DEEPAK KUMAR VISHWAS vs THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010243702025 2026:CGHC:45294
AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 3138 of 2025
Deepak Kumar Vishwas S/o Late Shri Atul Krishna Vishwas, Aged
About 58 Years By Occupation Advocate, R/o Village P.V. 40,
SHYNA
AJAY
Pakhanjur, Tahsil- Pakhanjur, District Uttar Bastar, Kanker,
Digitally signed
by SHYNA AJAY
Date:
2026.10.31
17:42:47 +0530
Chhattisgarh.
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Law And
Legislative Department, Government Of Chhattisgarh. Naya Raipur,
District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Additional Secretary, Law and Legislative Department,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 3508 of 2025

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Murli Manohar Upreti S/o Late Shri Kripalu Datt Upreti, Aged About
66 Years, By Occupation Advocate, R/o Nayapara Ward No 13,
Bhanupratappur District- Uttar Bastar , Kanker (C.G.)
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through its Secretary, Law And
Legislative Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Naya Raipur
Distt- Raipur CG
2 - Additional Secretary, Law and Legislative Department
Mantaralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Nava Raipur Atal Nagar Distt-
Raipur (C.G.)
--- Respondent(s)
(Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Akhilesh Kumar Government Advocate
SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board

27/10/2026
1. By way of these captioned Writ Petitions, the respective
petitioners challenge the order dated 12.03.2025 (Annexure
P/11 in WPC No.3138/2025) and the order dated 28.3.2025
(Annexure P/8 in WPC No.3508/2025), whereby Respondent

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No. 2 rejected the applications of the petitioners for renewal
of their Notary Certificates and ordered the deletion of their
names from the Register of Notaries on the ground that they
acted in contravention of Section 9 of the Notaries Act, 1952
(in short “the Act, 1952”).
2. For the sake of convenience, WPC No.3138/2025 is being
treated as the lead case and the facts of the said petition are
being referred to for the purpose of adjudication. The decision
rendered herein, shall, however, govern the connected Writ
Petition as well. In sum and substance, both the writ
petitioners have prayed for the same reliefs. In WPC
No.3138/2025, the petitioner therein has prayed for the
following reliefs:
I. quash/set aside the order dated 12/3/25,
No. 1140/ 3517/21-B/CG/2024 issue by
respondent no. 2 (Annexure P/11)
II Direct the respondents to add the name of
the petitioner in the Register of Notaries, by
renewing his licence of Notary, by allowing
the petitioner for renewal of Notary Licence.
III. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court
deems fit and proper under the facts and
circumstances of the case may also be
passed in favour of the petitioner and the
cost of the petition may be awarded in
favour of the petitioner

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3. Brief facts, as set-forth by the petitioner, are that that the
petitioner is an Advocate continuously practicing law since
19.09.1994, who was duly appointed as a Notary by the
Government of Chhattisgarh under the Act, 1952 on
27.02.2007 with territorial jurisdiction across Tahsil Pakhanjur,
District Uttar Bastar Kanker. His authorization was
subsequently renewed up to 26.02.2022, during which time he
maintained an unblemished record supported by a clearance
letter dated 02.12.2021 from the Bar Association
Bhanupratappur. Upon applying for renewal on 07.12.2021
along with the requisite SBI challan before the Law and
Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh
(Respondent No. 2) issued a show cause notice dated
19.04.2022 (Annexure P/5) regarding delay in submission, to
which the petitioner submitted a detailed reply explaining his
bona fide oversight. However, Respondent No. 2 mechanically
passed an unreasoned and non-speaking order dated
16.12.2022 deleting his name from the Register of Notaries,
depriving him of his primary source of livelihood. Though the
petitioner submitted a representation dated 30.12.2022
(Annexure P/8) and subsequently challenged its rejection
before this Court by filing WPC No.1688/2023. This Court vide
order dated 30.09.2024 (Annexure P/10) set aside the
rejection and directed Respondent No. 2 to pass a reasoned
order within 60 days. Respondent No. 2 did not comply with
the aforesaid order and thereby, failed to adhere to the

