Atul Chauhan vs State Of Haryana

2026 INSC 640
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. _______ OF 2026
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 25892 of 2025)


ATUL CHAUHAN ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present Civil Appeal has been preferred by Atul
Chauhan (hereinafter referred to as “the Appellant”), being
aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 12th May, 2025
(hereinafter referred to as the “impugned judgment”), passed by
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil
Writ Petition No. 13053 of 2025 (O&M), whereby the High Court
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MINI
Date: 2026.06.11
16:59:52 IST
Reason:
upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 23(1) of the Haryana
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Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or
Appointment) Rules, 2019 (for short “the Rules of 2019”) and
dismissed the Appellant’s writ petition seeking compassionate
appointment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. A reference to the facts in brief is necessary for a proper
appreciation of the issues arising for adjudication in this appeal.
The Appellant’s father, Late Shri Gajender Singh Chauhan, was
initially employed as a Junior Basic Teacher (JBT) at the
Government Primary School, Gudhrana, Tehsil Hodal, District
Palwal, Haryana, since the year 1997. On 28th September, 2021,
the said Government employee died in a road accident under
suspicious circumstances, when the motorcycle on which he was
travelling was allegedly hit from behind by a speeding car.
4. In connection with the aforesaid incident, the
Appellant’s mother, Smt. Pushpa Devi was booked under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on the allegation that she
had conspired with other persons in the commission of the
murder of her husband, i.e., the deceased Government
employee. A criminal case was accordingly registered, and a full-
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fledged trial was conducted before the Court of Additional
District and Sessions, Palwal, Haryana, being SC No. 80 of 2022.
5. It must also be noted that Smt. Pushpa Devi, the mother
of the Appellant, swore an affidavit to the effect that all post-
death benefits of her deceased husband ought to be issued in
her name, and that in case of any legal obstacle thereto, such
benefits may be issued in the name of both her sons, including
the Appellant. She further declared that she had no objection to
the benefits being extended to her sons and undertook not to
assert any independent claim in that regard against the
department.
6. The Appellant and his family members approached the
Respondent No. 6 — Principal, Government Senior Secondary
School, Palwal, Haryana, seeking clarification from the higher
authorities regarding the disbursement of service and policy-
related benefits to the dependents of the deceased Government
employee. The Principal, vide letter dated 11th April, 2022,
addressed to the Respondent No. 5 — Block Education Officer,
sought guidelines with regard to extending benefits to the
accused wife, Smt. Pushpa Devi. Subsequently, vide letter dated
26th April, 2022, the relevant documents were forwarded to the
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Respondent No. 5 — Block Education Officer for necessary
action in respect of Compassionate Financial Assistance or
Appointment.
7. Subsequently, the Respondent No. 2 — The Director of
Elementary Education vide communication dated 4th May,
2022, informed the Respondent No. 3 — District Elementary
Education Officer that, in view of the Rules of 2019, the wife of
the deceased Government employee was not entitled to any
benefits. It further directed that if the children of the deceased
employee were major, all relevant documents regarding their
claim for compassionate appointment or financial assistance be
submitted to the Directorate. Consequently, the mother of the
Appellant made a representation dated 18th November, 2022, to
the Respondent No. 2 — Director of Elementary Education,
seeking release of service and policy-related benefits.
8. Aggrieved by the inaction of the Respondents, the
Appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by
filing Civil Writ Petition No. 24711 of 2023 (being the first writ
petition filed by the Appellant), which was disposed of vide order
dated 3rd November, 2023, with the direction to the
Respondents to decide the Appellant’s representation in
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accordance with law. In compliance, the Appellant made a
representation dated 14th November, 2023, to the Respondent
No. 6 — Principal of the Government Senior Secondary School,
requesting consideration of his claim for compassionate
appointment.
9. Meanwhile, the Appellant’s mother was acquitted of the
charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Palwal, vide judgment dated 14th
October, 2024, in SC No. 80 of 2022. It is, however, important
to note that the acquittal was not an honourable acquittal;
rather, it was an acquittal on the basis of “benefit of doubt”.
Subsequent to the said acquittal, the Appellant represented his
case afresh on 5th November, 2024, requesting reconsideration
of compassionate benefits in light of the trial court’s verdict.
10. However, the complainant, viz., Mahender Singh, the
brother of the deceased Gajender Singh Chauhan, preferred an
appeal against the said acquittal before the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana, registered as CRM-A No. 119 of 2025, in which
notice was issued and the said appeal was fixed for hearing. The
criminal proceedings arising out of the same incident thereby
remained sub judice .
Page 5 of 34

