Rahul vs The New India Assurance Company Limited
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 710
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27425 OF 2025)
RAHUL S/o. RAMNARAYAN MADANKAR
& ANR. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE
COMPANY LIMITED & ORS ...RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment dated 19.08.2023
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench, in Writ Petition No. 5560 of 2021. By the impugned
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.07.16
15:49:04 IST
Reason:
judgment, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by
the appellants and upheld the rejection of the appellant No.1’s
Page 1 of 23
claim for compassionate appointment with the New India
Assurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the
“respondent-company”), under the Scheme for Compassionate
Appointment in Public Sector General Insurance Companies.
3. The appellant No.2, the father of the appellant No.1,
applied for voluntary retirement on medical grounds before he
attained the age of 55 years. The application was accompanied
by a certificate issued by the Civil Surgeon, General Hospital,
Gondia, certifying him as permanently incapacitated for
further service. The respondent-company did not reject the
said certificate before the appellant No.2 crossed 55 years. Nor
did it call upon him before that date to submit a certificate
from a duly appointed Medical Board. It called for such a
certificate only after appellant No.2 crossed 55 years, and
thereafter rejected the appellant No.1’s claim for
compassionate appointment on the ground that the appellant
No.2 had retired after completing 55 years.
4. The issue, therefore, is whether the respondent-
company, after receiving a retirement application on medical-
ground before the employee crossed the age threshold, could
keep the application pending, communicate the deficiency
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only after the age threshold had crossed, and then rely upon
that very consequence to deny the dependent’s claim.
5. The facts of the case are that the appellant No.2,
Ramnarayan Mahadeo Madankar, joined the respondent-
company on 18.10.1984. He initially joined as sub-staff/Peon
and was later working as Assistant Clerk-cum-Cashier at the
Gondia Branch. His date of birth is 10.12.1960. The
respondent-company introduced the Scheme for
Compassionate Appointment in Public Sector General
Insurance Companies by circular dated 12.11.2014, with
effect from 01.11.2014. The Scheme reopened compassionate
appointments in cases of death in service and retirement on
medical grounds due to incapacitation before the employee
reached 55 years of age.
6. The appellant No.2 suffered serious neurological
problems while in service. The Civil Surgeon, General Hospital,
Gondia issued a certificate on 21.07.2015 recording that the
appellant No.2 was about 54 years old and was completely and
permanently incapacitated for further service. On the very
next day, i.e. 22.07.2015, the appellant No.2 submitted his
application for voluntary retirement on medical grounds. The
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application recorded his date of joining as 18.10.1984, his date
of birth as 10.12.1960 and his total service as 30 years and 8
months. It is not in dispute that the appellant No.2 had not
completed 55 years on the date of his application.
7. As the application remained pending, the appellant No.2
sent a reminder on 06.11.2015 stating that he had submitted
his VRS application dated 22.07.2015 with necessary
documents and had not received any acknowledgment from
the office. He sent another reminder on 01.12.2015, again
stating that the VRS application had been submitted with
necessary documents, that he had already sent one reminder
on 06.11.2015, and that he had still not received any
acknowledgment or status from the office.
8. These two reminders were sent before the appellant
No.2 completed 55 years on 10.12.2015. Thus, before the age
threshold expired, the respondent-company had before it the
VRS application dated 22.07.2015, the Civil Surgeon’s
certificate dated 21.07.2015 and two reminders requesting
action. Yet, before 10.12.2015, the respondent-company
neither accepted the application nor rejected the medical
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certificate, nor called upon the appellant No.2 to produce a
Medical Board certificate.
