Ravi Nagar Cooperative Houseing Society A Society Registered Under M.P. Cooperative Societies Adhini vs Indore Development Authority A Statutory Body Constituted Under M.P. Nagar Tata Gram Nivesh Adhiniya
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32305
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
th
ON THE 20 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 24830 of 2021
CNR No.: MPHC020284602021
RAVI NAGAR COOPERATIVE HOUSEING SOCIETY A SOCIETY
REGISTERED UNDER M.P. COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ADHINI AND
ANR
Versus
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY A STATUTORY BODY
CONSTITUTED UNDER M.P. NAGAR TATA GRAM NIVESH
ADHINIYA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Veer Kumar Jain - Senior Advocate with Shri Arpit Kumar Oswal
- Advocate for the petitioners.
Ms Mini Ravindran - Advocate for the respondent no.1/IDA.
Shri Rajwardhan Gawde - Govt. Advocate for the respondent no.2 and
3/State.
RESERVED ON : 17.11.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 20.11.2026
WHETHER REPORTABLE : YES
ORDER
The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been filed praying for the following reliefs:
Signature Not Verified
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" 7. RELIEF PRAYED FOR:-
It is therefore prayed that the present petition may kindly be allowed and by
issuing appropriate writ, order or direction-
(a) The decision of the IDA contained in communication dated 27/01/2021
(Annexure-P/26) refusing to apply resolution no. 148 dated 3/10/1991
(Annexure-P/3) may kindly be quashed; AND
(b) The note sheet dt. 02/03/2021 (Annexure P/28) whereby CEO of
respondent no. 1 Authority decided the case by debarring the petitioner society
from entitlement of any revised calculation or allotment of additional land, may
kindly be qushed; AND
(C) The IDA maybe directed to consider the claim of the Petitioner Society to
allotment of "developed area" in accordance with resolution no. 9 dated
31/01/1986 (Annexure-P/2), as amended by resolution no. 148 dated
03/10/1991 (Annexure-P/3) applicable on the date of the agreement dated
06/08/1993 (Annexure-P/4) and date of allotment 29/09/1999 vide resolution
no. 119 (Annexure- P/10) and complete the process of allotment in accordance
with law at par with Sneh Nagar Cooperative Housing Society and other
Societies similarly situated within 3 months; AND
(D) In the peculiar facts of the case any other relief which this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit may kindly be granted along with costs of this petition."
2. FACTS OF THE CASE IN BRIEF:
The Petitioner No. 1, Society, is registered under M.P. Cooperative
Societies Act, 1960 vide certificate dated 28.06.1967. At present, the
Petitioner No. 2 is the elected president of the Petitioner Society. The
Petitioner Society was owner of subject lands as described above under an
agreement to sale dated 05.03.1981 executed by Bhumiswami Balaram
Mukati. Balaram Mukati had submitted an application under section 20 of
the Urban Land Ceiling Act of 1976[for brevity, referred to as 'the Act of
1976' hereinafter] for exemption on 05.03.1981. The Authority had passed
resolution no. 9 dated 31.01.1986. Under this resolution a scheme was
framed to acquirer Mands of various Cooperative Societies with the
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stipulation with that after execution of the scheme, the Societies shall be
allotted proportionate "developed residential area" obtained in proportion to
the total residential area of the scheme as a whole as per clause 5. The
Resolution No. 9 was amended on 03.10.1991, whereby, Resolution No. 148
was passed contemplating "proportionate developed area" to be allotted
subject to a payment schedule payable by the Society to the Development
Authority. Since, the Petitioner Society was eligible under Resolution No. 9
as amended by resolution no. 148, on 06.08.1993, an agreement was
executed between the Society and the Authority and as per this agreement,
the Petitioner Society was given the benefit of Resolution No. 9, subject to
the condition of withdrawal of pending petition challenging the scheme, an
undertaking that land acquisition proceeding shall not be challenged with a
clear stipulation that Resolution No. 9 dated 31.01.1986 shall apply. On
13.10.1998 (date mentioned as 13.10.1992 in the letter due to typographical
error), a letter was sent by the Authority to the society for forwarding list of
its members. On 06.01.1994, the Authority vide its letter required the Society
to pay the amount of premium at the rate of Rs. 22 lacs per hectare in
installments as mentioned in the letter. At that moment 5% i.e. Rs. 143 lacs
was demanded from the society clearly mentioning that the total developed
land would be 1.306 hectares out of the total land of the society having area
admeasuring 3.787 hectares. On 18.02.1994, the Society submitted a letter
stating that on 07.01.1994, the amount of Rs. 1.43 lacs was already
deposited, however, the society expressed that the total allottable area comes
to 34% , which is much less than the desired area for all its members. On
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01.09.94, the IDA had sent another letter to the Society demanding 10%
amount of Rs. 2.86 lacs before inviting tenders for development. Again, the
said amount was deposited by the Petitioner Society. Even after deposit of
amount by Society, nothing substantial was done and neither the
development had commenced nor allotment of proportionate developed area
was made. On 25.04.1996, a legal notice was sent by the Petitioner Society
through its Advocate requiring the Authority to commence and complete the
development work and hand over proportionate developed area to the
society, but all in vain. On 29.09.1999, Resolution No. 119 was passed by
the Authority in which it was mentioned that in the case of Sneh Nagar
Cooperative Housing Society, the total allottable developed area comes to
39.3%. Similarly, in respect of the Petitioner Society, it was mentioned that
the total proportionate allottable developed area comes to 29.17%. Thus, the
Board of IDA took a conscious decision on 29.09.1999 to allot 29.17% plots
as this percentage was taken to be "residential area" obtained from Scheme
No. 94, although, on the said date, Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991 was
applicable contemplating allotment of ''developed area'' as against
"residential area". After passing this resolution, a supplementary calculation
sheet was prepared by the Officers of the Authority determining the total
developed area to be 34.32% in place of 29.17%. On 15.12.1999, Resolution
No. 165 was passed to implement the scheme of allotment of developed
plots. Clause 4 of this resolution clearly shows that amendments to
Resolution no. 9 dated 31.01.1986 after execution of agreement, were sought
to be made applicable subject to consent of the society to be obtained.
