UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK (UCO BANK) AND ORS. vs INDRANATH MUKHERJEE

Court
Calcutta High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE



Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty
&
The Hon’ble Justice Partha Pratim Roy


MAT 1479 of 2025
+
IA No.: CAN 1 of 2025

United Commercial Bank (UCO Bank) & Others
-Versus-
Indranath Mukherjee



For the Appellants : Mr. S. Pal,
Mr. S. Pal Choudhuri,
Mrs. S. Dey Pal Choudhuri,
Ms. S. Paul


For the Writ Petitioner/
Respondent : Mr. Kallol Basu,
Mr. Samik Sarkar



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Hearing is concluded on : 16 November, 2026.



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Judgment On : 16 November, 2026.


Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.
1. The United Commercial Bank (UCO Bank) (hereinafter referred to as
the Bank) and its functionaries, being the appellants herein, have taken

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nd
exception to a judgment dated 22 July, 2025 passed by the learned Single
Judge in a writ petition, being WPA 6755 of 2018 setting aside the
‘Memorandum of Charge - sheet dated 29.08.2013, the Enquiry Report, the
order of punishment issued by the Disciplinary Authority dated 28.09.2013
and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 31.12.2014’ and directing the
appellants ‘to disburse all admissible terminal benefits to the petitioner,
treating the case as if no disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against
him.’ .
2. Records would reveal that the writ petitioner/respondent herein,
namely, Indranath Mukherjee (in short, Indranath) joined the services in a
clerical cadre in the year 1981. He worked for about 32 years in different
capacities and got promotions. He had no antecedents. At the fag end of his
service tenure and barely a month prior to the date of his retirement a
Disciplinary Proceeding (hereinafter referred to as DP) was initiated against
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him by a Charge Sheet (hereinafter referred to as CS) dated 29 August,
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2013 to which he replied on 6 September, 2013. The Enquiry Officer
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(hereinafter referred to as EO) was appointed thereafter on 7 September,
2013 and he submitted an undated Enquiry Report (hereinafter referred to
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as ER) to which Indranath replied on 24 September, 2013. The
Disciplinary Authority (hereinafter referred to as DA) issued a second show-
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cause notice on 27 September, 2013 and passed the order of punishment
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on 28 September, 2013, against which Indranath preferred a statutory
appeal which was disposed of by the Appellate Authority (hereinafter
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referred to as AA) by an order dated 31 December, 2014. Thereafter on

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15 May, 2015, Indranath sought for copies of documents regarding enquiry
proceeding initiated against one Tapas Kumar Banerjee (in short, Tapas),
who was a staff of the Bank and was named in the CS. As such prayer was
not considered Indranath filed an application under the Right to Information
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Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the 2005 Act) on 15 January, 2015.
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Aggrieved by an order of dismissal dated 28 January, 2015, he preferred a
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statutory appeal on 9 February, 2015 but the same was dismissed by the
first appellate authority under the 2005 Act and accordingly, Indranath
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approached the second appellate authority on 19 March, 2015 and upon
the same not being answered, he preferred a writ petition which was
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disposed of on 7 July, 2015 directing the competent authority to dispose of
the second appeal and pursuant thereto, the second appeal was dismissed
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on 4 July, 2016 and the review preferred thereafter was not answered. As
his termination was not due to any act of wilful omission or moral turpitude
or riotous act, Indranath approached the competent authority under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Act) and
pursuant to the order passed by the appellate authority under the 1972 Act
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on 29 September, 2017, the appellants disbursed the gratuity amount.
Thereafter, Indranath preferred the writ petition in the month of May, 2018
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which was disposed of finally by the judgment dated 22 July, 2025,
impugned in the present appeal.
3. According to Mr. Pal, learned advocate appearing for the appellants, as
the DP was guided by the bipartite settlement, Indranath had an alternative
efficacious remedy to approach the Industrial Tribunal and the learned