9. The respondent-company’s own stand is that it called
upon the appellant No.2 by letter dated 03.02.2016 to submit
a disability certificate from a Medical Board. This
communication came after the appellant No.2 had already
crossed 55 years. The appellant No.2 thereafter obtained the
Medical Board certificate from K.T.S. District General
Hospital, Gondia on 10.02.2016. According to the respondent-
company, the said certificate was submitted by a letter dated
09.03.2016. The record also contains a representation dated
01.04.2016 wherein the appellant No.2 stated that he had
complied with the documents demanded from time to time,
including the Civil Surgeon’s certificate dated 21.07.2015, the
certificate of Dr. Shankar Khobragade dated 19.01.2016, the
Medical Board certificate dated 10.02.2016 and the medical
treatment papers demanded by the office. The said
representation does not by itself establish that the certificate
of Dr. Shankar Khobragade was submitted on 19.01.2016; it
only shows that the certificate dated 19.01.2016 was referred
to in the representation dated 01.04.2016.
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10. The appellant No.2 thereafter sent another reminder
dated 06.05.2016 stating that all necessary documents had
been submitted and requested the respondent-company to
inform him if it was not possible to decide the matter, so that
he could take appropriate legal steps. The respondent-
company accepted the voluntary retirement application on
31.05.2016 and relieved the appellant No.2 on 03.06.2016.
The appellant No.1’s application for compassionate
appointment was thereafter forwarded by the Gondia Branch
to the Personnel Department on 09.06.2016 with supporting
documents.
11. The claim for compassionate appointment also
remained pending for a considerable period. The appellants
pursued the matter vide communications dated 04.10.2017,
02.01.2018, 29.01.2018, 27.04.2018, 04.10.2018 and
05.07.2019. The respondent-company eventually rejected the
claim on 15.07.2019. The rejection proceeded on the ground
that the Scheme applied only where the employee retired or
was superannuated on medical grounds due to incapacity up
to the age of 55 years, whereas the appellant No.2 had retired
on medical grounds on 03.06.2016 after completing 55 years.
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12. The High Court upheld the rejection. The High Court
referred to Clause 1.1 of the Scheme and held that the
certificate dated 21.07.2015 issued by the Civil Surgeon did
not satisfy the requirement of certification by a duly appointed
Medical Board. The High Court further held that the Medical
Board certificate was obtained only on 10.02.2016, by which
time the appellant No.2 had crossed 55 years. On that basis,
the High Court concluded that the denial of compassionate
appointment was not contrary to the Scheme.
13. Since the controversy turns substantially on whether
the delay was attributable to the employee or to the
respondent-company, the material dates may be noticed in
brief:
Date Event Significance
21.07.2015 Civil Surgeon, General
Medical incapacity was
Hospital, Gondia certified
certified before the
the appellant No.2 as
appellant No.2 attained
permanently incapacitated
55 years.
for further service.
22.07.2015 Appellant No.2 applied for
The application was made
voluntary retirement on
when the appellant No.2
was below 55 years.
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medical grounds with the
Civil Surgeon’s certificate.
06.11.2015
Appellant No.2 sent
The respondent-company
/
reminders stating that the
was reminded before the
01.12.2015
VRS application had been
appellant No.2 crossed 55
submitted with necessary
years.
documents and no
acknowledgment/status was
received.
10.12.2015 Appellant No.2 completed 55
The age threshold under
years of age.
Clause 1.1 was crossed
while the application
remained pending.
03.02.2016 Respondent-company first
The alleged deficiency
called for the Medical Board
was communicated only
certificate, according to its
after the appellant No.2
own case.
crossed 55 years.
10.02.2016 Medical Board certificate
Appellant No.2 obtained
was issued by K.T.S. District
the certificate within
General Hospital, Gondia.
seven days of the
respondent’s demand.
31.05.2016 /
VRS was accepted and
Respondent later relied
03.06.2016
appellant No.2 was relieved.
on this post-55 years
retirement date to deny
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compassionate
appointment.
15.07.2019 Compassionate appointment
Rejection was founded on
claim was rejected.
the ground that the
appellant No.2 retired
after attaining 55 years.
14. At this stage, it is necessary to notice Clause 1.1 of the
Scheme, since the controversy turns on the age threshold
prescribed therein and the stage at which the respondent-
company communicated the requirement of a Medical Board
certificate. Clause 1.1 reads as follows:
“1.1 : To a dependent family member of permanent
employee of a Public Sector General Insurance
Company (PSGIC) who—
(a) dies while in service (including death by suicide).