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However, neither any communication was made by the Authority seeking
consent of the Petitioner Society nor any such consent referable to clause 4
was ever given by the Petitioner Society. In 2001, the aforesaid resolution
no. 119 came to the notice of the Petitioner Society whereafter on
14.09.2001, a letter was sent by the Petitioner Society regarding rates of
premium payable on developed plots to be allotted to the the Society. It was
also mentioned that the total developed area allottable to the Petitioner
Society should be at par with Sneh Nagar Cooperative Society. From
06.04.2005 to 05.09.2020, the Petitioner Society continuously submitted
representations to the Authority claiming allotment of "developed area"
based on Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991 . The Petitioner Society
further obtained certified copies of note-sheets of the IDA under Right to
Information Act, 2005 from the office of the Authority. The following facts
emerge from the said note sheets:-
(a) 08/05/2015- Calculation was done as per resolution 119 dated
29/09/1999 based on "residential area" and 29.17% area
equivalent to 1.1046 hectare was determined to be allottable to the
Petitioner Society.
(a-1) Calculation as per resolution no. 9 dated 31.01.1986 as
amended by Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991 based on
"developed area" was made and allottable area was found to be
38.13% equivalent to 1.4439 hectares.
(b) 06/07/2016- As per this note sheet the calculation as per
Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991, the revised calculation was
proposed.
(c) 01.10.2016- Again recalculation was done and the Petitioner
Society was found to be entitled to developed area based upon
Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991
(d) 16.01.2017- Based on revised calculation, the legal opinion
was sought to be obtained.
(e) 18.05.2017- According to the legal opinion, it was found that
Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991was found to be applicable
and Petitioner Society was also found to be entitled to be allotted
at par with Sneh Nagar Housing Society at the rate of 39.3%
"developed area" instead of 29.17% "residential area".
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(f) 16.11.2017- From this date to 24.08.2018, the note sheets show
that although the area mentioned in the agreement was 3.787
hectares; on spot the area was found to be 3.885 hectares based on
field survey carried out by the Authority, the area calculation for
the Petitioner Society was done finding allottable area to be 1637
hectares.
(g) In note sheet dated 13/8/20, it is mentioned that allotment of
29.17% developed plots was made to the Society by Resolution
No. 119 dated 29/09/1999 (Annexure-P/10). In this note-sheet, the
Chief Engineer of Authority referred the matter to the Chief City
Planner of the Authority for taking decision on application filed
by the Petitioner Society claiming for additional land based on
revised calculation.
3 . From the aforesaid narration of facts, it is clear that date of
allotment of developed plot area was 29.09.1999. As such, this is a crucial
date to determine as to the mode of calculation and up to 29.09.1999,
Resolution.no. 148 dated 03.10.1991 was valid and applicable. From the
aforesaid note sheets it is clear that for all these years the society was
running from pillar to post for obtaining appropriate percentage of area for
the benefit of its members. On 03.12.2020, a representation was made to the
Respondent No. 2 giving all details and claiming that allotment of developed
area should be made in accordance with Resolution no. 9 dated 31.01.1986
as amended by Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991 .On 27.01.2021, a
communication has been sent by the IDA to the Director, T & CP, Bhopal
marking a copy to the Respondent No. 2. The Petitioner Society has obtained
a copy under the RTI Act for placing this document on record. According to
this communication issued by the IDA, Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991
has been cancelled by Resolution no. 197 dated 22.02.2001, therefore, the
Petitioner Society is only entitled to 29.17% of land i.e. 1.105 hectares and
not in accordance with Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991. Although, no
formal Order has been issued by the IDA under due intimation to the
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Petitioner, but as soon as the Petitioner came to know about this
communication, on 26.03.2021, a representation was made to the Director
claiming allotment of developed area as per Resolution no. 9 dated
31.01.1986 and Resolution no. 148 dated 03.10.1991 and this representation
is still pending marking a copy thereof to Respondent No. 2. In the meantime
petitioner no.2 again sought the inspection of file under RTI Act 2005.
Shockingly, in said inspection Petitioner no.2 got to know that C.E.O. of the
Respondent no. 1 Authority arbitrarily, illegally, malafidely,
unconstitutionally and without giving any information to the petitioners
decided the instant issue by mentioning "no additional allotment of plot
remains to be given to society". The action of the respondent no. 1 is
completely arbitrary, illegal, perverse, prejudice, in violation of the
principles of natural justice and in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. The decision taken in this note-sheet was never
communicated to the Petitioners at any point of time. Hence, this petition has
been filed.
4. GROUNDS RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS
(i) RESOLUTION NO. 148 IS BINDING UPON THE
RESPONDENT AUTHORITY: Learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that the Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991 was already in force
when the Agreement dated 06.08.1993 was executed between the parties.
The Resolution No. 148 was amended to Resolution No. 9 even prior to the
execution of Agreement and, therefore, its applicability to the Petitioner
Society cannot be disputed. Furthermore, the Respondent Authority itself,
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vide communication dated 06.01.1994 , acknowledged the applicability of
the amended Resolution and quantified the developed land to be allotted to
the Society at 1.306 hectares. Its subsequent official Note Sheets dated
08.05.2015, 01.10.2016 and 18.05.2017 further acknowledged the Petitioner's
entitlement to Resolution No. 148.