11. Respondent No. 2 — The Director of Elementary
Education, vide office order dated 26th November, 2024, kept
the Appellant’s claim in abeyance until the conclusion of the
criminal proceedings against his mother. Eventually, the claim
was again declined vide a revised order dated 7th February,
2025. The Appellant had, in the interregnum, filed Contempt
Petition No. COCP 4979 of 2024 before the High Court, alleging
non-compliance with the earlier directions, which he withdrew
on 6th March, 2025, with liberty to avail appropriate legal
remedies.

12. Aggrieved by the rejection of his claim, the Appellant
filed Civil Writ Petition No. 13053 of 2025 before the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana (the second writ petition), assailing the
constitutional validity of Rule 23(1) of the Rules of 2019 and
seeking a direction for consideration of his claim for
compassionate appointment notwithstanding the pendency of
the criminal appeal against his mother’s acquittal.
13. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment dated
12th May, 2025, while upholding the constitutional validity of
Rule 23(1), held that the suspension of compassionate benefits
during the pendency of criminal proceedings is legally justified.
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Simultaneously, the High Court observed that the Appellant’s
mother, being the widow of the deceased Government employee,
holds the first right to compassionate benefits under Rule 5(1)(f)
of the Rules of 2019, and that the Appellant’s own right, if any,
can arise only after her claim is conclusively determined. The
High Court further held that the pending appeal against the
acquittal constitutes a continuation of the trial, rendering the
Appellant’s claim premature. The writ petition was accordingly
dismissed.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
14. The Rules of 2019 were duly notified by the State
Government on 2nd August, 2019, to provide a uniform
mechanism for extending either “Compassionate Financial
Assistance” or “Compassionate Appointment” to the family of a
Government employee who dies or disappears while in service.
Pertinently, Rule 2 of the Rules of 2019 sets out the object of the
scheme in the following terms:
“ 2 . Object of rules — The object of these rules is to
grant compassionate financial assistance or
appointment to the family of Government employee
who dies or disappears while in service, consequently
to relieve the family of Government employee
”
concerned from financial distress.
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15. At the outset, it must be noted that the scheme makes
a structural distinction between “Compassionate Financial
Assistance” (defined under Rule 5(1)(a)) and “Compassionate
Appointment” (defined under Rule 5(1)(b)). Correspondingly, the
definitions of ‘family’ also differ: Rule 5(1)(f) defines ‘family’ for
the purpose of compassionate financial assistance, while Rule
5(1)(g) defines ‘family’ for the purpose of compassionate
appointment. The procedure for payment of compassionate
financial assistance is prescribed in Rule 38, whereas the
procedure for compassionate appointment is governed by Rule
8. Likewise, the competent authority for compassionate
appointment is described in Rule 9, while the competent
authority for sanction of compassionate financial assistance is
described in Rule 37.
16. Most importantly, Rules 7 and 23 of the Rules of 2019,
which lie at the heart of the present challenge, dealing with
‘compassionate appointment’ and ‘compassionate financial
assistance’, respectively, are extracted as follows:
“ 7. Compassionate Appointment on Group C or D
post. (1) In case of death or disappearance of the
Government employee while in service, before
attaining the age of fifty-two years subject to
completion of minimum five years service on regular
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basis, the eligible family member may opt for
compassionate appointment, in place of compassionate
financial assistance.
(a) The compassionate appointments under these
rules shall be confined to Group C or Group D post
only.
(b) Status of the deceased or missing Government
employee or the higher qualifications of the
eligible family member shall not be considered for
giving compassionate appointment.
(c) The compassionate appointment being offered
shall be to a post of at least one step lower
Functional Pay Level than the functional level or
Assured Career Progression (ACP) Level or any
other level higher than the Functional Level of the
post last held by the deceased or missing
Government employee, except in cases where the
deceased or missing Government employee was
working at the lowest level in Group D post.
Explanation 1. — The functional pay level of the post
last held by the deceased or missing Government
employee is FL-12 (corresponding to Functional Grade
Pay 7600), the compassionate appointment shall be
made to a post of Group C, but not lower than the post
of Clerk, depends upon the eligibility and qualification
and also the availability of vacancy in the Department.
Explanation 2.— The functional pay level of the post
last held by the deceased or missing Government
employee is FL-6 (corresponding to Functional Grade
Pay 4200), the compassionate appointment shall be
made to a post of Group C below the functional level of
4200, but not lower than the post of Clerk, depends
upon the eligibility and qualification of the eligible
family member and also the availability of vacancy in
the Department.
Explanation 3.— The functional pay level of the post
last held by the deceased or missing Government
employee is FL-6 (corresponding to Functional Grade
Pay 4200) but pay was being drawn in ACP Level-11
(corresponding to ACP grade Pay 4800) the
compassionate appointment shall be made to a post of
Group C below the ACP level last held, but not lower
than the post of Clerk, depends upon the eligibility and
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qualification of the eligible family member and also the
availability of vacancy in the Department.
Explanation 4.— The deceased or missing
Government employee was holding the post of Group D
and was drawing pay in the functional pay level
corresponding to Functional Grade Pay 1650, the
compassionate appointment shall be made to a post of
Group D in the functional level. ”
*
“ 23. Regulation of compassionate financial
assistance in case of criminal proceedings. (1)
Where a family member, who in the event of death
while in service of a Government employee, is eligible
to receive compassionate financial assistance, is
charged with the offence of murdering the Government
employee or for abetting in the commission of such an
offence, the claim of such member, including other
eligible member(s) of the family to receive the
compassionate financial assistance, shall remain
suspended till the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings instituted against him.
(2) If on the conclusion of the criminal proceedings
referred to in sub-rule (1), the family member is,—
(i) convicted for the murder or abetting in the
murder of the Government employee, such a
person shall be debarred from receiving the
compassionate financial assistance which shall be
payable to next eligible member of the family, from
the next day of the death of Government employee;
(ii) acquitted of the charge of murder or abetting in
the murder of the Government employee, the
compassionate financial assistance shall be
payable to such person. ”
SUBMISSIONS
17. Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that Rule
23(1) of the Rules of 2019, by its plain and express language,
operates only upon the claim for “compassionate financial
assistance” and has no application whatsoever to a claim for
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“compassionate appointment”. It was submitted that the Rules
of 2019 maintain a clear and deliberate legislative distinction
between the two categories of relief, and that the Respondents,
as well as the High Court, committed a manifest error of law by
applying Rule 23(1), a provision textually confined to financial
assistance, to the Appellant’s claim for compassionate
appointment, which is governed by inter alia Rule 7. Reliance
was also placed on the affidavits furnished by the Appellant’s
mother and brother, wherein they renounced their respective
claims to compassionate appointment in favour of the Appellant.

18. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 — State of Haryana and Others
submitted that the Rules of 2019 constitute a single, integrated
welfare scheme, and that compassionate financial assistance
and compassionate appointment are not independent or disjoint
remedies, but two components of one consolidated benevolent
scheme. It was argued that a purposive and harmonious
construction of Rule 23(1) necessarily implies that the
suspension of compassionate benefits during the pendency of
criminal proceedings extends to both forms of relief, and that
any other interpretation would create an anomalous and absurd
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situation wherein a person under a cloud of criminal suspicion
could secure public employment but be denied financial
assistance. It was further submitted that there exists no vested
right to compassionate appointment, and that the claim of the
Appellant’s mother, as the widow of the deceased, is entitled to
priority under Rule 5(1)(f) and (g) and that until her claim is
conclusively determined, no derivative right can accrue to the
Appellant.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
19. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
upon careful perusal of the material placed on record, including
the written submissions filed on behalf of both sides, we proceed
to examine the legal issues that arise for our consideration.
I. The Nature of Compassionate Appointment — Not a
Vested Right
20. Before embarking upon the merits of the case, we begin
by restating the foundational position of law on the nature of
compassionate appointment. It is settled through a consistent
line of authority of this Court that compassionate appointment
is not a vested or heritable right. It is a relief extended by the
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State in the public interest as a humane response to the sudden
financial destitution occasioned by the death in harness of the
breadwinner of a family. However, the said relief is subject to the
claimant fulfilling all eligibility requirements prescribed under
the applicable policy, instructions, or rules governing
compassionate appointment. While holding that the
compassionate appointment is not a vested right, this Court in
1
Tinku v. State of Haryana lucidly held as follows:
“ 12. As regards the compassionate appointment being
sought to be claimed as a vested right for appointment,
suffice it to say that the said right is not a condition of
service of an employee who dies in harness, which
must be given to the dependent without any kind
of scrutiny or undertaking a process of selection. It is
an appointment which is given on proper and strict
scrutiny of the various parameters as laid down with
an intention to help a family out of a sudden pecuniary
financial destitution to help it get out of the emerging
urgent situation where the sole bread earner has
expired, leaving them helpless and maybe penniless.
Compassionate appointment is, therefore, provided to
bail out a family of the deceased employee facing
extreme financial difficulty and but for the
employment, the family will not be able to meet the
crisis. This shall in any case be subject to the claimant
fulfilling the requirements as laid down in the policy,
instructions, or rules for such a compassionate
appointment .”

