Ashok Kumar Agarwal vs The Uco Bank Ltd.Through Its Chairman And 3 Ors
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
A.F.R.
Neutral Citation No. -
2026:AHC-LKO:81970
Reserved on: 03.11.2026
Delivered on: 16.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - A No. - 2000245 of 2004
Ashok Kumar Agarwal
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
The Uco Bank Ltd.Through its Chairman and 3 Ors
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Ravi Singh, Kamlesh Singh,
Pushpila Bisht
Counsel for Respondent(s) : P.k.srivastava, Anand Kumar Singh,
C.S.C.
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Ms. Pushpila Bisht, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Sri Adarsh Srivastava, Advocate holding brief of Sri Anand Kumar
Singh, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. The present writ petition has been filed on following prayer(s):
“I. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
certicrary, quashing the impugned orders dated 28.6.2003,
passed by the opposite party no.4, (con-tained in annexure
no.1) and impugned appellate order dated 12.12.2003
passed by the opp party no.3 (contained in annesire no.2)
with all conse quential benefits.
II. issue a writ order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to give
effect the impugned orders dated 28.6.2003 passed by the
opp party no.4 (contained in annexure no.1) and impugned
appellate order dated 12.12.2003, passed by the opp party
no.3 (contained in annexure no.2)
III. Any other appropriate order or direction may
kindly also be passed which the Hon'ble Court deems fit
and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.
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IV. Cost of the writ petition may be awarded to the
petitioner.”
3. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the dismissal
order dated 28.06.2003 passed by opposite party no.4, whereby the
petitioner has been dismissed from the services of UCO Bank, as well as
the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by opposite party no.3,
rejecting the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order
of dismissal. The petitioner assails the aforesaid orders on the ground
that the departmental proceedings were conducted in violation of the
principles of natural justice, without affording adequate opportunity of
defence and without supplying the original documents necessary for an
effective defence. It is further contended that the charges levelled against
the petitioner were vague and did not constitute misconduct and the
punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.
4. The petitioner further contends that the impugned dismissal order
was passed with mala fide intention, despite the fact that his request for
voluntary retirement under the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary
Retirement Scheme, 2000 had already been accepted on 16.06.2001.
According to the petitioner, his voluntary retirement was initially
scheduled to take effect from 30.06.2001, but his relieving was
subsequently extended up to 31.07.2001. Thereafter, he was transferred
from Gomti Nagar Branch to the Regional Office, Lucknow, on
05.07.2001 and was placed under suspension on 16.07.2001.
Subsequently, without issuing any show-cause notice or affording any
opportunity of hearing, his voluntary retirement was cancelled on
23.07.2001. The petitioner has, therefore, alleged that the subsequent
disciplinary proceedings were initiated with a predetermined and mala
fide intention. Copies of the voluntary retirement scheme, the suspension
order and the order cancelling voluntary retirement have been brought
on record as Annexures Nos. 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
5. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner was initially
appointed as a Clerk in the erstwhile United Commercial Bank on
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22.04.1968 and was confirmed on the said post with effect from
01.11.1968 by order dated 15.10.1968. On the basis of his service
record, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Officer Grade-D with
effect from 01.01.1976 vide order dated 30.12.1975. Subsequently, he
was confirmed on the said post with effect from 01.07.1976 vide order
dated 04.05.1978.
6. In the year 1982, the posts of Grade-D and Grade-C in the Bank
were categorised as Junior Management Scale-I and Middle
Management Scale-II and III, respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner was
promoted to Middle Management Grade-C (Scale-II) with effect from
01.07.1983 vide order dated 30.07.1983. It has been stated that the
petitioner maintained an unblemished service record throughout his
career and his work and conduct were consistently appreciated by the
superior authorities. At the relevant time, he was working in Middle
Management Grade-C (Scale-II), drawing a basic salary of Rs.15,380/-
and total monthly salary of Rs.19,518.79.
7. In pursuance of the decision of the Board of Directors, UCO Bank
introduced the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme,
2000, which was implemented on 16.11.2000. Since the petitioner
fulfilled the eligibility criteria prescribed under the said scheme, he
submitted an application dated 01.01.2001 to opposite party no.1,
seeking voluntary retirement from the services of the Bank. A copy of
the application has been annexed as Annexure No.7 to the writ petition.
The petitioner's application for voluntary retirement was submitted
through the proper channel, namely, opposite party no.4, who duly
forwarded the same to opposite party no.1 for consideration.
8. The competent authority accepted the petitioner's request for
voluntary retirement, which was communicated to him by the Deputy
General Manager vide order dated 16.06.2001, stipulating that he would
be relieved from the services of the Bank on 30.06.2001. A copy of the
acceptance order has been annexed as Annexure No.7-A to the writ
petition.
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9. However, on 30.06.2001, the petitioner's services were extended
for a further period of one month on account of administrative
exigencies and it was decided that he would be relieved from service on
31.07.2001. Subsequently, vide order dated 05.07.2001, the petitioner
was transferred from Gomti Nagar Branch to the Regional Office of the
Bank at Lucknow, with a direction to report at the transferred place by
06.07.2001.
10. Thereafter, the petitioner was placed under suspension by opposite
party no.4 vide order dated 16.07.2001. According to the petitioner, the
said action was taken with mala fide intention, as immediately thereafter,
on 23.07.2001, his voluntary retirement was cancelled without issuance
of any show-cause notice or providing him an opportunity of hearing.
11. The petitioner has relied upon Clause 5.2(c) of the UCO Bank
Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000, which provides that
employees against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or
pending, or who are under suspension, are not eligible to seek voluntary
retirement under the scheme. It is contended that, on the date when the
petitioner's request for voluntary retirement was accepted, no
disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or pending against him, nor
was he under suspension. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the
subsequent cancellation of his voluntary retirement was contrary to the
provisions of the scheme.
12. The petitioner has further placed reliance upon Clause 10.6 of the
scheme, which provides that the competent authority has discretion to
accept or reject an employee's request for voluntary retirement, but
reasons for rejection are required to be recorded in writing and the
decision is to be communicated to the concerned employee in writing. It
is contended that no reasons were recorded by opposite party no.4 while
cancelling the petitioner's voluntary retirement, thereby rendering the
cancellation contrary to the aforesaid clause.
13. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 27.12.2001 was issued to the
petitioner, containing allegations which, according to him, were vague,
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baseless and did not constitute misconduct in the eyes of law. A copy of
the charge-sheet has been annexed as Annexure No.8 to the writ petition.
14. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on
11.01.2002, categorically denying the allegations levelled against him.
He contended that the relevant documents referred to in the charge-sheet
had not been supplied to him and, consequently, he was unable to furnish
an effective and specific reply to the charges. It was further asserted that
the allegations were false, fabricated and did not disclose his
involvement in any misconduct.
15. According to the petitioner, he was compelled to submit his reply
before the Inquiry Officer. Subsequently, on 03.03.2003, the Presenting
Officer of the Bank submitted a written statement before the Inquiry
Officer, substantially reiterating the allegations contained in the charge-
sheet. A copy of the written statement submitted by the Presenting
Officer has been annexed as Annexure No.9 to the writ petition.
16. The petitioner claims that he repeatedly demanded the original
documents referred to in the charge-sheet, but the same were not
supplied by the Inquiry Officer. He also sought permission to inspect the
original records on the ground that the photocopies supplied to him were
allegedly fabricated and tampered with and contained overwriting. A
copy of the petitioner's application dated 10.09.2002, seeking inspection
of the original documents, has been annexed as Annexure No.10 to the
writ petition.