(ii) SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL AMENDMENT CANNOT
DEFEAT ACCRUED CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS: It is further submitted
that the Respondent Authority's reliance upon Resolution No. 197 dated
22.02.2001, whereby Resolution No. 148 is alleged to have been cancelled or
modified, is wholly misconceived. Firstly, the relevant provision governing
proportionate allotment of developed land was not specifically rescinded by
the subsequent Resolution. Secondly, even assuming such cancellation or
modification, the same cannot be applied retrospectively so as to extinguish
the rights already accrued to the Petitioner Society under the Agreement
dated 06.08.1993.
(iii) PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION : It is also submitted that the respondent Authority, having
induced the Petitioner Society to surrender its land and pay development
charges upon specific representations had estopped from subsequently
withdrawing their own commitments. The principles of promissory estoppel
and legitimate expectation squarely applied to the case of petitioner society,
particularly when the Respondent Authority has itself repeatedly
acknowledged the applicability of Resolution No. 148 and calculated the
additional entitlement of the Petitioner Society.
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(iv) HOSTILE DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: It is submitted that the
Respondent Authority has discriminatory standards in allotting developed
land to similarly situated Co-operative Societies under the same adopted
Scheme. While Sneh Nagar Co-operative Society was allotted approximately
39.3% developed land, the Petitioner Society was restricted to merely
29.17%, despite both Societies being governed by the same Resolutions and
Scheme. The justification advanced by the Respondent Authority regarding
deductions towards Ring Road and informal-sector development does not
satisfactorily explain the departure from the uniform and fixed formula
contemplated under Resolution No. 148.
(v) IMPUGNED DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CONTRARY
TO THE AUTHORITY'S OWN RECORD: It is also submitted
that notwithstanding the aforesaid contractual calculations and repeated
obligations, acknowledgments, the Respondent Authority, vide impugned
communication dated 27.01.2021, denied the Petitioner's entitlement by
relying upon Resolution No. 197 dated 22.02.2001. Subsequently, through
Note Sheet dated 02.03.2021, it concluded that no additional allotment
remained due, without communicating any reasoned decision to the
Petitioner Society and that the aforesaid conclusion is directly inconsistent
with the Respondent Authority's own calculation to entitlement Petitioner's
establishing the approximately 0.352 hectare of additional developed land.
The Authority cannot disregard its own records, depart from the terms of the
Agreement and retrospectively invoke a subsequent unilateral amendment to
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deny an accrued entitlement. Such action is arbitrary, unreasonable,
discriminatory and unsustainable under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
(vi) Apart from the above mentioned grounds, it is also submitted
that the Petitioner Society had surrendered its valuable land and fulfilled its
contractual obligations in consideration of the assurance that proportionate
developed land would be allotted under the amended Resolution. The
Respondent Authority cannot, by a subsequent unilateral amendment of its
policy, retrospectively alter the terms of an existing Agreement or deprive
the Petitioner Society of benefits already accrued thereunder. The Authority
may possess the power to amend its policy prospectively, but such power
cannot be exercised arbitrarily to defeat pre-existing contractual obligations
and vested rights. Any contrary interpretation would render the Agreement
illusory and permit the Respondent Authority to retain the land surrendered
by the Petitioner Society while denying the corresponding benefit promised
in consideration thereof.
(vii) In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner
has placed reliance on the following judgments:
State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Prasad Verma[(2017) 5 SCC 665]
Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskirt and Ors. Vs. Dr.
Manu and Others [(2023) 19 SCC 30]
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
[(1979) 2 SCC 409]
IFGI Refreactories Ltd. Vs. Orissa State Financial Corp. [(2026)
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SCC Online SC 28]
U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd.[
(2008) 2 SCC 777]
Vice Chairman & Managing Director Vs. Shishir Realty Private
Limited Ors. [ (2022) 16 SCC 527]
Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed
Industries[(1993) 1 SCC 71].
Banari Amman Sugars Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer [(2005)
1 SCC 625].
MRF Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment),[ (2006) 8
SCC 702]
Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh, [(2015) 10
SCC 400].
Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another Vs. Vithal Rao and Ors.
[(1973) 1 SCC 500]
Noida Entrepreneurs Vs. Noida and Ors. [(2011) 6 SCC 508
5 . CONTENTIONS RAISED ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT/IDA.
(i) Learned counsel for the respondent/IDA has raised the preliminary
objection of delay in filing the present petitioner as the same is filed in the
year 2021, assailing the inaction of the authority for allotment of plot,
residential plot of lesser area as compared to other societies. The petitioner
society had entered into agreement dated 06.08.1993 for giving the benefit of
Resolution No. 9 dated 31.01.1986. The petitioner society, by virtue of the
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Resolution No. 119 dated 29.09.1999, has been allotted the residential
plots and by letter dated 25.11.1999 has been allotted an area of 1.1097
hectare of land comprising of 77 plots. Now, this area is more than the
eligibility of the petitioner/society. Still, inspite of allotments completed, the
petitioner, apart from giving various representations, have not assailed this
action anywhere, but has filed the petition in the year 2021. Therefore, the
same is delayed and is a stale and delayed claim.
(ii) It is further contended that so far as the issue of parity with Sneh
Nagar Society is concerned, it is noteworthy that the petitioner society has
been allotted the residential plot on the basis of same criteria as is allotted in
the case as the residential area is allotted in the case of Sneh Nagar Society.
Furthermore, the allotment is to be undertaken on the basis of the land which
is part of the scheme. Here in this case, the final calculation undertaken
thereby determining the residential allotment of land of petitioner society and
Sneh Nagar society is that the land coming under the ring road is deducted.
In case of Sneh Nagar, less the total land of Sneh Nagar society is more as
compared to the petitioner society. Therefore, the calculation of percentage
definitely is higher in case of Sneh Nagar whereas in case of petitioner, as
the land pool itself is small, therefore, the allotment of plots in residential
plots in lieu of the raw land is lesser in area.