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timeline and ultimately, passed a fresh rejection order dated
12.03.2025 (Annexure P/11) introducing an entirely new
ground of violation of Section 9 of the Act, 1952. This final
order was passed without issuing any prior show cause
notice, without conducting an inquiry under Section 10(d) of
the Act, 1952 read with Rule 13 of the Notaries Rules, 1956
(in short “the Rules, 1956”) and in complete violation of both
the principles of natural justice and the directions issued by
this Court. Hence, this Petition(s).
4. Mr. Parag Kotecha, learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that by virtue of the impugned order, the renewal application
of the petitioner was illegally rejected and his name was
arbitrarily deleted from the Register of Notaries in blatant and
flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, Section
10(d) of the Act, 1952 and the mandatory procedural
safeguards encapsulated under Rule 13 (including sub-rules
4, 4A, 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13) of the Rules, 1956. Furthermore,
the Respondent Authority has acted in direct defiance of the
directions and mandate issued by this Court in the earlier
round of litigation by impermissibly shifting its stance and
introducing an entirely novel ground for rejection without
affording any prior show cause notice, inquiry or reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He submits that the
minimal delay in submitting the renewal application was
sufficiently justified by a bona fide oversight and lack of
statutory awareness with the prescribed renewal fee having

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been duly and timely deposited via State Bank of India
Challan pursuant to Rule 9. He submits that the rejection of
the application and the imposition of a severe professional
penalty without considering the matter on its merits amounts
to malice in law, continuously harassing a 58 year old
practitioner who has been engaged in this profession since
2007. He also submits that this arbitrary action effectively
deprives the petitioner and his family of their sole means of
livelihood, inflicts grave and irreparable hardship, casts an
unmerited stigma upon his professional career and renders
the impugned action entirely unsustainable in the eyes.
5.
On the other hand, Mr. Akhilesh Kumar, learned counsel for
the State submits that the petitioner's Practice Certificate
expired on 26.02.2022 and he failed to submit his renewal
application prior to the statutory deadline of 26.08.2021,
submitting the same only on 07.12.2021 after an unexplained
delay of four months. After the issuance of a show cause
notice dated 09.04.2022, the reply submitted by the petitioner
was found unsatisfactory upon administrative scrutiny. He
submits that an examination of the official Notary Register
revealed that the petitioner unlawfully continued to perform
notarial work past the expiry of his license, in direct violation of
Section 9 of the Act, 1952. Hence, the State Government
acted in accordance with law and within the powers conferred
under Sections 3, 4, 5, and 10(d) of the Act of 1952 in
removing the name of the petitioner name from the Register.

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He submits that the impugned order(s) is legal, constitutional,
and valid. In view of the above, the present petition is devoid
of merit and liable to be dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the
documents annexed with the petition with utmost
circumspection.
7. For a proper adjudication of the controversy involved in the
present case, it would be apposite to refer to the statutory
scheme governing the field, particularly Sections 4, 5, 9, and
10 of the Act, 1952 :
4. Registers. —

(1) The Central Government and every State
Government shall maintain, in such form as may
be prescribed, a Register of the notaries appointed
by that Government and entitled to practise as
such under this Act.
(2) Every such Register shall include the
following particulars about the notary whose name
is entered therein, namely:—
(a) his full name, date of birth, residential and
professional address;
(b) the date on which his name is entered in the
Register;
(c) his qualifications; and
(d) any other particulars which may be
prescribed.
5. Entry of names in the Register and issue or
renewal of certificates of practice .—(1) Every
notary who intends to practise as such [may], on
payment to the Government appointing him of the

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prescribed fee, if any, be entitled-
(a) to have his name entered in the Register
maintained by that Government under section 4;
and
(b) to a certificate authorising him to practise for
a period of [five years] from the date on which the
certificate is issued to him.
[(2) The Government appointing the notary, may,
on receipt of an application and the prescribed fee,
renew the certificate of practice of any notary for a
period of five years at a time.]
9. Bar of practice without certificate .— (1)Subject
to the provisions of this section, no person shall
practise as a notary or do any notarial act under the
official seal of a notary unless he holds a certificate
of practice in force issued to him under section 5:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to the presentation of any promissory note,
hundi or bill of exchange for acceptance or payment
by the clerk of a notary acting on behalf of such
notary.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall,
until the expiry of two years from the
commencement of this Act, apply to any such person
as is referred to in the proviso to clause (d) of
section 2:
[Provided that in relation to the State of
Jammu and Kashmir the said period of two years
shall be computed from the date on which this Act
comes into force in that State.]
10. Removal of names from Register .—
The Government appointing any notary may, by
order, remove from the Register maintained by it
under section 4 the name of the notary if he—
(a) makes a request to that effect; or