17. On 26.09.2002, the petitioner was permitted to inspect the original
records at the Gomti Nagar Branch of the Bank. However, according to
him, certain material documents were not made available for inspection,
namely, the correspondence file; account-opening forms relating to
Savings Bank Accounts Nos. SB-8600, SB-8576, SB-86584 and
SB-6529; signature cards; and Savings Bank account vouchers dated
03.05.2001. The petitioner relies upon the letter dated 27.11.2002 written
by the Branch Manager, Gomti Nagar Branch, to the Inquiry Officer,
wherein it was allegedly acknowledged that the aforesaid documents had
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WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
not been shown to the petitioner. A copy of the said letter has been
annexed as Annexure No.11 to the writ petition.
18. The petitioner further asserts that, on 02.12.2001, he demanded
authenticated photocopies of several documents required for preparing
his defence. These included the withdrawal form dated 13.11.2000
relating to withdrawal of Rs.22,500/- from Savings Bank Account
No.86584; loan account records relating to certain borrowers; various
circulars issued by the Bank; a letter dated 12.03.2001; vendor call
registers and rectification reports; the External Auditor's report for
March 2001 and RBI Form No.567 dated 31.03.2001; a letter dated
30.01.2002; loan account statements and sanction letters; and document
No. EP 3133/01 dated 07.06.2001. It is contended that these documents
were not supplied to him, thereby seriously prejudicing his defence
before the Inquiry Officer. A copy of the petitioner's application dated
02.12.2001 has been annexed as Annexure No.12 to the writ petition.
19. The petitioner has further stated that the Presenting Officer, along
with his written statement, furnished details of several bank accounts
which were allegedly opened on the basis of photocopies of account-
opening forms. However, according to the petitioner, the said Savings
Bank accounts had not been opened by him.
20. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner submitted a tentative
reply to the charge-sheet on 29.03.2003 before the Inquiry Officer. In the
said reply, he specifically reiterated that he had not been permitted to
inspect the original documents and had only been supplied photocopies
which were allegedly tampered with, fabricated and contained
overwriting. He further alleged that the entire disciplinary proceedings
were being conducted with mala fide intention. A copy of the tentative
reply dated 29.03.2003 has been annexed as Annexure No.13 to the writ
petition.
21. It is further the case of the petitioner that the Inquiry Officer did
not permit him to produce or lead evidence in his defence. No material
witness was examined during the inquiry, nor did the Presenting Officer
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produce any material evidence or witness to establish the charges
levelled against the petitioner.
22. According to the petitioner, after submission of his reply, the
Inquiry Officer neither recorded the oral statements of any witnesses nor
afforded him an opportunity to cross-examine any witness. Instead, the
Inquiry Officer forwarded the inquiry report to opposite party no.4
merely on the basis of the reply submitted by the petitioner, without
fixing any date, time or place for conducting the inquiry. The inquiry
report dated 29.04.2003 has been annexed as Annexure No.14 to the writ
petition.
23. Upon receipt of the inquiry report, the petitioner submitted his
reply dated 21.05.2003, raising objections to the findings recorded
therein. A copy of the said reply has been annexed as Annexure No.15 to
the writ petition. The petitioner has alleged that several documents
produced by him in support of his defence were not considered by the
Inquiry Officer. According to him, this omission was apparent from the
inquiry report itself and was specifically pointed out in his reply dated
21.05.2003. However, opposite party no.4 also failed to consider the said
objections and proceeded to pass the impugned dismissal order in an
illegal manner, despite the alleged procedural irregularities vitiating the
entire departmental inquiry.
24. It is further contended that, while passing the impugned dismissal
order, opposite party no.4 also took into consideration the petitioner's
past service record without issuing any show-cause notice or affording
him an opportunity of hearing in that regard. The petitioner has also
questioned the authority of the opposite parties to initiate and continue
disciplinary proceedings against him after acceptance of his request for
voluntary retirement. According to him, despite acceptance of his
voluntary retirement, he was deliberately retained in service with mala
fide intention so as to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.
25. The petitioner has further asserted that the charge-sheet contained
five charges and twelve statements of allegations, out of which six
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statements of allegations were not proved during the inquiry. It is alleged
that the Presenting Officer failed to establish any correlation between the
charges and the statements of allegations. Despite the failure to prove six
statements of allegations, the Inquiry Officer, without assigning cogent
reasons, erroneously recorded a finding that all the charges stood proved
against the petitioner.
26. It is further stated that, after submission of the petitioner's reply to
the inquiry report, opposite party no.4 passed the dismissal order without
issuing any further show-cause notice or affording an opportunity of
personal hearing. The petitioner has alleged that no cogent reasons or
findings were recorded in support of the conclusions drawn by the
disciplinary authority. It is also contended that, although certain
allegations, including allegations Nos.4, 10 and 11, were not proved
during the inquiry, opposite party no.4 recorded that allegations Nos. 6, 8
and 12 were partly proved against the petitioner without assigning
adequate reasons.
27. Aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 28.06.2003, the petitioner
preferred a statutory appeal before opposite party no.3 on 05.06.2003,
challenging the legality and validity of the disciplinary proceedings and
the punishment imposed upon him. The statutory appeal was rejected by
opposite party no.3 vide order dated 12.12.2003. The petitioner contends
that the appellate authority rejected the appeal in a cryptic manner
without properly considering the grounds raised therein. It is, however,
alleged that the appellate authority itself noticed that opposite party no.4
had failed to consider certain material facts raised by the petitioner,
which, according to the petitioner, rendered the entire departmental
inquiry unsustainable.
28. The petitioner has further challenged the imposition of recovery of
Rs.1,44,616/- along with the punishment of dismissal, contending that
the simultaneous imposition of both penalties amounts to double
jeopardy. It is also stated that no recovery proceedings have been
initiated against him till the filing of the writ petition. Hence, the
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petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition,
seeking appropriate relief against the impugned dismissal order dated
28.06.2003 and appellate order dated 12.12.2003.
29. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned
dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by opposite party no.4 and the
appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by opposite party no.3 are
illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law, being contrary to the
principles of natural justice and the settled principles governing
disciplinary proceedings. It was contended that the disciplinary authority
failed to consider the material facts, the petitioner's defence and the
objections raised by him during the course of the departmental inquiry.
30. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had applied for
voluntary retirement under the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary
Retirement Scheme, 2000 and his application was duly accepted by the
competent authority vide order dated 16.06.2001, with the stipulation
that he would be relieved from service on 30.06.2001. Thus, the
acceptance of the petitioner's request for voluntary retirement was a
concluded decision of the competent authority. However, subsequently,
his relieving was extended up to 31.07.2001, without assigning any
specific reason affecting the acceptance already communicated to him.
31. It was further submitted that, after acceptance of the petitioner's
voluntary retirement, he was transferred from Gomti Nagar Branch to
the Regional Office, Lucknow, on 05.07.2001 and was placed under
suspension on 16.07.2001. Thereafter, his voluntary retirement was
cancelled on 23.07.2001, without issuance of any show-cause notice,
without affording him an opportunity of hearing and without
communicating any legally sustainable reason for such cancellation.
Learned counsel contended that the subsequent actions of the Bank,
particularly the suspension and initiation of disciplinary proceedings,
were arbitrary and intended to defeat the petitioner's accrued rights
flowing from the acceptance of his voluntary retirement.