(iii) It is further submitted that the Resolution no. 148 dated
03.10.1991 does not override Clause no. 5 of resolution no. 9 dated
31.01.1986, as the Resolution no. 148 is merely an amendment of Clause no.
9, 10, 11, 12 of Resolution no. 9 dated 31.01.1986. The Resolution no. 148
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neither changed, amended, nor deleted Clause no. 5. Therefore, the Clause
no. 5 of Resolution no. 9 dated 31.01.1986 prevails, and the agreement is
also executed for getting the benefit arising out of Resolution no. 9 dated
31.01.1986. The agreement does not contain the recital that Resolution no.
148 dated 03.10.1991 is also applicable amongst the parties. The agreement
dated 06.08.1993 prevails over everything, and the agreement categorically
prescribes that the Resolution no. 9 and its amendment shall be binding on
the parties. Therefore, the agreement is to be adhered to in the matter.
(iv) It is also submitted that the State Government vide its letters
dated 11.12.2008 and 17.8.2005 have categorically clarified that the Clause
no. 5, as it stood on the date of agreement, is to be adhered to. Therefore, the
Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991 is not applicable, and it does not
override clause no. 5 of Resolution No. 9 dated 31.01.1986.
(v) It is also contended that the petitioner society has been allotted
1.1097 hectare of land beyond its eligibility, which comes to only land
admeasuring area of 1.046 which is the allottable land. Therefore, the claim
for further increase in the plot area it cannot be entertained.
(vi) It is further contended that the petitioner has not shown or
produced any document or pleaded that a particular percentage of residential
plot has to be allotted to the petitioner society by virtue of Resolution no. 9
or any other resolution of the IDA. In fact, there is no percentage decided by
the IDA by way of its resolutions, but in fact the land is to be allotted to the
society in proportion to the developed residential area obtained from the
entire scheme.
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(vii) It is contended that the question of promissory estoppel will only
come into play once there is an explicit promise and it has not been adhered
to. Rather, here is a disputed question of fact regarding the particular area of
land allotted to the petitioner society. The petitioner society has been allotted
land as per the agreement.
By raising all the aforementioned contentions, it is submitted that the
petition deserves to be dismissed.
6 . I have heard, rival contentions advanced by the parties and
perused the record.
7 . On scrutiny of the material available on the record and on
appreciating the submissions made at the Bar, it transpires that there is no
quarrel about the fact that the petitioner society was the owner of the land
admeasuring 3.787 hectares situated at Village Khajrana Distt. Indore, which
was surrendered to the respondent/IDA under the Scheme No. 94 pursuant to
the Resolution no. 9 dated 31.01.1986 , which as contended by the petitioner
was amended by the Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991 and thereafter,
pursuant to that an agreement dated 06.08.1993 was executed between the
parties. It is also relevant to note that Clause 5 of the Resolution No. 9
originally contemplated allotment of proportionate developed residential area
to the concerned cooperative societies. However, it seems that by way of
Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991, the said provision was amended to
provide allotment of proportionate developed area making totally developed
area of the scheme, the relevant basis for determination of entitlement of the
Society.
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8. It also transpires from the record that petitioner was allotted
1.1046 hectares of area pursuant to the Resolution No. 119 dated 29.09.1999
and as per calculation provided by the petitioner, the said area of 1.1046
hectares is equivalent to 29.17% of the land surrendered by the petitioner
society. However, it also transpired from the record that this was just a
provisional allotment because layout of various sectors of scheme were not
sanctioned till the parties have filed written synopsis.
9. Another important aspect as pointed out by the counsel for the
petitioner which is required to be taken into consideration here is that the
authority has calculated the total developed area and the said fact is clear
from the notesheet no. 110 dated 22.06.2015 that petitioner is entitled to
0.352 hectare additional land. This is a vital aspect of the matter. Though the
notesheet is not having any effect of circular or resolution, but it is also
relevant aspect, especially when the dispute about the calculation of land
which is required to be allotted to the petitioner is subject matter of the
petition. It is also transpired from the notesheet that this aspect is not
properly dealt with by the respondent authority. Moreover, it is further most
significant and decisive factor of the present controversy that the
respondent/authority in its official notesheet forming part of one of the
annexure in the petition has calculated the entitlement of the petitioner
society in accordance with Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991 and
determined that society is entitled to additional developed land. The
calculation of the total area of Scheme No. 94 and thereafter considering the
entitlement calculated by the IDA and developed area already allotted to the
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society, said notesheet indicates that approximately 0.352 hectare additional
land is remaining for allotment which is supported by the record of the
respondent authority i.e. the official notesheet. Though it is a part of the
official record of respondent/authority itself, but can only be considered as
corroborative material and not as conclusive material for consideration of
case of petitioner and, therefore, prima-facie case is made out in favour of
the petitioner.
10. Considering the fact that Resolution No. 148 dated 03.10.1991
was in force when the agreement dated 06.08.1993 was executed between
the parties and by virtue of Resolution no. 148, the conditions of Resolution
No. 9 was amended prior to the execution of agreement and, therefore, it
cannot be said that the said resolution is not applicable to the petitioner
society. It also transpired from the record as well as from the submissions of
the parties that the respondent/authority has relied on Resolution No. 197
dated 22.02.2001 whereby Resolution No. 148 is allegedly cancelled or
modified. On perusal of that Resolution, it transpires that the relevant
proposed allotment of developed land was not specifically rescinded by the
subsequent Resolution and even assuming by reading of that Resolution, it
can be presumed that it amounts to cancellation or modification of the earlier
resolution , then also the said resolution cannot be applied retrospectively
because the rights which have already accrued to the petitioner society
under the agreement dated 06.08.1993 cannot be extinguished.
