Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs D V Singh

$~81
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
# CNR No. DLHC010856902024
+ W.P.(C) 16418/2024, CM APPL. 69336/2024

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. Divya Swamy, SC with Mr.
Yagyawalkya Singh, Ms. Nidhi Kumar and
Ms. Akriti Singh, Advs.

versus

D V SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sachin Chauhan and Ms.
Ridhi Dua, Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 24.08.2026

C.HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. The respondent, who was working as Junior Engineer
1
(Building), HQ in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi , was arrested
in connection with RC 4(A)/96-DLI registered under Section 7 read
with Section 13(2) and 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
2
1988 , by P.S. CBI/A.C. Branch. Consequent to his arrest, he was
placed under deemed suspension with effect from 16 January 1996 by
the Additional Commissioner (Engg.).

1
“MCD”, hereinafter
2
“the PC Act” hereinafter
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2. Criminal proceedings followed, in which, by judgment dated
18/21 January 2000, the respondent was convicted by the learned
Special Judge for having committed offences punishable under
Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. He was
sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹
10,000/- and default simple imprisonment of six months under Section
7 and two years rigorous imprisonment with an identical punishment
under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act.


3. The respondent filed Crl. App. 47/2000 against the said
decision. By judgment dated 29 November 2018, this Court allowed
the appeal. We deem it appropriate to reproduce the following
paragraphs from the judgment of this Court:

“7. The submissions of both sides have been heard and the
record has been carefully perused. There are some glaring
deficiencies, gaps and discrepancies in the evidence on which
account serious doubts arise as to the extent of the truthfulness of
the prosecution case against the appellant. This may be elaborated
hereinbelow.

8. In the complaint on which the FIR was registered by the
CBI, there is no reference to the status of the application for
sanction of the building plan. The complainant (PW-1), while
deposing in the court was also conspicuously silent on this during
his chief-examination. The relevant file of the application of his
wife for sanction of building plan (Ex. PW3/B) had been seized
during the investigation that followed after the trap. This file
contains (at page 43/C), a document (Ex. PW1/DA) on which
signatures of PW-1 would appear at the bottom – encircled portion
at point ‘A’. PW-1 was confronted with this document, during his
cross-examination, when he conceded that he had appended the
said signatures on the said document in the relevant file on
18.01.1996 at the time of he being handed over the sanction of the
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building plan duly accorded and issued.

9. There is no explanation worth the name in the court
testimony of PW-1 as to why there would still be a demand for
illegal gratification if the official duty for purpose of which such
money had been demanded, had already been carried out. Though
there was some indication in the complaint that the appellant had
extended threats that he would cause obstruction to the
construction work if money was not paid, PW-1 is totally silent in
such regard in his court testimony. Without facts of such threats
having been testified, mere allegations at some earlier stage cannot
be treated as the gospel truth.

10. PW-2 was the shadow witness who was supposed to be
with the complainant at the time of the trap. Undoubtedly, he
would speak about this on the lines of prosecution story. But then,
the demand followed by handing over of the trap money to the
appellant may not have possibly taken place within his ear shot or
within his view. This is brought out by the sequence of events
narrated not only by the said witness (PW-2) but also by the
complainant (PW-1). Both of them speak about the appellant
having gone to the room of his superior, Assistant Engineer (AE)
where the demand was reiterated and the money passed on, it
statedly pocketed by the appellant while he was still inside the
room of the AE. Though PW-1 would state that the shadow witness
(PW-2) was behind him, adding at one stage that he was within the
room of the AE, PW-2 would contradict him and show otherwise.
As per the version of PW-2, he was at least one and half yards
away from the door of the room of the A.E. From the manner in
which he testified, it is clear that he was present not inside but
outside the room. The possibility of the entire exchange being
witnessed cannot be assumed in this scenario.

11. More than the above, the sequence of events narrated by
PW-1 with regard to what happened after the money had statedly
been taken over by the appellant renders a fatal blow to the
prosecution case. As per the PW-1, after the money had been
handed over and the predetermined signal had been given, the
appellant was apprehended in the presence of the shadow witness
(PW-2) and panch witness (PW-4). The appellant had allegedly
taken out the trap money from his pocket and thrown it on the
floor. He added that, at that stage, PW-2 and PW-4 had picked up
the trap money from the ground and put it back into the pocket of
the trouser of the appellant questioning him as to why he was
throwing the money and rather he should keep it in his pocket.
Though the TLO and the other witnesses would not say so, the
evidence of PW-1 to this effect cannot be ignored. The fact that the
trap money was forced into the pocket of the appellant by the two
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panch witnesses gives rise to the probability that the money had
been thrust upon him. At any rate, it renders the result of hand
wash or pocket wash meaningless.