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32. Learned counsel specifically placed reliance upon Clauses 5.2(c)
and 10.6 of the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme,
2000 and submitted that, on the date when the petitioner's application
was accepted, no disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated
against him, nor was he under suspension. Therefore, the subsequent
initiation of disciplinary proceedings could not retrospectively invalidate
the acceptance of his voluntary retirement. It was further argued that,
even assuming that the competent authority possessed discretion to
cancel or reject the request, such discretion was required to be exercised
in accordance with the scheme and for reasons recorded in writing. In
the present case, no such reasons were recorded or communicated to the
petitioner, rendering the cancellation order dated 23.07.2001 legally
unsustainable.
33. Learned counsel next submitted that the charge-sheet dated
27.12.2001 was issued only after the petitioner's voluntary retirement
had been accepted and its subsequent cancellation. The timing and
sequence of events clearly demonstrated that the disciplinary
proceedings were initiated with a predetermined and mala fide intention.
It was argued that the Bank could not be permitted to take advantage of
its own subsequent actions to defeat the consequences of an earlier
decision accepting the petitioner's voluntary retirement, particularly
when no disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated at the
relevant time.
34. It was further submitted that the charges levelled against the
petitioner were vague and did not disclose the specific misconduct
allegedly committed by him. The charge-sheet was not supported by the
relevant original documents and the petitioner was not supplied the
material relied upon by the Bank. Consequently, he was deprived of an
effective opportunity to understand and rebut the allegations. Learned
counsel contended that a disciplinary proceeding founded upon vague
charges and conducted without supplying the material documents
necessary for an effective defence cannot be sustained in law.
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WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
35. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had categorically
denied the charges in his reply dated 11.01.2002. However, the Inquiry
Officer failed to consider the specific defence taken by the petitioner and
proceeded with the inquiry without ensuring supply of the documents
relied upon by the Bank. It was argued that the disciplinary authority
was under a legal obligation to consider the petitioner's defence and
examine whether the allegations were supported by admissible and
reliable material. The failure to consider the defence goes to the root of
the validity of the inquiry.
36. Learned counsel further contended that the petitioner had
specifically demanded inspection of the original documents and had
pointed out that the photocopies supplied to him were allegedly
tampered with and contained overwriting. Although permission for
inspection was granted on 26.09.2002, several material documents,
including the correspondence file, account-opening forms, signature
cards and relevant vouchers, were not made available to him. The non-
supply of such documents materially prejudiced the petitioner's defence
and deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to controvert the
allegations.
37. It was further submitted that the petitioner had also demanded
authenticated copies of several documents, including withdrawal forms,
loan account records, relevant circulars, correspondence, vendor call
registers, rectification reports and audit records. However, the Inquiry
Officer failed to furnish the same. Learned counsel argued that the right
to defend oneself in a departmental inquiry necessarily includes the right
to inspect and obtain copies of material documents relied upon by the
employer, particularly when their authenticity and correctness are
specifically disputed by the delinquent employee.
38. Learned counsel laid particular emphasis upon the fact that the
Presenting Officer had relied upon details of several Savings Bank
accounts allegedly opened on the basis of photocopies of account-
opening forms. The petitioner had specifically disputed his involvement
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in the opening of those accounts and had pointed out that the said
accounts had not been opened by him. Despite this specific objection,
the Inquiry Officer failed to examine the relevant original records or
undertake any proper scrutiny to establish the petitioner's individual
responsibility. It was contended that mere production of account
particulars or documents, without establishing their connection with the
petitioner, could not constitute proof of misconduct.
39. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner had
submitted his tentative reply dated 29.03.2003, specifically raising
objections regarding non-supply of original documents, non-permission
to inspect material records and the alleged tampering of photocopies
supplied by the Bank. However, neither the Inquiry Officer nor the
disciplinary authority considered these objections in their proper
perspective. It was argued that the failure to deal with material
objections raised by the delinquent employee renders the findings
recorded in the inquiry report arbitrary and vitiated by non-application of
mind.
40. Learned counsel specifically assailed the manner in which the
Inquiry Officer conducted the proceedings and submitted that the entire
inquiry was founded upon the statement of a solitary witness produced
on behalf of the respondent Bank. The petitioner had raised specific
objections regarding the testimony of the said witness, the absence of
independent corroboration and the failure to establish the charges
through the original documentary evidence. However, the Inquiry
Officer failed to properly consider or adjudicate upon those objections. It
was argued that where the entire case of the employer rests upon the
testimony of a sole witness, the Inquiry Officer is legally required to
examine the credibility, reliability and evidentiary value of such
testimony, particularly when its correctness is specifically disputed by
the delinquent employee.
41. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner was not
afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine the said witness or to
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controvert the material relied upon by the Bank. The Inquiry Officer
failed to appreciate that the petitioner's objections regarding the
testimony of the sole witness were material to the determination of the
charges. It was contended that the findings recorded without proper
consideration of such objections and without affording an effective
opportunity to challenge the evidence relied upon by the Bank were
contrary to the principles of natural justice.
42. It was further argued that the Inquiry Officer failed to permit the
petitioner to lead evidence in his defence, whereas the Presenting Officer
also failed to establish the charges through reliable evidence. The inquiry
report dated 29.04.2003 was submitted without properly examining the
evidence, considering the petitioner's objections or recording a reasoned
finding on the defence taken by him. Learned counsel contended that the
findings of guilt recorded in such circumstances were perverse and
unsustainable.
43. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner, upon receipt of the
inquiry report, submitted a detailed reply dated 21.05.2003, specifically
pointing out the deficiencies in the inquiry proceedings, the non-
consideration of his defence documents and the failure of the Inquiry
Officer to deal with his objections regarding the evidence produced by
the Bank. However, the disciplinary authority failed to consider the said
reply independently and mechanically proceeded to impose the
punishment of dismissal. It was argued that consideration of the
delinquent employee's representation against the inquiry report is not an
empty formality; the disciplinary authority is required to apply its
independent mind to the objections raised and record reasons for
accepting or rejecting the same.
44. Learned counsel further submitted that the disciplinary authority
failed to record any cogent reasons for disagreeing with or rejecting the
petitioner's defence. The petitioner had specifically pointed out that
several statements of allegations were not proved during the inquiry and
that the Presenting Officer had failed to establish any correlation
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between the five charges and the twelve statements of allegations.
Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer erroneously recorded that all the
charges stood proved. The disciplinary authority, without examining
these material discrepancies, accepted the inquiry findings and imposed
the extreme punishment of dismissal.
45. It was also contended that the disciplinary authority relied upon
the petitioner's past service record while imposing the punishment,
without giving him any prior notice or opportunity to explain the alleged
adverse material. Learned counsel submitted that reliance upon such
material without affording an opportunity of hearing was contrary to the
principles of natural justice and further demonstrated the arbitrary
manner in which the punishment was imposed.
46. Learned counsel next submitted that the punishment of dismissal
was grossly disproportionate to the nature of the allegations, particularly
when several statements of allegations were not proved and the evidence
relied upon by the Bank itself was not properly examined. It was argued
that the disciplinary authority failed to consider the petitioner's long and
otherwise unblemished service record and imposed the extreme penalty
without recording adequate reasons demonstrating why such punishment
was warranted.