11. It also transpires from the record that petitioner society has
surrendered large chunk of available land and has performed its part of
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contractual obligation in expectation that the proportionate developed land
would be allotted under the amended resolution and, therefore, the
contention raised by the petitioner society regarding the aspect that the
respondent authority cannot by subsequent unilateral amendment of its
policy, retrospectively after the terms of existing agreement or deprive the
petitioner society of the benefits already accrued thereunder, is required to
be accepted, as the authority can have power to amend its policy
prospectively, but such power cannot be exercised arbitrarily to defeat pre-
existing contractual obligations and vested rights.
12. There is some substance in the contention raised by the petitioner
with regard to principle of Promissory Estoppel and legitimate expectation as
the same also has some play in the present matter. For this aspect, it is
relevant to note that from record, it transpires that the respondent authority
has convinced the petitioner society to surrender its land and pay
development charges upon specific representations regarding proportionate
allotment and, therefore, prima-facie, the contention regarding estoppel is
required to be accepted as now the respondent authority has estopped from
subsequent withdrawing its own commitment. The principle of promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectation is broadly applicable to the facts of the
present case, more particularly when the respondent authority has itself
repeatedly acknowledge the applicability of Resolution No. 148 and
calculated the additional entitlement of the petitioner society which is
reflected from various notesheets and other documents. The aspect of
promissory estoppel is squarely considered by the judgments of the Hon'ble
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Supreme Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1979) 2 SCC 409; U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sant Steels &
Alloys (P) Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 777; MRF Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner
(Assessment), (2006) 8 SCC 702; and Food Corporation of India v.
Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71 and, therefore, in view
of this in the present case also the principles governing promissory estoppel,
legitimate expectation, fairness in State action and protection against
arbitrary withdrawal of promised benefits have been recognized.
13. Most relevant aspect of the matter is consideration of violation of
principle of natural justice and unequal treatment of similarly situated society
given by the respondent authority, which amounts to colorable exercise of
power also. It can be seen from the record that the respondent/authority has
adopted discriminatory standards in allotting developed land to the similarly
situated cooperative society under the same scheme, as on one hand, the
petitioner society was restricted to the quantum of merely 29.17% of
developed land and on the other hand similarly situated Sneh Nagar Society
was allotted approximately 39.3% developed land, though both the societies
being governed by the same resolutions and schemes. The justification
advanced by the respondent/authority regarding deduction towards Ring
Road and informal sector development does not satisfactorily explain the
departure from the uniform and fixed formula contemplated under the
Resolution No. 148.
14. In this regard, the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in case of Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2015)
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10 SCC 400, is worthy of reference, more particularly paragraph 113, has
disapproved arbitrary variations in the proportion of reconstituted land
allotted to landowners without any valid basis of calculation. In the present
case aslo, discriminatory treatment is being given to the Petitioner Society,
and it can be said that respondent had acted in arbitrary manner and ,
therefore fails to satisfy the constitutional mandate of equality and non-
arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
15. It is also found that the impugned decision by relying on
Resolution No. 197 dated 22.02.2001 by the respondent authority is arbitrary
and contrary to the record of the respondent authority. When the authority on
calculation, established the petitioner's entitlement to approx 0.352 hectares
of additional developed land, the authority cannot disregard its own records
and depart from the terms of the agreement and retrospectively invoke a
subsequent unilateral amendment to deny an accrued entitlement. In the
considered opinion of this Court, such an action of the respondent/authority
is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and unsustainable under Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
Article 14 of the Constitution of India is reproduced below for ready
reference and convenience:
" 14. Equality before law
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India."
1 6 . Further, the relevant paragraphs of following judgments can
profitably be to referred, which are cited by the parties at the Bar for proper
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adjudication of the matter:
Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskirt and Ors. Vs. Dr.
Manu and Others [(2023) 19 SCC 30].Para 31 of the judgment is
reproduced below for ready reference:
31. It is trite that any legislation or instrument having the force of law, which is
clarificatory or explanatory in nature and purport and which seeks to clear
doubts or correct an obvious omission in a statute, would generally be
retrospective in operation, vide Ramesh Prasad Verma [State of Bihar v.
Ramesh Prasad Verma, (2017) 5 SCC 665] . Therefore, in order to determine
whether the Government Order dated 29-3-2001 may be made applicable
retrospectively, it is necessary to consider whether the said order was a
clarification or a substantive amendment.
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
[(1979) 2 SCC 409]. Para 32 of the judgment is reproduced below for
ready reference:
32. We may now turn to examine the facts in the light of the law discussed by
us. It is clear from the letter of Respondent 4 dated January 23, 1969 that a
categorical representation was made by Respondent 4 on behalf of the
Government that the proposed vanaspati factory of the appellant would be
entitled to exemption from sales tax in respect of sales of vanaspati effected in
Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of
production. This representation was made by way of clarification in view of the
suggestion in the appellant's letter dated January 22, 1969 that the financial
institutions were not prepared to regard the earlier letter of Respondent 4 dated
December 22, 1968 as a definite commitment on the part of the Government to
grant exemption from sales tax. Now the letter dated January 23, 1969 clearly
shows that Respondent 4 made this representation in his capacity as the Chief
Secretary of the Government, and it was, therefore, a representation on behalf
of the Government. It was faintly contended before us on behalf of the State
that this representation was not binding on the Government, but we cannot
countenance this argument, because, in the first place, the averment in the writ
petition that Respondent 4 made this representation on behalf of the
Government was not denied by the State in the affidavit in reply filed on its
behalf, and secondly, it difficult to accept the contention that Respondent 4,
who was at the material time the Chief Secretary to the Government and also
advisor to the Governor who was discharging the functions of the Government
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during the President's rule, had no authority to bind the Government. We must,
therefore, proceed on the basis that this representation made by Respondent 4
was a representation within the scope of his authority and was binding on the
Government. Now, there can be no doubt that this representation was made by
the Government knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the
appellant, because the appellant had made it clear that it was only on account
of the exemption from sales tax promised by the Government that the
appellant had decided to set up the factory for manufacture of vanaspati at
Kanpur. The appellant, in fact, relying on this representation of the
Government, borrowed moneys from various financial institutions, purchased
plant and machinery from De Smet (India) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay and set up a
vanaspati factory at Kanpur. The facts necessary for invoking the doctrine of
promissory estoppel were, therefore, clearly present and the Government was
bound to carry out the representation and exempt the appellant from sales tax
in respect of sales of vanaspati effected by it in Uttar Pradesh for a period of
three years from the date of commencement of the production.