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(b) has not paid any prescribed fee required to be
paid by him; or
(c) is an undischarged insolvent; or
(d) has been found, upon inquiry in the prescribed
manner, to be guilty of such professional or other
misconduct as, in the opinion of the Government,
renders him unfit to practise as a notary; [or]
[(e) is convicted by any court for an offence
involving moral turpitude; or]
[(f) does not get his certificate of practice renewed.]
8. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions shows that Section
9 of the Act, 1952 unambiguously mandates that no person
shall practice as a Notary or do any notarial act under the
official seal of a Notary unless he holds a certificate of practice
in force, issued to him under Section 5. Section 10 of the Act,
1952 governs the removal of a Notary's name from the
Register maintained under Section 4. Specifically, under
Section 10(d), a Notary may be removed from the Register if,
upon an inquiry conducted in the prescribed manner, he is
found guilty of such professional or other misconduct as, in
the opinion of the Government, renders him unfit to practice
as a Notary.
9. Furthermore, the Rules, 1956 prescribe a complete statutory
procedure for conducting an inquiry into allegations of
professional or other misconduct of a Notary. The relevant
extracts of Rule 13, including sub-rules (1), (2), (3), (4), (4A),
(6), (7) and (10) thereof, read as under:

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[13 . Inquiry into the allegations of professional or
other misconduct of a notary
[(1) An inquiry into the misconduct of a notary may be
initiated either suo motu by the appropriate
Government or on a complaint received in Form XIII.]
(2) Every such complaint shall contain the following
particulars, namely:-
(a) the acts and omissions which, if proved, would
render the person complained against unfit to be a
notary;
(b) The oral or documentary evidence relied upon in
support of the allegations made in the complaint.
(3) The appropriate Government shall return a
complaint which is not in the proper Form or which
does not contain the aforesaid particulars to the
complainant for representation after compliance with
such objections and within such times as the
appropriate Government may specify :
Provided that if the subject-matter in a complaint is, in
the opinion of the said Government substantially the
same as or covered by, any previous complaint and if
there is no additional ground, the said Government
shall file the said complaint without any further action
and inform the complainant accordingly.
(4) Within sixty days ordinarily of the receipt of
complaint, the appropriate government shall send a
copy thereof to the notary at his address as entered in
the Register of Notaries.

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[(4A) Where an inquiry is initiated, suo motu by the
appropriate Government, the appropriate Government
shall send to the notary a statement specifying the
charge or charges against him, together with
particulars of the oral or documentary evidence relied
upon in support of such charge or charges.]
xxx
(6) If on a persual of [the written statement,] if any, of
the notary concerned and other relevant documents
and papers, the appropriate Government consider that
there is a prima facie case against such notary, the
appropriate Government shall cause and inquiry to be
made in the matter by the competent authority. If the
appropriate Government is of the opinion that there is
no prima facie case against the notary concerned, [the
complaint or charge shall be filed] and the
complainant and the notary concerned shall be
informed accordingly.
[(7) Every notice issued to a notary under this rule shall
be sent to him by registered post. If any such notice is
returned unserved with an endorsement indicating that
the addressee has refused to accept the notice or the
notice is not return unserved within a period of thirty
days from the date of its dispatch, the notice shall be
deemed to have been duly served upon the notary.]
xxx
xxx
(10) Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the

