the
presence of the Plaintiff, to allow him to keep some of his goods inside the
suit property, at night. Out of compassion, Shri Ram Singh permitted him to
do so, on the understanding that the goods would be removed every
morning. One of the keys to the shutter had been given to Shri Babu Lal
solely for the purpose of enabling him to store and remove his goods.
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RSA 214/2017 Page 3 of 31
9. The Plaintiff maintained that Shri Babu Lal acquired no right in the
suit property, by this arrangement. The permission to park the rehri and
store goods was gratuitous and personal to Shri Babu Lal and amounted, at
best, to a licence and nothing else.
10. Subsequently, Shri Babu Lal died on 14.11.2007 and after his last rites
were performed, his family members were asked to remove his articles from
the suit property.
11. In the meantime, Shri Ram Singh , brother of the Plaintiff, who was
also unwell, died on 04.12.2007. Thereafter, Defendant No. 1, Shri
Surender, the son-in-law of Shri Babu Lal; Defendant No. 2, Smt.
Dharmesh, his daughter; and Defendant No. 3, Shri Naveen, the son of Shri
Surender, took advantage of the situation. They broke open the locks and
used the key given to Shri Babu Lal , and replaced the small rehri with a
larger one, obstructing access to the shop. They also changed the locks on
the shutter and retained the goods belonging to Shri Ram Singh.
12. When the Plaintiff asked the Defendants to remove their goods and
the rehri, they quarrelled with him, refused to vacate the shop and declined
to hand over its keys.
13. The Plaintiff asserted that the permission granted to Shri Babu Lal
had, was temporary and gratuitous and, in any event, came to an end upon
his death. The Defendants’ entry into the shop, change of locks and retention
of the keys, were not only in breach of the terms on which Shri Babu Lal had
been permitted to use the premises, but was also illegal.
14. Despite the issuance of a Legal Notice dated 01.03.2008, calling upon
the Defendants to vacate the suit property and hand over the keys, they
failed and neglected to do so.
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Signing Date:20.11.2026
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RSA 214/2017 Page 4 of 31
15. Aggrieved thereby, the Plaintiff filed a Suit for Mandatory Injunction
directing the Defendants to remove their goods, rehri and hand over the keys
of the suit property along with a Permanent Injunction restraining them
from creating third-party rights therein.
16. The Plaintiff also sought Mesne profits and damages for the
Defendants' use and occupation of the suit property at the rate of Rs. 4,000/-
per month during the pendency of the Suit and until its vacation.
17. The Defendants filed a joint Written Statement . They raised
preliminary objections that the Suit was not maintainable as it disclosed no
cause of action and that the Plaintiff had no locus standi ; being neither the
owner, nor the landlord of the suit property.
18. They contended that the Plaintiff was seeking possession, under the
garb of a Mandatory Injunction and was, therefore, required to value the
Suit accordingly and pay the requisite Court Fee. The Suit had thus, not
been properly valued for the purposes of Court Fee and jurisdiction, nor had
the requisite Court Fee been paid.
19. The Defendants also denied that any legal and valid Notice had been
served upon them, before the institution of the Suit.
20. Their case was that the entire area in which the suit property was
situated belonged to Ramjas Foundation, which had earlier collected rent
from the shops therein.
21. It was admitted that Shri Ram Singh, who had a shop in the vicinity
of suit property, was on good terms with Shri Babu Lal. Shri Babu Lal,
being illiterate, used to hand over the licence fee/rent to Shri Ram Singh for
deposit with Ramjas Foundation. The Defendants alleged that Shri Ram
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Singh took advantage of his illiteracy and ill-health, to procure and fabricate
documents concerning the suit property.
22. It was further contended that the Plaintiff, Bharat Lal, brother of late
Shri Ram Singh, has no concern whatsoever with the suit property.
23. On merits, the Defendants denied that Smt. Kundania Devi had
executed any document in favour of Shri Ram Singh or that he had acquired
rights by virtue of the Mutation Letter dated 19.09.2003. They also disputed
the House-Tax receipts, alleging that these had been obtained by
misrepresentation. According to them, Shri Ram Singh had no right in the
suit property which could devolve upon the Plaintiff.
24. The the description of the suit property in the Plaint was asserted to be
not correct and maintained that the Site Plan was incorrect and incomplete.
25. The Plaintiff, in connivance with late Ram Singh, has forged and
fabricated certain documents, which have been filed along with the Plaint
with the sole intent to harass the Defendants.
26. The Defendants claimed that late Shri Babu Lal had remained in
continuous occupation of the suit property for more than 50 years until his
death, and had thereby become its owner by way of adverse possession.
27. Upon his demise, the Defendants claimed to have inherited his interest
therein, and Defendant No. 3, Shri Naveen, grandson of late Shri Babu Lal,
continues to remain in possession of the suit property.
28. The Defendants denied that either Shri Ram Singh or the Plaintiff
used to sit in the suit property or look after its affairs. They also denied that
Shri Babu La l had been permitted to park a rehri outside the shop or keep
his goods there overnight. According to them, Shri Babu Lal had occupied
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RSA 214/2017 Page 6 of 31
the shop in his own right, and the rehri used by the Defendants, was the
same one that had been there for more than 15 years.