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Single Judge ought not to have negated such issue, as urged, applying the
general principle that existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute
bar against maintainability of a writ petition and observing that Indranath
does not fall within the definition of ‘ workman ’, as contemplated under
Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
the 1947 Act) failing to appreciate that the principal duty discharged by him
was clerical in nature.
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4. He contends that the statutory appeal was disposed of on 31
December, 2014 and the writ petition was preferred about 4 years thereafter
in the month of May, 2018. Such delay was not appropriately explained by
Indranath and the learned Single Judge construed an excuse given by
Indranath to escape from the blame, to be an explanation and negated the
issue of maintainability without any reason whatsoever.
5. He argues that the scope of review in matters concerning imposition of
punishment by the DA is strictly confined to procedural compliance,
observance of natural justice, adherence to statutory rules and freedom
from extraneous or mala fide consideration, rather than assessing the
correctness of the decision, re-appreciating evidence or evaluating its
adequacy, reliability or sufficiency. It is not a case that Indranath had been
found guilty on the basis of mere surmises. His guilt stood established
through the specific findings in the report of the EO as well as in the order
of the DA. It is also not a case that Indranath was not granted adequate
opportunities to defend himself. Elaborating such argument, he submits
that in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court

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does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the DA and the
AA. The learned Single Judge glossed over the issue that Indranath himself
admitted the guilt that he had approved upon verification, the modification
of the introducer’s name using his ID in the system and sought to wriggle
out of the rigours of the act by giving a purported explanation that he had
done so in good faith and it was an unintentional mistake on his part. In
support of such argument, as advanced, reliance has been placed upon the
judgment delivered in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran
reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 and an unreported judgment delivered in Civil
Appeal No.2148 of 2015 (Central Industrial Security Force & Ors. vs. Abrar
Ali) .
6. He contends that the learned Single Judge also failed to appreciate
that a Bank officer is required to exercise high standard of honesty and
integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. As
such, he is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the
Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion
and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. It is
no defence available to say that no loss or profit resulted. In view thereof,
Indranath’s act is a misconduct and attracts Clause 5(j) of the bipartite
settlement.
7. He contends that even in cases where the penalty imposed appears to
be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct, the matter
needs to be relegated to the DA/AA to take a call and it is not for the Court
to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment more

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so when it is not a case that the impugned judgment results in inconsistent
treatment of similarly placed personnel, creating inconsistency in judicial
outcomes and possible complications.
8. Per contra , Mr. Basu, learned advocate appearing for Indranath,
argues that the entire proceeding smacks of biased and closed mind. The
EO, the DA, the AA have all been swayed by a pre-conceived notion that
Indranath had deliberately approved upon verification, the modification of
the introducer’s name using his ID in the system in the account
no.02770210000892 being entered by Tapas and had acted in connivance
with the said staff in causing loss to the Bank though such allegation of
connivance does not feature in the CS and a perusal of the ER would
categorically reveal that no evidence was led to establish any allegation of
connivance against Indranath. Suspicion, howsoever high may be, under no
circumstances, can be held to be a substitute for legal proof.
9. He argues that as Indranath’s acts were sought to be linked with those
of Tapas, he sought for all the documents regarding the DP against Tapas
and as such prayer was not considered, he availed the remedies provided
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under the 2005 Act unsuccessfully expending the period from 15 January,
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2015 till 4 July, 2016. As his termination was not for any act of wilful
omission or moral turpitude or riotous act, Indranath also approached the
competent authority under the 1972 Act and pursuant to the order passed
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by the Act on 29 September, 2017, the appellant disbursed the gratuity
amount. The finding that for the service rendered by Indranath, the
appellants did not suffer any loss had a direct bearing on the DP and as

