STATE OF ODISHA vs RANGADHAR PAIKARAY
- Court
- Odisha High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
I.A. No.3601 of 2025
arising out of
W.A. No.1450 of 2025
CNR No. ODHC010574142025
(In the matter of an Application to condone the delay in filing Writ
Appeal under Article-4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948)
read with
Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting
the High Court of Judicature at Patna
and
Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule-2 of Chapter-VIII
of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 194)
1. State of Odisha , represented through the
Principal Secretary to Government of Orissa, in
the Department of Higher Education, At/P.O.
Secretariat Building, Bhubaneswar, Dist.
Khurda.
2. Director of Higher Education, Odisha , At/P.O.
Bhubaneswar, Dist. Khurda.
3. Deputy Director (+2 Education), Odisha ,
.... Appellants
At/P.O. Bhubaneswar, Dist. Khurda.
-versus-
1. Sri Rangadhar Paikaray , Son of Late- Banamali
… .
Respondent
2. Governing Body of Kaptipada College , At/P.O.
Paikaray, At/P.O. Kaithagadia, P.S. Khaira,
Dist. Balasore.
Nuasahi, Dist. Mayurbhanj, Represented by its
Secretary.
Principal, Kaptipada College
3. , At/P.O. Nuasahi,
Dist. Mayurbhanj.
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W.P.(C) No.9278 of 2022
// 2 //
Ramakrushna Mahakuda
4. , Son of Maheswar
Proforma
Respondents
….
Mahakuda, At-Baunsambal, P.O. Padasal, Dist.
Balasore
Advocates for the parties
For Appellants : Mr. Subha Bikash Panda,
Additional Government Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. Rudra Prasad Kar,
Senior Advocate being assisted by
Mr. Soumya Ranjan Paikray, Advocate
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.R. MOHAPATRA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO
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Date of Hearing: 03.09.2026 : Date of Judgment : 03.09.2026
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
J U D G M E N T
K.R. Mohapatra, J
1.
This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.
2. Appearance memo of Mr. Rudra Prasad Kar, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the Respondent No.1 filed in Court is taken
on record.
3. This is an application filed by the Appellants for condonation
of delay of 325 days in filing the Intra-Court Appeal as pointed out
by the S.R.
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W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 3 //
4. The Intra-Court Appeal has been filed assailing the judgment
dated 23.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)
No.18641 of 2009.
5. It is stated in the petition that the judgment passed in W.P.(C)
No.18641 of 2009 was received in the Office of the Appellant No.2,
namely, Director of Higher Education, Odisha on 23.08.2024.
5.1. Mr. Panda, learned Additional Government Advocate submits
that though it is stated at Paragraph-2 of the Interim Application that
the decision was taken to file the Writ Appeal on 05.08.2024, but it
is an inadvertent typographical error and the correct date would be
25.08.2024. The Appellant No.2 took a decision to file the Writ
Appeal on 25.08.2024.
6. It is stated at Paragraph-3 of the I.A. that required process was
to be undertaken in the Administrative Branch of the Government
Department. The decision to file the Writ Appeal was taken by the
Administrative Branch of the Government in the Department of
Higher Education on 08.10.2024 as the relevant records were
presented before the Administrative Department on 08.10.2024.
Soon after the decision was taken, the relevant records were
presented before the legal section of the Administrative Department
on 14.10.2024, the Administrative Department, namely, Department
of Higher Education, Government of Odisha as per the Rules of
Business decided to send the file for obtaining the views of the Law
Department on 15.10.2024. Accordingly, the entire case record was
presented before the Law Department, Government of Odisha and
after scrutiny the Law Department returned the file on 14.05.2025
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W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 4 //
giving a nod to the proposal to file Writ Appeal. Thereafter, the
relevant records were presented before the Office of the learned
Advocate General on 17.06.2025 after obtaining all the relevant
records. Soon after the proposal was received in the Office of the
learned Advocate General, Law Officer was entrusted to prepare the
grounds of Appeal. At Paragraph-6 it is stated that the concerned
Law Officer called the competent Officer from the Department to
discuss and finalise the grounds of Appeal. Accordingly, the Appeal
memo containing the grounds was prepared on 19.06.2025. It was
scrutinized on 21.06.2025 and finalized on 25.06.2025. As such, the
delay of 325 days occurred in filing the Writ Appeal is bona fide and
not intentional.