IFGI Refreactories Ltd. Vs. Orissa State Financial Corp. [(2026)
SCC Online SC 28]. Para 135 of the judgment is reproduced below for
ready reference:
G. CONCLUSION
135. In view of the foregoing and considering the totality of the circumstances,
our conclusion on each issue is as follows:
(i) The MM Plant unit fulfils the definition of a "new industrial unit" under
Clause 2.7 of the industrial policy of 1989. This is because the fixed capital
investment for the MM Plant unit was made after the effective date of the
industrial policy of 1989, i.e., 01.12.1989, and the unit was separately
registered, separately located, independently powered, and commenced
independent commercial production in 1992.
(ii) The MM Plant is not an expansion/modernisation/diversification of an
existing unit as defined under Clause 2.2 of the industrial policy of 1989. The
MM Plant unit constitutes a physically and functionally distinct industrial
undertaking, meeting the judicial tests as more particularly discussed above,
distinguishing a new unit from an expanded unit.
(iii) The concept of overall financial limit under the amended Clause 4.4 as
introduced retrospectively vide the instruction letter dated 28.10.1994 and later
the amended notification dated 30.10.2008 applies only to
expansion/modernisation/diversification of an existing unit. It has no
application to new industrial units, which are governed by Clause 4.1 and are
entitled to all incentives including fresh subsidy subject inter alia to the unit
wise caps specified in Clause 5.1 and Clause 11.4.4 of industrial policy of 1989
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respectively.
(iv) The appellant company is entitled to the disbursement of sanctioned
subsidies. We have held that a clear and unequivocal representation was made
by the respondent authorities with respect to sanction and grant of subsidies by
way of various communications particularly the letters dated 05.11.1998
10.04.2003, 19.04.2003, 24.03.2007, and 23.08.2007 respectively as mentioned
above, and the appellant company having legitimate expectation that
sanctioned subsidies would be disbursed, and acting upon the same set up and
continued the production in the MM Plant unit by incurring substantial
expenses pursuant to such promises and assurances. This reliance on the
promises and assurances of respondents was neither speculative nor unilateral,
but flowed directly from unequivocal sanction and official communications
issued by the respondents, rendering the subsequent volte-face not only unfair
but also untenable.
U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd.[
(2008) 2 SCC 777]. Para(s) 33 and 35 of the judgment are reproduced
below for ready reference:
33. It is true that a detailed statement was given in various paragraphs of the
written statement filed by the appellant Corporation before the Allahabad High
Court and unfortunately, the High Court did not advert to these details but we
have examined all these details and found that all the nine points raised by Dr.
Singhvi do not persuade us to take a contrary view from the view taken by the
High Court. There is no gainsaying that the public interest is paramount and
the private interest has to be sacrificed for the larger interest. But, after survey
of all these cases on the subject, the judicial consensus that emerges is that
whenever the State has made a representation to the public and the public has
acted on that representation and suffered economically or otherwise, then in
that case the State should be estopped from withdrawing such benefit to the
detriment of such people except in public interest or against the statute. So far
as the public interest as involved in the present case is concerned, we have
found that there was no overwhelming evidence to revoke the benefit granted
to the industrial units in the hill areas. So far as the statute is concerned, the
notification was issued under Section 49 of the Act of 1948 and the same was
revoked under Section 49 of the Act of 1948 though there was no such
provision contained in Section 49 that it will be open to the Corporation to
revoke the same but could be possible by invoking the principle of the General
Clauses Act. But in (sic case of) such delegated legislation such withdrawal
could only be permitted if larger public interest is involved or if the Act is
passed by legislature.
35. In this 21st century, when there is global economy, the question of faith is
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very important. The Government offers certain benefits to attract the
entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs act on those beneficial offers. Thereafter,
the Government withdraws those benefits. This will seriously affect the
credibility of the Government and would show the short-sightedness of
governance. Therefore, in order to keep the faith of the people, the
Government or its instrumentality should abide by their commitments. In this
context, the action taken by the appellant Corporation in revoking the benefits
given to the entrepreneurs in the hill areas will sadly reflect their credibility
and people will not take the word of the Government. That will shake the faith
of the people in the governance. Therefore, in order to keep the faith and
maintain good governance it is necessary that whatever representation is made
by the Government or its instrumentality which induces the other party to act,
the Government should not be permitted to withdraw from that. This is a matter
of faith.
Vice Chairman & Managing Director Vs. Shishir Realty Private
Limited Ors. [ (2022) 16 SCC 527] Para(s) 73 and 79 of the judgment
are reproduced below for ready reference:
73. It is admitted as per record that the respondent M/s Metropolis Hotel was
the highest bidder. Moreover, the appellants failed to bring anything on record
to prove that the State exchequer has suffered losses pursuant to the said
allotment. Nothing has been produced on record, the public interest that will be
prejudiced if the respondent lessees are allowed to go ahead with the said
project. On the contrary, the respondent lessees acting in furtherance of the
assurances given by the authorities, obtained huge financial assistance. Equity
demands that when the State failed to produce an iota of evidence of either
financial loss or any other public interest that has been affected, it should be
compelled to fulfil its promises. In fact, it is the respondent lessees who shall
be gravely prejudiced if the order of cancellation is upheld by this Court after
investing a significant amount and facing prolonged litigation.