OR
(b) is retired on medical grounds due to incapacitation
before reaching the age of 55 years,
(incapacitation is to be certified by a duly appointed
Medical Board in a Government Medical College /
Government District Head Quarters Hospitals / Panel
of Doctors nominated by the Company for the
purpose).”
15. The aforesaid clause contains two requirements in a
case of medical retirement. First, the employee must have
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retired on medical grounds due to incapacitation before
attaining the age of 55 years. Secondly, the incapacitation
must be certified by a duly appointed Medical Board in a
Government Medical College, Government District Head
Quarters Hospital or by a panel of doctors nominated by the
company for the purpose. The respondent-company is,
therefore, right in contending that the claim cannot be
considered outside the Scheme and that compassionate
appointment cannot be granted merely on sympathy.
16. This position is consistent with the settled law. In
Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC
138 , this Court explained the object and limits of
compassionate appointment in the following terms:
“ 2. The question relates to the considerations which
should guide while giving appointment in public
services on compassionate ground. It appears that
there has been a good deal of obfuscation on the issue.
As a rule, appointments in the public services should
be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of
applications and merit. No other mode of appointment
nor any other consideration is permissible. Neither the
Governments nor the public authorities are at liberty to
follow any other procedure or relax the qualifications
laid down by the rules for the post. However, to this
general rule which is to be followed strictly in every
case, there are some exceptions carved out in the
interests of justice and to meet certain contingencies.
One such exception is in favour of the dependants of
an employee dying in harness and leaving his family
in penury and without any means of livelihood. In such
cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration taking
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into consideration the fact that unless some source of
livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to
make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules
to provide gainful employment to one of the
dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for
such employment. The whole object of granting
compassionate employment is thus to enable the
family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not
to give a member of such family a post much less a post
for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere
death of an employee in harness does not entitle his
family to such source of livelihood. The Government or
the public authority concerned has to examine the
financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it
is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of
employment, the family will not be able to meet the
crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member
of the family.”
“ 6. For these very reasons, the compassionate
employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a
reasonable period which must be specified in the rules.
The consideration for such employment is not a vested
right which can be exercised at any time in future. The
object being to enable the family to get over the
financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death
of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate
employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever
the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.”
17. Later, in Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India,
(2011) 4 SCC 209 , this Court considered the principles
governing compassionate appointment in the context of
medical invalidation. In para 15, this Court observed:
“ 15. Now, it is well settled that compassionate
employment is given solely on humanitarian grounds
with the sole object to provide immediate relief to the
employee's family to tide over the sudden financial
crisis and cannot be claimed as a matter of right.
Appointment based solely on descent is inimical to our
Constitutional scheme, and ordinarily public
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employment must be strictly on the basis of open
invitation of applications and comparative merit, in
consonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
of India. No other mode of appointment is permissible.
Nevertheless, the concept of compassionate
appointment has been recognized as an exception to
the general rule, carved out in the interest of justice, in
certain exigencies, by way of a policy of an employer,
which partakes the character of the service rules. That
being so, it needs little emphasis that the scheme or the
policy, as the case may be, is binding both on the
employer and the employee. Being an exception, the
scheme has to be strictly construed and confined only
to the purpose it seeks to achieve.”
18. The above authorities support the respondent-company
only to the limited extent that compassionate appointment
cannot be granted contrary to the governing Scheme. They do
not support the further proposition that an employer may
receive an application before the employee crosses the age
threshold, keep the application pending beyond reasonable
delay, communicate the essential deficiency only after the
threshold has crossed, and thereafter rely on that very delay
to defeat the claim. The requirement that the claim must
remain within the Scheme does not release the employer from
its duty to administer the Scheme fairly and within a
reasonable time.