7. Mr. Panda, learned Additional Government Advocate relied
upon the case law in G. Ramegowda, Major and others vrs. Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore: (1988) 2 SCC 142 . The
-15 & 17 has held as under:
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraphs
“15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is
yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If
appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults,
no person is individually affected; but what, in the
ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional decisions
and do not share the characteristics of decisions of
private individuals.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case,
constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it
might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from
the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these
factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the government. Governmental decisions
are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
Page 4 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 5 //
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process
of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore,
not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear
responsibility of Government must have “a little play at
the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable
limits is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be
—
rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put government and private parties on the
same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural
delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the
opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers
of the Government placed the Government in a
predicament and that it was one of those cases where the
mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers.
Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd.
[LR (1899) 2 Ch 629, 673] observed, though in a different
context:
“Business cann ot be carried on upon
principles of distrust. Men in responsible
positions must be trusted by those above
them, as well as by those below them, until
there is reason to distrust them.”
In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time
for the government to realise that the law officers failed
that trust.”
8. Learned Additional Government Advocate also relied upon
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag vrs. Mst.
the case of
Katiji; (1987) 2 SCC 107 to support his prayer for condonation of
delay. The decision in Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through LRS
and others vrs. Union of India and another ; 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1278 is relied upon by the learned Additional Government
Advocate . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph -29 of the said
judgment held as under:
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W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
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“ 29. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there
cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to
ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State
are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical
considerations of delay. However, these decisions
notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay
being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of
discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of
the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the
explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or
an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the
shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain
other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the
courts must distinguish between an „explanation‟ and an
„excuse‟. An „explanation‟ is designed to give someone all of
the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify
the circumstances of a particular event and allows the
person to point out that something that has happened is not
his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be
taken to distinguish an „explanation‟ from an „excuse‟.
Although peo ple tend to see „explanation‟ and „excuse‟ as
the same thing and struggle to find out the difference
between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is
real. An „excuse‟ is often offered by a person to deny
responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort
of a defensive action. Calling something as just an „excuse‟
would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to
be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all
situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay
based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be
decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament
that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more
often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard
public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda
is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the
higher courts for adjudication.
”
9. In course argument, Mr. Panda, learned Additional
Government Advocate also relied upon the case of Esha
Bhattacharjee vrs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
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W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
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Academy and others ; (2013) 12 SCC 649 and submits that while
dealing with an application for condonation of delay, a liberal
approach should be adopted by the Court. It is further submitted that
the Appellants have fair chance of success in the Writ Appeal. Thus,
an opportunity should be given to the Appellants to put-forth their
case on merit after condoning the delay subject to payment of
reasonable cost.
10. Mr. Kar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the contesting
Respondent No.1 refuted all submissions made by Mr. Panda,
learned Additional Government Advocate. It is submitted that a
stereotype approach has been made by the Appellants by stating that
the file moved from one table to another and one Department to
other in the decision making process: whether to file appeal or not.
11. Learned Senior Counsel relies upon the ratio in the case of
Postmaster General vrs. Living Media India Limited; (2012) 3
SCC 563 , wherein this stereotypical approach of movement of file to
challenge an order,
has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court and the application for condonation of delay therein was
rejected. He further submits that the Respondent No.1 was
successful before the learned Single Judge, but could not enjoy the
fruits till date and he has been made to fight out litigation for last 40
years. He is almost bedridden at present. It is submitted that the
respondent is compelled to face prolonged litigation due to apathetic
attitude of the Appellants.
12. In course of argument, Mr. Kar, learned Senior Advocate
relied upon the case of State of Odisha and others vrs. Adhir
Page 7 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 8 //
Kumar Swain in W.A. No.314 of 2026 and I.A. No.705 of 2026
which was heard along with a batch of Appeals, and a Coordinate
Bench of this Court dealt with the issue of condonation of delay in
filing Writ Appeals in threadbare discussing the law settled by the
Court. By common judgment dated 21.07.2026 in
Hon’ble Supreme
the batch of Writ Appeals, the Coordinate Bench after discussing the
explanation given by the Appellants in each of the Writ Appeals for
condonation of delay, made the following observations while
analyzing the rival contentions of the parties. At Paragraphs-7, 8 & 9
of the judgment, it is observed as under:
At the very outset, we must keep in mind the well-nigh
“7.
principle governing the field of condonation of delay that the
length of delay is immaterial, but what is central to, is the
sufficiency of the cause pleaded and proved by the appellant.