21. These principles are, however, an instrument that cuts
equally in both directions. The same principle which enjoins the
claimant to satisfy all conditions prescribed under the governing

1
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3292.
Page 13 of 34

rules equally demands of the State that it must justify any
refusal or deferment of a claim by grounding that refusal in a
provision which the applicable rules actually prescribe, and
which is actually applicable to the form of relief being claimed,
tested on the anvil of non-arbitrariness enjoining under Article
14 of the Constitution.
22. The State cannot deny or defer a claim for
compassionate appointment by invoking a provision which, on a
proper reading of the rules, applies only to a different form of
relief. The strict construction required of the claimant is
matched, in equal measure, by the requirement that the
authority exercise only such power as the rules confer upon it.
This assumes even greater significance when viewed in light of
the underlying humanitarian object of compassionate
appointment. Time and again, this Court has underscored that
compassionate appointment is intended to provide immediate
succour to the bereaved family of a deceased employee and to
alleviate the sudden financial distress. In M.P. State Agricultural
2
Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh , this Court observed as follows:
“ 11. In families where a deceased stood as the only
source of sustenance, death carries with it not only

2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2925.
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emotional devastation but the looming threat of
deprivation, insecurity and social marginalisation. A
welfare State, committed to the Constitutional ideals of
justice with the mandate of reducing inequality,
promoting social justice and ensuring a basic standard
of living for all, cannot afford to allow such bereaved
families to slide into destitution by the mechanical
operation of procedural formalities. Significantly, a
responsibility has been cast upon the State under the
provisions of Part IV of the Constitution of India, i.e.,
Article 39 of the Directive Principles of State Policy to
serve such a welfare State. Thus, the policy of
compassionate appointment is not a concession,
largesse or mercy shown to hapless dependents of a
deceased employee, but a structured response of the
State to ensure that the death of an employee does not
mark the beginning of economic calamity for those left
behind. It is from this vantage point that the competing
claims in the present appeal must be examined .”
II. Rule 23(1) — Its Plain Language Admits of No Extension
to Compassionate Appointment
23. The primary and decisive question in this appeal is:
Does Rule 23(1) of the Rules of 2019 apply to a claim for
compassionate appointment? In our view, the answer, compelled
by the text, the structure, and the legislative architecture of the
Rules of 2019, is unequivocally in the negative.
24. The language of Rule 23(1) is unambiguous and admits
of only one reading. The provision employs the expression
‘compassionate financial assistance’, and that expression alone
throughout. The marginal heading of the rule is equally explicit:
‘Regulation of compassionate financial assistance in case of
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criminal proceedings’. Neither the body of the rule nor its
heading makes any reference, whether express or implicit, to
‘compassionate appointment’. Additionally, Rule 23(2), which
prescribes the consequences of conviction or acquittal upon the
conclusion of the criminal proceedings, likewise confines its
operation entirely to ‘compassionate financial assistance’, with
not a word about appointment. Nowhere in Rule 23, in none of
its clauses or sub-clauses, does the expression ‘compassionate
appointment’ appear.