47. Learned counsel further submitted that the statutory appeal
preferred by the petitioner on 05.06.2003 was rejected by opposite party
no.3 vide order dated 12.12.2003 in a wholly mechanical and illegal
manner. The appellate authority failed to examine the principal grounds
raised in the appeal, including the prior acceptance and subsequent
cancellation of voluntary retirement, non-supply of original documents,
denial of an effective opportunity of defence, non-consideration of the
petitioner's reply to the inquiry report and the objections concerning the
sole witness produced by the Bank. It was contended that the appellate
authority was required to independently examine the legality and
correctness of the disciplinary findings and could not dispose of the
statutory appeal by passing a cryptic and non-speaking order.
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WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
48. Learned counsel also submitted that the appellate authority itself
noticed that certain material facts raised by the petitioner had not been
considered by the disciplinary authority. Despite noticing such
deficiencies, the appellate authority failed to examine their effect on the
validity of the inquiry and mechanically rejected the appeal. It was
argued that the appellate order suffers from non-application of mind and
failure to exercise the statutory appellate jurisdiction in accordance with
law.
49. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the disciplinary authority
had also imposed recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- along with the punishment
of dismissal, without properly examining the legal basis and justification
for such recovery. It was contended that the imposition of the aforesaid
consequences, in the facts of the case, further demonstrates the arbitrary
exercise of disciplinary power.
50. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
petitioner urged that the impugned orders cannot be sustained, as the
entire disciplinary proceedings were initiated after acceptance of the
petitioner's voluntary retirement and were conducted in violation of the
principles of natural justice. The disciplinary authority failed to consider
the petitioner's reply and material objections, particularly those relating
to the testimony of the sole witness produced by the Bank, whereas the
appellate authority also failed to independently examine the legality of
the proceedings and rejected the statutory appeal through a non-speaking
order.
51. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the writ
petition be allowed and the impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003
passed by opposite party no.4 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003
passed by opposite party no.3 be quashed, with all consequential service
and monetary benefits admissible to the petitioner.
52. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent on the basis
of written submission placed before this Court submitted that the
impugned orders dated 28.06.2003 and 12.12.2003 have been passed by
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WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
the competent authorities in accordance with the UCO Bank Employees'
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, and do not suffer from any
illegality warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
53. It was contended that although the petitioner's voluntary
retirement application was accepted, he was never actually relieved from
service and the date of relieving had been deferred to 31.07.2001. Since
he was placed under suspension on 16.07.2001, before the effective date
of retirement, he became ineligible under Clause 5.2(c) of the Voluntary
Retirement Scheme, 2000. Consequently, cancellation of his voluntary
retirement vide order dated 23.07.2001 was justified. The petitioner has
also not challenged the suspension or cancellation orders, which have
attained finality.
54. Learned counsel submitted that the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2001
contained specific allegations of financial irregularities and fraudulent
transactions during the petitioner's tenure as Manager/Senior Manager of
the Gomti Nagar Branch. The petitioner submitted detailed replies
denying the charges and, therefore, cannot subsequently claim that the
charges were vague or indefinite.
55. It was further submitted that the departmental inquiry was
conducted in accordance with the applicable Regulations, affording the
petitioner adequate opportunity to defend himself, cross-examine
witnesses, produce defence evidence and submit his explanation.
Relevant documents were supplied and original records were made
available for inspection. The petitioner has failed to establish that non-
availability of any particular document caused actual prejudice to his
defence.
56. Learned counsel contended that the inquiry report dated
29.04.2003 was duly supplied to the petitioner, who submitted his
representation dated 21.05.2003. Thus, the principles of natural justice,
as explained in the case of Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar;
(1993) 4 SCC 727 were duly complied with. No further show-cause
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notice regarding the proposed punishment or separate personal hearing
was legally required.
57. It was submitted that the Disciplinary Authority independently
examined the charges and imposed punishment only in respect of the
allegations found proved. The Appellate Authority also considered the
petitioner's appeal on merits and affirmed the punishment. Therefore, the
impugned orders cannot be termed mechanical, arbitrary or non-
speaking.
58. Learned counsel further submitted that the scope of judicial
review under Article 226 is limited and this Court cannot reappreciate
evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the departmental
authorities unless the findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence or
vitiated by procedural illegality. No such infirmity has been established
in the present case.
59. Repelling the plea of double jeopardy, it was submitted that
Article 20(2) of the Constitution has no application to departmental
proceedings. Further, dismissal from service and recovery of
Rs.1,44,616/- relate to different charges and recovery of pecuniary loss
is a permissible penalty under Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal
Regulations, 1976.
60. Lastly, it was submitted that the misconduct involving fraudulent
transactions and financial irregularities is grave in nature, particularly
when committed by an officer holding a responsible managerial position
in a banking institution. The punishment of dismissal is proportionate to
the misconduct established. Reliance was placed upon the case of
Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C.
Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364.
61. Accordingly, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner has
failed to establish any violation of statutory provisions, breach of natural
justice, perversity in the findings or disproportionality of punishment.
The writ petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
18
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
62. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material on record as well as law reports
cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.
63. To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion
of judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent – Bank
and Clause 5.2(c) of the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement
Scheme, 2000 are being quoted below:
Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent:
a) Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (Supra):
“29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry
officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent
employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry
officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at
its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the
employee with regard to the charges levelled against him.
That right is a part of the employee's right to defend
himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial
of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary
authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of
reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his
innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural
justice.
30 [v] The next question to be answered is what is the
effect on the order of punishment when the report of the
enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what
relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer
to this question has to be relative to the punishment
awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed
from service and the inquiry is set aside because the
report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-
furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely
while in other cases it may have made no difference to the
ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct
reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all
cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical
ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the
principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold
the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his
just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor
rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions.
Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the
employee or not on account of the denial to him of the
report, has to be considered on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after
the furnishing of the report, no different consequence
would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice
to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the
consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the
dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept
19
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts
to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in
itself is antithetical to justice.
31. 31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's
report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the
disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should
cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the
aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it
before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the
employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was
prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If
after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the
conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have
made no difference to the ultimate findings and the
punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere
with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should
not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the
ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably
being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting
to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will
apply their judicial mind to the question and give their
reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of
punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional
authority), there would be neither a breach of the
principles of natural justice nor a denial of the
reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal
finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a
difference to the result in the case that it should set aside
the order of punishment. Where after following the above
procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of
punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to
direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the
authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by
placing the employee under suspension and continuing
the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the
report. The question whether the employee would be
entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the
date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if
ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided
by the authority concerned according to law, after the
culmination of the proceedings and depending on the
final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh
inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority
should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will
treat the period from the date of dismissal till the
reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent
of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made
as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to
furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement
for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage
of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh
inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in
law.”
b) Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank
(Supra):
20
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
“11. The common thread running through in all these
decisions is that the court should not interfere with the
administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers
from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance
of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been
stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 :
(1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the
correctness of the choice made by the administrator open
to him and the court should not substitute its decision to
that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is
limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and
not the decision.
12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no
scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may,
in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is
shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to
direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
to reconsider the penalty imposed.
13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any
reason as to how and why it found the punishment
shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion
on this aspect. The only discernible reason was the
punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani case. As was
observed by this Court in Balbir Chand v. Food Corpn. of
India Ltd. [(1997) 3 SCC 371 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 808]
even if a co-delinquent is given lesser punishment it cannot
be a ground for interference. Even such a plea was not
available to be given credence as the allegations were
contextually different.
