MR. B M PATIL AND ORS vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS

- 1 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA



KALABURAGI BENCH

TH
DATED THIS THE 5 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

PRESENT


THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMANYA RANGARAO


WRIT PETITION NO. 202195 OF 2021 (S-KAT)


BETWEEN:

1. MR. B. M. PATIL
S/O MADHAVAR RAO,
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED DIRECTOR
(SENIOR SCALE),
DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
R/O. 8-9-265,
GURUNAGAR COLONY,
BIDAR, DIST. BIDAR- 585401.

2. SRI. PATIL PRABHU RAO
S/O ANNA RAO,
AGED ABOUT 78 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
R/O. 8-9-278,
GURUNAGAR COLONY,
BIDAR,
DIST. BIDAR- 585401.







Digitally signed by
B NAGAVENI
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

- 2 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


3. SRI.G.A. MADAKE
S/O APPANNA MADAKE,
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED DIRECTOR
(SENIOR SCALE),
DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS, BIDAR
R/O. 8-9-265,
GURUNAGAR COLONY,
BIDAR,
DIST. BIDAR- 585401.

4. SRI. DIGAMBAR JAGTHAP
AGED ABOUT 78 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS
R/O. 5-5-25, STATION ROAD,
NEAR SUBHASH CHOWK,
BIDAR, DIST. BIDAR- 585401.

5. SMT. H. KANTHA
D/O HUSSAINAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
R/O. H.11-2-27
BETHLEHME COLONY,
MANGALPETH BIDAR.

6.



A)

B)

C)

SRI. SANGAPPA JALDE,
SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED
BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS,

SMT. KASTURI BAI,

SRI. CHANDRASHEKAR,

SRI. RAVINDRA,

- 3 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


RESIDING AT 8-9-158
RAVICHANDRA NILAYA,
OPPOSITE TO SRS FUNCTION HALL,
BIDAR, DIST. BIDAR.

7. SUBHASH M. PATIL
S/O LATE MANIQ RAO PATIL,
AGE: 61 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED AS DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
R/O. NO. 8-9-142,
GURUSAGAR, BIDAR,
DIST. BIDAR.


…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. K. M. GHATE, ADVOCATE)


AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
(PRIMARY AND SECONDARY),
M.S. BUILDING
SACHIVALAYA-2,
BENGALURU- 560 001.

2. THE COMMISSIONER FOR
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
K.R CIRCLE,
BANGALORE- 560 001.

3. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTIONS,

- 4 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


KALABURAGI,
DIST. KALABURAGI.

4. THE PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTANT
GENERAL A AND E,
KARNATAKA PARK HOUSE ROAD,
BENGALURU- 560 001.


…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VEERANAGOUDA MALIPATIL, AGA)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO
ALLOW THE WRIT PETITIONS AND ISSUE WRIT OF
CERTIORARI / DIRECTIONS, QUASHING THE ORDER PASSED
BY THE TRIBUNAL IN APPLICATIONS NO.9007 TO 9013/2016
C/W APPLICATION NO.10656/2016 BEFORE THE KARNATAKA
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED 12.07.2021 VIDE ANNEXURE-B TO THE WRIT PETITION
AND ETC.

THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
IN B GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS
UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMANYA RANGARAO

- 5 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI)

1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioners
challenging the order dated 12.07.2021 passed in
Application Nos.9007 to 9013 of 2016 connected with
Application No.10656/2016 by the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal, Kalaburagi (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Tribunal’).