25. This is not a case of ambiguous drafting that requires
judicial resolution. This is a case of a provision which speaks
clearly, specifically, and exclusively about one thing, i.e.,
compassionate financial assistance, and says nothing at all
about another, viz., compassionate appointment. To read the
former as including the latter would not be an act of statutory
interpretation; it would be an act of judicial legislation.
26. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the
Respondent-State that Rule 23(1) must be read purposively so
as to include compassionate appointment within the expression
‘compassionate financial assistance’ cannot be accepted.
Purposive construction is a tool to resolve genuine ambiguity; it
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is not a licence to override an unambiguous text or to introduce
provisions which the legislature/State has not seen fit to
introduce. The text here is clear and specific, and we are bound
to give effect to it. If the Rule-making authority intended the bar
under Rule 23(1) to extend to compassionate appointment as
well, it was well within its power, in exercise of the rule-making
authority under Article 309 of the Constitution, to say so
explicitly.
III. The Separate Treatment of the Two Forms of Relief — A
Structural Demonstration
27. The distinction between compassionate financial
assistance and compassionate appointment under the Rules of
2019 is not confined to their definitions; it is a structural feature
that permeates the entire architecture of the Rules of 2019.
28. It is pertinent to highlight that Rule 5(1)(a) defines
‘compassionate financial assistance’ as monthly assistance;
Rule 5(1)(b) defines ‘compassionate appointment’ as an
appointment to a post in Group C or D service. The two are, by
definition, qualitatively different forms of relief. Rule 5(1)(f)
defines ‘family’ for the purpose of compassionate financial
assistance with a detailed hierarchical priority structure; Rule
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5(1)(g) defines ‘family’ for the purpose of compassionate
appointment separately and distinctly. Rule 7 governs the
conditions and modalities of appointment; Rules 36 to 39 govern
the separate procedures for financial assistance. Rule 8 and the
prescribed Form CFA-2 govern the application process for
compassionate appointment. Rule 9 designates the competent
authority for compassionate appointment; Rule 37 separately
designates the competent authority for sanction of
compassionate financial assistance.

29. This elaborate and carefully demarcated separation of
the two forms of relief throughout the Rules of 2019 leaves no
room for doubt: the Rule-making authority designed and
formulated the two as distinct categories. Rule 23, which
appears in the same Rules, must be read against this backdrop.
When Rule 23(1) speaks only of ‘compassionate financial
assistance’, it does so against a legislative background in which
‘compassionate financial assistance’ and ‘compassionate
appointment’ are clearly and consistently treated as distinct. The
omission of ‘compassionate appointment’ from Rule 23(1) must,
in this context, be regarded as deliberate and intentional on the
part of the Rule-making authority.
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IV. The Absence of Any Sequential Hierarchy in Rule 5(1)(g)
as Contrasted with the Express Cascading Structure of Rule
5(1)(f)
30. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, placed
considerable reliance upon Rule 5(1)(f) of the Rules of 2019 to
hold that the Appellant’s mother, as the widow of the deceased
Government employee, holds a preferential and antecedent claim
that must first be conclusively determined before the Appellant’s
own claim can receive any consideration. We are of the view that
this approach rests on a fundamental misreading of the Rules,
and that it conflates the priority structure governing
compassionate financial assistance with the altogether different
regime governing compassionate appointment.
31. It is necessary to set out the relevant provisions in some
detail. Rule 5(1)(f) defines ‘family for the purpose of
compassionate financial assistance’. The structure of Rule 5(1)(f)
is deliberately and explicitly hierarchical, employing a cascading
sequencing mechanism. Pertinently, Sub-clause (f)(i) designates
the widow as the first claimant. Sub-clause (f)(ii) and (f)(iii) then
provides as follows:
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“(ii) failing (i) above, the eldest unmarried and
dependent son(s) or daughter(s) upto the age of twenty-
five years;”
“(iii) failing (i) and (ii) above, the dependent eldest
divorced or widowed daughter(s)…”
32. Sub-clause (f)(iv) provides “failing (i) to (iii) above…”;
sub-clause (f)(v) provides “failing (i) to (iv) above…”; sub-clause
(f)(vi) provides “failing (i) to (v) above…”; and sub-clause (f)(vii)
provides “failing (i) to (vi) above…”. The pattern is unmistakable
and consistent: each tier of the priority list under Rule 5(1)(f) is
expressly prefaced with the phrase “failing” the preceding tier(s).
The use of this cascading language is the legislature’s deliberate
and express mechanism for creating a strict sequential bar: each
lower-tier claimant can receive financial assistance only upon
the failure of every claimant above them in the hierarchy. The
word “failing” is the operative instrument that constitutes the
bar; without it, no such bar exists.
33. We turn now to Rule 5(1)(g), which defines ‘family for the
purpose of compassionate appointment’. Rule 5(1)(g) provides as
follows:
“( g) ‘Family for the purpose of compassionate
appointment’ means — (i) widow or widower;
(ii) children, including adopted children, already not in
service in any Department or Organization under any
State Government or Government of India; and
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(iii) dependent brother and sister in case of unmarried
deceased or missing Government employee only.”