29. Shri Babu Lal had his own shop near that of Shri Ram Singh and had
no occasion to seek his permission to store goods. The Defendants denied
having changed the locks, threatened the Plaintiff or attempted to sell the
suit property.
30. It was further objected that the suit property fell within a Slum Area
and that the Suit was not maintainable, without obtaining permission under
the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956.
31. It was thus, denied that the Defendants were in unauthorised
occupation of the suit property or liable to pay mesne profits and damages.
The Defendants accordingly, sought dismissal of the Suit.
32. The Plaintiff, in the Replication, denied the averments made in the
Written Statement and reiterated the case set out in the Plaint.
33. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were
framed on 18.09.2008:
“ 1. Whether the Appellant has no locus standi to file the present
suit? OPD
2. Whether present suit is not valued property for the purpose of
Court fees? OPD
3. Whether the suit not maintained as per the provision of the
Slum Area improvement Act? OPP
4. Whether Appellant has concealed material facts, if so to what
effect? OPP
5. Whether Appellant is entitled to the decree of mandatory
injunction, as prayed for? OPP
6. Whether Appellant is entitled to the decree of mesne profit as
prayed for? OPP
7. Relief .”
Signature Not Verified
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RSA 214/2017 Page 7 of 31
34. In support of his case, the Plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and
tendered his evidence by way of Affidavit Ex. P-1, reiterating the averments
made in the Plaint. He relied upon the following documents:
Exhibit Document
Ex. PW-1/1 Site Plan of the suit property
Mutation Letter dated 19.09.2003 issued by the Municipal
Mark A
Corporation of Delhi in favour of late Shri Ram Singh
House Tax Receipt No. 466070 for the years 2004-2005
Ex. PW-1/3
to 2007-2008
House Tax Receipt No. 607071 dated 18.01.2008 for the
Ex. PW-1/4
year 2003-2004
Ration Cards of late Shri Ram Singh and the Plaintiff,
bearing the address 52/50B, Gali No. 17, Nai Basti,
Anand Parbat, New Delhi
Ex. PW-1/6 Legal Notice dated 01.03.2008 issued to the Defendants
Mark B and
Mark C
Registered postal receipt evidencing dispatch of the Legal
Ex. PW-1/7
Notice
Ex. PW-1/8 UPC receipt evidencing dispatch of the Legal Notice
Ex. PW-1/9 to
Returned Acknowledgment Due Cards
Ex. PW-1/11
35. PW-1 was duly cross-examined by the Defendants.
36. The Defendants, however, did not lead any evidence and,
pursuant to their statement dated 26.07.2012, their evidence was closed.
37. The learned Civil Judge observed that the Plaintiff had relied upon
the House Tax Receipts, Ex. PW-1/3 and Ex. PW-1/4, to claim ownership of
the suit property. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that the
property belonged to Ramjas Foundation; that Smt. Kundania Devi had no
Sale Deed in her name; and that the suit property had not been mutated in
his name. The Plaintiff also admitted that he had no document of title in his
own name or in the name of Smt. Kundania Devi or Shri Ram Singh .
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RSA 214/2017 Page 8 of 31
38. The learned Civil Judge held that in the absence of any document
establishing the rights claimed through Shri Ram Singh, the Plaintiff had
failed to establish his right, title or interest in the suit property and had no
locus standi to maintain the Suit.
39. The learned Civil Judge further observed that though the Suit had
been framed as one for Mandatory Injunction, the Plaintiff was, in effect,
seeking possession of the suit property. He was, therefore, required to file a
Suit for Possession and pay Court Fee on an ad valorem basis. The valuation
of the relief of Mandatory Injunction at Rs. 130/- was consequently, held to
be improper.
40. Insofar as the objection under Section 19 of the Slum Areas
(Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was concerned, the learned Civil
Judge noted the Plaintiff's admissions in his cross-examination that the area
in which the suit property was situated fell within a slum area, and that he
had not obtained permission from the Competent Authority before filing the
Suit. It was accordingly decided that the Suit was not maintainable, in the
absence of Slum permission.
41. It was further held that though the Plaintiff had claimed himself to be
the absolute owner, but his admission that the property belong to Ramjas
Foundation established that he had no ownership rights in the suit property.
42. In view of the findings on the aforesaid issues, the Plaintiff was held
not entitled to Mandatory Injunction or mesne profits, the Suit of the
Plaintiff was dismissed with costs.
43. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff filed Regular First Appeal bearing RCA No.
328/2016.
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RSA 214/2017 Page 9 of 31
44. The learned First Appellate Court observed that the Defendants'
failure to lead evidence did not dispense with the Plaintiff's obligation to
prove his own case. The Mutation Letter on which he relied, had only been
marked A and had not been proved by examining any witness from the
concerned department. The House Tax Receipts also did not establish
ownership or possession.