15. It needs no emphasis that when a court feels that the
punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record
reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression
that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would
not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of
administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v.
Amalgamated Engg. Union [(1971) 1 All ER 1148 : (1971)
2 QB 175 : (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA)] observed : (All ER p.
1154h) “The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals
of good administration.” In Alexander Machinery
(Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)] it was
observed:“Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of
justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the
decision-taker to the controversy in question and the
decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute
subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording
reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face
of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually
impossible for the courts to perform their appellate
function or exercise the power of judicial review in
adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an
indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another
21
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
rationale is that the affected party can know why the
decision has gone against him. One of the salutary
requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for
the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The
“inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous
with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. But as noted
above, the proceedings commenced in 1981. The employee
was placed under suspension from 1983 to 1988 and has
superannuated in 2002. Acquittal in the criminal case is
not determinative of the commission of misconduct or
otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with
the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in
the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee
to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the
factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be
considered while awarding punishment. It would depend
upon the facts of each case and even that cannot have
universal application.”
UCO Bank Employees Voluntary Retirement Scheme – 2000:
“5.2 However, the employees falling in the following
categories are not eligible to seek voluntary retirement
under the scheme: -
a) ………………..
b) ………………...
c) Employees against whom disciplinary proceedings
are contemplated/pending or who are under suspension.
d) ……………….
e) ……………….
f) …………………”
64. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and having carefully examined the material
available on record, this Court finds that the controversy involved in the
present writ petition is not confined merely to the correctness of the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer or the proportionality of the
punishment imposed upon the petitioner. The principal questions which
arise for consideration are whether the Bank was justified in cancelling
the petitioner's voluntary retirement after its acceptance by the
competent authority; whether the subsequent disciplinary proceedings
were conducted in accordance with the applicable service regulations
and the principles of natural justice; whether the petitioner was afforded
an effective opportunity to defend himself against the charges; and
whether the disciplinary and appellate authorities discharged their
22
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
respective obligations by independently considering the material placed
before them.
65. At the outset, it would be appropriate to examine the effect of
acceptance of the petitioner's application for voluntary retirement under
the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000. The
material on record establishes that the petitioner submitted his
application for voluntary retirement on 01.01.2001, which was duly
forwarded through the prescribed channel and accepted by the competent
authority vide communication dated 16.06.2001. Under the said
communication, the petitioner was to be relieved from service on
30.06.2001. Thus, the petitioner's request had not remained at the stage
of consideration but had culminated in an affirmative decision by the
competent authority.
66. The subsequent extension of the date of relieving up to
31.07.2001, allegedly on account of administrative exigencies, is an
intervening circumstance which requires consideration. However, mere
extension of the date of relieving, by itself, cannot be construed as an
automatic withdrawal or cancellation of the earlier decision accepting
voluntary retirement. The Bank was required to establish that such
extension was legally permissible under the scheme and that the
acceptance already communicated to the petitioner had been lawfully
modified or withdrawn in accordance with the applicable provisions.
67. The submission advanced on behalf of the respondent Bank that
the petitioner had not actually been relieved from service before
31.07.2001 and, therefore, his voluntary retirement could be cancelled
on account of his subsequent suspension dated 16.07.2001, cannot be
accepted in the manner in which it has been advanced. Admittedly, when
the competent authority accepted the petitioner's application on
16.06.2001, no disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated
against him and he was not under suspension. The disqualification
contemplated under Clause 5.2(c) of the scheme, therefore, did not exist
on the date of acceptance of his application.
23
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
68. The Bank has not demonstrated from the material placed on record
that the petitioner's application was accepted subject to any specific
condition reserving an unrestricted power to subsequently withdraw the
acceptance on the basis of circumstances brought into existence after
such acceptance. Equally, the Bank has not satisfactorily explained the
circumstances necessitating the extension of the relieving date and the
subsequent cancellation of voluntary retirement immediately after
placing the petitioner under suspension.
69. The distinction between acceptance of an application and actual
cessation of the employer-employee relationship is undoubtedly relevant.
Nevertheless, the employer cannot disregard an earlier decision
communicated to an employee and subsequently alter its legal
consequences arbitrarily. Any such action must have the sanction of the
governing scheme and must satisfy the requirements of fairness,
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the
Constitution.
70. The further submission of learned counsel for the respondent Bank
that the petitioner has not independently challenged the suspension order
dated 16.07.2001 and the cancellation order dated 23.07.2001, which
have attained finality, also requires consideration. It is true that the
petitioner has principally sought quashing of the dismissal order dated
28.06.2003 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003. However, the
legality of the circumstances in which the petitioner's voluntary
retirement was cancelled constitutes an important part of the foundation
of his challenge to the subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
71. This Court is conscious of the limitation that an order which has
not been specifically challenged cannot ordinarily be set aside by
granting relief beyond the pleadings. Nevertheless, the respondent Bank
cannot rely upon the subsequent cancellation as an unanswerable
justification for its disciplinary action without demonstrating that the
cancellation was made in accordance with the governing scheme. The
existence of the cancellation order does not dispense with the obligation
24
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
of the Bank to establish the legal foundation and procedural fairness of
the disciplinary proceedings which culminated in the petitioner's
dismissal.
72. Another significant aspect of the matter is that the respondent
Bank has relied upon Clause 5.2(c) of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme,
2000, which provides that employees against whom disciplinary
proceedings are contemplated or pending, or who are under suspension,
are not eligible to seek voluntary retirement under the scheme.
73. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that the
disqualification relates to the eligibility of an employee seeking
voluntary retirement. In the present case, the Bank has not established
that any disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or pending against
the petitioner when his application was accepted on 16.06.2001. The
suspension order was passed subsequently on 16.07.2001, followed by
cancellation of voluntary retirement on 23.07.2001. The subsequent
events cannot, without an appropriate legal basis under the scheme, be
retrospectively employed to establish that the petitioner was ineligible on
the date when his request was accepted.
74. The respondent Bank was, therefore, required to establish the
existence of a valid legal basis for cancelling the acceptance already
communicated to the petitioner. In the absence of such justification, the
sequence of events gives rise to a serious doubt regarding the fairness of
the action taken against the petitioner.
75. This Court now proceeds to examine the legality of the
departmental inquiry independently of the controversy relating to
voluntary retirement. It is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that
disciplinary proceedings must be conducted in a fair and transparent
manner and that the delinquent employee must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to meet the allegations levelled against him. Such
opportunity is not merely a formal right to submit a written explanation;
it necessarily includes an effective opportunity to know the material
relied upon by the employer, inspect the relevant records, challenge the
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WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
evidence produced against him and place his defence before the Inquiry
Officer.
76. In the present case, the petitioner submitted his reply dated
11.01.2002, specifically denying the allegations contained in the charge-
sheet dated 27.12.2001. He also repeatedly demanded the original
documents and authenticated copies of the records relied upon by the
Bank. His request was not a general or vague demand for documents but
related to specific account-opening forms, signature cards, withdrawal
vouchers, correspondence files, loan records, bank circulars, audit
reports and other material which, according to him, was necessary to
establish his innocence.
77. It is significant that although the petitioner was permitted to
inspect certain original records on 26.09.2002, the Branch Manager,
Gomti Nagar Branch, subsequently communicated to the Inquiry Officer
vide letter dated 27.11.2002 that certain documents, including the
correspondence file, account-opening forms, signature cards and Savings
Bank account vouchers, had not been shown to the petitioner.
