COAL INDIA LTD vs ORISSA EXPLOSIVE AND ORS
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
BEFORE :-
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA SARKAR
&
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE ARJUN RAY MUKHERJEE
MAT 1570 of 2025
with
CAN 1 of 2026
Coal India Limited
vs.
Orissa Explosive & Ors.
For the Appellant : Mr. Debnath Ghosh, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Sajosij Dasgupta, Adv.
Ms. Akansha Mukherjee, Adv.
Mr. Nilankan Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. Pradipta Bose, Adv.
Ms. Subesha Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. A. Das, Adv.
For the Respondents : Mr. Subir Sanyal, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Chittapriya Ghosh, Adv.
Ms. Aiswarjya Gupta, Adv.
Ms. Priyanka Saha, Adv.
Mr. Sourojit Mukherjee, Adv.
Judgment reserved on : 28.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on : 06.10.2026
Judgment uploaded on : 06.10.2026
Shampa Sarkar, J.
1. The appeal arises out of an order dated May 19, 2025 passed in WPA
No. 12688 of 2017. The learned Judge did not find any justification in the
action taken by the appellant in compelling the writ petitioner/respondent
No. 1, to accept the reduced rates in terms of the communication dated
2
March 31, 2017 issued by the Chief Manager (MM) Coal India Limited. The
learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents and
directed the appellant herein to release the payment for the goods supplied
by the appellant at the rate agreed upon in the Running Contract (R.C)
th
dated 30 March, 2015 and also to release any other amount including the
bank guarantee held by the appellant, within a period of twelve weeks from
the date of receipt of the said impugned order.
2. The dispute arose out of a communication dated March 31, 2017
issued by the Chief Manager (Material Management Division) of the
appellant, thereby, invoking a price fall clause against a Running Contract
(R.C) No. CIL/C2D/Cartridge Expl & Accy/2015-17/Orissa/5099 dated
March 30, 2015.
3. The appellant entered into a running contract with the writ petitioner
for supply of cartridge, explosives and accessories under certain terms and
conditions mentioned therein. The duration of the contract was valid from
April 15 to March 31, 2017. Clause 2 of the said contract classified the
items in terms of the description, quantity, unit price and subsidiary
allocation which were mentioned at Annexure I of the contract. The same is
quoted below :-
“ 02. Item description, quantity, unit price & subsidiary allocation
– As per Annexure – 1 .
The RC items, quantity for 2 years and unit prices are mentioned at
Annexure- ‘I’. The year wise RC qty. for each item shall be indicated
separately. The monthly allocation will be placed by the respective
subsidiary companies and NEC individually within their share of RC
qty as indicated at Annexure-1. Suppliers would be strictly governed
by the actual requirement of the collieries and as per the
allocation/order to be placed by the subsidiary companies and NEC in
every month against their specific approved indents only.”
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4. After entering into the contract, the writ petitioner regularly supplied
the explosives and accessories. There was no complaint with regard to the
supply of materials. The dispute arose when the writ petitioner received a
communication dated November 30, 2016 from the General Manager (MM)-
HOD, Coal India Limited. By the said communication, the writ petitioner
was informed that some other companies namely, M/s. Industrial
Explosives Limited (hereinafter referred to as Ideal), M/s. IDL Explosives
Limited (hereinafter referred to as IDL) and M/s. Regenesis Industries Pvt.
Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Regenesis) having similar RCs for supply of
the same product had existing work orders from Singareni Collieries
Companies Limited (in short SCCL) for supply of LD Explosives (CAP
sensitive/Booster) and LD Explosives (Non CAP sensitive/Coloumn) for the
period between May 2, 2016 and May 1, 2018, at a lower price than the rate
at which the writ petitioner was supplying to the subsidiaries of the
appellant. It was clarified in the said letter that the price fall clause shall be
invoked against the said firms. By a letter dated December 19, 2016, the
writ petitioner categorically expressed unwillingness to supply at the rate at
which SCCL was being supplied. The appellant remained silent. Thereafter,
by a communication dated March 27, 2017 the appellant extended the
running contract for a month at the existing rate. By the communication
dated march 31, 2017, on the last day when the period of supply ended, the
appellant invoked the price fall clause and informed the writ petitioner that
the price of the explosives that were supplied stood amended. The writ
petitioner by a letter dated April 4, 2017 raised a dispute with regard to
invocation of the price fall clause.
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5. As the appellant remained silent on the issue, the writ petition was
moved, inter alia, for following reliefs :-
“a. a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent
authorities and their men and/or agents and /or servants and/or
assignee and each of them specifically the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 to
cancel and/or set aside impugned communications being Ref Nos.
