Amar Puri vs Samar S Puri (D) Thr Lrs
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on : 01.04.2026
Pronounced on : 26.05.2026
Uploaded on : 26.05.2026
+ FAO 383/2024, CM APPLs. 72054/2024, 56931/2025
AMAR PURI .....Appellant
Through: Mr.Rajat Aneja, Mr. Aditya Sharma,
Ms.Saubhagya Chauriha, Advocates
versus
SAMAR S PURI (D) THR LRS .....Respondent
Through: Ms.Charu Dalal and Mr.Choudhary Amit
Bassoya, Advocates for LRs of respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal filed under Order XLIII Rule 1 of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908(hereinafter referred to as „CPC‟) is directed against the
order dated 18.09.2024, passed by the Trial Court, whereby the suit was held
to be a Commercial Suit and the plaint was returned under Order VII Rule
10 CPC.
2. The facts, in a nutshell, are that in the plaint, the plaintiff had asserted
that Commercial/industrial Shed bearing No.6A, D.D.A Sheds, Okhla
Industrial Area, Phase-II, New Delhi (hereinafter the „suit property‟ ) was
allotted to him by DDA in an Auction held on 30.10.1981, whereafter he
became its exclusive owner on payment of the sale consideration. A
Possession Letter dated 04.08.1982 was also issued in his name. Thereafter,
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the suit property was used by the plaintiff as the office of his partnership
firm namely, “M/s DESCON India”. It was further claimed that the
defendant, who is the elder brother of the plaintiff, was running his
partnership firm in the name of “ M/s Associated Engineers ” from the
adjacent premises bearing Shed No. 5-A, D.D.A Sheds, Okhla Industrial
Area, Phase-II, New Delhi and requested the plaintiff to permit him to use
the portion of suit property. The plaintiff claimed that he used the suit
property till the year 1996-1997, whereafter his office shifted to C-2, D.D.A.
Golf View Apartments, Saket, New Delhi-110017 . On defendant‟s request,
plaintiff permitted him to run the latter‟s partnership business on the suit
property. It was further claimed that on the demise of the youngest brother of
the parties, namely Shri Rajiv Puri, with whom the defendant was running
his aforesaid business, the partnership firm got dissolved. However, despite
requests, the defendant refused to vacate the suit property. In this backdrop,
the claim was filed seeking recovery of possession, damages/mesne profits
and permanent injunction.
3. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant filed an application
under Order VII Rule 10 CPC claiming that since the suit property was
being used for commercial purposes, the dispute fell within the ambit of
Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Court Act, 2015. It was also claimed
that the relief for mesne profits was covered under the said Section. While
relying on the decision of this Court in Jagmohan Behl v. State Bank of
1
Indore , it was submitted that the expression “arising out of” in Section
2(1)(c)(vii), in relation to agreements concerning immovable property, is
wide and expansive and is not to be given a narrow or restricted
1
2017 SCC OnLine Del 10706
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interpretation. It was contended that the said expression would include all
matters relating to agreements connected with immovable property used in
trade or commerce, including oral agreements. Further, reliance was placed
2
upon Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v . DLF Universal & Anr. , learned counsel
submits that the decree passed in a suit by a Court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction would be a nullity.
4. The plaintiff, however, contested the said application, contending that
the suit property had been permitted to be used by the defendant and was
handed over out of respect and not for any commercial consideration. Hence,
the requirement of Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act is not satisfied. The
oral agreement cannot amount to an agreement envisaged under Section
2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
5. The Trial Court, while considering Section 52 of the Indian Easements
Act, 1882, which defines „license‟ as a right granted by one person to
another to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of a
grantor something which would otherwise be unlawful, has observed that no
consideration is required for a valid licence and that a mere agreement (oral
or written) between the parties whereby such license is granted would be
sufficient. The Trial Court has noted the averments made in the plaint
wherein it was stated that the plaintiff had acceded to the defendant‟s request
and had permitted him to use the suit property for business purposes. In this
backdrop, it was held that the dispute was covered by a provision of Section
2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that no objection as to
jurisdiction was raised either in the written statement or at the stage of
2
(2005) 7 SCC 791
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framing of issues with respect to the maintainability of the suit under the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. It is contended that the controversy lies in a
narrow compass, namely, whether the arrangement pleaded in the plaint can
be construed as an “agreement relating to immovable property used
exclusively in trade or commerce” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii)
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The said provision reads as under:-
“(vii) agreements relating to immovable property used
exclusively in trade or commerce.”
7. Pertinently, for consideration of prayer for return of plaint under
Order VII Rule 10 CPC, only the averments made in the plaint alone need to
be examined.
8. Before proceeding further, let me take note of the position of law
noted by Supreme Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Limited v. K.S.