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competent authority shall have the power to regulate
his procedure relating to the inquiry in such manner as
he considers necessary and during the course of
inquiry, may examine witnesses and receive any other
oral or documentary evidence.
10.
When the facts of the present case are evaluated on the
touchstone of the aforesaid statutory provisions and rules, it is
clear that a person’s entitlement to practice as a Notary
depends on holding a valid Certificate of Practice issued
under Section 5 of the Act, 1952. In the earlier round of
litigation, as no reasoned order was passed regarding the
renewal or non-renewal of the petitioner's license, this Court
directed the competent authority to consider the matter afresh
and pass a reasoned order. In pursuance thereof, the
Respondent Authority passed the impugned order dated
12.03.2025, rejecting the renewal application of the petitioner
under Sections 9 & 10 of the Act, 1952 and ordering the
deletion of his name from the Register of Notaries on the
premise that he violated Section 9 of the Act, 1952.
11. A perusal of the pleadings and submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioner reveals that while a prior
show cause notice was issued and a reply was obtained
before passing the impugned order, no inquiry as
contemplated under Section 10(d) of the Act, 1952 read with
Rule 13 (specifically sub-rules 4A, 6, 7 and 10) of the Rules,
1956 was ever conducted. In the absence of any inquiry, the

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Respondent Authority rejected the renewal application and
struck off the name of the petitioner from the Register of
Notaries.
12. It is trite law that where an Act or Rule envisages a specific
procedure or inquiry prior to taking adverse action, such
procedure must be followed strictly. An order passed in
derogation of the prescribed statutory procedure is rendered
non-est in the eyes of law. In the instant case, because no
inquiry was conducted, the petitioner(s) was deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to rebut the allegations levied against
him, resulting in a prima facie violation of the principles of
natural justice.
13.
In the matter of Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad
r eported in (1999) 8 SCC 266, the following was held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.17:-
17. In our opinion insofar as an election petition is
concerned, proper presentation of an election petition in
the Patna High Court can only be made in the manner
prescribed by Rule 6 of Chapter XXI-E. No other mode
of presentation of an election petition is envisaged under
the Act or the rules thereunder and, therefore, an
election petition could, under no circumstances, be
presented to the Registrar to save the period of
limitation. It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular
manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no
other manner. (See with advantage: Nazir Ahmad v. King
Emperor [(1935-36) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253 (II)] ,
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. [AIR 1954 SC
322 : 1954 SCR 1098] , State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh

14
[AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 SCWR 57] .) An election
petition under the rules could only have been presented
in the open court up to 16-5-1995 till 4.15 p.m. (working
hours of the Court) in the manner prescribed by Rule 6
(supra) either to the Judge or the Bench as the case
may be to save the period of limitation. That, however,
was not done. However, we cannot ignore that the
situation in the present case was not of the making of
the appellant. Neither the Designated Election Judge
before whom the election petition could be formally
presented in the open court nor the Bench hearing civil
applications and motions was admittedly available on
16-5-1995 after 3.15 p.m., after the obituary reference
since admittedly the Chief Justice of the High Court had
declared that “the Court shall not sit for the rest of the
day” after 3.15 p.m. Law does not expect a party to do
the impossible — impossibilium nulla obligatio est — as
in the instant case, the election petition could not be filed
on 16-5-1995 during the court hours, as for all intents
and purposes, the Court was closed on 16-5-1995 after
3.15 p.m .
14. Further, in the matter of OPTO Circuits (India) Ltd. v. Axis
Bank, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 707, the following was held in
paragraph No.14:-
14. This Court has time and again emphasised that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular
manner, then it has to be done in that manner alone
and in no other manner. Among others, in a matter
relating to the presentation of an election petition, as
per the procedure prescribed under the Patna High
Court Rules, this Court had an occasion to consider the
Rules to find out as to what would be a valid
presentation of an election petition in Chandra Kishore
Jha v. Mahavir Prasad [Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir

15
Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266] and in the course of
consideration observed as hereunder : (SCC p. 273,
para 17)
“17. … It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular
manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no
other manner.”
Therefore, if the salutary principle is kept in perspective,
in the instant case, though the authorised officer is
vested with sufficient power; such power is
circumscribed by a procedure laid down under the
statute. As such the power is to be exercised in that
manner alone, failing which it would fall foul of the
requirement of complying with due process under law.
We have found fault with the authorised officer and
declared the action bad only insofar as not following the
legal requirement before and after freezing the account.
This shall not be construed as an opinion expressed on
the merit of the allegation or any other aspect relating to
the matter and the action initiated against the appellant
and its Directors which is a matter to be taken note of in
appropriate proceedings if at all any issue is raised by
the aggrieved party.
15.
In the matter of Union of India and Others Vs. Mahendra
Singh reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 909, the following
was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.16:-
16. The said principle has been followed by this Court in
Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of
Andhra Pradesh 11 wherein this Court held as under:
“14. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a
particular manner following a particular procedure, it
shall be done in the same manner following the
provisions of law, without deviating from the prescribed