45. On the objection under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance) Act, 1956, the learned First Appellate Court noted that the
Plaintiff had admitted that the area was a Slum Area and that no permission
had been obtained from the Competent Authority. Though the Court
observed that the admission, by itself, might not determine whether the Suit
Property fell within a Slum Area under the Act, the Plaintiff had failed to
prove otherwise. The finding of the learned Civil Judge on this issue was,
therefore, upheld.
46. The learned First Appellate Court further held that the Plaintiff had
failed to establish a better title to the suit property or that the Defendants
were occupying it, as his licensees. The Plaintiff was admittedly not in
possession and his title was disputed. In view of the principles laid down in
Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, he ought to have
sought a declaration of title and possession, instead of pursuing a Suit for
Mandatory and Permanent Injunction alone.
47. Finding no infirmity in the Judgment of the learned Civil Judge, the
First Appellate Court dismissed the Appeal vide Judgment dated
19.05.2017.
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Signing Date:20.11.2026
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RSA 214/2017 Page 10 of 31
48. Aggrieved by the concurrent dismissal of his Suit and First Appeal,
the Plaintiff has preferred the present Regular Second Appeal under
Section 100 CPC.
49. The grounds of challenge are that the concurrent findings of the
learned Civil Judge and the learned First Appellate Court are perverse and
contrary to the evidence on record.
50. It is contended that the evidence of the Plaintiff remained unrebutted,
as the Defendants neither entered the witness box nor led any evidence in
support of their defence. Despite this, the Courts below accepted the
unproved defence of the Defendants, disregarded the evidence led by the
Plaintiff and failed to draw an adverse inference against the Defendants, for
withholding the best evidence available to them.
51. Furthermore, though the Defendants claimed ownership of the suit
property, they neither produced any document nor examined any witness to
establish their claim. On the other hand, the Plaintiff/Appellant contended
that Ramjas Foundation was the original owner and relied upon 91 original
Receipts, evidencing payment of licence fee in favour of Smt. Kundania
Devi from 1978 to 1998, the Licence Deed executed in her favour and the
original House Tax Receipts for the years 2010-2012, to establish ownership
in the suit property.
52. It is further contended that the parties were illiterate and unfamiliar
with the English language, whereas the proceedings were conducted in
English. The testimony of the Plaintiff, being a rustic and illiterate person,
cannot be expected to be weighed on the same scale as the literate and
qualified people, and the principles of appreciation of evidence to be applied
in the two cases, should be different.
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RSA 214/2017 Page 11 of 31
53. The finding that the Plaintiff had no locus standi or could not claim
any right on the basis of the House Tax Records, is also assailed. It is
contended that Smt. Kundania Devi was the original Licensee under Ramjas
Foundation and, upon her demise, her rights devolved upon her husband,
late Shri Ram Singh. After the demise of Shri Ram Singh , the Plaintiff, being
his sole surviving Class II legal heir, succeeded to those rights. The Courts
below, therefore, erred in insisting upon a Sale Deed, without appreciating
the nature of the leasehold/licence rights claimed by the Plaintiff, through
his predecessors.
54. The Appellant further contends that his rights were required to be
examined vis-a-vis the Defendants and not vis-a-vis Ramjas Foundation,
whose ownership was never disputed. The Licence Deed, Licence-fee
Receipts and House Tax Receipts, established a better title and prior
possession in favour of his predecessors, whereas the Defendants failed to
prove any right in the suit property.
55. It is further submitted that prior possession constitutes good title
against all persons, except the true owner and entitles such a person to
recover possession from a trespasser having no better title. Reliance in this
regard is placed upon Sultan Narayanon v. Mathaya Aiyar , AIR 1966
Kerala 179; Subodh Gopal v. Province of Bihar, AIR 1950 Patna 222; Asher
v. Whitlock , (1865) 1 QB 1; Perry v. Clissold , (1907) AC 73; Sahodra Kuer
v. Gobardhan Tewari, AIR 1917 Patna 546; and Ram Dayal v. Saraswati,
ILR (1926) 49 All 191.
56. The finding that a Suit for Possession ought to have been filed, is also
challenged. According to the Appellant, Shri Babu Lal occupied the suit
property merely as a licensee and his licence came to an end upon his
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demise. A licensor who approaches the Court within a reasonable time after
termination of the licence, is entitled to seek possession by way of a
Mandatory Injunction. Reliance is placed upon E.P. George v. Thomas John,
AIR 1984 Kerala 224; Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh ; Hasan Ali v. Akbari
Begum @ Akbari Hajjan , 133 (2006) DLT 26; Ramesh Kumar Handoo v.
Binay Kumar Basu, RSA No. 286/2007; and Prabhu Dayal v. Roop Kumar,
AIR 2005 Delhi 144.
57. The finding under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956, is also challenged. It is contended that a locality
described as a "slum" in ordinary parlance, does not necessarily constitute a
notified slum area under the Act. The Defendants neither produced the
relevant Notification nor otherwise, proved that the suit property fell within
a notified slum area. On the contrary, the Notification relied upon by the
Appellant, showing that the suit property was not covered under the Act,
was not considered by the Courts below.