12. In the above facts and circumstances, the benefit of doubt will
have to be extended to the appellant. In the result, the appeal is
allowed. The impugned judgment and the order on sentence are set
aside. The appellant is acquitted. The bail bonds are discharged.”

4. A Special Leave Petition, preferred against the said decision,
was also dismissed by the Supreme Court.

5. In the interregnum, by order dated 13 March 2001, the
respondent was dismissed from service.

6. Consequent to his acquittal by this Court, the respondent
represented to the Additional Commissioner (Engg.) for being
reinstated in service. Consequential benefits were also sought. As
there was no response, the respondent approached the Central
3
Administrative Tribunal by way of OA 2292/2019, which was
disposed of, by the Tribunal, by order dated 2 September 2019 with a
direction to the petitioner to take a decision on the respondent’s
representation. After the respondent re-approached the Tribunal in
contempt, the petitioner, by order dated 12 December 2019, reinstated
the respondent in service. No decision was, however, taken with
respect to the back wages payable to the respondent for the period
from 16 January 1996 till 13 March 2001, when the respondent
remained under suspension or for the later period after 13 March 2001
till 12 December 2019, when he remained out of service.


3
“the Tribunal”, hereinafter
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7. This caused the respondent to re-approach the Tribunal by way
of OA 1443/2020, which was again disposed of with a direction to the
petitioner to take decision on the respondent’s representation. There
was no compliance with the order, resulting in the respondent having
to again move the Tribunal by way of CP 4/2021, whereafter the
petitioner rejected the respondent’s representation by order dated 16
February 2021.

8. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent approached the Tribunal, yet
again, by way of OA 2046/2021.


9. The said OA has been allowed by the Tribunal by judgment
dated 23 April 2024, under challenge in the present writ petition.

10. We have heard Dr. Divya Swamy, learned Standing Counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. Sachin Chauhan, learned Counsel for the
respondent at considerable length.

11. By the impugned judgment, the Tribunal has directed full pay
and allowances to be paid to the respondent for the period of his
suspension from 16 January 1996 to 13 March 2001 and 50% of his
pay and allowances to be paid for the period after the order of
dismissal from service till the order of reinstatement.


12. In arriving at the said decision, the Tribunal has relied inter alia
on FR 54.

13. Dr. Swamy contests the correctness of the impugned order by
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submitting that the acquittal of the respondent by this Court was an
acquittal on benefit of doubt and cannot be treated as an honourable
acquittal, as would justify the respondent to full pay and allowances
for the period during which he remained under suspension. Equally,
she submits the Tribunal was not justified in directing payment for the
period during which the respondent was dismissed from service as he
has rendered no services during the said period.

14. This is a somewhat peculiar case in which the respondent’s
dismissal from service was effected under Article 311 (2)(a) of the
Constitution of India, based on his conduct leading up to his
conviction. No disciplinary proceedings were ever initiated against the
respondent. In so far as the respondent’s conviction is concerned, from
para 12 from the judgment dated 29 November 2018 passed by this
Court in Crl App 47/2000, it is clear that the respondent was entirely
acquitted in the proceedings. This Court has gone to the extent of
holding that there were serious doubts regarding the veracity of the
case of the prosecution.

15. Though this Court has, in the concluding paragraph, employed
the expression, “benefit of doubt”, the Supreme Court has held in
4
Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan , that the words “benefit of doubts”
and “honourable acquittal”, etc., are not magic incantations and that
the Court has to go by the body of the order of acquittal in order to
decide whether it is a complete acquittal or acquittal in part. In so far
as the present case is concerned, FR 54(2) does not employ the
expression “honourably acquitted”. The expression that is used is

4
(2024) 1 SCC 175
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“fully exonerated”. In as much as the respondent’s dismissal was only
on the basis of his conduct leading up to his incarceration and the
respondent was entirely acquitted in the criminal proceedings by this
Court, it has to be held that the respondent was fully exonerated.

16. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal was, in our view, correct
in its opinion that, under FR 54(2), the respondent would be entitled to
full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension.

17. In fact, applying the same provision, the respondent may have
also been entitled to full pay and allowances for the period for which
he remained out of his job because of his dismissal. Nonetheless, the
Tribunal has, apparently with a view to balancing equities, granted
only 50% of the pay and allowances to the respondent during that
period.

18. The respondent has not challenged the order.

19. Accordingly, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned
order of the Tribunal, which is upheld in its entirety. The writ petition
is, accordingly, dismissed.


C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

VINOD KUMAR, J.
AUGUST 24, 2026 /aky
Signature Not Verified
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KUMAR
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