3
Infraspace LLP , where it elaborately discussed the jurisdiction of
Commercial Court and further held that a strict construction to the
provisions of Commercial Court Act is required otherwise any liberal
interpretation shall defeat the very objection for the purpose of the said Act
i.e. speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes. It was further
clarified that the expression “used exclusively in trade or commerce” refers
to property which is actually being used for commercial purposes, and not
property which is merely ready for use, likely to be used, or to be used for
trade or commerce in future. In the present case the plaint itself shows that
the suit property is a commercial/industrial shed and that the defendant was
permitted to use it for business activities.
3
(2020) 15 SCC 585
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9. Similarly, in Meena Vohra v. Master Hosts (P) Ltd. , the learned
Single Judge of this Court held that, for a dispute to be categorised as a
„commercial dispute‟, the transaction should be supported by a document
that records, governs, or evidences trade, commerce, or business activity.
This Court further observed that the absence of such a document raises
doubts as to whether a dispute can be classified as a „commercial dispute‟
under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. It was further held that a dispute
shall qualify as a „commercial dispute‟ when it arises from transactions
involving merchants, bankers, financiers, or traders or relating to mercantile
documents, including their enforcement and interpretation etc. The Court
also held that a commercial dispute inherently carries a commercial flavour,
encompassing elements of trade and business. The relevant observations of
the Court are as under:-
“31. Reference can be made to Black's Law Dictionary, 8th
Edition, which defines "mercantile" as "an act relating to a
merchant or trading and being commercial in nature." This
interpretation suggests that for a dispute to be categorised as a
"commercial dispute", the transaction should be supported by a
document that records, governs, or evidences trade, commerce,
or business activity. The absence of such a document certainly
raises doubts as to whether a dispute can be classified as a
"commercial dispute" under the provisions of the Act of 2015. A
dispute qualifies as a "commercial dispute" when it arises from
transactions involving merchants, bankers, financiers, or
traders, and relates to mercantile documents, including their
enforcement and interpretation. Pertinently, the essence of a
"commercial dispute" inherently carries a commercial flavour,
encompassing elements of trade and business."
10. In Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha and Others v. Manhabala Jeram
4
2025 SCC OnLine Del 1758
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Damodar and Another , the Supreme Court, while considering the nature of
license as defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act,1882 and
relied on its earlier decision in State of Punjab v. Brig. Sukhjit Singh,
observed that “ payment of licence fee is not an essential attribute for
subsistence of licence. Section 52, therefore, does not require any
consideration, material or non material to be an element, under the
definition of licence nor does it require the right under the licence must arise
by way of contract or as a result of a mutual promise ”. It was further held as
under:-
“53. We have referred to the meaning of the expressions
“licence” and “licensee” in various situations rather than one
that appears in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act only to
indicate that the word licence is not popularly understood to
mean that it should be on payment of licence fee, it can also
cover a gratuitous licensee as well. In other words, a licensor
can permit a person to enter into another‟s property without
any consideration, it can be gratuitous as well.”
11. However, the issue in the present case is not whether a gratuitous
licence is legally valid, but whether the arrangement pleaded in the plaint
possesses the commercial character contemplated under Section 2(1)(c)(vii)
of the Commercial Courts Act. Admittedly, the property in question is a
commercial/industrial shed and, as per the plaint itself, the defendant was
permitted to use the premises for running business activities. Therefore, the
arrangement has a commercial character and concerns immovable property
being used for commercial purposes. The alleged permissive gratuitous use
will not make the agreement non-commercial for deciding the applicability
of Commercial Courts Act.
5
(2013) 15 SCC 358
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12. In arguendo , learned counsel has prayed that in the alternative, the
suit be transferred to the Commercial Court instead of the plaint being
returned.
13. In this regard, this Court takes note of the fact that the present suit was
instituted in July, 2017 i.e., prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in
6
Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd. where prospective
applicability of the judgment was declared. The relevant paragraphs from the
judgment on the effect of the ruling on the pending suits is as under:-
“113.1. We declare that Section 12-A of the Act is mandatory
and hold that any suit instituted violating the mandate of
Section 12-A must be visited with rejection of the plaint under
Order 7 Rule 11. This power can be exercised even suo moto by
the court as explained earlier in the judgment. We, however,
make this declaration effective from 20-08-2022 so that
stakeholders concerned become sufficiently informed.
113.2. Still further, we however direct that in case plaints have
been already rejected and no steps have been taken within the
period of limitation, the matter cannot be reopened on the basis
of this declaration. Still further, if the order of rejection of the
plaint has been acted upon by filing a fresh suit, the declaration
of prospective effect will not avail the plaintiff.
113.3. Finally, if the plaint is filed violating Section 12-A after
the jurisdictional High Court has declared Section 12-A
mandatory also, the plaintiff will not be entitled to the relief.”
14. Clearly, in the present case, the suit having been filed in 2017, is
saved from the fatal consequences of Section 12-A non-compliance.
However, even in the pending suits that ought to have been filed as
commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, the compliance of 12-A
is mandatory, without rendering the suit not maintainable for pre-suit 12-A
6
(2022) 10 SCC 1
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non-compliance.
7
15. In Namita Gupta v. Suraj Holdings Ltd. this Court has adopted a
novel method to make it less inconvenient for the plaintiff in such suits, by
taking recourse to Section 24 of the CPC, rather than more abrupt and
disruptive consequences of Order VII Rule 10 of CPC. The Court has
observed that in order to avoid the consequence of loss of all proceedings
that have taken place before the earlier court, either of the parties may seek
recourse to Section 24 CPC, which empowers the High Court or the District
Court, on its own motion or otherwise, to transfer any Suit, appeal or other
proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to
it; or to withdraw any such Suit, appeal or proceeding pending in any Court
subordinate to it and inter alia transfer the same for trial or disposal to any
Court subordinate to it and competent to try and dispose of the same. The
Court further noted the difference between Section 24 and Order VII Rule 10
CPC by observing that in terms in terms of Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 in
following terms:-
“58. The difference between Section 24 and Order VII Rule 10
of the CPC is that in terms of Sub-Section (2) of Section 24,
where any Suit or proceeding has been transferred or
withdrawn, the Court which is thereafter to try or dispose of
such Suit or proceeding may, subject to any special directions
in the case of an order of transfer, either retry it or proceed
from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn.
Therefore, all proceedings that were undertaken before the
Court where a Suit was earlier instituted, though it lacked
jurisdiction to try the same, can be saved, and the Suit on its
transfer can be proceeded from the point at which it was
transferred.
7
2024 SCC OnLine Del 143
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xxx
63. As noted hereinabove, Section 16 of the Act provides that
the provisions of the CPC shall apply to any Suit in respect of
Commercial Dispute of a Specified Value, subject to the
amended provisions thereof as provided in the Schedule
appended to the Act. Section 24 of the CPC is not a provision
which has been amended by the said Schedule. It, therefore,
continues to apply in full force to a Suit in respect of a
Commercial Dispute of a Specified Value. If the Legislature
wanted to take away this power from the Court, it would have
expressly stated so by deleting the said provision in the
Schedule to the Act; it did not do so. There is also no implied
exclusion of this power, as this power, in no manner, is in
conflict with any provisions of the Act.
64. As far as non-compliance with Section 12A of the Act is
concerned, the Transferee Court shall consider the said
objection on merits upon the transfer of the Suit. The transfer of
the Suit does not, in any manner, affect the right of the
defendant to contend that the Suit has been filed without any
cause of action or is otherwise barred by any provision of law
or is liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
for any other reason, including for the failure of the plaintiff to
initiate pre-suit mediation as mandated under Section 12A of
the Act. These objections would remain open to the defendant
even on the transfer of the Suit under Section 24 of the Act.
65. As held hereinabove, a Commercial Court, constituted
under Section 3 of the Act, would be a Court subordinate to the
High Court. Reference in this regard may also be made to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation
of India v. Nandini J. Shah (2018) 15 SCC 356. Therefore, there
is no reason to exclude the applicability of Section 24 of the
CPC to a Suit in relation to a Commercial dispute of a specified
value. The first issue is answered accordingly.”
16. Recently, the Supreme Court in Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v.
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Union Of India , observed as under:-
63. It is interesting to note that the decision impugned before us
was referred to by this Court in paragraph 54 of Patil
Automation while it was discussing the divergent views of
different High Courts on the nature of Section 12-A of the 2015
Act. Therein, this Court had observed thus: (SCC pp. 28-29,
para 54)
“54. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Calcutta, in the decision in Dhanbad Fuels Ltd. v. Union
of India, took the view that mediation in India is still at a
nascent stage and requires more awareness. There was a
need for mandatory training of commercial disputes. It
was further found that the party cannot be denied the
right to participate in the justice dispensation system. It
was further noticed that there was no obligation on the
part of the defendant to respond to the initiative of the
plaintiff. Rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) in
view of Order 7 Rule 13, which enables a fresh suit to be
filed upon rejection under Order VII Rule 11, would show
that the power under Order VII Rule 11 should not be
invoked as it would not be in accordance with the
objectives of the Act and the Rules.”
17. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside.
18. Accordingly, in exercise of powers under Section 24 CPC, this Court
directs that the suit be transferred and for which purpose it would be listed
before the concerned Principal District and Sessions Judge at the first
instance on 06.07.2026 for directions. The question of compliance of Section
12-A, is kept open for the transferee Court to deal with in accordance with
law.
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(2025) 9 SCC 424
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19. In view of the above, the present appeal is disposed of alongwith the
pending applications.
(MANOJ KUMAR OHRI)
JUDGE
MAY 26, 2026
na
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