34. The contrast with Rule 5(1)(f) could not be more
pronounced. Rule 5(1)(g) contains no “failing” language
whatsoever. Sub-clause (g)(ii), which covers children, the
category to which the Appellant belongs, is not prefaced with the
words “failing (i) above”. Sub-clause (g)(iii) is similarly not
prefaced with “failing (i) and (ii) above”. The provision is drafted
as a plain list of persons who constitute the ‘family’ for the
purpose of compassionate appointment. It does not, by its text,
impose upon the children the condition that the widow’s claim
must first fail before theirs can be entertained. There is no
prioritisation of any class of heir/family member over another.

35. This structural contrast between the two provisions is
not a matter of drafting oversight or inadvertence. The Rule-
making authority/State was acutely conscious of the distinction
between the two forms of relief and has maintained that
distinction with precision and consistency across the entire legal
framework. The drafters were plainly aware of the cascading
“failing” mechanism, having employed it meticulously across six
consecutive sub-clauses of Rule 5(1)(f) for the purpose of
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compassionate financial assistance. They chose not to employ it
in Rule 5(1)(g), which provides the meaning of family for the
purpose of compassionate appointment. That choice must be
given effect.
36. The idea that the legislature is deemed to know the
effect of the language it employs, and to intend the consequences
that follow from its choice of language, applies with full force
here. Where the legislature has prescribed a strict sequential bar
by using the word “failing”, such a bar exists. Where the
legislature/Rule-making authority has refrained from using that
word, no such bar can be read in by the Court. The absence of
the “failing” formulation in Rule 5(1)(g) means that Rule 5(1)(g)
defines who constitutes ‘family’ for compassionate appointment
purposes, not that each category can be considered only to the
exclusion of the others or only upon the sequential failure of
those listed above it.
37. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, relied upon
Rule 5(1)(f), a provision governing financial assistance, to hold
that the widow’s claim is the first and antecedent claim that
must be determined before the Appellant’s claim for
compassionate appointment can be considered. This was a
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misdirection in law. The Appellant’s claim is governed by Rule
5(1)(g), not Rule 5(1)(f). The two provisions operate in distinct
domains and must not be conflated. Importing the sequential
bar contained in Rule 5(1)(f) into the domain of Rule 5(1)(g),
which contains no such bar, amounts to reading into Rule 5(1)(g)
a restriction that the Rule-making authority/State has not
formulated.
38. The practical consequence of this reading is as follows.
Under Rule 5(1)(g), the widow, children, and dependent siblings
are all persons who constitute the ‘family’ eligible for
compassionate appointment. The widow appears first, as the
natural first claimant in any compassionate scheme. But the
absence of the “failing” qualifier means that the children do not
stand entirely excluded from consideration so long as the
widow’s claim is unresolved. What Rule 5(1)(g) prescribes is the
eligibility of these persons as members of the family for the
purpose of the scheme; it does not, in the absence of the express
sequential language, prescribe an absolute bar that prevents
consideration of the children’s claim while the widow is alive and
her claim is undetermined. Where the widow herself does not
assert any claim to the appointment, as is the position in the
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present case, by virtue of her express declaration, there is
nothing in the text of Rule 5(1)(g) that mandates that the
children’s claim must await the resolution of a claim which is
not being made.
39. In the present case, as the Appellant’s mother, Smt.
Pushpa Devi and his brother, Sh. Jai Chauhan has both
executed affidavits relinquishing their claims; the Respondents
and the High Court erred in not giving them due effect.
V. Constitutional Validity of Rule 23(1) and Its Non-
Applicability to the Present Case

40. The Appellant also raised a constitutional challenge to
Rule 23(1) before the High Court. Having regard to the
interpretation we have placed upon Rule 23(1), that it applies
only to claims for compassionate financial assistance and not to
claims for compassionate appointment, the constitutional
challenge, insofar as it is directed at the application of Rule 23(1)
to a claim for appointment, is rendered academic in the present
case. Rule 23(1) simply does not operate in the field of
compassionate appointment, and there is accordingly nothing in
the present case that calls for a constitutional adjudication of
Rule 23(1) as applicable to the Appellant’s claim.
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41. We, however, proceed to examine the constitutional
validity of Rule 23(1) on its own terms, as applied to its proper
domain of compassionate financial assistance. Rule 23(1) is, in
our view, constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. The provision is not penal in character;
it is preventive and regulatory. It does not extinguish or
permanently deny the right to compassionate financial
assistance; it defers its exercise until the resolution of the
antecedent question of criminal liability for the death of the
Government employee. The classification created by Rule 23(1)
has a clear, rational, and direct nexus with its stated object: to
prevent the compassionate scheme from being accessed by a
person who may be criminally culpable for the very death that
gives rise to the entitlement under the scheme. A temporary,
purpose-linked suspension of a statutory concession, confined
to the duration of criminal proceedings, does not constitute
invidious discrimination and does not offend Article 14. The
constitutional challenge accordingly fails, and Rule 23(1) is
constitutionally valid in its proper domain.
42. However, and this is of the utmost importance,
declaring Rule 23(1) constitutionally valid does not extend its
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application to a field it does not govern. Validity and applicability
are distinct questions. Rule 23(1) is valid; it governs only
compassionate financial assistance. The Appellant claims a
compassionate appointment. Rule 23(1), whatever its
constitutional validity, has no application to his claim made
under the provision for the grant of compassionate appointment.
The High Court erred in holding otherwise, and that error is the
primary basis on which the impugned judgment falls.
VI. The Anomaly in the Rules of 2019 — A Desirable
Clarification by the Rule-making authority/State
43. We consider it necessary to observe that the
interpretation we have adopted, which is the only interpretation
that the text of the Rules of 2019 permits, reveals a significant
anomaly in the legislative scheme that deserves attention. A
compassionate appointment is, in every material respect, a
substantially greater and more consequential form of relief than
compassionate financial assistance. Financial assistance is a
monthly monetary payment of limited duration, calibrated to tide
the family over an immediate crisis. Compassionate appointment
is a permanent entry into government service, with all its
attendant benefits over a lifetime: regular salary, service
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seniority, the right to promotion, housing and service
perquisites, pension upon superannuation, gratuity, and the full
panoply of benefits that a career in public employment carries
for decades.
44. It would appear, on the face of it, incongruous that the
Rule-making authority/legislature saw fit to suspend even the
lesser form of relief, i.e., financial assistance, during the
pendency of criminal proceedings for the alleged murder of the
deceased employee, while providing no analogous safeguard in
respect of the far greater form of relief, viz., permanent public
employment. The result, on a plain reading of the Rules of 2019
as they stand, is that a family member who stands accused of
complicity in the death of the Government employee cannot
receive a monthly monetary payment during the criminal
proceedings, but may, on this interpretation, be considered for a
permanent government appointment during the same period.
That this anomaly could generate confusion, heartburn,
unnecessary litigation, and genuine difficulties in administration
is apparent. It is, in our view, strongly desirable that the State
Government examine and address this legislative gap by
introducing appropriate provisions in the Rules of 2019,
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expressly governing similar treatment of claims for
compassionate appointment in cases where a family member is
charged with, or stands under a criminal cloud relating to, the
murder or abetment of the murder of the deceased Government
employee.
45. We must, however, be clear that this Court cannot
remedy the anomaly by reading into the Rules a provision which
the legislature/State has not formulated. The judicial function
is to apply the law as it is. It is for the Rule-making
authority/State and the executive, in exercise of the rule-making
power under Article 309, to clarify and rectify the legislative
lacunae.
VII. The State’s Decision Is Unsustainable — The Appellant’s
Claim Must Be Considered on Merits
46. The foregoing analysis leads to the following composite
position that compels the allowing of this appeal:
i. First, Rule 23(1) of the Rules of 2019 does not
apply to a claim for compassionate appointment. The
Respondents erred, as a matter of law, in invoking Rule
23(1) as a ground for keeping the Appellant’s claim for
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compassionate appointment in abeyance. The
invocation of that provision for this purpose rests on no
legal foundation and cannot be sustained.
ii. Second, the sequential hierarchical bar that
prevents lower-priority claimants from being considered
while higher-priority claimants remain undetermined is
a feature of Rule 5(1)(f), which governs compassionate
financial assistance. It is expressed through the