58. It is, therefore, submitted that the findings concerning the Plaintiff's
title and locus standi , maintainability of the Suit, and applicability of the
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, are erroneous.
59. It is, therefore, submitted that the Impugned Judgments and Decrees
be set aside and the Suit of the Plaintiff be decreed.
60. Learned counsel for the Appellant has also filed Written
Submissions , wherein the grounds raised in the Appeal have been reiterated.
61. The Notice in the present Regular Second Appeal was issued vide
Order dated 21.08.2017. Upon service, the Respondents entered appearance
through Counsel, on 13.12.2017.
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62. During the pendency of the present Appeal, Ramjas Foundation
executed a Licence Deed dated 24.12.2019 in favour of the Plaintiff/
Appellant, Shri Bharat Lal, a copy of which was placed on record.
63. The Appellant also filed an Application under Order XLI Rule 27
CPC , seeking leave to place the additional documents, i.e. Licence Deed
dated 24.12.2019 executed between Ramjas Foundation and the Appellant,
Bharat Lal, in respect of the suit property, along with the Site Plan, and four
Receipts dated 24.12.2019 issued by Ramjas Foundation acknowledging the
payments made by the Appellant on record. The Application was allowed
vide Order dated 07.09.2021 and the documents appended thereto, were
taken on record.
64. On 07.04.2021, this Court was apprised that Respondent No. 3, Shri
Naveen, had expired on 19.03.2021, whereupon the Appellant sought time to
ascertain the particulars of his Legal Representatives in order to implead
them.
65. The better particulars of the Legal Representatives of Respondent No.
3 could not be ascertained, as learned Counsel who had been appearing for
the Respondents stated that he was no longer in contact with him. A Report
was, therefore, called from the concerned SHO, P.S. Anand Parbat, to
ascertain the whereabouts of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the particulars of
the Legal Representatives of Respondent No. 3.
66. Accordingly, a Status Report dated 20.09.2021 was filed by the
SHO, wherein it was reported that Respondent No. 1, Shri Surender , along
with his family, i.e. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, had earlier been residing at
the suit property, but had subsequently left the premises, and no one was
found residing there. SI Jagbir Rana visited the suit property and found the
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shop in a dilapidated condition and lying locked. Upon local enquiry, he
learnt that Respondent No. 3, Shri Naveen , had been running the vegetable
shop and had expired. His Death Certificate, however, could not be
obtained, while Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 remained untraceable.
67. SI Jagbir Rana also visited the other address of the Respondents, i.e.
407/Z4A, Than Singh Nagar, Anand Parbat, New Delhi-110005, as
mentioned in the Memo of Parties, and met Shri Kishan Swaroop, the owner
of the said property . He informed the police that Respondent No. 1 and his
family had been residing there as tenants since 2007, but had vacated the
premises in November, 2020. He further informed that they were residing
somewhere in Modi Nagar, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh; however, their
complete address was not known.
68. This Court took note of the Status Report on 25.11.2021. Since
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 remained untraceable and failed to appear,
Bailable Warrants were issued against them vide Order dated 02.05.2022.
Pursuant thereto, Respondent No. 2 , Smt. Dharmesh , appeared before this
Court on 24.05.2022 and stated that she and Respondent No. 1 were the only
Legal Representatives of deceased Respondent No. 3.
69. Subsequently, Respondent No. 1, Shri Surender , also expired and vide
Order dated 01.10.2024, the Appeal against him was recorded as having
abated. Since none appeared on behalf of Respondent No. 2, Smt.
Dharmesh , she was proceeded ex-parte on the same date.
70. Thereafter, the following Substantial question of law were framed
vide Order dated 25.04.2025, which read as under:
“ 3.1. Whether there is any requirement to obtain permission
under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
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Clearance) Act, 1956 in a suit seeking recovery of possession
from an unauthorized occupant of a property covered by that
Act;
3.2. Whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief on the basis of
„better title theory‟ with respect to a property where the
defendant has not filed any document nor led any evidence to
prove any title to the property at all; and
3.3. Whether a court can dismiss a suit for possession holding
that the plaintiff has no locus standi, solely for the reason that
the plaintiff is not shown to have any right, title or interest in
suit property, and the defendant is also unable to show any
right, title or interest in that property; ”
Submissions heard and record perused.
71. The Suit of the Appellant for Mandatory and Permanent Injunctions in
respect of the suit property, has been concurrently dismissed on the findings
that he had no locus standi and that it was not maintainable for want of
permission under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956. The three Substantial Questions of Law framed in the
present Appeal are now taken up for consideration in seriatim.
I. Whether the Suit was not maintainable under Section 19(1) of the Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956:
72. The first substantial question of law which arises for consideration is
whether prior permission of the Competent Authority under Section 19(1) of
the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter
referred to as the "Slum Act") was necessary for instituting the present Suit
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against the Defendants, who were alleged to be unauthorised occupants of
the suit property.