16
procedure………….”
16. In the matter of State of M.P. and Others vs. Jagdish
Prasad Dubey reported in 2024 SCC OnLine MP 1567, the
Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held the following
in paragraph 21 and 23:-
21. However, the aforesaid requirements of law have
not been complied with in the case at hand. It is
probably for this reason that there is no mentioning of
words “retired Government servant” in Rule 65 which
deals with recovery and adjustment of Government
dues. Rule 65 as extracted hereinabove deals with
“ascertainable Government dues” which includes
excess payment of pay and allowances. These excess
payments are recoverable from the Government
servant prior to his retirement since Rule 65(1) specifies
that it shall be the duty of every retiring Government
servant to clear all Government dues before the date of
his retirement. The dues towards excess payment and
allowances are recoverable from a retiring Government
servant. It is an established principle of law that if the
statute provides for a particular thing to be done in a
particular manner then it has to be done in that manner
alone and in no other manner. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir
Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266 held in para 17 as follows:—
“17…It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a statute
provides for a thing to he done in a particular manner,
then it has to be done in that manner and in no other
manner. (See with advantage : Nazir Ahmad v. King
Emperor [(1935-36) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)],
Mao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. [(1954) 1 SCC
296 : AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 SCR 1098], State of U.P.

17
v. Singhara Singh [AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 SCWR
57].)…”
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India v. Mahendra Singh, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 909
held in para 16 as follows:—
“16. The said principle has been followed by this Court
in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of
Andhra Pradesh [(2015) 13 SCC 722] wherein this
Court held as under:
“14. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a
particular mariner following a particular procedure, it
shall be done in the same manner following the
provisions of law, without deviating from the prescribed
procedure”
17. In the matter of A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation
versus Tahsildar and Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 447, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held the following in
paragraphs No.10 & 24:-
10. On 20.09.2010 the appellant preferred another writ
petition being Writ Petition No. 23477 of 2010, inter alia
assailing the purported panchnama. In Writ Petition
No. 23477 of 2010, the High Court directed that
pending further orders, the appellant shall not be
dispossessed from the Subject Land. The learned
Single Judge adjudicated both the writ petitions filed by
the appellants and allowed those vide common
judgment and order dated 03.01.2022. The learned
Single Judge held as under:—
“From the sum and substance of the above said
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various
other Courts, it is clear that the official respondents
after issuing notices under Section 10(1) and 10(3)
have to issue notice under Section 10(5) directing the

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party to surrender the possession of the land, within a
period of thirty days, and if voluntary possession of the
same is not given, then the official respondents are
obligated to issue notice under Section 10(6) to the
petitioner and then take possession. The above
judgments also make it abundantly clear that mere
issuance of the notice under Section 10(3) does not
automatically entitle the official respondents to take
possession of the notified lands, but the authorities
have to necessarily issue notice under Section 10(5) to
the land owner or any other interested person. The
Courts have also held that the taking over of the
possession has to be actual physical possession and
not mere de jure possession. Having regard to the
above laid proposition of law, the question now before
this Court is to see as to whether the notifications
issued under Section 10(5) and 10(6) by the authorities
and the panchnama stand to the legal scrutiny of this
Court?
xxxxxx
35. It is apt to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Barangore Jute Factory (referred supra) has held that
where the Statute requires a particular act to be done
in a particular manner, the same has to be done in that
manner alone. It is obvious from the record that the
official respondents did not follow the procedure
contemplated under the ULC Act, but acted contrary to
it. Once the ULC Act was repealed by the Central
Government and the same has been adopted by the
State Government and physical possession of the land
is still with the petitioners, the preparation of notices
under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) and the panchanama
of taking possession is void ab initio and non est in the
eye of law. The bare perusal of the panchanama,
notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act,
do not inspire any confidence in the Court, which