cascading “failing” language that runs through each
sub-clause of Rule 5(1)(f). Rule 5(1)(g), which governs
compassionate appointment, contains no such
conditional language. The absence of the “failing”
qualifier in Rule 5(1)(g) means that the children’s claim
for appointment does not stand as a matter of law
automatically barred by the mere existence of a living
widow whose claim has not been conclusively
determined. The widow here has, in any event, expressly
stated that she does not intend to claim compassionate
appointment, thereby removing any practical claim that
could stand in the way of the Appellant’s claim under
Rule 5(1)(g).
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iii. Third, the Respondents have at no stage disputed
the Appellant’s eligibility for compassionate
appointment on its merits. They have not contended
that he fails to satisfy any of the eligibility conditions
prescribed under the Rules of 2019. The only grounds
on which his claim has been kept in abeyance are the
invocation of Rule 23(1) — which we have held
inapplicable, and the priority of the widow’s claim, in
respect of which we have held that no absolute
sequential bar arises from Rule 5(1)(g) in the absence of
the “failing” language, and that the widow has in any
event declared she will not assert a claim.
47. There is, therefore, no legal impediment to the
Respondents considering and deciding the Appellant’s claim for
compassionate appointment on its own merits, strictly in
accordance with the eligibility conditions and requirements
prescribed under the Rules of 2019.
CONCLUSION
48. For the reasons elaborated hereinabove, we record the
following conclusions and issue the following directions:
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(i) The Appellant’s claim shall be considered and
decided in strict conformity with the eligibility
conditions, procedures, and requirements prescribed
under the Rules of 2019.
(ii) Rule 23(1) of the Rules of 2019, by its express
language and its marginal heading, applies only to
claims for ‘compassionate financial assistance’. It does
not, by its text or by any permissible process of
interpretation, extend to a claim for ‘compassionate
appointment’. The Respondent-State erred as a matter
of law in invoking Rule 23(1) to defer the Appellant’s
claim for compassionate appointment. The High Court
equally erred in upholding that application.
(iii) The two forms of relief under the Rules of 2019 are
governed by separate and independent statutory
frameworks throughout the enactment. The deliberate
structural separation of the two across all definitional,
procedural, eligibility, and administrative provisions of
the Rules confirms that the omission of ‘compassionate
appointment’ from Rule 23(1) was intentional and not
inadvertent.
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(iv) The sequential bar applicable to claims for
compassionate financial assistance under Rule 5(1)(f),
expressed through the cascading “failing” formulation in
each sub-clause thereof, has no counterpart in Rule
5(1)(g), which governs compassionate appointment.
Rule 5(1)(g) contains no “failing” language. The High
Court erred in importing the sequential bar from Rule
5(1)(f) into the domain of Rule 5(1)(g). No absolute
statutory bar prevents the consideration of the
Appellant’s claim for appointment on the sole ground
that the widow’s prior claim under Rule 5(1)(g) has not
been conclusively determined.
(v) Rule 23(1) of the Rules of 2019 is constitutionally
valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. It is preventive and regulatory in character, and
the classification it creates has a rational and proximate
nexus with the object of the provision. However, Rule
23(1) has no application to the facts of the present case,
as the Appellant’s claim is for compassionate
appointment and not for financial assistance.
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(vi) The Rules of 2019 truly present an anomaly: the
lesser form of compassionate relief, financial assistance,
carries an express suspension clause under Rule 23(1)
in cases of criminal proceedings for the murder of the
deceased employee, while the substantially greater form
of relief, compassionate appointment, with its lifelong
service benefits, pension, and emoluments, carries no
corresponding provision. It is strongly desirable that the
Rule-making authority/State Government of Haryana
address this legislative lacuna by introducing
appropriate amendments to the Rules of 2019.
49. As a result, the Civil Appeal is allowed. The Impugned
Judgment dated 12th May, 2025, passed by the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 13053 of 2025, is
hereby set aside.
50. The Respondents are directed to consider and decide the
Appellant’s claim for compassionate appointment on its own
merits, strictly in accordance with the eligibility conditions,
procedures, and requirements prescribed under the Rules of
2019, within a period of three months from the date of this
judgment. The consideration shall be uninfluenced by Rule 23(1)
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of the Rules of 2019, which has no application to a claim for
compassionate appointment.

51. We clarify that this Court has expressed no opinion on
the merits of the criminal proceedings pending in CRM-A No. 119
of 2025, and nothing in this judgment shall be construed as
having any bearing upon those proceedings.
52. We further clarify that the direction to consider the
Appellant’s claim shall not be construed as conferring any
absolute right to appointment. The Respondents shall consider
and decide the claim on its merits in accordance with the Rules
of 2019, including all conditions relating to eligibility, the
availability of a post, and such other requirements as are
prescribed thereunder.
53. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……..……………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)

……..……………..………………….………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)


NEW DELHI;
JUNE 11, 2026
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