79. From a consideration of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is clear
that there is an element of abuse of bureaucratic power behind subsequent
change in the tender allotment. After conducting a tender process and receiving
money, the Government backtracked which led to this present prolonged
litigation. The impugned order of Cidco, inter alia, annulling the allotment on
hypertechnical grounds cannot be sustained for being contrary to the doctrine
of fairness. The reasons stated in the aforesaid order are perverse and per se
based on extraneous considerations. As analysed above, we are not able to
identify any substantive violation of law or tender conditions, which mandate
annulling the allotment and subsequent arrangements, thereby proving the
conduct of the appellate authority to be disproportionate.
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Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed
Industries[(1993) 1 SCC 71]. Para(s) 7 of the judgment is reproduced
below for ready reference:
7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its
instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which
non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in
public law : A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public
good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is
‘fairplay in action’. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good
administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to
be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with
this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in
all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State
action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the
reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the
decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an
abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in
a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the
ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in
the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise
by judicial review.
Banari Amman Sugars Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer [(2005)
1 SCC 625]. Para(s) 8 & 9 of the judgment is/are reproduced below for
ready reference:
8. A person may have a “legitimate expectation” of being treated in a certain
way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private
law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a
representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied
representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate
expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. It
is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough
merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to
enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain
the leave of the court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that
“legitimate expectation” gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial
review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to
right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise
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or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to
claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystallised
right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does
not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest
requires otherwise. In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation is
not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should
justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public
interest. (See Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC
499 : AIR 1994 SC 988] )
9. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power,
when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative
and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made
fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by
any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every
State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the
field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of
Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence
and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the
panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly
for discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning
and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualised than
precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is
to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A
basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any
discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it
really satisfy the test of reasonableness.
MRF Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment),[ (2006) 8
SCC 702]. Para(s) 39 of the judgment is/are reproduced below for
ready reference:
39. MRF made a huge investment in the State of Kerala under a promise held
to it that it would be granted exemption from payment of sales tax for a period
of seven years. It was granted the eligibility certificate. The exemption order
had also been passed. It is not open to or permissible for the State Government
to seek to deprive MRF of the benefit of tax exemption in respect of its
substantial investment in expansion in respect of compound rubber when the
State Government had enjoyed the benefit from the investment made by MRF
in the form of industrial development in the State, contribution to labour and
employment and also a huge benefit to the State exchequer in the form of the
State's share i.e. 40% of the Central excise duty paid on compound rubber of
Rs 177 crores within the State of Kerala. The impugned action on the part of
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the State Government is highly unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and, therefore,
the same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The action of
the State cannot be permitted to operate if it is arbitrary or unreasonable. This
Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [(1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S)
165] observed that where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal
both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore
violative of Article 14. Equity that arises in favour of a party as a result of a
representation made by the State is founded on the basic concept of “justice
and fair play”. The attempt to take away the said benefit of exemption with
effect from 15-1-1998 and thereby deprive MRF of the benefit of exemption
for more than 5 years out of a total period of 7 years, in our opinion, is highly
arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable and deserves to be quashed. In any event the
State Government has no power to make a retrospective amendment to SRO
No. 1729/93 affecting the rights already accrued to MRF thereunder.
Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh, [(2015) 10
SCC 400]. Para(s) 110 to 115 of the judgment is/are reproduced below
for ready reference:
110. It has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the
appellants that taking away land located in prime location and giving away
land anywhere as per the discretion of Respondent 2 RDA, that too, to the
extent of mere 35% of the area, is constitutionally impermissible. Against this
contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the learned
Senior Counsel for Respondent 1 State Government as well as the High Court
of Chhattisgarh, relied upon the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v.
Shantilal Mangaldas [State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, (1969) 1 SCC
509 : AIR 1969 SC 634] to hold that taking away land and giving back 35%
developed land in return, is in accordance with the Constitution.
111. On this aspect, we are inclined to rely upon the decision of this Court in
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [(1973) 4 SCC 225] which laid down
the subsequent development on the jurisprudence of compensation and
overruled the decision of Shantilal [State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas,
(1969) 1 SCC 509 : AIR 1969 SC 634] in the process. It was held in
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [(1973) 4 SCC 225] as under : (SCC
pp. 455 & 888, paras 584 & 1744)
“584. … The later decisions [P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Collector (LA), AIR
1965 SC 1017 and Union of India v. Metal Corpn. of India Ltd., AIR 1967 SC
637] had continued to uphold the concept of ‘compensation’ i.e. just equivalent
of the value of the property acquired in spite of the amendments made in 1955.
In State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas [State of Gujarat v. Shantilal
Mangaldas, (1969) 1 SCC 509 : AIR 1969 SC 634] the decision in Metal
Corpn. of India [Union of India v. Metal Corpn. of India Ltd., AIR 1967 SC
637] , was overruled which itself was virtually overruled by Rustom Cavasjee
Cooper v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 248] . According to the Advocate
General of Maharashtra, if Shantilal Mangaldas case [State of Gujarat v.
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Shantilal Mangaldas, (1969) 1 SCC 509 : AIR 1969 SC 634] had not been
overruled by Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 248] ,
there would have been no necessity of amending Article 31(2).
*
1744. In Bank Nationalisation case [(1970) 1 SCC 248] , the majority decision
virtually overruled the decision in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas
[State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, (1969) 1 SCC 509 : AIR 1969 SC
634] . The majority was of the view that even after the Fourth Amendment
‘compensation’ meant ‘the equivalent in terms of money of the property
compulsorily acquired’ according to ‘relevant principles’ which principles must
be appropriate to the determination or compensation for the particular class of
property sought to be acquired.”