The delay of a longer period deserves condonation on a
proper explanation having offered and the delay of a shorter
period may not be condoned in absence thereof. We are,
thus, not trammelled with the period of delay in the
respective appeals, but we confined our scrutiny to the
pleadings and the explanations so offered within the four
corners of the expression “sufficient cause” being the corner
stone of determining the cause in pursuit of condoning the
delay.
8. In W.A. No.303 of 2026 and W.A. No.57 of 2026, the
State has put emphasis on the observations made in
paragraph 41 of a judgment rendered by the apex Court in
—
Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal Representatives
and others v. Union of India and another reported in
(2023) 10 SCC 531 , wherein it is held that certain hidden
forces are prevalent in the functioning of the various
departments of the State in presenting the appeal within the
period of limitation and, therefore, a pragmatic view is a
need of an hour in balancing the competing interests.
The inspiration appears to have been drawn from the
above observation that in all situations and circumstances,
Page 8 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 9 //
the Court must take into account the complexities in working
of the departments as the official entrusted in this regard
does not have any personal interest and, therefore, the State
should be treated differently than of an individual in a case
relating to the condonation of delay. The Sheo Raj Singh
(supra) case originated from the order passed by the learned
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in condoning the delay
of 479 days in presentation of an appeal against a decision
of a Reference Court under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894.
9. In order to consider the discretion having exercised by
the High Court in condoning the delay, the apex Court
sought to create a distinction between an “explanation” and
an “excuse”. While embarking his journey from such
peripheral, the explanation was explained that a thing
“ ”
designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the
cause for something, which would help to clarify the
circumstances of a particular event and permit the person to
point out that something, which happened, is not his fault.
On the other hand, the word “ excuse ” was explained to the
circumstances offered by a person to deny responsibility and
the consequences when under attack. It is, thus, primarily a
shield. ”
13. The Coordinate Bench in Adhir Kumar Swain ( supra ), also
discussed the observations in Delhi Development Authority vrs.
Tejpal: (2024) 7 SCC 433 , Paragraph-12 of the judgment reads as
under:
“ 12. However, in a subsequent decision rendered in Delhi
Development Authority v. Tejpal , reported in (2024) 7
SCC 433 , the Three-Judge Bench of the apex Court was
considering the contention raised by the Government
entities that a certain amount of leeway be given in this
regard for condonation of delay. The Three-Judge Bench
took note of the various judgments rendered at an earlier
point of time including the Sheo Raj Singh (supra) and
held that the Government cannot stand on a different
pedestal than of an individual in relation to a condonation
of delay in the following:
Page 9 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 10 //
“54. It seems to us that acceding to the
appellants' request on the aforesaid account
would also have undesirable consequences. If
delay were to be condoned merely on the basis of
a broad general assertion of bureaucratic
indifference, without requiring demonstration of
bona fides or an act of mala fides on the part of
specific individuals, it would create an artificial
distinction between the private parties and the
Government entities vis-à-vis the law of
limitation. This would not be in conformity with
the spirit of equality before law as guaranteed
under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude
would further distort incentives for the
Government and encourage more laxity by the
bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby
undermining quality governance.”
14. The Coordinate Bench in Adhir Kumar Swain ( supra ) further
discussed the law laid down in State of Odisha vrs. Managing
Committee of Namatara Girls High School: 2026 SCC OnLine SC
191 at Paragraph-13;
“ 13. In a recent decision rendered in State of Odisha v.
Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School
reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191 , the apex Court held
as under:
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo
Raj Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the
judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the
view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra)
and a host of other decisions following the same
while not interfering with an order of
condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a distinction
ought to be drawn between an „explanation‟ and
an „excuse‟ that is proffered as cause for
condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that
a different approach has to be adopted while this
Court is considering an application for
condonation of delay in presentation of an
Page 10 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 11 //
appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over
a discretionary order of the high court granting
the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of
the former, whether to condone or not would be
the only question whereas in the latter, whether
there has been proper exercise of discretion in
favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has
to be examined.
xxx xxx xxx
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra)and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in
doubt that it did not take much time for this Court
to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law
was laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following
Katiji (supra), with much optimism that matters
would improve. Their Lordships, however, found
no visible support for such optimism and the
Court's patience having been tested to the
extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even
if the litigant labouring under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference is the Government. 20.