78. This circumstance assumes considerable significance because the
allegations against the petitioner primarily concerned financial
transactions and the opening and operation of bank accounts during his
tenure as Manager/Senior Manager. The original account-opening forms,
signature cards and transaction vouchers were, therefore, not peripheral
documents but were directly relevant to determining whether the
transactions in question were attributable to the petitioner.
79. Once the petitioner specifically disputed the authenticity and
correctness of the photocopies supplied to him and pointed out alleged
overwriting and tampering, the Inquiry Officer was required to ensure
that the original records were made available for inspection and that the
petitioner was afforded a meaningful opportunity to controvert the same.
80. The respondent Bank has failed to demonstrate from the material
placed before this Court that the aforesaid documents were subsequently
26
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
made available to the petitioner or that their non-availability had no
bearing whatsoever on his defence.
81. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent Bank that the
petitioner was supplied relevant documents and permitted to inspect the
original records and that he has failed to establish actual prejudice,
cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case.
82. The requirement of establishing prejudice cannot be converted
into an impossible burden upon the delinquent employee, particularly
where the very documents necessary to establish or disprove the
allegations were within the exclusive custody and control of the
employer. The petitioner had specifically identified the documents
required by him and explained their relevance to the charges. The Bank,
on the other hand, has not satisfactorily explained why the documents
were not made available or how the inquiry could fairly proceed without
examining the original records.
83. The prejudice is, therefore, not merely conjectural. It is evident
from the nature of the allegations and the specific documents which were
withheld or not made available for inspection. Had the petitioner been
provided the opportunity to examine the original account-opening forms,
signatures, vouchers and relevant correspondence, he could have
effectively challenged the alleged transactions and demonstrated whether
the same were attributable to him.
84. Consequently, the denial of access to material documents has
materially impaired the petitioner's right of defence and has vitiated the
fairness of the departmental proceedings.
85. The next important aspect requiring consideration is the manner in
which the evidence was recorded and evaluated by the Inquiry Officer.
The petitioner specifically raised objections regarding the testimony of
the solitary witness relied upon by the respondent Bank and questioned
the reliability of the evidence produced against him. He also disputed the
absence of independent documentary corroboration connecting him with
the alleged irregular transactions.
27
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
86. It is well settled that departmental proceedings are not governed
by the strict technical rules of the Evidence Act and that even the
testimony of a solitary witness may, in an appropriate case, constitute
sufficient evidence to establish misconduct. However, the mere fact that
one witness has been produced does not automatically establish the
charges. The Inquiry Officer is required to examine the credibility of the
witness, the consistency of his testimony, its connection with the charges
and the supporting documentary material, if any.
87. In the present case, the petitioner's specific objections regarding
the testimony of the sole witness and the absence of reliable supporting
material were required to be examined. The Inquiry Officer could not
have treated the allegations as proved merely because the Presenting
Officer had reiterated the allegations contained in the charge-sheet or
because the petitioner had submitted a written explanation denying them.
88. The record, as placed before this Court, further indicates that the
petitioner was not afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine the
witness whose testimony was relied upon by the Bank. Nor is there any
satisfactory demonstration that the Inquiry Officer properly examined
the petitioner's objections concerning the evidentiary value of such
testimony.
89. The opportunity to cross-examine a witness is particularly
significant where the witness's testimony constitutes the principal basis
for recording a finding of guilt and the delinquent employee disputes the
factual assertions made by him. In such circumstances, denial of an
effective opportunity to test the testimony strikes at the very foundation
of a fair inquiry.
90. The respondent Bank has asserted that the petitioner was afforded
an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and lead defence evidence.
However, such assertion, in the absence of satisfactory support from the
inquiry proceedings, cannot outweigh the specific objections raised by
the petitioner and the deficiencies demonstrated from the material on
record.
28
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
91. The Inquiry Officer was under an obligation to conduct an inquiry
and not merely to collect the petitioner's explanation and record a
conclusion on the basis of the allegations made by the employer. The
failure to undertake a meaningful evaluation of the evidence and the
petitioner's objections renders the findings vulnerable to judicial
interference.
92. This Court also finds substance in the submission that the Inquiry
Officer failed to properly correlate the five charges with the twelve
statements of allegations and did not satisfactorily explain how the
evidence available on record established each charge.
93. It is evident from the petitioner's defence that he specifically
disputed the findings concerning several statements of allegations and
pointed out that six out of the twelve statements had not been proved. He
further asserted that allegations Nos. 4, 10 and 11 were not established,
whereas allegations Nos.6, 8 and 12 were treated as partly proved
without adequate reasoning.
94. In disciplinary proceedings, the burden lies upon the employer to
establish the charges on the basis of some legally acceptable and reliable
material. A finding of guilt cannot be sustained merely by reproducing
the allegations or by recording a general conclusion that all the charges
stand proved. The Inquiry Officer must identify the evidence supporting
each charge and explain how the same establishes the delinquent
employee's responsibility.
95. Where several allegations are clubbed together under a composite
charge, it becomes all the more necessary to examine the evidentiary
foundation of each material allegation and its connection with the
employee concerned.
96. The inquiry report dated 29.04.2003, as assailed by the petitioner,
does not satisfactorily demonstrate such an exercise. The failure to
distinguish between proved, partly proved and unproved allegations and
to record reasons supporting the findings reflects non-application of
mind to the material questions involved.
29
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
97. It is also relevant that the petitioner submitted his tentative reply
dated 29.03.2003, specifically reiterating his objections regarding non-
supply of original documents, alleged tampering of photocopies and
denial of an effective opportunity to defend himself. These objections
went to the root of the fairness of the inquiry and could not have been
brushed aside as routine objections.
98. An Inquiry Officer is not expected to accept the explanation of the
delinquent employee merely because it has been submitted. Equally, he
cannot reject the defence without examining its substance and the
supporting material. The requirement of a fair inquiry operates equally
upon the employer and the employee and demands an objective
evaluation of the material placed by both sides.
99. The record further indicates that the Inquiry Officer forwarded the
inquiry report dated 29.04.2003 without satisfactorily dealing with the
petitioner's material objections and without demonstrating that a fair
evidentiary exercise had been undertaken.
100. The respondent Bank has placed reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL
(Supra), particularly paragraphs 29 to 31 thereof, to contend that the
petitioner was supplied with the inquiry report and was permitted to
submit his representation dated 21.05.2003 and, therefore, the
requirements of natural justice stood satisfied.
101. There can be no dispute with the legal proposition laid down in the
aforesaid judgment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically
recognised that the delinquent employee must be supplied with the
inquiry report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion
and that the effect of any violation of this requirement must be examined
in the light of the prejudice caused to the employee.
102. However, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment does not assist the
respondent Bank in the facts of the present case. The controversy herein
is not merely whether the inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner.
The petitioner admittedly submitted his detailed representation dated
30
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
21.05.2003 after receipt of the inquiry report. His grievance is that the
disciplinary authority failed to consider the specific objections raised
therein and proceeded to impose the extreme punishment of dismissal
without examining whether the inquiry itself had been conducted fairly.
103. The judgment in the case of B. Karunakar (Supra) does not lay
down that mere supply of the inquiry report and receipt of a
representation automatically cure all other procedural irregularities
committed during the inquiry. Rather, the underlying principle of the
judgment reinforces the requirement that the employee must receive a
real and effective opportunity to defend himself and that the disciplinary
authority must examine whether any procedural deficiency has caused
prejudice.