112. Since compensation for acquisition of land needs to be reasonable and
adequate in the interest of justice, we rely upon the decision of Kesavananda
Bharati case [(1973) 4 SCC 225] to hold that returning 35% of land in lieu of
acquisition is constitutionally impermissible. This is also because the
“development” which occurs due to the implementation of the town
development scheme accrues the benefit to everyone. In the same way, the
appellants whose land has been acquired and proposed to be developed, would
have gained from the development, if at all, as a member of the community
gaining from the town development scheme and not in his individual capacity.
When the compensation for land acquisition is determined, the price of the
land on the date of the declaration of intention of acquisition is taken into
consideration and not subsequent development after acquisition since the
development is not connected to acquisition. In the same manner, if the land is
reconstituted in plots for distribution to the economically weaker sections of
the community or other public purposes, the same cannot be done by
arbitrarily depriving the landowners of their constitutional rights guaranteed
under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. They are entitled for the
compensation from the State Government. The State Government on the other
hand, cannot involuntarily acquire land and impose developmental charges in
the same breath.
113. We come to this conclusion further on the ground that 35% figure was
arrived at by Respondent 2 RDA while allocating reconstituted land to the
appellants, without any valid form of calculation arrived at by the respondents.
This action of the respondents is arbitrary also because the percentage of
reconstituted land to be returned to the landowners varies from 35% to 58% for
large plot-holders and small plot-holders. Also, from the Letter dated 20-7-
2009, it is evident that Respondent 2 RDA had already taken a decision that
not more than 40% of land will be returned to the landowners. This decision is
arrived at without taking into consideration the value of each portion of land on
the basis of their geographical locations.
114. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the
appellants that taking land under “Development Contribution” to the extent of
65% is not contemplated under Section 50(6) of the Act. Section 50(6)(vi) of
the 1973 Act reads as under:
“50. (6)(vi) evaluate the increment in the value of each reconstituted plot and
assess the development contribution leviable on each plot-holder:
Provided that the contribution shall not exceed half the accrued increment in
value;”
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115. Even under Section 40(3)(jj)(a) of the Gujarat Act, the maximum
permissible contribution of land by a landowner cannot exceed 50%.
Therefore, in the absence of any reasonable procedure arrived at by the
respondents, taking 65% of the area of the plot as development contribution is
wholly unfair and arbitrary, and is also impermissible as per Section 50(6)(vi)
of the 1973 Act. We hold that the respondents were not justified in returning
only 35% of reconstituted plots and retaining 65% for different purposes
mentioned by them.
Noida Entrepreneurs Vs. Noida and Ors. [(2011) 6 SCC 508
]. Para(s) 39 of the judgment is/are reproduced below for ready
reference:
39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone
of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must
be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and
relevance. Functioning of a “democratic form of Government demands equality
and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination”. The rule of law prohibits
arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance
with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be
suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias,
favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or
without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the
decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.
17. In view of the above discussion and considering the fact that the
present is a clear case of discriminatory approach applied in the case of
petitioner society while comparing with the case of similarly situated Sneh
Nagar Society, to whom the respondent/authority has granted benefit of more
than 39% of the developed plots and contrary to the same, the petitioner was
granted the benefit of 29% of developed plot against the surrendered portion
of land, is ex-facie arbitrary, irrational and unjustified action, which is not
only violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, but also violative
of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The said authority like the
present respondent/IDA is required to act in a fair and proper manner to
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extend consistent treatment to the the petitioner society as extended to the
similarly situated society. In the case in hand, it can be said that it is a case
of colourable exercise of power by the respondent/IDA.
1 8 . The contentions raised by the respondent/IDA regarding the
aspect of delay and latches cannot be accepted in the totality of facts and
circumstances where the petitioner society had continuously made
representations and thereafter, after getting material regarding treatment
given to the Sneh Nagar Society, the present petition is filed. Even otherwise,
looking to the discriminatory approach adopted by the respondent/IDA and
arbitrariness in its actions, I find no reason to accept the contention regarding
delay and latches, that too after five years, as the petition is filed in the year
2021 and is now argued for final consideration of the matter and, therefore,
on any count petition does not suffer from delay and latches.
19. Moreover, considering the fact that the subsequent resolution will
nullify the effect of earlier resolution, the said contention raised by the
respondent cannot be countenanced as the respondent/IDA has acted earlier
on Resolution No. 9 and thereafter by way of subsequent Resolution No.
148, which was passed after long period and the respondent authority has
also acted pursuant to earlier resolution by giving benefits to the other
society namely Sneh Nagar Society. Now, the respondent/IDA cannot be
permitted to take a different stand by giving different treatment to the
petitioner society as against Sneh Nagar Society. On that count also, the
contention raised by the respondent/IDA is ill-founded and required to be
rejected.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SEHAR HASEEN
Signing time: 20-11-2026
18:02:54
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:32305
30 WP-24830-2021
20. In view of the above discussion as well as the propositions of
law as enunciated above, this Court has come to the conclusion that the
action of respondent /IDA is not only illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory,
but also violative of principles of promissory estoppel as well as legitimate
expectation and Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, I find
good reason to allow the present petition by declaring that the present
society is entitled to additional developed land by Resolution No. 148 dated
03.10.1991 and agreement dated 06.08.1993 and also by considering the
authorities own Calculation Notesheet No. 110 dated 22.06.2015.
21. In the result, the impugned communication dated
27.01.2021(Annexure P-26) and the subsequent decision on the basis of
same i.e. Notesheet dated 02.03.2021(Annexure P-28) are hereby quashed,
relegating the matter to the respondent/IDA to re-consider the representation
of petitioner society and allot approx 0.352 hectares of developed land to the
petitioner society, strictly in accordance with Resolution No. 148 dated
03.10.1991 and agreement dated 06.08.1993 within a period of 30 days,
together with further appropriate relief, which can be granted to the
petitioner society.
22. With the aforesaid directions, petition stands allowed.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
sh
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SEHAR HASEEN
Signing time: 20-11-2026
18:02:54