2. Brief facts giving rise to filing of this petition are as
under:
The petitioners were initially appointed as Assistant
Teachers in the then Taluk Development Board/
Municipal Units, which were subsequently taken over
by the State Government in 1971. The petitioners
retired from service in the year 1994. The petitioners
noticed regarding the order passed by the Tribunal in
Application Nos.5472-78 of 1997 challenging the cut-
off date of 01.07.1994 and the said applications were

- 6 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


partly allowed by the Tribunal by order dated
04.07.2002 observing that the claim of the
applicants be reworked relating to their entitlement
of pension and pensionary benefits on the basis of
the seniority to be determined in terms of sub-
paragraphs-1 to 3 of paragraph-17 of the order
passed in Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995. It is
contended that the State Government challenged the
order passed by the Tribunal in Application
Nos.5472-78 of 1997 in Writ Petition Nos.4888-94 of
2003. The said writ petitions were dismissed by order
dated 20.09.2004. The petitioners contending that
they are entitled for similar benefit granted in
Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995 on the ground of
parity, approached the Tribunal in the year 2016
along with an application for condonation of delay.
The Tribunal dismissed the applications for
condonation of delay on the ground that there is an

- 7 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


inordinate delay and consequently, dismissed the
applications. Hence, this writ petition is filed.

3. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the
petitioners and learned Additional Government
Advocate appearing for the respondents.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners are entitled for similar orders passed in
Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995 on the ground of
parity. He also submits that the Government has
issued the Government Order in the year 2014.
Based on the said Government Order, the petitioners
approached the Tribunal in the year 2016. Hence,
there is no delay in approaching the Tribunal. The
said aspect was not considered by the Tribunal and
committed an error in dismissing the applications on
the ground of delay and latches. He submits that
since similarly situated petitioners have been
extended the benefit, the petitioners are also entitled

- 8 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


for similar benefits on the ground of parity. Hence,
on these grounds, he prays to allow the writ petition.

5. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the
petitioners placed reliance on the judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Autar
Singh Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
others in Civil Appeal No.13806 of 2024
disposed of on 04.12.2024 .

6. Per contra , learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the respondents submits that the order
in Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995 was passed on
31.10.1996. The petitioners retired from service in
the year 1994. The petitioners have not chosen to
approach the Tribunal within a reasonable time. He
submits that mere issuance of Government Order in
the year 2014, does not extend the period of
limitation. He submits that there is inordinate delay
in approaching the Tribunal. He submits that the

- 9 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


petitioners ought to have approached the Tribunal
within a reasonable time. Therefore, the Tribunal was
justified in dismissing the applications on the ground
of inordinate delay and laches. Hence, on these
grounds, he prays to dismiss the writ petition.

7. Learned Additional Government Advocate has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs' Vs.
1
Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. , wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has declined to condone the
delay and also in the case of Lingeswaran Etc. vs.
Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C)
Nos.2054-2055/2022 disposed of on 25.02.2022 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declined to
condone the delay of 465 days.

8. Perused the records and considered the submissions
of the learned counsel for the parties.

1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969

- 10 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021



9. It is an undisputed fact that similarly placed
employees approached the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal in the year 1995 in
Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995. The said
applications came to be allowed vide order dated
31.10.1996. It is also an undisputed fact that the
State Government preferred writ petition before this
Court challenging the order passed in Application
Nos.5472-78 of 1997. The said writ petition was
dismissed in the year 2004. Though the petitioners
retired from service in the year 1994, they did not
approach the Tribunal within a reasonable time.
Meanwhile, the State Government has issued
Government Order in the year 2014. By the time, the
Government Order is issued, the claim of the
petitioners has become a stale claim and there is an
inordinate delay in approaching the Tribunal. The
Tribunal is justified in holding that the petitioners

- 11 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


have failed to show sufficient cause for condoning
the inordinate delay.

10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board
2
v. T.T. Murali Babu , has declined to condone the
delay of 465 days. Paragraph-16 of the said
judgment reads as under:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches
should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court
is required to weigh the explanation offered and
the acceptability of the same. The court should
bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a
constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to
keep itself alive to the primary principle that
when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure
or pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it

2
(2014) 4 SCC 108

- 12 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may not
be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
delay would only invite disaster for the litigant
who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a
litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic
norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest
thief of time” and second, law does not permit
one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does
bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”