73. The learned Civil Judge, while deciding Issue No. 3, held that the Suit
was not maintainable for want of permission under Section 19 of the Slum
Act. This finding was principally founded upon the admission of the
Plaintiff that the suit property was situated in a slum area and that no
permission had been obtained from the Competent Authority. The learned
First Appellate Court affirmed the said finding, observing that the Plaintiff
had failed to establish that the suit property was outside the ambit of the
Slum Act.
74. The first aspect is whether the suit property is situated in a slum area
at all. The admission of the Appellant that the area was a slum area and that
no permission had been obtained before filing the Suit could not, by itself,
have invited an adverse finding. Whether a property falls within a slum area
for the purposes of the Slum Act, depends upon a Notification issued under
the Act, and not upon how the locality is described in common parlance.
75. Moreover, the Appellant has placed on record the Government of
India Notification dated 02.04.1987, which clearly reflects that the suit
property does not fall in a slum area. Being a Government Notification,
judicial notice can be taken of it. It is, therefore, established that the suit
property is not situated in a slum area.
76. The second aspect is that, even if it is assumed that the suit property is
situated in a slum area, the question arises whether permission under Section
19(1) of the Slum Act was required for instituting the present Suit. Section
19(1) of the Slum Act reads as under:
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RSA 214/2017 Page 17 of 31
“19. Proceedings for eviction of tenants not to be taken
without permission of the competent authority.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force, no person shall, except with the
previous permission in writing of the competent authority,—
(a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas
(Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964, any
suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the
eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum
area; or
(b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or
proceeding instituted before such commencement for the
eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area,
execute such decree or order.”
77. Section 19(1) restricts only the eviction of a “tenant”. The meaning
of this expression was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in Punnu
Ram & Ors. v. Chiranji Lal Gupta & Ors., AIR 1982 Delhi 431. The Full
Bench, while considering the interpretation of Section 19(4), examined
whether the expression “tenant ” under Section 19 included every person
occupying premises situated in a slum area. It was observed as under:
"This brings us to the consideration of a few other
aspects agitated at the Bar. Sub-section (3) of
Section 19 of the Act postulates grant or refusal of
the permission to institute any suit or proceeding
for obtaining a decree or order for eviction of a
tenant or where any decree or order is obtained in
any suit or proceeding instituted before the
commencement of the Act for eviction of a tenant
from any building or land in an area declared as a
slum area. The question that arises for
consideration is what is the meaning of the term
"tenant". As noticed earlier, this term is not defined
by the Act. Mr. Narula submits that tenant
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contemplated by Section 19 is a person in
occupation or a person likely to be evicted, if
permission is granted to institute eviction
proceedings or execute an order of eviction. We do
not agree. The protection contemplated is for a
tenant as recognised by law. A mere occupier can
not be equated to a tenant. An occupier may be a
trespasser or a licensee or a tenant. The concept
of welfare State cannot extend to giving protection
to trespasser or persons who have no right of
occupation. Therefore, when the Legislature used
the term "tenant" in Section 19 as well as in the
Preamble of the Act it meant tenant-in-law."
78. The aforesaid principle was reiterated in Giri Raj (Since Deceased)
Through LRs. v. Deepak Gupta & Ors. , RSA Nos. 151/2012, 152/2012 and
164/2012, decided on 12.09.2013, wherein the Defendants, who had
originally occupied the suit properties as tenants, subsequently asserted
ownership by adverse possession. The Court held that, having renounced
their tenancy rights by asserting a hostile title, the Defendants could not
invoke the protection under Section 19. Following Punnu Ram (supra ), it
was held that the Slum Act protects tenants recognised in law and not
mere occupiers or unauthorised occupants.
79. The same principle was applied in Satender Jain v. Satya Narain
Sanjiv Gupta HUF , RSA 139/2019, decided on 09.09.2021, wherein the
legal heirs of the original tenant continued in occupation after the tenancy
rights were claimed to have stood extinguished. Relying upon Punnu Ram
(supra) and Giri Raj (supra), held that the protection under Section 19
extends only to tenants recognised in law and not to occupiers generally.
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80. The legal position which thus, emerges from the aforesaid decisions is
that the applicability of Section 19(1) cannot be determined merely by
establishing that the property falls within a notified slum area. The statutory
restriction is directed against the eviction of a tenant and not against every
person found in occupation of such property. Consequently, the Court must
first examine the legal character of the occupation before concluding that
prior permission from the Competent Authority, was mandatory.
81. In the present case, the Appellant’s case was that late Shri Ram Singh
had merely permitted late Shri Babu Lal to park his rehri and keep his goods
in the suit property, and that the Respondents continued in unauthorised
occupation after their demise. The Respondents, on the other hand, claimed
that the suit property belonged to Ramjas Foundation and that late Shri Babu
Lal, being illiterate, used to hand over the licence fee/rent to late Shri Ram
Singh for its deposit with Ramjas Foundation on his behalf . They further
claimed that late Shri Babu Lal had become the owner of the suit property
by adverse possession, and that they had inherited his interest therein.