19. This principle was applied with particular force in
Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa, 2022 SCC OnLine
Page 12 of 23
SC 684 . In that case, the application for compassionate
appointment had remained pending for years, and the
authorities later sought to apply a subsequent set of Rules.
This Court held in paras 12 and 14 to 16 as extracted
hereunder:
“ 12. Thus, from the aforesaid, it can be seen that there
was no fault and/or delay and/or negligence on the
part of the appellant at all. He was fulfilling all the
conditions for appointment on compassionate grounds
under the 1990 Rules. For no reason, his application
was kept pending and/or no order was passed on one
ground or the other. Therefore, when there was no fault
and/or delay on the part of the appellant and all
throughout there was a delay on the part of the
department/authorities, the appellant should not be
made to suffer. Not appointing the appellant under the
1990 Rules would be giving a premium to the delay
and/or inaction on the part of the
department/authorities. There was an absolute
callousness on the part of the department/authorities.
The facts are conspicuous and manifest the grave
delay in entertaining the application submitted by the
appellant in seeking employment which is indisputably
attributable to the department/authorities. In fact, the
appellant has been deprived of seeking compassionate
appointment, which he was otherwise entitled to under
the 1990 Rules. The appellant has become a victim of
the delay and/or inaction on the part of the
department/authorities which may be deliberate or for
reasons best known to the authorities concerned.”
“ 14. Before parting with the present order, we are
constrained to observe that considering the object and
purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds,
i.e., a family of a deceased employee may be placed in
a position of financial hardship upon the untimely
death of the employee while in service and the basis or
policy is immediacy in rendering of financial
assistance to the family of the deceased consequent
upon his untimely death, the authorities must consider
and decide such applications for appointment on
compassionate grounds as per the policy prevalent, at
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the earliest, but not beyond a period of six months from
the date of submission of such completed applications.
15. We are constrained to direct as above as we have
found that in several cases, applications for
appointment on compassionate grounds are not
attended in time and are kept pending for years
together. As a result, the applicants in several cases
have to approach the concerned High Courts seeking a
writ of Mandamus for the consideration of their
applications. Even after such a direction is issued,
frivolous or vexatious reasons are given for rejecting
the applications. Once again, the applicants have to
challenge the order of rejection before the High Court
which leads to pendency of litigation and passage of
time, leaving the family of the employee who died in
harness in the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further,
for reasons best known to the authorities and on
irrelevant considerations, applications made for
compassionate appointment are rejected. After several
years or are not considered at all as in the instant case.
16. If the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds as envisaged under the
relevant policies or the rules have to be achieved then
it is just and necessary that such applications are
considered well in time and not in a tardy way. We
have come across cases where for nearly two decades
the controversy regarding the application made for
compassionate appointment is not resolved. This
consequently leads to the frustration of the very policy
of granting compassionate appointment on the death of
the employee while in service. We have, therefore,
directed that such applications must be considered at
an earliest point of time. The consideration must be
fair, reasonable and based on relevant consideration.
The application cannot be rejected on the basis of
frivolous and for reasons extraneous to the facts of the
case. Then and then only the object and purpose of
appointment on compassionate grounds can be
achieved.”
20. The same conclusion also flows from the broader
principle that no authority can take advantage of its own
default. In Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar,
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(2007) 11 SCC 447 , this Court observed that where the
authority was required to act in a particular manner, its failure
to do so could not prejudice the citizen. The Court held:
“ 12. ...The authority cannot neglect to do that which
the law mandates and requires doing. By not issuing
consequential final statement under Section 11(1) of
the Act, the authority had failed to discharge its
statutory duty. Obviously, therefore, the appellant is
justified in urging that such default in discharge of
statutory duty by the respondents under the Act
cannot prejudice him...”
“ 16. It is settled principle of law that a man cannot be
permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his
own wrong to gain favourable interpretation of law. It
is sound principle that he who prevents a thing from
being done shall not avail himself of the non-
performance he has occasioned. To put it differently, ‘a
wrong doer ought not to be permitted to make a profit
out of his own wrong’.”