104. In the present case, the prejudice is apparent from the non-
availability of material documents, the failure to effectively test the
evidence relied upon by the Bank, the non-consideration of the
petitioner's defence and the absence of adequate reasons supporting the
findings of guilt. Thus, the respondent Bank cannot derive any benefit
from the judgment cited by it to sustain an inquiry otherwise vitiated by
material procedural irregularities.
105. The next issue relates to the consideration of the petitioner's reply
dated 21.05.2003 to the inquiry report by the disciplinary authority.
106. The requirement of furnishing the inquiry report and inviting the
representation of the delinquent employee is not a mere procedural
formality. It is intended to enable the disciplinary authority to
independently examine the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and
consider whether the same deserve acceptance in the light of the
objections and supporting material furnished by the employee.
107. The disciplinary authority is not expected to function as a rubber
stamp of the Inquiry Officer. It must apply its independent mind to the
findings, examine the defence and determine whether the conclusions
are supported by the material available on record.
31
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
108. In the present case, the petitioner had specifically pointed out that
several statements of allegations had not been proved, that the Presenting
Officer had failed to establish a correlation between the charges and the
alleged transactions, that material documents had not been supplied and
that his objections concerning the testimony of the sole witness had not
been properly examined.
109. These were substantial objections having a direct bearing upon the
validity of the inquiry report. The disciplinary authority was, therefore,
required to deal with them by recording appropriate reasons. However,
the material placed before this Court does not demonstrate that the
disciplinary authority undertook such an independent and reasoned
examination before passing the dismissal order dated 28.06.2003.
110. The failure to consider the petitioner's representation in its proper
perspective renders the impugned dismissal order unsustainable.
111. This Court further finds substance in the petitioner's grievance that
the disciplinary authority relied upon his past service record while
imposing the punishment of dismissal without affording him an
opportunity to explain any adverse material forming part of such record.
112. It is true that the past service record of an employee may, in an
appropriate case, be relevant for determining the nature and quantum of
punishment. However, where the disciplinary authority proposes to rely
upon adverse material relating to the employee's past service, which was
not part of the charges or inquiry proceedings, fairness requires that the
employee be informed of such material and afforded an opportunity to
offer his explanation, particularly where such material has a bearing
upon the severity of punishment.
113. The disciplinary authority cannot introduce additional adverse
considerations at the stage of punishment without affording the
employee an effective opportunity to meet them.
114. In the present case, the petitioner had served the Bank from
22.04.1968 and had earned successive promotions, ultimately reaching
Middle Management Grade-C (Scale-II). His length of service and the
32
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
circumstances of his employment were relevant considerations while
determining the proportionality of punishment. The disciplinary
authority was required to demonstrate that these aspects had been
considered objectively and that the punishment imposed was justified by
the misconduct actually established.
115. Another important infirmity in the impugned proceedings is the
failure of the appellate authority to exercise its statutory jurisdiction in
the manner required by law.
116. An appeal under the UCO Bank Employees' (Discipline and
Appeal) Regulations, 1976, is a substantive statutory remedy. The
appellate authority is required to examine the legality of the disciplinary
proceedings, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the objections
raised by the delinquent employee and the proportionality of the
punishment imposed.
117. The appellate authority cannot discharge its obligation merely by
affirming the conclusion of the disciplinary authority. It must
independently consider the grounds raised in the appeal and record
reasons indicating why the objections do not merit acceptance.
118. In the present case, the petitioner challenged the dismissal order
on several specific grounds, including the prior acceptance and
subsequent cancellation of voluntary retirement, non-supply of original
documents, denial of an effective opportunity of cross-examination, non-
consideration of his defence, absence of reliable evidence establishing
his individual responsibility and the failure to correlate the charges with
the statements of allegations.
119. These grounds went to the root of the validity of the departmental
proceedings and required independent adjudication by the appellate
authority.
120. The appellate order dated 12.12.2003, however, does not
demonstrate satisfactory consideration of the aforesaid material
objections. More importantly, it is the petitioner's specific case that the
appellate authority itself noticed that certain material facts raised by him
33
WRIA No. - 2000245 of 2004
had not been considered by the disciplinary authority, yet proceeded to
reject the appeal without examining the legal consequences of such
omission.
121. If the appellate authority found that the disciplinary authority had
failed to consider material facts, it was incumbent upon it to examine
whether such failure had affected the fairness of the proceedings and
whether the findings of guilt could legally be sustained. Merely noticing
an omission without addressing its effect cannot be regarded as proper
exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
122. The requirement of recording reasons assumes greater significance
where an employee's livelihood and long-standing service career are at
stake. A non-speaking or cryptic appellate order deprives the affected
employee of the assurance that his statutory remedy has been genuinely
considered and also prevents effective judicial scrutiny of the decision-
making process.
123. Accordingly, the appellate order suffers from non-application of
mind and failure to discharge the statutory obligation of independent
consideration.
124. The respondent Bank has also relied upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman and Managing
Director, United Commercial Bank (Supra) to contend that the scope
of judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited and that the High
Court cannot substitute its own decision for that of the disciplinary
authority.
125. This Court has carefully considered the aforesaid judgment. There
can be no quarrel with the proposition that the High Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not sit
as an appellate authority over departmental findings and ordinarily does
not reappreciate the evidence merely because another view is possible.
126. However, the same judgment recognises that judicial interference
is permissible where the administrative decision suffers from procedural
impropriety, is illogical or is such that it shocks the conscience of the
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Court. It also emphasises that reasons constitute an essential link
between the material considered and the conclusion arrived at by the
decision-making authority.
127. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the respondent Bank does
not confer immunity upon disciplinary orders from judicial scrutiny.
Rather, it recognises the power of judicial review where the decision-
making process suffers from material illegality or procedural
impropriety.
128. In the present case, this Court is not undertaking a fresh appraisal
of the evidence to substitute its own conclusion for that of the
disciplinary authority. The interference is necessitated by identifiable
legal infirmities, namely, non-supply of material documents, denial of an
effective opportunity to challenge the evidence relied upon by the Bank,
failure to consider the petitioner's material objections, absence of
satisfactory reasons supporting the findings of guilt and non-application
of mind by the appellate authority.
129. The judgment in the case of P.C. Kakkar (Supra) is, therefore,
distinguishable on facts and does not advance the case of the respondent
Bank.
130. The question of proportionality of punishment also requires
consideration. The petitioner was subjected to the extreme punishment of
dismissal from service, coupled with recovery of Rs.1,44,616/-. Such
punishment has serious civil and financial consequences, particularly in
the case of an employee who had rendered more than three decades of
service with the Bank.
131. It is true that an officer holding a managerial position in a banking
institution is expected to maintain the highest standards of integrity,
diligence and financial propriety. Any established financial irregularity
or fraudulent transaction committed by such an officer is required to be
viewed seriously, having regard to the fiduciary nature of banking
operations and the confidence reposed in the institution by its customers.
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132. However, the seriousness of the nature of the allegations cannot
dispense with the requirement of proving the charges through a fair and
legally sustainable inquiry. The responsibility of a managerial officer
may justify strict disciplinary action where misconduct is established,
but it cannot justify punishment on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations or findings recorded in violation of the principles of natural
justice.
133. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has not satisfactorily
demonstrated how the individual acts and omissions attributed to the
petitioner were established through reliable evidence, particularly when
material documents were not made available and his objections
concerning the testimony of the sole witness were not properly
adjudicated.