We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the
High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has
been approached by the State of Odisha four
months after expiry of the period of limitation. 21.
Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the
Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite
all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are
of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be
shown here by the State of Odisha is not an
explanation but a lame excuse. No case for
exercise of discretion has been set up.”
15. After scrutinizing the aforesaid case law, the Coordinate
Bench in Adhir Kumar Swain ( supra ) made the following
observations which are also apt for the present discussion:
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// 12 //
“14. What, thus, emerged from the decisions referred to
above that the Court should not mechanically condone the
delay simply because the appellant is a Government entity.
Even, in case of an appeal filed by the Government entities,
the application seeking condonation of delay must
demonstrate the circumstances, which occasioned the delay
in preferring an appeal beyond the period of limitation and
such circumstances must show the bona fides and
diligences in pursuing the matter. The Government or
Government entities cannot be treated differently nor to be
accorded greater latitude while considering an application
for condonation of delay simpliciter on the account of
administrative exigencies. The explanation offered for
delay in preferring an appeal must have a reasonable
nexus to a bona fide attempt having made and steps having
taken in promptitude. The Government cannot claim
condonation of delay as a matter of right nor be put in a
higher position than of an individual. It would corrode the
concept of equality in law in the event the Government is
treated differently than of an individual. The reliance upon
a judgment of the apex Court rendered in Sheo Raj Singh
(supra) in all conceivable situations appears to be
misplaced, which is also highlighted in Tejpal‟s case in
holding that the Sheo Raj Singh‟s case was considering
twin situations, namely, (i) its constraints while sitting in
an appeal over a discretionary order; and (ii) itself
considering the application for condonation of delay.
15. We have noticed in a recent time that the application
for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal without
any proper explanation is solely founded upon an
observation made in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) without
having any parity on facts. It is a trite law that the
judgment rendered by the Courts and the observations
made therein are to be read in conjunction with the facts
involved in the instant case as a little difference in facts or
an existence of an additional fact may invite diametrically
opposite decision. It is a duty of the Court to look upon the
facts pleaded by a litigant seeking condonation of delay
and in the event, it is found that there is a complete lack of
bona fide and/or diligence in pursuing the matter, it hardly
opens a door of the room for the Courts to condone the
delay.”
Page 12 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 13 //
16. In the result, the Coordinate Bench dismissed the Interim
Applications for condonation of delay in the respective Writ Appeals
and consequently dismissed the Writ Appeal on the ground of delay
and latches.
17. Mr. Kar, learned Senior Advocate in course of his argument
verily relies upon the observation of Ho n’ble Supreme Court at
Paragraph-18 of the case of Namatara Girls High School ( supra )
which reads as under:
However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of
“18.
the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and
consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon'ble
M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief
order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur
Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers of the
ng with promptitude. This order was
“revenue” in not acti
made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra).
We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety
hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned
senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16,
1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in
the past, this Court has been making observations as
to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by
appeals brought on behalf of the Government being
lost on the point of limitation. Such observations
have been made for over a few years in the past. But
there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is
apparent in the present petition which is filed in
November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had
better be set out in petitioner's own words:
g) The Advocate-on-Record got the
“(
special leave petition drafted from the
drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along
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// 14 //
with the case file. (h) The Board returned the
case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9,
1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP
was not approved by the Board. The Board
after approving the draft SLP sent this file to
CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a
judicially acceptable ground for condonation of
delay. After the earlier observations of this Court
made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to be no visible
support for this optimism. There is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if
the litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having
regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in
the case of the former the decisions to present and
prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by
the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this
also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely serves to
aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue
in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is
again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it
susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not
seem to attach any importance to the need for
promptitude even where it affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is,
accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is,
therefore, dismissed as barred by time”.
(emphasis ours)
18. In the case of Namatara Girls High School ( supra ), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to Ramegowda ( supra ) and
Katiji ( supra
). The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken note of
Page 14 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 15 //
the observations in the case of
of Hon’ble Supreme Court
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay vrs. Amateur Riders Club,
Bombay; 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603 , which was given emphasis by the
as quoted above.
Hon’ble Supreme Court
19. It is thus submitted by Mr. Kar, learned Senior Advocate that
stereotype causes shown to explain the delay in approaching this
Court are mere excuses and cannot qualify to be ‘ explanation ’ by
any stretch of imagination.
20. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of
the records, this Court finds from the facts stated in the I.A. to
explain condonation of delay that the inordinate delay of 325 days in
filing the Intra-Court Appeal occurred due to movement of file from
one table to another and one Department to the other, which is
almost similar to that in the case of Adhir Kumar Swain ( supra ).
21. In the case of State of Odisha and others vrs. Ratnakar
Swain in W.A. No.99 of 2026 (I.A. No.160 of 2026) disposed of by
judgment dated 30.06.2026, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has
taken note of Litigation Policy of the State Government to reduce
‘ ’
litigation and time consumed in filing the affidavits and petitions
before the Court.
22. Mr. Kar, learned Senior Advocate verily relied upon 14.5 of
the said case, which is culled out herein:
14.5. This Court is apprised of the fact that a
“
“Stan dard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Ensuring
Timely Filing of
Affidavits in Courts and Tribunals” has
been issued by the Government of Odisha in Law
Department vide -
Notification No.8292─IV/2 LR
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W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025
// 16 //
210/26/L., dated 10.06.20263 in consequence of Order
dated 24th March, 2026 passed in CONTC No 1011 of
2026 arising out of WP(C) No 18177 of 2025 taking into
account the casual approach adopted by the State
Authorities in filing affidavits/instructions resulting in
unwarranted delays in disposal of Court Cases. It is also
noticed that though the State Litigation Policy was
formulated in the State during 2011 to reduce the State
litigations basing on the National Litigation Policy as
per recommendation of the 13th Finance Commission, in
its place a new State Litigation Policy4 has been
formulated to minimize the litigations against/by the
State and streamlining consideration of the grievances
to prevent avoidable litigations keeping in view the
Order dated 3rd October, 2023 passed by this Court in
WPC (PIL) No.28053 of 2023 and the Guidelines of the
National Litigation Policy
”
23. From the facts stated in the I.A. for condonation of delay as
narrated above and from the submissions of Mr. Panda, learned
Additional Government Advocate, this Court finds that the
inordinate delay was due to lackadaisical and leisurely approach by
the Appellants to take a decision to file the Writ Appeal. The
explanations as given in the I.A. are mere excuses and cannot be
considered as explanations which would persuade the Court to treat
them to be sufficient cause. The reasons stated explaining the delay
of 325 days in approaching the Court are mere inter/intra-
departmental communications and movement of file. The State
Government has a robust mechanism and competent officers are in
place to deal with matter to take a decision to file Appeal. If a
decision is to be taken to file the Writ Appeal or to implement the
order of the learned Single Judge; such decision ought to have been
taken within the statutory period of 30 days. Filing of Appeal
beyond the period of thirty days with no judicially acceptable
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// 17 //
explanation has been placed on record for consideration by the
Court. Nothing has been stated as to why the Intra-Court Appeal
could not have been filed within the statutory period. The State
Government does not have a different statutory period to file the
Writ Appeal. Giving the dates indicating movement of file does not
qualify to be ‘ sufficient cause ’ .
24. There being no sufficient cause shown explaining inordinate
delay of 325 days in filing the Intra-Court Appeal, we are not
inclined to entertain the I.A. Accordingly, the I.A. is dismissed.
Consequently the Writ Appeal stands dismissed due to delay and
latches on the part of the Appellants.
25. Consequent upon dismissal of the Writ Appeal, all the interim
orders accordingly stand vacated including the order dated
07.07.2026.
26. It is expected that the order dated 23.08.2024 passed in
W.P.(C) No.18641 of 2009 will be complied with in its letter and
spirit as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of two
months hence.
(K.R. Mohapatra)
Judge
(Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
rd
Dated the 3 day of September, 2026/ Amit-Rajesh
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: AMIT KUMAR MOHANTY
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 04-Sep-2026 20:02:46
Page 17 of 17
W.A. No.1450 of 2025 & I.A. No.3601 of 2025