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such the writ petition was filed challenging the DP. Considering the said
sequence of facts and giving reasons, the learned single Judge entertained
the writ petition condoning the delay and negating the plea of alternative
remedy. The argument that the delay in preferring the writ petition had been
condoned on the rudiments of a mere excuse is thus not sustainable.
Considering such sequence of facts, the learned Single Judge entertained
the writ petition condoning the delay and negating the plea of alternative
remedy. The argument that the delay in preferring a writ petition had been
condoned on the rudiments of mere excuse, is thus not sustainable. In
support of such submission, reliance has been placed upon the judgments
delivered in the case of Union of India & ors. vs. R. Reddappa & anr. reported
in (1993) 4 SCC 269 and Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. through Power-of-
Attorney Holder vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors.
reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 .
10. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties at
length and we have given our anxious consideration to the facts and
circumstances of the case, as well as to the documents disclosed before us.
11. Discussing and deliberating upon the arguments as advanced by the
learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the learned Single
Judge delved into the following facets of the lis : ‘(i) whether the writ petition
is maintainable in view of the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy
and the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the same; (ii) whether the present writ
petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay; (iii) whether the acts
of omission and/or commission by the petitioner, in the absence of mala fide
intent, can still amount to misconduct; (iv) whether the findings recorded by

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the Enquiry Officer and/or the decision rendered by the Disciplinary Authority
are perverse; and whether the findings of the EO and order of the DA and AA
are non-speaking; (v) whether the punishment imposed is so disproportionate
as to shock the conscience of the Court’.
12. The argument that the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on
the ground of availability of an alternative remedy and delay was rightly
discounted by the learned single Judge since the existence of the bipartite
agreement did not create any absolute bar towards preference of the writ
petition more so when, the appellants themselves have stated that
Indranath was promoted to the post of Special Assistant and was drawing a
pay in excess of Rs.40,000/- per month. The jurisdiction of this Court
cannot be fettered by a mechanical tendency to retreat from exercise of the
plenary powers vested in the Writ Court by Article 226 of the Constitution.
Indranath sought for directions from the Writ Court for protection of his
constitutional right since on the basis of the ER, the DP was not sustainable
as the EO arrived at a specific finding that ‘evidences and depositions on
record do not suggest any malafide intention on the part of CSE and the
mistake so committed, in all likeliness is unintentional, there is no denying the
fact that the transaction was verified by Sri Mukherjee in routine manner’. For
having allegedly conducted the verification in a routine manner, Indranath
could not have been dismissed. The allegation that Indranath’s dismissal
was for an act of willful omission resulting in financial loss also could not be
established by the appellants in the proceedings under the 1972 Act. In view
thereof, the learned single Judge rightly exercised discretion in favour of
Indranath.

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13. The DP was initiated alleging that Indranath had verified the
modification of the introducer’s name using his ID in the system in the
account no. 02770210000892, entered by Tapas. There was no specific
charge of any connivance or of any financial loss caused to the Bank.
Indranath was not in any manner responsible for the acts of Tapas
inasmuch as there was no allegation against Indranath in the proceedings
initiated against Tapas. The alleged fraud devised by Tapas and four other
officials was investigated by the police authorities and in the same nothing
was found against Indranath and the appellants in their affidavit-in-
opposition also admitted that the proceedings against Indranath had no
connection with the proceedings against Tapas. The learned Single Judge
rightly discounted the argument that Indranath had admitted the guilt
delving deep into the facts and arriving at a finding that an unintentional
mistake bereft of any ill motive cannot be construed as a misconduct under
clause 5(j) of the bipartite settlement.
14. It is well-settled that a judgment is an authority for what it decides
and not what can be deduced therefrom. A minor difference in facts and
circumstances may lead to a huge difference in the decision making process.
There is no dispute as regards the proposition of law as laid down in the
judgments upon which reliance has been placed by the appellants, however,
the same are distinguishable on facts.
15. An appellate power interferes not when the judgment appealed is not
right but only when it is clearly wrong. Such interference is called for
primarily when the subordinate Court had acted wholly without jurisdiction
or in excess of it or where the discretion exercised is not supported with

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reasons or when the decision is perverse. Having regard to this constellation
of considerations, carefully viewed in the jurisprudential setting above
silhouetted, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment impugned,
more so when, the learned Single Judge upon dealing with the factual issues
arrived at specific findings supported with detailed reasons.
16. Accordingly, the appeal and the connected application are dismissed.
17. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
18. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, shall
be granted to the parties as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance of all
formalities.


(Partha Pratim Roy, J.) (Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.)