134. The long service rendered by the petitioner, his previous
promotions and the assertion that he maintained an unblemished service
record were also relevant circumstances requiring consideration. The
disciplinary authority was required to balance the gravity of the
misconduct actually established against the petitioner's service record
and the circumstances of the case.
135. The punishment of dismissal, being the most severe consequence
in the service hierarchy, cannot be imposed mechanically without
recording reasons demonstrating why such extreme action is warranted.
The impugned dismissal order does not satisfactorily establish that the
disciplinary authority undertook such an exercise.
136. This Court is conscious that proportionality is not a ground for
interference merely because a different punishment could have been
imposed. However, where the very findings of guilt are vitiated by
material procedural irregularities and the disciplinary authority has failed
to consider the employee's defence and relevant circumstances, the
resulting punishment cannot be sustained by merely invoking the
seriousness of the allegations.
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137. So far as the recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- is concerned, learned
counsel for the respondent Bank has submitted that Article 20(2) of the
Constitution is not attracted to departmental proceedings and that
recovery of pecuniary loss is a permissible penalty under Regulation 4 of
the UCO Bank Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976.
138. The proposition that Article 20(2) of the Constitution does not
ordinarily apply to departmental disciplinary proceedings is not in
dispute. Equally, the applicable disciplinary regulations may provide for
recovery of pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by an employee's
misconduct.
139. However, the power to impose recovery is not an unregulated or
automatic power. Before directing recovery, the disciplinary authority
must establish the employee's responsibility for the alleged loss,
determine the amount attributable to the misconduct and record
appropriate reasons supporting the direction.
140. In the present case, since the findings of misconduct themselves
suffer from material procedural infirmities and the petitioner's individual
responsibility has not been established through a fair and reliable
inquiry, the consequential direction for recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- cannot
independently survive.
141. The recovery direction is, therefore, liable to be set aside along
with the impugned dismissal order.
142. This Court is also unable to accept the submission of the
respondent Bank that the petitioner has failed to establish any prejudice
on account of the procedural irregularities committed during the inquiry.
The prejudice in the present case must be assessed cumulatively and not
by isolating each procedural defect from the other.
143. The petitioner was not supplied with certain material documents
despite specific requests; the original records necessary to verify the
disputed transactions were not fully made available for inspection; his
objections concerning the testimony of the sole witness were not
properly examined; he was not afforded an effective opportunity to
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controvert the material relied upon by the Bank; and his detailed
representation dated 21.05.2003 was not dealt with by the disciplinary
authority through a reasoned decision.
144. These deficiencies, when considered together, demonstrate that the
petitioner was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself.
The inquiry, therefore, cannot be regarded as a fair and impartial
exercise conforming to the requirements of natural justice.
145. It is well settled that the principles of natural justice are not empty
formalities. Their object is to ensure that a person likely to suffer adverse
civil consequences is afforded a genuine opportunity to meet the case
against him and that the authority deciding the matter acts fairly and
objectively.
146. In the present case, the consequences of the departmental
proceedings were extremely serious, as the petitioner was dismissed
from service after having served the Bank for more than three decades,
apart from being subjected to a substantial monetary recovery. In such
circumstances, strict adherence to procedural fairness and an objective
evaluation of the evidence were indispensable.
147. The respondent Bank, being a public sector banking institution, is
expected to act fairly, reasonably and in accordance with the governing
service regulations. Its disciplinary powers, though necessary for
maintaining institutional discipline and financial integrity, must be
exercised within the bounds of law.
148. The impugned proceedings, unfortunately, do not satisfy these
requirements.
149. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion leads this Court
to the conclusion that the inquiry report dated 29.04.2003 suffers from
material procedural infirmities and the findings recorded therein have
not been shown to rest upon a fair and adequate consideration of the
evidence and the petitioner's defence. The disciplinary authority failed to
independently consider the petitioner's objections dated 21.05.2003 and
did not record satisfactory reasons for rejecting his material submissions
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before imposing the punishment of dismissal. The appellate authority, in
turn, failed to correct these deficiencies and rejected the statutory appeal
without undertaking the requisite independent scrutiny.
150. The impugned orders, therefore, suffer from procedural
impropriety, non-application of mind and violation of the principles of
natural justice. Such infirmities go to the root of the decision-making
process and cannot be treated as minor or inconsequential irregularities.
151. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent Bank that
this Court should refrain from interfering with the impugned orders in
view of the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution is, therefore, misconceived in the facts of the present case.
The limitation on judicial review does not prevent this Court from
examining whether the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted in
accordance with law, whether the delinquent employee has been afforded
a reasonable opportunity of defence and whether the conclusions
recorded by the authorities are supported by a fair and reasoned
decision-making process.
152. The Court is not substituting its own assessment of the alleged
financial transactions for that of the disciplinary authority. Rather, it is
examining the legality of the process through which the petitioner was
found guilty and dismissed from service. Once the process itself is found
to be materially defective, the resulting orders cannot be permitted to
stand merely on the ground that the allegations are serious or that the
disciplinary authority possesses jurisdiction to impose punishment.
153. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by
opposite party no.4 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by
opposite party no.3 cannot be sustained in law. The respondent Bank has
failed to demonstrate that the inquiry was conducted in a manner
ensuring an effective opportunity of defence to the petitioner or that the
disciplinary and appellate authorities independently considered the
material objections raised by him.
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154. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent
Bank, namely, Managing Director, ECIL (Supra) and Chairman and
Managing Director, United Commercial Bank (Supra) , lay down
well-recognised principles governing disciplinary proceedings and
judicial review. However, the said judgments do not support the
proposition that a disciplinary order can be sustained despite material
violations of natural justice and failure to consider the employee's
defence. On the contrary, the principles enunciated therein reinforce the
necessity of a fair inquiry, consideration of prejudice and recording of
reasons by the competent authorities. The aforesaid judgments are,
therefore, distinguishable on the facts of the present case and do not
come to the rescue of the respondent Bank.
155. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and is
hereby allowed .
156. The impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by
opposite party no.4 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by
opposite party no.3 are hereby quashed .
157. The consequential direction for recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- imposed
upon the petitioner pursuant to the impugned disciplinary proceedings is
also quashed . In case any amount has been recovered from the
petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the same shall be refunded
to him in accordance with law.
158. So far as the consequential service and monetary benefits are
concerned, the respondent Bank shall undertake an appropriate exercise
for determining the petitioner's entitlement in accordance with the
applicable service regulations and the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary
Retirement Scheme, 2000, keeping in view the acceptance of his
voluntary retirement communicated on 16.06.2001, the subsequent
extension of the relieving date and the cancellation order dated
23.07.2001.
159. While undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the Bank shall not treat
the impugned dismissal order as a valid basis for denying the petitioner
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his lawful service and terminal benefits. The Bank shall specifically
examine the legal effect of the acceptance of voluntary retirement and
the subsequent cancellation thereof and shall pass a reasoned order
determining the date from which the petitioner is entitled to be treated as
having ceased to be in service and the consequential monetary and retiral
benefits admissible to him.
160. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the competent
authority of the respondent Bank within a period of three months from
the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The
consequential monetary and retiral benefits found admissible to the
petitioner shall thereafter be released within a further period of one
month, subject to adjustment of any amount already paid to him under
the applicable service provisions.
161. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Irshad Ali,J.)
November 16, 2026
Adarsh K Singh
Digitally signed by :-
ADARSH KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench