Mahindra And Mahindra Limited & Anr. vs Diksha Sharma Proprietor Of Mahidnra Packers Movers & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
- Case type
- Civil Suit Commercial
- Decided on
- 16-03-2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 10.03.2026
Judgment delivered on: 16.03.2026
CS(COMM) 209/2023
MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA LIMITED & ANR .....Plaintiffs
versus
DIKSHA SHARMA PROPRIETOR OF
MAHIDNRA PACKERS MOVERS & ORS. .....Defendants
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiffs: Mr. Vishal Nagpal, Ms. Suhrita Majumdar, Mr.
Debjyoti Sarkar and Mr. Bal Krishan Singh,
Advocates.
For the Defendants: Ms. Shivani Choudhary, Advocate for D-5.
Mr. Aditya Mathur and Ms. Anuparna Chatterjee,
Advocates for D-6.
Mr. Satya Ranjan Swain, CGSC with Mr. Kautilya
Birat, Advocate for D-9/DOT.
J U D G M E N T
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
1. The present suit has been instituted by the plaintiffs seeking the
following prayers:-
“a) A decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants,
their partners, proprietors, servants, agents, distributors, marketers,
suppliers and all others in active concert or participation with them
from operating its business, selling, offering for sale, advertising,
providing its services directly or indirectly, under the trade mark/
trading name/ domain name using the Plaintiffs’ trade mark
MAHINDRA and/or any other mark / name deceptively similar to the
Plaintiffs’ registered trade marks MAHINDRA resulting in the
infringement of the Plaintiffs’ rights in the well-known registered
trade marks;
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b) A decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants, their
partners, proprietors, servants, agents, distributors, marketers,
suppliers and all others in active concert or participation with them
from operating its business, selling, offering for sale, advertising,
providing its services directly or indirectly, under the trade mark/
trading name/ domain name using the Plaintiffs’ trade mark
MAHINDRA and/or any other mark / name deceptively similar to the
Plaintiffs’ registered trade marks MAHINDRA so as to suggest
association between the Defendants and Plaintiffs resulting in the
passing off of the Plaintiffs’ rights in the well-known trade mark
MAHINDRA;
c) A decree of mandatory injunction against Defendant No. 5, 7 & 8 to
block/suspend the Infringing domain names;
i. www.mahindrapackers.com
ii. www.mahindrapackers.in
iii. www.mahindrapackersmovers.com
iv. www.mahindrapackersandmovers.com
v. www.mahindrapackersandmovers.in
vi. Any other domain name which contains Plaintiff’s registered
trade mark MAHINDRA as may be included as per leave and
directions of the present Hon’ble Court.
d) A decree of mandatory injunction against the Defendant No.9 to:
i. Issue directions to DNR’s/Internet Service Licensee’s for
blocking domain names as listed in prayer (c), and
ii. Issue directions to DNR’s/Internet Service Licensee’s to
intimate Plaintiffs wherever a domain name which contains
Plaintiffs “MAHINDRA” trademark is registered;
e) A decree of mandatory injunction against the Defendant No.6 to
delist any listings pertaining to the infringing domain names as listed
in prayer (c);
f) A sum of ₹2,00,02,000/- as a decree of damages as valued for the
purposes of this suit, or such amount as may be ascertained in the
present suit to be paid by the Defendants, jointly or severally, on
account of violation of the Plaintiffs' rights;
g) An order to the Defendants, its directors, group company,
associates, assignee in business, licensees, franchises, dealers,
proprietors, affiliates, distributors, agents etc. for rendition of
accounts of the business generated, transactions carried out, sale
revenues accrued and the profits made from its business under the
trade mark/ trading name/ domain name violating the Plaintiffs’
rights in the well-known trade mark MAHINDRA;
h) An order as to the costs of the present proceedings;
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i) Any further order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper
in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interests of
justice.”
2. It is stated that plaintiff no.1 is the flagship company of Mahindra
Group, founded in the year 1945, and claims to have been carrying on
business under the corporate name and trading style “Mahindra” and
“Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.” since 1948. It also claims to hold registrations
of the word marks “MAHINDRA” in Classes 12, 35, and 39, which are set
out hereunder:
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3. It is further stated that plaintiff no.2 is a part of the mobility service
centres of the Mahindra Group and claims to be an integrated third-party
logistics service provider that specializes in supply chain management and
enterprise mobility solutions. It is the case of the plaintiffs that their mark has
already been recognized as a well-known trademark in the judgment passed
by the Supreme Court in Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. Vs.
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 147 .
4. It is claimed that the defendants are packers and movers who are using
the plaintiff’s word mark “MAHINDRA” in the form of various devices and
logos, thereby infringing the plaintiff's registered trademarks, to deceive or
confuse the customers into believing the existence of an association between
the defendants and the plaintiffs. It is also claimed that the defendants have
registered certain domains under their names, particularly defendant nos.1 to
4, who are the contesting defendants in the present suit. It is further stated that
defendant nos.5 to 8 are mere intermediaries, and their role is limited to the
extent of blocking and suspending the domain names. It is also stated that the
defendant no.9 is the Department of Telecommunications, under the Ministry
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of Communications, Union of India. It is also stated that the defendant nos.10
to 12 are the entities, claimed to be using and violating the plaintiff’s well-
known trademark and domain name. Being aggrieved by the malafide act of
the defendants, the plaintiffs have approached this court seeking the
abovementioned prayers.
5. Mr. Vishal Nagpal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that this
Court, vide order dated 12.04.2023, had granted the following reliefs by way
of an e x-parte ad-interim injunction as enumerated in para 16 of the said
order. The said order was further modified to a limited extent vide order dated
02.05.2024. Both the orders dated 12.04.2023 and 02.05.2024 are extracted
hereunder:-
Order dated 12.04.2023:-
“16. In these circumstances, following the principles enunciated in
Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia and Laxmikant
V. Patel V. Chetanbhai Shah an order of injunction is to follow. As
such, till the next date of hearing, the following directions are issued:
(i) The defendants as well as all others acting on their behalf shall
stand restrained from using directly or indirectly the mark
“MAHINDRA” or any other mark or name which is deceptively
similar thereto.
(ii) Defendants 5, 7 and 8 are directed to block/suspend the five
domain names enlisted in para 9 (supra) as well as any
alphanumeric variation thereof.
(iii) Defendant 9 is directed to issue directions to the Domain
Names Registrar/internet service licensees to block the aforesaid
domain names.
(iv) Defendant 6 is directed to delist any listing pertaining to the
aforesaid infringing domain names and to block/suspend the email
IDs enlisted in para 51 of the LA.”
Order dated 02.05.2024:-
th
“7. Accordingly, para 16 (ii) of order dated 12 April, 2023 is
modified to read as under:
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Signing Date:17.03.2026
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“Defendants 5, 7, and 8 are directed to block/suspend the five
domain names enlisted in para 9 (supra). The plaintiff is permitted
to implead any mirror/redirect alphanumeric variations of the said
domain names, if so noticed/discovered by filing an application
under Order 1 Rule 10, CPC. The Joint Registrar may then
examine the said application and direct extension of the injunction
orders to the said domain name as well. The plaintiff shall also be
entitled to seek directions in relation to MEITY/DoT with respect to
these mirror/redirect alphanumeric variations of the domain
names for blocking orders in that regard. The Joint Registrar may
examine the same and extend the directions given in para 16 (iii) to
the same.”
6. He would submit that so far as defendant nos.10 to 12 are concerned,
who are entities alleged to be using and violating the plaintiff’s well-known
trademark and domain name, they were impleaded during the subsistence of
the present suit in terms of the order dated 02.05.2024, whereby permission
was granted to the plaintiffs to implead other mirror/redirect alphanumeric
variation websites. He would also submit that the learned Joint Registrar, vide
order dated 02.08.2024, permitted the impleadment of defendant nos.10 and
11 and extended the interim order dated 12.04.2023, particularly the
directions contained in para 16, to operate against them, and similarly, vide
order dated 09.09.2024, identical directions were passed in respect of
defendant no.12
7. Mr. Satya Ranjan Swain, learned Central Government Standing
Counsel for defendant no.9 drew attention of this Court to the communication
letter dated 03.05.2023 filed by defendant no.9, vide the Index dated
04.11.2024, in compliance with the direction enumerated in para 9 of the
order dated 12.04.2023, confirming the blocking of five (05) websites. The
said letter is extracted hereunder:-
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By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:17.03.2026
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“ BY EMAIL & DoT website
Government of India
Ministry of Communications
Department of Telecommunications
BY EMAIL & DoT website
Sanchar Bhawan, 20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi - 110 001
(Data Services Cell)
No. 813-07 /LM-15/2023-DS-II Dated: 03.05.2023
To,
All Internet Service Licensee's
Subject: CS(Comm) 209 of 2023, Mahindra and mahindra limited &
ANR VS. Diksha Sharma Proprietor of Mahindra Packers Movers
& Ors. Before Hon'ble Delhi High Court.
Kindly find the enclosed Hon'ble Delhi High court order dated
12.04.2023 on the subject matter.
2. Please refer to the para 10(iii) of the said court order in respect of
blocking of 05 websites enumerated in the para 9 of the said court
order.
3. Accordingly, in view of the above, all the Internet Service licensees
are hereby instructed to take immediate necessary action for blocking
of the said websites, as above, for compliance of the said court order.
Director (DS-11)
Tel: 011-2303 6860
Email: [email protected]”
8. Ms. Shivani Choudhary, learned counsel for defendant
no.5/GoDaddy.com submitted that, insofar as defendant no.5 is concerned, an
affidavit of compliance was filed on 31.07.2023. She further submitted that
vide order dated 19.07.2023, this Court had directed defendant no.5 to
disclose the registrant and payment details of domain names
<mahindrapackers.com>, <mahindrapackers.in> and
<mahindrapackersandmovers.in> within two weeks from the date of the said
order. The said directions have since been complied with and the affidavit in
terms thereof has also been placed on record.
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9. Mr. Vihan Dang, learned counsel for defendant no.6/Google LLC,
submitted that in compliance with the order dated 12.04.2023, the defendant
no.6 had also de-indexed the websites in question, which are enumerated in
para 5 of the written statement filed by defendant no.6. The same reads thus:-
“5. Without prejudice to the Answering Defendant’s rights and
contentions, pursuant to this Hon’ble Court’s direction vide the order
dated 12th April 2023 (hereinafter also the “Ad-interim Order”), the
Answering Defendant has de-indexed the Identified Domains at serial
numbers (iii) and (v) of paragraph 3 above, from the Google Search
Engine in the country domain. In relation to the Identified Domains at
serial numbers (i), (ii) and (iv) of paragraph 3 above, a perusal of the
records of the Answering Defendant reflect that the said Identified
Domains were not in the index of the Google Search Engine in the
country domain, and therefore, no action in respect of the said
domains was necessitated or required to be taken by the Answering
Defendant. Further, pursuant to the Ad-interim order, the Answering
Defendant has disabled the Gmail Service for the Identified Email
Accounts.”
10. Mr. Nagpal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs thus submitted that,
insofar as the original prayers sought in the suit are concerned, the same stand
satisfied in view of the affidavit of compliance and other compliance reports
filed by the official defendants, and the decree in that regard may accordingly
be passed. Thus, this Court deems it appropriate, keeping in view the fact that
the directions have already been complied with by defendant nos.1 to 4 and
10 to 12, the requirement for calling for oral evidence is not warranted. In
accordance with the Rule 7(viii) of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property
Rights Division Rules, 2022, the same is dispensed with.
11. Mr. Nagpal, however, sought another relief in terms of the judgments
passed in UTV Software Communication Ltd. & Ors. v. 1337X.To & Ors.,
(2019) SCC OnLine Del, and Universal City Studios LLC & Ors. v. Mixdrop
Co. & Ors., (2023) SCC OnLine Del 3395 , whereby a Coordinate Bench of
this Court had permitted the plaintiffs therein to implead
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mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites which may provide access to the same
websites/services of defendants who had already been injuncted. He
submitted that such impleadment may be permitted by filing an appropriate
application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
( “CPC” ) alongwith supporting affidavits and evidence, so as to enable the
learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) to extend the final judgment passed by the
Court vide orders dated 10.04.2023 and 02.05.2024.
12. At this stage, this Court initially was of the opinion that the plaintiff
may be entitled to some reliefs, however, upon an examination of the law in
this regard, this Court deemed it appropriate to hear the arguments of the
learned counsel for the plaintiffs on the clarifications sought in that regard,
i.e., (i) whether the plaintiffs would be entitled to such liberty to implead the
alleged infringers by way of an application post-decree of the suit, without
having sought such a prayer in the prayer clause of the suit; and (ii) whether
the Court while exercising its powers under Section 151 of the CPC, can
extend the dynamic injunction to mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites by
empowering the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) to pass appropriate orders
on applications seeking impleadment of third parties post-pronouncement of
the judgment.
13. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs qua query no. (i), submitted that there
is no need to make any specific prayer in the prayer clause in the infringement
suit regarding impleadment of mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites or third
parties post-decree of the suit, as per Order VII Rule 7 of the CPC. While
referring to the said Order, he submitted that the suit plaint shall specifically
state the relief which the plaintiff seeks to claim either simply or in the
alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief, as
the pleadings and everything therein have to be looked at together. He placed
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emphasis on prayer clause 86(c) in the suit to contend that the prayer clause,
however, explicitly contains a prayer seeking relief against any other domain
names that contain the plaintiff’s registered trademarks. While referring to
para 68 of the suit, he submitted that the plaintiffs have categorically
mentioned its grievance with respect to such websites, as any entity would be
able to register infringing domain names with mirror/redirect/alphanumeric
variants. Therefore, he would contend that the plaintiffs have made the
necessary averments as also sought the necessary relief in that regard.
14. In support of his contentions, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad, (2002) 1 SCC 90 , particularly
to para 10, which is extracted hereunder:
“10. A plain reading of Order VII Rule 7 makes it clear that it is primarily
concerned with the drafting of relief in a plaint. It is in three parts–the first
part directs that the relief claimed by the plaintiff, simply or in alternative,
shall be stated specifically. It incorporates in the second part the well-settled
principle that it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which
may always be given as the court may think just on the facts of the case to the
same extent as if it had been asked for. The third part says that in regard to
any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement, the same rule
shall apply.”
15. With respect to the second issue, this Court had apprised learned
counsel of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Das vs.
State of M.P. & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 500; Orissa Administrative Tribunal
Bar Assn. vs. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 1; Mehta Suraya & etc. vs.
United Investment Corporation, (2002) SCC OnLine Cal 57, wherein it has
been held that the Civil Court having pronounced the judgment, is denuded of
any jurisdiction to interfere in the said judgment except to the extent of
exercise of power of Review under Order LXVII of CPC or correction of
errors under Section 152 of the CPC, and therefore, it may not be possible to
grant any such relief as sought. To that, learned counsel for the plaintiffs
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relied upon the same judgments to submit that the Court, by virtue of the
inherent power exercised under Section 151 of the CPC, may grant similar
reliefs and further extend the final judgment post decree, even though it
becomes “functus officio”.
16. Relying on the aforementioned judgments, learned counsel submitted
that having regard to almost identical situation having arisen in the present
suit, the plaintiffs would be entitled to the similar relief against the
mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites on the basis that the said websites
would link directly to the original websites, which have been injuncted by this
Court by way of an interim order or by the final judgment this Court shall
pass. He thus concluded that, this Court, therefore, may be inclined to grant
similar reliefs under Section 151 of the CPC by empowering the learned Joint
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to pass appropriate orders on an applications
seeking impleadment of third parties and upon the evidence being furnished
by the plaintiffs, to further extend the order dated 12.04.2023 upon such
newly impleaded parties.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, it would be
worthwhile to extract relevant paragraphs of the UTV Software (supra) and
Universal City Studios (supra) judgments as relied upon by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff. The same reads thus:-
UTV Software Communication Ltd. v. 1337X.To and Ors.
“99. Though the dynamic injunction was issued by the Singapore
High Court under the provisions of Section 193 DDA of the
Singapore Copyright Act, and no similar procedure exists in India,
yet in order to meet the ends of justice and to address the menace of
piracy, this Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section
151 CPC permits the plaintiffs to implead the
mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites under Order I Rule 10 CPC
as these websites merely provide access to the same websites which
are the subject of the main injunction.
CS(COMM) 209/2023 Page 12 of 32
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100. It is desirable that the Court is freed from constantly
monitoring and adjudicating the issue of
mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites and also that the plaintiffs
are not burdened with filing fresh suits. However, it is not disputed
that given the wide ramifications of site-wide blocking orders, there
has to be judicial scrutiny of such directions and that ISPs ought
not to be tasked with the role of arbiters, contrary to their strictly
passive and neutral role as intermediaries.
101. Consequently, along with the Order I Rule 10 application for
impleadment, the plaintiffs shall file an affidavit confirming that the
newly impleaded website is a mirror/redirect/alphanumeric website
with sufficient supporting evidence. On being satisfied that the
impugned website is indeed a mirror/redirect/alphanumeric website
of injuncted Rogue Website(s) and merely provides new means of
accessing the same primary infringing website, the Joint Registrar
shall issue directions to ISPs to disable access in India to such
mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites in terms of the orders
passed.
102. It is pertinent to mention that this Court has delegated its
power to the learned Joint Registrar for passing such orders under
Section 7 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 read with Chapter II,
Rule 3(61) read with Rule 6 of the Delhi High Court (Original
Side) Rules 2018. The said provisions are reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“3. Powers of the Registrar- The powers of the Court,
including the power to impose costs in relation to the
following matters, may be exercised by the registrar:
(61) Such other application, as by these Rules are directed to
be so disposed of by the Registrar, but not included in this
Rule and any other matter, which in accordance with orders
or directions issued by Court, is required to be dealt with by
the Registrar.
6. Delegation of the Registrar’s Power – The Chief Justice
and his companion Judges may assign or delegate to a Joint
Registrar, Deputy Registrar or to any officer, any functions
required by these Rules to be exercised by the Registrar.”
103. In the event, any person is aggrieved by any order passed by
the Registrar, the remedy for appeal is provided and may be
availed of under Rule 5 of Chapter II of the Delhi High Court
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(Original Side) Rules, 2018 reproduced hereinbelow:-
“5. Appeal against the Registrar’s orders.- Any persons
aggrieved by any order made by the Registrar, under Rule 3
of this Chapter, may, within fifteen days of such order, appeal
against the same to the Judge in Chambers. The appeal shall
be in the form of a petition bearing court fees of Rs.2.65.”
SUGGESTION
xx xx xx
RELIEF
107. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings, a decree of permanent
injunction is passed restraining the defendant-websites (as
mentioned in the chart in paragraph no. 4(i) of this judgment) their
owners, partners, proprietors, officers, servants, employees, and all
others in capacity of principal or agent acting for and on their
behalf, or anyone claiming through, by or under it, from, in any
manner hosting, streaming, reproducing, distributing, making
available to the public and/or communicating to the public, or
facilitating the same, on their websites, through the internet in any
manner whatsoever, any cinematograph
work/content/programme/show in relation to which plaintiffs have
copyright. A decree is also passed directing the ISPs to block
access to the said defendant-websites. DoT and MEITY are directed
to issue a notification calling upon the various internet and telecom
service providers registered under it to block access to the said
defendant-websites. The plaintiffs are permitted to implead the
mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites under Order I Rule 10 CPC
in the event they merely provide new means of accessing the same
primary infringing websites that have been injuncted. The plaintiffs
are also held entitled to actual costs of litigation. The costs shall
amongst others include the lawyer's fees as well as the amount
spent on Court-fees. The plaintiffs are given liberty to file on record
the exact cost incurred by them in adjudication of the present suits.
Registry is directed to prepare decree sheets accordingly.”
Universal City Studios LLC & Ors vs. Mixdrop.co & Ors. ,
“40. Piracy through Cyberlockers is swift and dealing with that
is challenging. As per Plaintiffs’ contentions, it is anticipated
that Defendants No. 1 to 13 will re-emerge with mirror websites,
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redirect pages, or websites featuring variations using
alphanumeric characters. This is not a hypothetical proposition,
but a hard reality. Once a film is uploaded to a Cyberlocker
website, it can be shared and downloaded by numerous users in
a matter of minutes or hours, leading to widespread
infringement before effective countermeasures can be
implemented. To avoid burdening the Court with the constant
monitoring of such websites, Plaintiffs are permitted to implead
mirror/redirect/alphanumeric variation websites which provide
access to the same websites/ services of Defendants Nos. 1 to 13
that have been injuncted, by filing an appropriate application
under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, supported by affidavits and
evidence, in terms of the decision of this Court in UTV Software
Communication Ltd. & Anr. v. 1337x.to and Ors. Such
application shall be listed before the Joint Registrar, who on
being satisfied with the material placed on record, shall issue
directions to disable access to such
mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites in India.”
18. In the context of reliance upon the ratio laid down by the Coordinate
Bench in the UTV Software (supra) and Universal City Studios (supra)
judgments, this Court is unable to fathom the prayers made by learned
counsel for the plaintiff. A direction of the nature sought by the plaintiff can
or may be permissible to be considered while the suit is “alive” and the Court
is in “seisin” of such suit. However, once the Court passes a final judgment
and a decree is directed to be drawn up in terms thereof, the Court becomes
“functus officio” . Moreover, it is trite by stare decisis that once a judgment is
passed by a Court as per the provisions of Order XX of CPC, such judgment
or decree can or may be interfered with, only in two circumstances and none
other. Those are, (i) if a party seeks correction of the nature of clerical or
typographical errors/mistakes or; (ii) a party seeks review of the judgment. In
all other circumstances, undoubtedly, the Court becomes “functus officio” .
19. There is a long line of unshakeable judgments, timeless, seminal, which
have unequivocally and manifestly held that the Courts become “functus
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officio” once the final judgment under Order XX, CPC is passed. Some of
them are also in the context of whether any order under Section 151, CPC can
be passed once a final judgment under Order XX, CPC is passed by a Court.
To get a flavor, some of such judgments of the Supreme Court as well as
various High Courts are reproduced hereunder:
i. Dwaraka Das vs. State of M.P. & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 500:
“6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or
arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders of errors
arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise of
this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court of its
ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective
judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The settled
position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or
order, the court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus being
not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders
earlier passed. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only
accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes
which might have been committed by the court while passing the
judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which
goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 for
which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or
review application. It implies that the section cannot be pressed into
service to correct an omission which is intentional, however
erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the courts below have
been liberally construing and applying the provisions of Sections 151
and 152 of the CPC even after passing of effective orders in the lis
pending before them. No court can, under the cover of the aforesaid
sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment,
decree or order. In the instant case, the trial court had specifically
held the respondent-State liable to pay future interest only despite the
prayer of the appellant for grant of interest with effect from the date of
alleged breach which impliedly meant that the Court had rejected the
claim of the appellant insofar as pendente lite interest was concerned.
The omission in not granting the pendente lite interest could not be
held to be accidental omission or mistake as was wrongly done by the
trial court vide order dated 30-11-1973. The High Court was,
therefore, justified in setting aside the aforesaid order by accepting
the revision petition filed by the State.”
[emphasis supplied]
ii. State Bank of India & Ors. vs. S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92:
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“26. It is true that once an authority exercising quasi-judicial power
takes a final decision, it cannot review its decision unless the relevant
statute or rules permit such review. But the question is as to at what
stage an authority becomes functus officio in regard to an order made
by him. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edn., Vol.
2, pp. 1946-47) gives the following illustrative definition of the term
“functus officio”:
“Thus a judge, when he has decided a question brought before
him, is functus officio, and cannot review his own decision.”
27. Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn., p. 673) gives its meaning as
follows:
“Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished
the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority.”
28. We may first refer to the position with reference to civil courts.
Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with judgment and
decree. Rule 1 explains when a judgment is pronounced. Sub-rule (1)
provides that the court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce
judgment in an open court either at once, or as soon thereafter as may
be practicable, and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some
future day, the court shall fix a day for that purpose of which due
notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. Sub-rule (3)
provides that the judgment may be pronounced by dictation in an open
court to a shorthand writer [if the Judge is specially empowered (sic
by the High Court) in this behalf]. The proviso thereto provides that
where the judgment is pronounced by dictation in open court, the
transcript of the judgment so pronounced shall, after making such
corrections as may be necessary, be signed by the Judge, bear the
date on which it was pronounced and form a part of the record. Rule 3
provides that the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in
open court at the time of pronouncing it and when once signed, shall
not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by Section 152
or on review. Thus, where a judgment is reserved, mere dictation does
not amount to pronouncement, but where the judgment is dictated in
open court, that itself amounts to pronouncement. But even after such
pronouncement by open court dictation, the Judge can make
corrections before signing and dating the judgment. Therefore, a
Judge becomes functus officio when he pronounces, signs and dates
the judgment (subject to Section 152 and power of review). The
position is different with reference to quasi-judicial authorities. While
some quasi-judicial tribunals fix a day for pronouncement and
pronounce their orders on the day fixed, many quasi-judicial
authorities do not pronounce their orders. Some publish or notify their
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orders. Some prepare and sign the orders and communicate the same
to the party concerned. A quasi-judicial authority will become functus
officio only when its order is pronounced, or published/notified or
communicated (put in the course of transmission) to the party
concerned. When an order is made in an office noting in a file but is
not pronounced, published or communicated, nothing prevents the
authority from correcting it or altering it for valid reasons. But once
the order is pronounced or published or notified or communicated, the
authority will become functus officio. The order dated 18-1-1995
made on an office note, was neither pronounced, nor
published/notified nor communicated. Therefore, it cannot be said that
the appointing authority became functus officio when it signed the
note dated 18-1-1995.
[emphasis supplied]
iii. Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association. vs. Union of India,
(2023) 18 SCC 1:
104. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon (1997 Edn.) defines the
term functus officio as:
“A term applied to something which once has had a life and
power, but which has become of no virtue whatsoever … One who
has fulfilled his office or is out of office; an authority who has
performed the act authorised so that the authority is exhausted.”
105. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) defines the term as follows:
“Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or
accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or
authority. … an instrument, power, agency, etc. which has fulfilled
the purpose of its creation, and is therefore of no further virtue or
effect.”
106. The doctrine of functus officio gives effect to the principle of
finality. Once a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority has rendered a
decision, it is not open to her to revisit the decision and amend,
correct, clarify, or reverse it (except in the exercise of the power of
review, conferred by law). Once a judicial or quasi-judicial decision
attains finality, it is subject to change only in proceedings before the
appellate court.
107. For instance, Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 provides that a court of law is not to alter its judgment once it is
signed:
“ 362. Court not to alter judgment .—Save as otherwise provided
by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no
Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a
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case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or
arithmetical error.”
108. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC
169, this Court recognised that Section 362 was based on the doctrine
of functus officio :
“10. … The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law
that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court
in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus
officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same
relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a
court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The
court becomes functus officio the moment the official order
disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered
except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical
error.”
109. The doctrine of functus officio exists to provide a clear point
where the adjudicative process ends and to bring quietus to the
dispute. Without it, decision-making bodies such as courts could
endlessly revisit their decisions. With a definitive endpoint to a case
before a court or quasi-judicial authority, parties are free to seek
judicial review or to prefer an appeal. Alternatively, their rights are
determined with finality. Similar considerations do not apply to
decisions by the State which are based entirely on policy or
expediency.
110. Turning to the present case, the appellants’ argument that the
Union Government was rendered functus officio after establishing
OAT does not stand scrutiny. The decision to establish OAT was
administrative and based on policy considerations. If the doctrine of
functus officio were to be applied to the sphere of administrative
decision-making by the State, its executive power would be crippled.
The State would find itself unable to change or reverse any policy or
policy-based decision and its functioning would grind to a halt. All
policies would attain finality and any change would be close to
impossible to effectuate.”
[emphasis supplied]
iv. Mehta Suraya & etc. vs. United Investment Corporation, (2002) SCC
OnLine Cal 57:
“21. Correction/Amendment of decree:
Order 20, Rule 3, CPC provides that the judgement is to be signed
by the Judge, and once signed, it shall not be altered or added to
afterwards, save as provided by Section 152 or on review. Once
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the Court pronounces the decree and signs it, the Court becomes
functus officio, except within the scope and ambit of Section 152 or
under Section 114 read with Order 47, CPC. In 1976, Section 153-
A was inserted in CPC. It is an extension of the power under
Section 152, to be exercised by the Trial Court in certain cases,
even though the decree is that of the Appeal Court. Section 153-A
has not introduced any new power. It only empowers the Trial
Court to exercise the power under Section 152, in respect of a
decree that has been affirmed or modified by the Appeal Court, in
certain cases.
22. Section 153: Order 6, R. 17, CPC:
In the present case, the Orders dated 17th August, 2000 and 22nd
August, 2000 purported to amend the plaint in the suit as well as
the application for decree on admission and the consequential
amendment in the decree, by incorporating the building, which was
not subject matter of the suit and the decree, till the amendment
was allowed. The power under Section 153 is available to the
Court during the pendency of the suit, viz: until the Court becomes
functus officio. Therefore, the Court could not exercise Section 153
read with Order 6, Rule 17, in this case, in view of Order 20, Rule
3, CPC. The only jurisdiction available to the Court, is that of
under Section 152 read with Section 153-A, CPC. It is not a case of
review, and as such we may not examine the said aspect now. The
amendment of the plaint and the amendment of the application for
decree on admission, could not be undertaken by the Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 153 read with Order 6, Rule
17, CPC.
xx xx xx
23.2. It is an admitted proposition that S. 151 is to be resorted to,
when there is no express provision provided in C.P.C. Section 153
provides power to make necessary amendments in the pleadings read
with O. 6, R. 17, C.P.C. This can be exercised till the Court becomes
functus officio. Order 20, Rule 3 prescribes that a decree cannot be
altered or added to after it is signed, except under S. 152. When the
Code provides a specific provision barring Courts' jurisdiction,
exercising jurisdiction under S. 151, C.P.C., it cannot circumvent the
same. Section 151 cannot be used to contradict the procedure laid
down in CPC itself. It is only when no specific provision is available
under C.P.C., then S. 151 can be availed of. But when something is
prohibited by C.P.C., exercising Section 151, the same cannot be
circumvented.
24. Ends of justice:
Be that as it may, even then it has to be exercised for the ends of
justice. Can it be said, that the plaint and the application for
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decree on admission were amended for the ends of justice! The
answer is simply in the negative. Inasuch as, even if it is for the
ends of justice, such ends of justice is not only in favour of the
decree-holder but also the judgment-debtor. But by reason of such
exercise, third parties, who were not otherwise bound by the
decree, cannot be made to be bound, particularly, when the relief
that is now being sought to be asked for, could have been included
in the plaint or could have been kept open by obtaining leave under
O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C. Such amendment will not only contradict O. 20,
R. 3, C.P.C., but also will contradict O. 2, R. 2 thereof. What the
plaintiff could not avail of under O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C., is sought to be
achieved through S. 152 or under S. 151, which is wholly
impermissible. Once the decree is passed and is signed, the Court
becomes functus officio. It can no more exercise its power under S.
153 read with O. 6, R. 17, C.P.C. If it cannot do so by reason of
express provision available for such purpose, it cannot do it under
S. 151, C.P.C. It would be simply altering a decree, which is
subject to S. 151, C.P.C. The Court having become functus officio
can no more go behind the decree. As the executing Court cannot
go behind the decree, the Court that passed the decree, can also
not go behind the decree, except as provided under S. 152, C.P.C.
Section 151 cannot be utilized or exercised for any purposes,
which are not permissible, or in other words which are prohibited
under O. 20, R. 3 or O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C.
xx xx xx
26.2. In Dwarka Das v. State of M.P., 1999 (3) SCC 500 : (AIR 1999
SC 1031), it was held that S. 152, C.P.C. provides for correction of
clerical or arithmetical mistake in judgments decree or orders or
errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The
exercise of this power contemplates the correction of mistake by the
Court of its ministerial action and does not contemplate of passing
effective judicial orders on the judgment, decree or order. It is a
settled proposition of law, that after the passing of the judgment,
decree or order the Court or Tribunal becomes functus officio and
thus it is not entitled to vary the terms of the judgment, decrees and
orders passed. The powers contemplated, are of correcting only
accidental omission or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes,
which might have been committed by the Court, while passing the
judgment, decree or order. It implies that the Section cannot be
pressed into service to correct an omission, which is intentional, how
far erroneous that may be. It has been noticed, that sometimes the
Courts have been liberally construing and applying the provinces of
Sections 151 and 152 of the C.P.C., even after passing of effective
orders in the lis, which ceased to be pending before them. No Court
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can, under the cover of the aforesaid Section modify, alter or add to
the terms of its original judgment, decree or order. In the present
case, the amendment that has been incorporated, relates to the
amendment of the plaint and the application for decree on admission,
without which, the decree could not be amended. Such a correction
cannot be brought about, even by way of review. Such a correction is
not a correction within the scope and ambit of S. 152, not being an
accidental slip or omission or a clerical or arithmetical mistake by the
Court. The mistake, error or omission in a judgment or decree, which
are subject matter of correction under S. 152 read with S. 151 are
mistakes, errors and omissions of the Court. This provision does not
contemplate correction of errors, omissions or mistakes made by a
party to the lis viz: in the pleadings etc.
[emphasis supplied]
v. Vasantha Mills Ltd. vs. Nandakumar Athappan, (2021) 1 HCC (Mad)
640:
“ 48. “Functus officio” is a latin term applied to something, which
once has had a life and power, but which has become of no virtue
whatsoever, after fulfilling or accomplishing the purpose of its
creation. In Dwaraka Das case [Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P., (1999)
3 SCC 500 , after the decree of the trial court, the decree-holder filed
an application under Section 152 CPC praying for awarding of
interest from the date of the suit, till the date of the decree by
correcting the judgment and decree on the ground that non-awarding
of interest pendente lite was an accidental omission. The trial court
allowed this application and directed the correction of the judgment
and decree by awarding interest pendente lite. Aggrieved by the
judgment and decree of the trial court, the judgment-debtor (JD)
appealed to the High Court. The High Court partly allowed the appeal
by holding the judgment-debtor (JD) is liable to pay only a sum of Rs
4783.33 to the decree-holder with interest at the rate of 6% pa. The
order of the trial court granting interest pendente lite was set aside.
Challenging the High Court order, the decree-holder took up the
matter to the Supreme Court. In the said context, the Supreme Court
said,
“Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or
arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors
arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise
of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court
of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing
effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The
settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment,
decree or order, court or the Tribunal becomes functus officio and
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thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees
and orders earlier passed. The corrections contemplated are of
correcting only accidental omission or mistakes and not all
omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the
court, while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission
sought to be corrected, which goes to the merits of the case is
beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for
the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It
implies that the section cannot be pressed into service to correct an
omission which is intentional, how erroneous that may be. It has
been noticed that the courts below have been liberally construing
and applying the province of Sections 151 and 152 CPC even after
passing off effective orders in the lis pending before them. No court
can under the cover of the aforesaid sections modify, alter or add
to the terms of its original judgment, decree or order. In the instant
case, the trial court specifically held the respondents State court
said, liable to pay future interest only, despite the prayer of the
appellant for grant of interest with effect from the date of alleged
breach, which impliedly meant that the court had rejected the
claim of the appellant insofar as pendente lite interest was
concerned. The omission in not granting the pendente lite interest
could not be held to be accidental omission or mistake.”
49. Following the above dictum laid in Dwaraka Das case, the
Supreme Court in its subsequent judgment K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N.
Swamy, (2001) 5 SCC 37, held:
“In the present case, neither the arbitrators nor the trial court
awarded pendente lite interest to the decree-holder. The executing
court also refused to grant pendente lite interest to the decree-
holder and the same was upheld by the High Court in the revision
petition filed against the order of the executing court. However, the
position would be different where the judgment of a court provides
for pendente lite interest and decree omits to mentions such
interest. Such a mistake could be corrected under Section 152
CPC. The correct position of law is that a decree cannot add or
subtract any relief except what has been provided in the
judgment.”
50. The four line order of the Supreme Court in Narpat Singh v.
Rajasthan Financial Corpn., 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1580 relied by
appellant counsel reads as below:
“IA Nos. 15-16 for clarification and direction of court's order dated
3-5-2007 are totally misconceived. Moreover, ordinarily no IA lies
after a case is finally disposed of. Ordinarily, an IA is maintainable
only in a pending case. Once a case is finally disposed of the Court
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becomes functus officio, and thereafter an IA lies ordinarily only for
correcting clerical or accidental mistake. The same are accordingly,
dismissed.”
51. Bholi v. Lachhman Singh, 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1963 case arise
from a suit for declaration of title alleging the sale deed obtained by
defendants by fraud. The plaintiff lost before the trial court. Pending
his appeal before the appellate court, the parties entered into
compromise and a decree was passed. As per the terms of the
compromise, Defendants 8 to 18 agreed to pay a sum of Rs 10,000 in
two instalments, one of Rs 7000 on or before 30-10-1985 and second
instalment of Rs 3000 on or before 30-5-1986. However, the
defendants failed to pay the second instalment within the time fixed.
An application was filed under Section 147 CPC for extension of time
to deposit the second instalment which was rejected by the trial court.
Aggrieved thereby, the defendants filed an application under Section
115 CPC which was allowed by the High Court by extending the time
enabling the defendants to deposit the second instalment. Against the
order of the High Court, the plaintiff filed civil appeal (CA) before the
Supreme Court. The said civil appeal was disposed of on 30-10-2002
with the following observation:
“It is not disputed that the settlement arrived at between the
parties was made part of the decree of the court. It was a decree
like any other decree passed by the civil court. Once a decree is
passed by the court, it becomes functus officio to modify the
decree. It is only the higher court either to set aside the decree or
to modify the decree. Since the court, after passing the decrees
became functus officio, it also had no power under Section
148CPC to extend the time for depositing the money by modifying
the terms of the decree which was passed on settlement between
the parties. If the court modifies the decree, it varies the terms of
the settlement which is not permissible. In that view of the matter,
the High Court fell in error in extending the time for depositing the
second instalment by the defendants. Consequently, the appeal
deserves to be allowed.”
[emphasis supplied]
vi. Telecom Watchdog v. Union of India, (2025) SCC OnLine Del
8811
“ 14. We have considered the respective submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the records
available on this miscellaneous application, however we are unable to
agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding maintainability of the instant miscellaneous
application for the following reasons:—
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A. Once this Court disposed of W.P.(C) 10621/2020 by passing the
order dated 09.08.2024, the Court became functus officio and as
such as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar
Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3677],
Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd.
[2024 SCC OnLine SC 313] and State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal
[(2008) 8 SCC 92 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 678], the instant
application cannot be legally permitted to be proceeded with.
In Ajay Kumar Jain (supra) the law laid down by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (supra) has
been quoted with approval and it has clearly been held that a
miscellaneous application filed in a disposed of proceedings
would be maintainable only for the purpose of correcting any
clerical or arithmetical error and that a post disposal
application for modification or clarification of order would lie
only in rare cases where the order passed by the Court is
executory in nature and the directions of the Court may have
become impossible to be implemented because of subsequent
events. The Apex Court had very clearly held that the Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain such an application as no
proceedings could be said to be pending before the Court once
the proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of the writ
petition, be it under Article 32 or Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, thus,
observed that in such a situation, it is not open to the Court to
reopen the proceedings by means of miscellaneous application
in respect of a matter which provides a fresh cause of action.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone even to the extent of
observing that if this principle is not followed there would be
confusion and chaos and the finality of the proceedings would
cease to have any meaning. The observations made by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Jain (supra) in paragraphs 11
to 17 are quoted hereunder:—
“11. This Miscellaneous Application on the face of it is not
maintainable in law.
12. It is high time that this Court says something on the
practice of the litigants filing miscellaneous applications in
disposed of proceedings and that too after a period of 5 years,
7 years, 10 years.
13. These miscellaneous applications which are being filed on
daily basis have something to do with fresh cause of action that
might have arisen with a very remote connection with the main
proceedings.
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14. No miscellaneous application is maintainable in a writ
petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events.
15. In fact, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such
application as no proceedings could be said to be pending
before it. When proceedings stand terminated by final disposal
of the writ petition be it under Article 32 of the Constitution or
Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, it is not
open to the Court to re-open the proceedings by means of a
miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which
provided a fresh cause of action. If this principle is not
followed, there would be confusion and chaos and the finality
of the proceedings would cease to have any meaning.
16. In the recent past, a co-ordinate bench of this Court
observed the following in “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v.
Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 313”:—
“We felt it necessary to examine the question about
maintainability of the present application as we are of the
view that it was necessary to spell out the position of law as
to when such post-disposal miscellaneous applications can
be entertained after a matter is disposed of. This Court has
become functus officio and does not retain jurisdiction to
entertain an application after the appeal was disposed of by
the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court on
31.08.2020 through a course beyond that specified in the
statute. This is not an application for correcting any
clerical or arithmetical error. Neither it is an application
for extension of time. A post disposal application for
modification and clarification of the order of disposal shall
lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by this Court
is executory in nature and the directions of the Court may
become impossible to be implemented because of
subsequent events or developments. The factual
background of this Application does not fit into that
description.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, this Court made it abundantly clear that a
miscellaneous application filed in a disposed of proceedings
would be maintainable only for the purpose of correcting any
clerical or arithmetical error. The Court further clarified that a
post disposal application for modification or clarification of
the order would lie only in rare cases where the order passed
by this Court is executory in nature and the directions of the
Court may have become impossible to be implemented because
of subsequent events or developments.”
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Enunciating the doctrine of functus officio the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in S.N. Goyal (supra) has held in respect of Civil Courts that a Judge
becomes functus officio when he pronounces, signs and dates the
judgment and such judgment are subject only to Section 152 of the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) and provision for review. It will be
apposite to note here that Section 152 CPC only permits clerical or
arithmetical mistakes in judgment/decree/orders or errors arising
therein from any omission, to be made by the Court either on its own
motion or on an application by the parties to the proceedings.
[emphasis supplied]
20. Thus, the question as to the competence of a Court guided by the
procedure laid down in the CPC for passing any direction after the judgment
under Order XX, CPC has been pronounced, it is no more res integra. The
Court after such pronouncement becomes “functus officio” , except to review
its judgment or correct any clerical/typographical errors or arithmetical or
calculation mistakes under Section 152, CPC, for which no judicial
determination or recording of any findings or settlement of issues are
required. In other words, there is no judicial application of mind to the issues
already settled in the said judgment.
21. How this gathers relevance in the present situation is that the prayers
sought by the plaintiffs are to be acted upon after the pronouncement of
judgment and post the Court becoming “functus officio” . Two things emerge,
(i) the ratio laid down by the above referred judgments clearly postulate that
the only manner provided to the Court, which has pronounced the judgment,
to revive its power to consider the judgment so pronounced is, when either of
the parties file (a) an application for review of the judgment or; (b) when an
application under Section 152, CPC is preferred to the limited purposes
mentioned therein;, and (ii) once the Court pronounces the judgment and it
becomes “functus officio” , it cannot exercise any jurisdiction over such
matter, except for the aforementioned limited purposes. If that be so, then the
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question of a Court, which has itself become “functus officio” , granting any
power to a learned Joint Registrar (Judicial), who is only a Principal Officer
of the Court to not only implead a party to the already decided and disposed
of suit, but also to extend the interim order of injunction against such party is
completely contrary to and principally against the very tenets of civil
jurisprudence. Once the Court itself is denuded of its power to reopen or
introduce any new issue having become “functus officio” , it is beyond
comprehension as to how such power can be conferred or vested upon the
Principal Officer of the Court who is surely not equal or even equivalent to
the Court itself.
22. Another view could also be as to whether the lis would ever come to an
end. In the manner proposed by learned counsel for the plaintiff, the suit
would always be “alive” even after the judgment is pronounced or the decree
is drawn up. A successful party can revive the suit even after a passage of
long time. This would draw curtains upon the doctrine of finality attached to
any legal proceedings.
23. With great respect and humility, in view of various pronouncements of
the Apex Court as discussed above, I am unable to subscribe to the view taken
in UTV Software (supra) and Universal City Studios LLC (supra) limited
only in respect of the actions which could be taken by the plaintiff; and the
right, authority and jurisdiction of the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) to take
up, adjudicate and implead a party in the first place; and further have any
power at all to extend the dynamic injunction granted while the suit was
subsisting, in the second; and all this, after the judgment is pronounced. It is
made clear that the present examination is limited only to the post
pronouncement of judgment exercise of powers by the learned Joint Registrar
(Judicial) of this Court.
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24. Another very relevant, yet, fundamental issue would be to consider and
appreciate that the interim order of any nature, particularly, an interim
injunction order finally merges and subsumes itself in the final judgment and
decree, and thus, does not exist independently for any authority, muchless a
learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) to exercise any jurisdiction at all.
Wherefrom such power or jurisdiction is conferred or vested upon the
Principal Officer of the Court, that too, post pronouncement of the judgment,
is unknown and surely cannot be traced to any provision in the CPC. Section
151 of the CPC is also envisaged and postulated during the subsistence of a
suit. The jurisdiction to entertain any application even under Section 151,
CPC, is clearly proscribed by the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Das (supra) .
Thus, even the Court cannot exercise any such power after pronouncement of
the final judgment and decree and is limited in its very jurisdiction only to
review of the judgment or correction of errors falling within Section 152,
CPC alone. If the Court itself is denuded of any such power, the question of
conferring or vesting such power on a persona non grata is fundamentally not
available.
25. Though it may be in the context of Administrative Law, it is trite that
what is not available with the Delegator cannot be conferred upon the
Delegatee. In other words what cannot be achieved directly cannot be
achieved indirectly. The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad in Kasturi Rangachari (A.) v. Chairman, Food
Corporation of India, 1980 SCC OnLine AP 198, held as under:
15. It is now well settled that delegation could take place only when the
delegator has the power to delegate; but when the delegator does not have
any power to delegate, we fail to appreciate how it could delegate to any
other officer the powers which it did not possess. As pointed out
hereinabove, according to regulation 4.57 read in conjunction with the
appendix, it is only the executive committee which is the competent
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authority to impose penalties. It is also not in dispute that it is the
executive committee which is the appointing authority, so far as the
petitioner is concerned. Therefore, when the draft regulations, which have
been framed under S. 45 of the Act, gave powers to the executive
committee to impose major penalties, so far as the petitioner Is concerned,
then we fail to understand how the board of directors which was not given
any such powers under the regulations, could pass the resolution, dated 19
February 1969, delegating its powers and functions with regard to
suspension and initiation of disciplinary proceedings to the managing
director. In other words, since the draft regulations noted hereinabove
gave power only to the executive committee to appoint the petitioner and
also to impose major penalties the board of directors, which was not given
any such powers under the draft regulations, could not delegate such
powers to the managing director by its resolution, dated 19 February
1969.
[emphasis supplied]
26. This Court has also observed that none of the parties in UTV Software
(supra) had brought to the notice of the learned Coordinate Bench of this
Court, the aforenoted judgments passed by the Supreme Court and other High
Courts as well. Thus, the judgment in UTV Software (supra) and Universal
City Studios (supra), appears to have been passed in the absence of the
benefit of the aforenoted judgments.
27. It is trite that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is binding upon
all Courts of the land, including High Courts, therefore, this Court is bound to
follow the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned
judgments. This would be in consonance and conformity with the principles
of judicial hierarchy and discipline. In such circumstances, this Court is
required to render the above opinion, which is slightly divergent only on this
issue.
28. Undoubtedly, the concept of a dynamic or a dynamic + injunction is
evolving and the Courts are grappling as to how to control or curb the menace
and how to effectively implement its order. Currently, the only option
available with a decree holder is to implement the decree by way of execution
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under the CPC. However, having regard to the technological advancements in
the field of innovation and concepts like Artificial Intelligence and the rapid
developments in use of the internet, rather misuse, the Courts have developed
the law in relation to suits and executions to align with such technological
advancements. However, the moulding of relief and innovation in the method
of execution which may be required in view of the critical situation a plaintiff
may face, cannot, in the humble view of this Court, travel beyond the confines
of the CPC. Of course, that is till such time the Legislature amends the
provisions of CPC or the Central Government introduces and engrafts drastic
changes in the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital
Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, which may assist the implementation of the
Court orders in cases where dynamic + injunctions and decrees are passed.
There is an urgent and alarming need for the Central Government and the
Legislature to act in haste to bring about radical changes in CPC as also the IT
Rules to suit, and align with the complex and critical issues that the citizens,
organizations, and entities are grappling with. One can easily fathom the huge
financial losses that institutions and companies etc. may face even after being
successful in a litigation. Surely, no successful litigant can be expected to
hold a decree and still be frustrated on account of non-implementation
thereof.
29. As such, the Legislature and the Central Government are requested and
advised to urgently take all appropriate steps to address this issue which is
growing at an alarming rate and would consume and frustrate the execution of
judgments and decrees passed by Courts in such special circumstances.
30. Thus, this Court is unable to accede to the arguments of the learned
counsel for the plaintiffs regarding the prayers made to the extent of granting
liberty to implead mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites by filing an
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application under Order I Rule 10 of CPC, and to empower the learned Joint
Registrar (Judicial), while exercising inherent powers under Section 151 of
CPC to extend the final judgment passed by this Court, and as such the same
.
are rejected
31. This Court has perused the affidavit of compliance and other
compliance reports filed by the official defendants. There is no impediment in
case this suit is decreed in terms of the statement rendered by the learned
counsel for the parties as enumerated in paras 6 to 10 above.
32. Let the decree sheet be drawn up accordingly.
33. The suit is decreed and disposed of.
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J
rl
MARCH 16, 2026/
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