19
warrants any indulgence of this Court in favour of the
official respondents.
xxxxx
24. This Court in the case of Bhavnagar University v.
Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111, in the
context of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
Development Act, 1976 held thus:—
“The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the
property must be strictly construed. It is well settled that
when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a
particular manner, the same must be done in that
manner or not at all. The state and other authorities
while acting under the said Act are only creature of
statute. They must act within the four corners thereof”.
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Where an administrative or statutory order entails civil
consequences, procedural requirements must be strictly
adhered to and the principles of natural justice must be
complied with in letter and spirit. In the case at hand, serious
allegations of violating Section 9 of the Act, 1952 were made
against an Advocate possessing an established reputation in
society. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the
authorities to afford him a real and effective opportunity of
hearing by conducting a proper inquiry, which was evidently
omitted.
19. In the matter of State Bank of India and Others Vs. Rajesh
Agarwal and Others, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 1, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held the following in paragraph
No.36:-

20
36. We need to bear in mind that the principles of
natural justice are not mere legal formalities. They
constitute substantive obligations that need to be
followed by decision-making and adjudicating
authorities. The principles of natural justice act as a
guarantee against arbitrary action, both in terms of
procedure and substance, by judicial, quasi-judicial, and
administrative authorities. Two fundamental principles
of natural justice are entrenched in Indian jurisprudence
: (i) nemo judex in causa sua, which means that no
person should be a Judge in their own cause; and (ii)
audi alteram partem, which means that a person
affected by administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial
action must be heard before a decision is taken. The
courts generally favour interpretation of a statutory
provision consistent with the principles of natural justice
because it is presumed that the statutory authorities do
not intend to contravene fundamental rights. Application
of the said principles depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case, express language and basic
scheme of the statute under which the administrative
power is exercised, the nature and purpose for which
the power is conferred, and the final effect of the
exercise of that power. [Union of India v. J.N. Sinha,
(1970) 2 SCC 458]
20. In the matter of Basudev Dutt Vs. State of West Bengal and
Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3616, the following
was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph
Nos.12.3 to 12.8:-
12.3. That apart, before passing the termination order,
no opportunity of personal hearing was provided to the
appellant to defend his stand effectively. In Mazharul
Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P. 10 , it was categorically

21
held by this Court that ‘personal hearing should be
given, before termination of employee from service’.
The relevant paragraph of the same is quoted below for
ready reference:
“25. It was observed in that case that it is a fundamental
rule of law that no decision must be taken which will
affect the rights of any person without first giving him an
opportunity of putting forward his case. The main
requirements of a fair hearing, as pointed out by this
Court earlier, are : (i) A person must know the case that
he is to meet; and (ii) he must have an adequate
opportunity of meeting that case. These rules of natural
justice, however, operate in voids of a statute. Their
application can be expressly or implicitly excluded by
the legislature. But, such is not the case here. On the
contrary, the two circulars issued by the State
Government, to which a reference has been made
earlier, expressly imported these principles of natural
justice and required that in all cases in which the
services of an officer or servant were to be determined
on the ground of his unsuitability, they must be given an
opportunity of personal hearing by the Committee. The
whole purpose of the personal interview was that, when
it was proposed to declare an official unsuitable for
absorption, the Committee had to afford him an
opportunity to appear before it and clear up his position.
Since it is nobody's case that such an opportunity was
afforded to the appellant, we would hold that the order
dated August 26, 1967 (of termination of his services
passed by the State) suffers from a serious legal
infirmity and must be quashed. He will, therefore, have
to be treated as having continued in service till the age
of superannuation and entitled to all the benefits
incidental to such a declaration.
12.4. In S. Govindaraju v. Karnataka State Road
Transport Corporation again, this Court held thus:

22
“7…..There is no dispute that the appellant's services
were terminated on the ground of his being found
unsuitable for the appointment and as a result of which
his name was deleted from the select list, and he
forfeited his chance for appointment. Once a candidate
is selected and his name is included in the select list for
appointment in accordance with the Regulations, he
gets a right to be considered for appointment as and
when vacancy arises. On the removal of his name from
the select list serious consequences entail as he forfeits
his right to employment in future. In such a situation
even though the Regulations do not stipulate for
affording any opportunity to the employee, the
principles of natural justice would be attracted and the
employee would be entitled to an opportunity of
explanation, though no elaborate enquiry would be
necessary. Giving an opportunity of explanation would
meet the bare minimal requirement of natural justice.
Before the services of an employee are terminated,
resulting in forfeiture of his right to be considered for
employment, opportunity of explanation must be
afforded to the employee concerned. The appellant was
not afforded any opportunity of explanation before the
issue of the impugned order; consequently the order is
rendered null and void being inconsistent with the
principles of natural justice…”
12.5. This Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa
in an unequivocal terms observed as follows:
“73……This Court has repeatedly observed that even
when the rules are silent, principles of natural justice
must be read into them.
74. In its keen anxiety of being fair to the
victim/complainants and wrap up the complaints
expeditiously, the Committee has ended up being
grossly unfair to the appellant. It has completely
overlooked the cardinal principle that justice must not