11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Damor
Nanabhai Manabhai and Others v. State of
3
Gujarat and Others at paragraph-9 has held as
under:
“9. In the present case, the petitioners, whose
services stand terminated, are not identically
situated as the writ petitioner in Special Civil
Application No.4293 of 2021, who raised a claim
in respect of higher grade pay scales while being
in service. Similarly, while a court order in
favour of a set of persons may, in appropriate

3
2025 SCC Online SC 3105

- 13 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


cases, be extended to others who are identically
situated, this is subject to recognised
exceptions, including delay, laches and
acquiescence. Those who seek to claim the
benefit after long delay, merely upon noticing
that others have succeeded, cannot as a matter
of course demand similar relief. In State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1
SCC 347, this Court has explained these
principles succinctly in the following portion:
"22. The legal principles which emerge from
the reading of the aforesaid judgments,
cited both by the appellants as well as the
respondents, can be summed up as under.
22.1. The normal rule is that when a
particular set of employees is given relief
by the court, all other identically situated
persons need to be treated alike by
extending that benefit. Not doing so would
amount to discrimination and would be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. This principle needs to be applied in
service matters more emphatically as the
service jurisprudence evolved by this Court
from time to time postulates that all
similarly situated persons should be treated

- 14 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would
be that merely because other similarly
situated persons did not approach the Court
earlier, they are not to be treated
differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to
well-recognised exceptions in the form of
laches and delays as well as acquiescence.
Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and
acquiesced into the same and woke up
after long delay only because of the reason
that their counterparts who had approached
the court earlier in time succeeded in their
efforts, then such employees cannot claim
that the benefit of the judgment rendered
in the case of similarly situated persons be
extended to them. They would be treated
as fence-sitters and laches and delays,
and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid
ground to dismiss their claim."

12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shivamma
supra, at paragraphs-261 to 264 has held as under:
“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the
impugned order of the High Court deserves to

- 15 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


be set aside. Before we proceed to close this
judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it
abundantly clear that administrative lethargy
and laxity can never stand as a sufficient
ground for condonation of delay, and we want
to convey an emphatic message to all the High
Courts that delays shall not be condoned on
frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper
case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein
the State-machinery is able to establish that it
acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all
throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice,
as is famously said. But courts, and more
particularly the constitutional courts, ought not
to obviate the procedure for a litigating State
agency, who also equally suffer the bars of
limitation from pursuing litigations due to its
own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a
legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of
State authorities or its instrumentalities, and
should remain extra cautious, if the party
seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates
for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional
courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and
pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be
placed in situations of perpetual litigations,

- 16 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable
orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at
pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put
all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen
matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient
cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add
insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals
under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its
jurisdiction is already limited to questions of
law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to
maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain
for finality. More than the importance of judicial
time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant
with limited means, who is to contest against an
enormous State, and its elaborate and never-
exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations
deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold,
because, say if a party litigating against the
State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest
the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the
present case, it reopens the lis for another
round of litigation, and leaves such litigant
listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is
our obligation that we assure that a litigant is
not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

- 17 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


264. No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted
by the courts to misuse the process of law."

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of New Delhi
4
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others at
paragraph-16 has observed as under:
“16. There is another aspect of the matter
which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents
herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They
did not agitate their grievances for a long time.
They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity
with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible
opportunity. They did not implead themselves
as parties even in the reference made by the
State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not
their case that after 1982, those employees
who were employed or who were recruited after
the cut-off date have been granted the said
scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore,
the writ petitions could not have been
entertained even if they are similarly situated.
It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may
not be exercised in favour of those who
approach the court after a long time. Delay and

4
(2007)9 SCC 278

- 18 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-K:10786-DB
WP No. 202195 of 2021


CNR: KAHC030312992021


laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction.”

14. In view of the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the cases referred to supra, we are of
the view that the Tribunal is justified in passing the
impugned order. We do not find any error in the
impugned order passed by the Tribunal.

15. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
The writ petition is dismissed .

Sd/-
(ASHOK S. KINAGI)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(SUBRAMANYA RANGARAO)
JUDGE

NB/List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5.1.Ct:pk