21. Though the aforesaid observations were made in a
different statutory context, the principle culled can provide a
safe guidance in resolving the issue in the present case. The
respondent-company was dealing with a time-sensitive
application. Clause 1.1 of the Scheme made the age of 55 years
a material threshold. Once the appellant No.2 applied for
voluntary retirement on medical grounds before attaining 55
years of age and supported the application with a Government
medical certificate, the respondent-company was required to
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scrutinise the application with reasonable promptitude. If the
Civil Surgeon’s certificate was considered insufficient, the
respondent-company had to inform the appellant No.2 so
before the age threshold expired. It could not remain silent till
the appellant No.2 crossed 55 years and thereafter, rely on the
consequence of its own delayed action.
22. The respondent-company’s principal submission is that
Clause 1.1 uses the expression “is retired on medical grounds”
and not “applies for retirement on medical grounds”.
Ordinarily, such a submission may carry force. Where an
employee applies belatedly, fails to submit any medical
material, or does not comply with a timely direction to produce
the prescribed certificate, the dependent cannot insist that the
date of application must necessarily replace the date of
retirement. The present case, however, does not fall in that
category.
23. The appellant No.2 submitted his application on
22.07.2015, before attaining 55 years of age. He enclosed the
certificate dated 21.07.2015 issued by the Civil Surgeon,
General Hospital, Gondia. The certificate certified him as
completely and permanently incapacitated for further service.
Page 16 of 23
The respondent-company may contend that the Civil
Surgeon’s certificate did not satisfy the requirement of Clause
1.1, which refers to certification by a duly appointed Medical
Board in a Government Medical College / Government District
Head Quarters Hospital / panel of doctors nominated by the
company. Even assuming that contention to be correct, the
respondent-company was required to communicate the
deficiency within a reasonable time and, in any event, before
the appellant No.2 crossed 55 years on 10.12.2015.
24. The record shows that the appellant No.2 did not remain
inactive after submitting his application. He sent reminders on
06.11.2015 and 01.12.2015. Both reminders preceded the age
threshold. By then, the respondent-company had before it the
VRS application, the Civil Surgeon’s certificate and the
reminders requesting action. Yet, the respondent-company
neither decided the application nor informed the appellant
No.2 that a Medical Board certificate was required.
25. The respondent-company, on its own showing, called for
the Medical Board certificate only by letter dated 03.02.2016.
By that date, the appellant No.2 had already crossed 55 years.
The appellant No.2 thereafter obtained the Medical Board
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certificate on 10.02.2016, within seven days of the
respondent-company’s communication. This conduct clearly
shows that the appellant No.2 did not delay the production of
the Medical Board certificate once the requirement was
communicated to him. The delay in obtaining the Medical
Board certificate before the age threshold was, therefore, a
consequence of the respondent-company communicating the
requirement only after the threshold had already crossed.
26. Clause 1.1 cannot be construed in a manner that
enables the employer to control eligibility through delayed
processing. The purpose of the age condition is to identify
cases where an employee is medically incapacitated before the
prescribed age. The purpose is not to enable the employer to
defer scrutiny until the age condition expires and thereafter
reject the dependent’s claim on that basis.
The requirement of certification by a duly appointed
Medical Board in a Government Medical College / Government
District Head Quarters Hospital, or by a panel of doctors
nominated by the Company, is intended to ensure that the
claim of medical incapacitation is duly verified and that
frivolous applications are not entertained. Further, as the
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Scheme itself contemplates certification by a panel of doctors
nominated by the Company, the respondent-company was
expected either to refer the appellant No.2 to such a panel, if
one had been constituted, or to promptly inform him to obtain
certification from the other authorities contemplated under
Clause 1.1. Having remained silent after receiving the
application and the Civil Surgeon’s certificate, the respondent-
company could not thereafter turn around belatedly and
deprive the appellants of the benefit available under the
Scheme.
Such a technical construction adopted by the
respondent-company would place the benefit of the Scheme at
the mercy of administrative delay and would defeat the
fairness inherent in the administration of a beneficial scheme.
27. We also find guidance from Bhawani Prasad Sonkar
(supra), where this Court, after finding that the rejection of
compassionate appointment could not be sustained, did not
remand the matter indefinitely but issued a direction for grant
of employment. In paras 24 and 25, this Court held:
“ 24. In light of the fact that Circular dated 29th
November, 2001 was not applicable in the case of
appellant's father, inasmuch as the benefit of the 29th
April, 1999 Circular was not extended to him, and he
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was made to retire from service, we are of the opinion
that the earlier circular dated 22nd September, 1995
is applicable in the instant case. Consequently, the
appellant would be entitled to employment on
compassionate ground as the said Circular
contemplates compassionate employment for the
wards of those employees who have been medically
de-categorized, and have retired, without being offered
an alternative suitable job. We are unable to accept the
plea of the respondents that on being de-categorized,
appellant's father had opted for voluntary retirement.
25. In light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is
allowed; the impugned judgment is set aside and it is
directed that the appellant shall be granted
employment on compassionate ground within three
months of the receipt of copy of this judgment, subject
to his complying with other eligibility conditions, as
applicable on 1st September, 1999. However, for all
intents and purposes, he shall be deemed to be in
service from the date of actual joining.”
28. In the present case, the rejection letter dated
15.07.2019 was founded on the ground that the appellant
No.2 had retired on medical grounds on 03.06.2016 after
completing 55 years. For the reasons already recorded, the
respondent-company could not have relied upon the said
circumstance, since the appellant No.2 had applied for
voluntary retirement on medical grounds before attaining 55
years, had supported the application with a Government
medical certificate, had sent reminders before crossing 55
years, and the requirement of a Medical Board certificate was
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communicated by the respondent-company only after he had
crossed 55 years.
29. We, therefore, do not lend our agreement to the
approach adopted by the High Court in accepting the tenuous
self serving plea of the respondent-company. The High Court
treated the date of the Medical Board certificate and the date
of acceptance of voluntary retirement as the relevant date of
application, without examining the respondent-company’s
own delay in communicating the requirement of such
certificate. This led to an erroneous affirmation of the rejection
order.
30. Once the very basis of rejection is found unsustainable,
the denial of compassionate appointment cannot be upheld.
The claim has remained pending since 2016 and the
appellants have been pursuing the matter diligently and
continuously. The object of compassionate appointment would
be defeated if, after such prolonged delay, the matter is again
left at the stage at which the respondent-company ought to
have acted years ago. In the peculiar facts of the case, the
appropriate relief is to allow the appeal and direct grant of
compassionate appointment.
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31. Consequently, the judgment dated 19.08.2023 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in
Writ Petition No. 5560 of 2021 is set aside. The rejection
communication dated 15.07.2019 issued by the respondent-
company is also set aside.
32. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the following
terms:
(i) The respondent-company shall grant compassionate
appointment to the appellant No.1 under the Scheme
for Compassionate Appointment in Public Sector
General Insurance Companies in accordance with the
post/cadre contemplated under the Scheme.
(ii) If the appellant No.1 has crossed the applicable
upper age limit during the pendency of these
proceedings, the respondent-company shall grant the
necessary age relaxation, since the delay in finalising
the claim cannot operate to his prejudice in the facts
and circumstances of the case.
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(iii) The appointment order shall be issued in favour of
the appellant no.1 within eight weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this judgment.
(iv) The appellant No.1 shall be entitled to monetary
benefits only from the date of actual appointment.
33. In spite of setting aside the impugned judgment dated
19.08.2023 passed by the High Court, the direction issued by
the High Court regarding verification and payment of any
unpaid dues of the appellant No.2 is not interfered with. If any
admissible dues remain unpaid, the respondent-company
shall release the same to the appellant no.2 within eight
weeks.
34. There shall be no order as to costs.
35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………….…………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 16, 2026.
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