23
only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done.
The principles of audi alteram partem could not have
been thrown to the winds in this cavalier manner.”
12.6. It is manifestly clear from the above judgments
that reasons are heartbeat of every order and every
notice must specify the grounds on which the
administrative or quasi-judicial authority intends to
proceed; if any document is relied upon to form the
basis of enquiry, such document must be furnished to
the employee; it is only then a meaningful reply can be
furnished; and the failure to furnish the documents
referred and relied in the notice would vitiate the entire
proceedings as being arbitrary and in violation of the
principles of natural justice; and before taking any
adverse decision, the aggrieved person must be given
an opportunity of personal hearing. In the light of the
same, we have no hesitation to hold that the order of
termination passed against the appellant is arbitrary,
illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice
and it cannot be sustained.
12.7. Though we are in agreement with the proposition
laid down in the decisions cited on the side of the
respondent(s), the same does not apply to the present
case, which factually differs.
12.8. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, we find that the
Tribunal was right in observing that without following the
principles of natural justice and without affording any
opportunity to explain his case before the authority, the
appellant was terminated and hence, his termination
order cannot be sustained in the eye of law; and
accordingly, set aside the order of termination.
However, the High Court erroneously allowed the writ
petition filed by the State and set aside the order of the
Tribunal by observing that the action of the authorities in
issuing a show cause notice and inviting a reply
therefrom and the availing of such opportunity by the

24
appellant, is in adherence with the principles of natural
justice. Hence, we are inclined to set aside the order of
the High Court and restore the order of the Tribunal to
that extent.
21. In the matter of Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. Vs.
State of U.P. and others, reported in (2026) 2 SCC 729, the
following in paragraph No.44:-
44. Having surveyed the relevant case law on the
subject, let us revert back to the present case. From the
conspectus of facts and law, it is clearly evident that the
impugned orders [Chandra Shekhar v. State of U.P.,
,
2022 SCC OnLine NGT 5405] [Chandra Shekhar v.
State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine NGT 219] are in
complete violation of the procedures laid down in the
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974,
the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, more
particularly Sections 21 and 22 of the Water Act and the
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, including Section 19
thereof. It is crystal clear that the impugned decisions
[Chandra Shekhar v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine
,
NGT 5405] [Chandra Shekhar v. State of U.P., 2022
SCC OnLine NGT 219] , which entail adverse civil
consequences upon the appellant, were passed without
following the due procedure laid down under the statute
as well as the elementary principles of natural justice.
We, therefore, have no hesitation in declaring such
orders to be illegal, and null and void.
22. Coming to the facts of the present case, in light of the
foregoing discussion and in light of the principles laid down in
the aforesaid judgments, the impugned orders dated
12.3.2025 and 28.3.2025, in both the writ petitions cannot be

25
sustained in law and are hereby quashed.
23.
Consequently, both the Writ Petitions are Allowed , as neither
the prescribed procedures were followed nor proper
opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioners . While
quashing the impugned orders dated 12.3.2025 and
28.3.2025, the concerned Respondent Authorities are directed
to restore the name of the petitioners in the Register of
Notaries forthwith, with liberty reserved to the Respondents to
initiate a fresh inquiry strictly in accordance with Rule 13 of the
Rules, 1956, if so advised.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Shyna Ajay

26
HEAD NOTE
WPC No. 3138 of 2025 & WPC No. 3508 of 2025
Any administrative action entailing serious civil consequences
must conform to the procedure prescribed by law. Failure to
adhere to the mandatory statutory procedure and principles of
natural justice renders the impugned order illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable in law.