Significantly, the Defendants neither pleaded any tenancy under the Plaintiff
or his predecessor nor led any evidence to establish a subsisting tenancy
recognised in law . Mere occupation of the suit property, even if prolonged,
could not confer the protection contemplated under Section 19.
82. The learned Courts below, therefore, erred in treating the location of
the suit property in a slum area, as sufficient to attract the bar under Section
19, without determining whether the Defendants were tenants entitled to
statutory protection.
83. In view of the foregoing discussion, the suit property is not shown to
be situated in a slum area and, in any event, the Defendants were not tenants
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entitled to the protection under Section 19(1). The prior permission of the
Competent Authority was, therefore, not required. The finding of the learned
Civil Judge and the learned First Appellate Court on Issue No. 3 being
contrary to established law, is, accordingly, set aside.
II. Whether the Appellant was Entitled to Relief on the Basis of a Better
Title, and Whether he had the Locus Standi to Maintain the Suit:
84. The second and third Substantial Questions of Law are interlinked
and are, therefore, taken up together. The Appellant, Bharat Lal, in order to
establish his lawful ownership in the suit property, had explained that the
entire area was owned by Ramjas Foundation, which had given licences to
various persons, in respect of the shops existing in the area.
85. The suit property had been given on licence to Smt. Kundania Devi,
through a Licence Deed dated 01.07.1978, (which was taken on record, on
the Application of the Plaintiff, under Order VII Rule 14 CPC, vide Order
dated 19.11.2011) who thereafter, gave the property to late Shri Ram Singh ,
the brother of the Appellant. Late Shri Ram Singh applied to the MCD for
mutation of the property in his name and, along with the Application,
submitted his transfer documents. On the basis of those documents, the
property was admittedly transferred in the name of late Shri Ram Singh,
vide Mutation Letter dated 19.09.2003.
86. The Appellant explained in the Plaint, and also deposed as PW-1, that
late Shri Ram Singh died on 05.12.2007 and that his wife had predeceased
him. He died issueless and was not survived by any Class I legal heir. The
Appellant, being the brother and the only Class II legal heir, inherited the
suit property, which stood in the name of late Shri Ram Singh .
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87. The Appellant was, therefore, able to prove that the suit property had
come to him through his brother, late Shri Ram Singh , in whose favour there
existed the Mutation Letter dated 19.09.2003, Ex. PW-1/2. The Appellant
also deposed that the House Tax of the suit property was being paid by late
Shri Ram Singh . The House Tax Receipts dated 22.01.2008 and 18.01.2008,
Ex. PW-1/3 and Ex. PW-1/4 respectively, further corroborate the possessory
rights of late Shri Ram Singh .
88. Even if the Mutation Letter and the House Tax Receipts are not, by
themselves, documents of title, they establish that late Shri Ram Singh dealt
with the suit property as its owner. Read with the unrebutted testimony of
the Appellant, they are sufficient to establish a better title in his favour as
against the Respondents, who have not produced even a scrap of paper in
support of their claim. The Appellant has, therefore, been able to
establish his possessory rights in the suit property.
89. Significantly, during the pendency of the present Appeal, Ramjas
Foundation, which is admittedly the owner of the suit property and had
initially granted the licence in favour of Smt. Kundania Devi , executed a
fresh Licence Deed dated 24.12.2019 in favour of the Appellant, Bharat Lal.
The said Licence Deed was taken on record, vide Order dated 07.09.2021.
The admitted owner has thus, recognised the Appellant as the licensee in
respect of the suit property, which further reinforces his superior entitlement
thereto, vis-à-vis the Respondents, and affirms that neither late Shri Babu
Lal nor, thereafter, the Respondents had any possessory rights therein.
90. The next aspect is the status and right of the Respondents to
occupy the suit property. The case of the Appellant was that late Shri Ram
Singh had permitted late Shri Babu Lal, the predecessor-in-interest of the
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Respondents, to park his vegetable rehri / thela outside the shop during the
day and to keep his goods inside the shop at night. It was thus, deposed that
late Shri Babu Lal had been given a permissive, limited right to use the suit
property.
91. The Respondents, are the legal heirs of late Shri Babu Lal, who
admittedly died on 14.11.2007. They had admitted that late Shri Babu Lal
was a small vegetable vendor, but claimed that he was an old occupant of
the suit property and had been selling his vegetables from the shop, for more
than 50 years. It was denied that he had merely been given permissive rights
to keep his vegetables and goods, after the year 2000. It was also denied that
there was ever any temporary arrangement between late Shri Ram Singh and
late Shri Babu Lal, especially when late Shri Ram Singh had his own shop
near the shop of late Shri Babu Lal.
92. Though the Defendants/Respondents had claimed that Late Babu Lal
occupied the suit property in his own right, but not a single document was
filed along with the Written Statement to show that the shop was ever
allotted to late Shri Babu Lal. Moreover, no evidence whatsoever, has been
led by the defendants, to establish any right in the suit property. In fact, they
chose not to lead any evidence , which was closed vide Order dated
26.07.2012.
93. It is significant to observe that in order to ascertain the legal heirs of
deceased respondent No.3, the SHO was deputed, who submitted his Report
dated 20.09.2021, that the Respondents had left the suit property, which was
found lying locked and in a dilapidated condition. Respondent No. 3, Shri
Naveen, who had been running the vegetable shop, had expired on
19.03.2021. Respondent No. 1, Shri Surender, also subsequently expired and
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the Appeal against him was recorded as having abated vide Order dated
01.10.2024. Respondent No. 2, Smt. Dharmesh, was proceeded ex parte on
the same date. Thus, none of the Respondents remained in occupation of the
suit property, which was lying abandoned, in dilapidated condition.
94. Significantly, the defence taken in the Written Statement, was that late
Shri Babu Lal was paying the Licence fee to Ramjas Foundation, through
late Sh. Ram Singh, thereby acknowledged the superior possessory title of
late Sh. Ram Singh. There was no circumstance, either pleaded or proved by
the Defendants, to show any right superior to that of the Appellant. The
Respondents have thus not been able to prove any right, title or interest in
the suit property.
95. The Appellant has, through his unrebutted testimony and the
documents on record, established that the shop had been acquired by his
brother, late Shri Ram Singh , from Smt. Kundania Devi, to whom the licence
had actually been granted, and that after the demise of late Shri Ram Singh ,
he has inherited the rights in the suit property. The evidence of the
Appellant, coupled with the absence of any evidence on behalf of the
Respondents, establishes the superior possessory rights of the Appellant.
96. The law recognises the right to claim possession either on the basis of
proprietary title or on the basis of superior possessory rights. Indeed, the
dispute revolves around the "possessory rights" , rather than the "ownership
rights", inter se the parties.
97. It is, therefore, significant to understand the two concepts, i.e.
"possessory rights" and "ownership rights" . Salmond on Jurisprudence
(12th Edn., at paras 59-60) expounded the two concepts as under:
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" These two concepts of ownership and possession,
therefore, may be used to distinguish between the de facto
possessor of an object and its de jure owner, between the
man who actually has it and the man who ought to have it.
They serve also to contrast the position of one whose rights
are ultimate, permanent and residual with that of one whose
rights are only of a temporary nature."
98. Legal remedies thus intended for the protection of possession, even as
against ownership, are called possessory, while those available for the
protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. The
distinction in modern and medieval civil law is expressed by contrasted
terms: Petitorium (a Proprietary Suit) and Possessorium (a Possessory Suit).
99. It has been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Nair
Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander , AIR 1968 SC 1165, has
authoritatively laid down that a person in possession of land in the assumed
character of owner, and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of
ownership, has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the
rightful owner. When the facts disclose no absolute title in either party,
possession alone decides.
100. In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs., (2008) 4
SCC 594, on which the learned First Appellate Court placed reliance, the
Supreme Court observed that a person has a right to protect his possession
against any person who does not prove a better title. Summarising the law
on suits for injunction relating to immovable property, it held that where a
cloud is raised over the plaintiff’s title and he is not in possession, the
remedy ordinarily is a suit for declaration and possession. However, where
there are necessary pleadings regarding title and an appropriate issue
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relating to title on which the parties lead evidence, and the matter involved
is simple and straightforward, the Court may decide the issue regarding title
even in a Suit for Injunction.
101. The said principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Poona
Ram v. Moti Ram, (2019) 11 SCC 309, wherein it was observed that legal
remedies appointed for the protection of possession, even against
ownership, are called possessory, while those available for the protection
of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary . It was further held
that in order to claim possessory title, the Plaintiff must establish his own
case and must also show that he has a better title, than the Defendant.
102. Where neither party establishes an absolute title, the Court is required
to decide which of the two has the better possessory title ; it cannot non-suit
the Plaintiff merely because he does not hold a Sale Deed, while leaving the
Defendant, who has no title at all, in occupation. In the light of the aforesaid
principles, it is proved that the Appellant had a better possessory title rights,
while the Respondents had no right whatsoever in the suit property, except
the permissive rights.
103. The Two Courts failed to appreciate the facts of this case in the light
of settled law and the findings suffer from perversity, and are liable to be set
aside.
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III. Whether the Defendants have ownership in the suit property, by
Adverse Possession:
104. Lastly, the Defendants sought to resist the Suit by claiming that
late Shri Babu Lal had acquired ownership of the suit property by way
of adverse possession , having remained in its occupation for more than 50
years.
105. To establish ownership by adverse possession, the determinative
consideration is not merely the duration of possession. Such possession must
be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario , namely , peaceful, open and continuous,
besides being actual, exclusive and hostile to the true owner throughout
the statutory period.
106. In S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254, the Supreme
Court held that a plea of adverse possession must, at the very least, disclose
when the possession became adverse so that the commencement of
limitation against the person affected can be ascertained. Likewise, in
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India , (2004) 10 SCC 779, it
was held that a person claiming adverse possession must clearly plead and
establish all the facts necessary t o prove adverse possession, namely, the
date on which he came into possession, the nature of his possession, whether
the factum of possession was known to the other party, how long his
possession continued, and whether it was open and undisturbed.
107. The aforesaid position has recently been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Bhag Singh (D) through Mahant Kashmir Singh v. Basant Kaur (D)
through LRs., 2026 INSC 983. It was observed that where possession is
referable to a lawful or permissive origin, mere lapse of time does not
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render it adverse; there must be clear and unequivocal evidence of the point
at which such possession became hostile to the true owner .
108. The Apex Court further held that the absence of pleadings identifying
the commencement of hostile possession is not a mere technical defect, since
unless such commencement is pleaded and proved, the statutory period for
adverse possession cannot even begin to run.
109. Tested on these principles, the defence of the Respondents does not
stand scrutiny. Not even the basic particulars of adverse possession were
proved, as the Respondents led no evidence at all. Their plea is, moreover,
self-contradictory. The Respondents themselves pleaded that late Shri Babu
Lal, being illiterate, used to hand over the Licence fee/rent to late Shri Ram
Singh, for deposit with Ramjas Foundation. A person who pays Licence fee
or rent in acknowledgement of the title of the owner cannot, in the same
breath, claim to hold the property adversely to it. This pleading, rather, lends
support to the case of the Appellant that the occupation of late Shri Babu
Lal, was not independent of late Shri Ram Singh.
110. Even otherwise, the occupation of late Shri Babu Lal was permissive
in its very origin. The rights of a person permitted to occupy premises were
considered by the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes
v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370, wherein the brother, who
had been permitted by his sister, the owner, to look after her house in Goa as
a caretaker, claimed to be in possession in his own right. The Supreme Court
crystallised the principles of law as under:
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“(i) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was
allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously; even by long
possession of years or decades, such person would not
acquire any right or interest in the said property;
(ii) A caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire
interest in the property, irrespective of his long
possession, and is required to give possession forthwith
on demand;
(iii) The Courts are not justified in protecting the
possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was
allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a
friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant;
(iv) The protection of the Court can only be granted or
extended to a person who has a valid, subsisting rent
agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his
favour; and
(v) The caretaker or agent holds the property of the
principal only on behalf of the principal and acquires no
right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property,
irrespective of his long stay or possession.”
111. The Supreme Court in Maria Margarida (supra) thus, held, inter alia ,
that gratuitous occupation, even for years or decades, does not confer title
and a caretaker, servant, friend or relative permitted to occupy the premises
does not acquire an interest merely by reason of such occupation. A
caretaker or agent merely holds the property on behalf of the principal and
cannot claim an independent right merely from the duration of possession.
The Supreme Court thus, concluded that no one acquires title to a property
if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously, and even by
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long possession of years or decades, such a person does not acquire any
right or interest therein.
112. The aforesaid principles apply squarely to the present case. Late Shri
Babu Lal had been permitted only to park his rehri outside the suit property
during the day and to store some of his goods inside the shop at night,
without payment of any consideration. Such limited and gratuitous
permission could not mature into ownership merely because the arrangement
allegedly continued for a prolonged period.
113. Moreover, the Respondents neither identified any act by which the
permissive occupation became hostile nor proved that any hostile title had
been asserted to the knowledge of the true owner. Late Shri Babu Lal ,
therefore, acquired no right or interest in the suit property merely by reason
of the duration of his occupation, and no better right could have devolved
upon the Respondents after his demise.
114. Consequently, the plea of adverse possession is wholly without merit.
The Respondents failed to establish any right, title or interest capable of
defeating the superior possessory entitlement of the Appellant.
115. Therefore, the conclusions of the learned Civil Judge, which were
affirmed in the Appeal, are patently erroneous and based on non-
appreciation of the evidence and the documents on record.
IV. Whether the Appellant/Plaintiff is entitled to Mesne Profits :
116. The Appellant also sought Mesne Profits @ Rs. 4000/- per month.
However, no evidence whatsoever has been led in respect of the Mesne
Profits or the benefit which was being derived by the Respondents from the
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use and occupation of the suit property, as required under Order XX Rule 12
CPC. The Appellant is, therefore, not entitled to any Mesne Profits.
Conclusion:
117. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned Judgment dated
31.01.2013 of the learned Civil Judge and that of the learned First Appellate
Court dated 19.05.2017 are hereby, set aside. The Suit of the Appellant for
Mandatory Injunction is decreed, and the belongings of the Respondents
lying in the suit property are directed to be removed and its possession
handed over to the Appellant. The Suit for Permanent Injunction is also
decreed, and the Respondents, their legal representatives, assigns or any
person claiming through them, are restrained from creating third-party rights
in the suit property.
118. The Regular Second Appeal is accordingly allowed, and the Suit of
the Appellant for Mandatory and Permanent Injunction is hereby, decreed.
However, the dismissal of relief of mesne profits, is upheld.
119. Pending Applications, if any, are also disposed of.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
RS
dss/ /va
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