CIL/C2D/LDC Explosives & Accessories/2016-2017/1749 dated
31.03.2017 forthwith;
b. A writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent
authorities and their men and/or agents and/or servants and/or
assignee and each of them specifically the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 to
release the price of LD explosives (CAP sensitive/Booster) and L.D
Explosive (Non CAP Sensitive/ column) as per Running Contract dated
30.03.2015 in favour of the petitioner;
c. A writ in the nature of Certiorari commanding the respondents to
transmit and produce the entire original records before this Hon’ble
Court so that conscionable justice may be administered by quashing
the impugned action and by granting other relief as prayed
hereinabove;
d. A writ in the nature of Prohibition prohibiting the respondents from
giving effect and/or further effect to the impugned communications
being Ref No. CIL/C2D/LDC Explosives & Accessories/2016-
2017/1749 dated 31.03.2017;
e. Rule NISI in terms of prayers (a) to (d) above;
f. Ad-interim order do issue directing the respondent authorities and
their men and/or agents and/or servants and/or assignee and each of
them not to give effect and/or further effects to the impugned
communications being Ref No. CIL/C2D/LDC Explosives &
Accessories/2016-2017/1749 dated 31.03.2017 pending hearing of
the instant writ petition;
g. Costs;
h. And/or to pass such further order or orders, direction and/or
directions as Your Lordship may deem fit and proper.”
6. Mr. Debnath Ghosh, learned senior Advocate for the appellant
submitted that the learned Judge had exceeded his jurisdiction in passing
the order impugned, inasmuch as, the interpretation of the terms and
conditions of the contract was beyond the scope of judicial review. His
Lordship foreclosed all opportunities for the appellant to take steps against
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the contractor / writ petitioner by claiming damages for breach of the
contractual terms, i.e., the price fall clause.
7. According to Mr. Ghosh, by a communication dated November 30, 2016
the Chief Manager (MM)-HOD informed the appellant that Ideal, IDL and
Regenesis had accepted three orders from SCCL for supply of LD Explosives
for the period from May 2, 2016 to May 1, 2018 at lower rates than that at
which the writ petitioner was supplying to the appellant. The writ petitioner
was informed that the price fall clause would be invoked in respect of those
suppliers.
8. The price fall clause clearly provided that, in case price of a product
was reduced for any supplier due to invocation of the said clause or for any
other reason, the same lower price would also be applicable for other
suppliers who were having parallel RCs for that item. If any supplier did not
accept the lower price, the appellant would have the right to delete the item
from the scope of the RC and procure explosives from other existing
suppliers. As soon as it came to the notice of the appellant that SCCL was
being supplied the same item i.e. LD Explosives (CAP sensitive/Booster) and
LD Explosives (Non CAP sensitive/Column) by Ideal, IDL and Regenesis at a
lower rate, the appellant invoked the price fall clause in respect of the items
supplied by the writ petitioner. As the writ petitioner refused to reduce the
price, but continued to supply at the original rate, the said refusal
amounted to breach of the price fall clause, which entitled the appellant to
recover the differential amount from the money due and payable to the writ
petitioner for the supply of goods relating to the subject tender. A writ court
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could not restrict the appellant from invoking the clauses of the RC or the
tender document.
9. It was further submitted by Mr. Ghosh that, in effect, the learned Single
Judge had passed a money decree without appreciating that disputed
questions of fact could not be adjudicated by a writ court. Moreover, the
steps that the appellant could take under the terms and conditions of the
said tender, namely, claiming agreed liquidated damages, cancellation of the
subject order, imposition of penalty, forfeiture of the security deposit etc.
had been foreclosed by the learned Single Judge, by the order impugned.
Tender conditions, breach thereof and/or implementation thereof could not
be the subject matter of a writ petition. The writ court did not enjoy any
authority under the law to direct payment of a disputed money claim. Mr.
Ghosh justified the deduction of the amount payable to the writ petitioner
by submitting that, the differential amount was required to be recovered
from the payment due. The goods had been supplied. Thus, the appellant
could not have deleted the item from the RC. Whether such action of the
appellant was justified or not, would depend upon an interpretation of the
tender conditions, which was beyond the scope of the writ court.
10. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
matter of M.P. Power Management Company Limited, Jabalpur vs. Sky
Power Southeast Solar India Private Limited and Ors. reported in
(2023) 2 SCC 703, to support the contention that, in the event disputed
questions of fact were involved, which were complex in nature and required
assessment of oral evidence, the writ court should loathe to interfere with an
administrative decision of the authority. Money claims, per se, particularly
7
those arising out of contractual obligations were normally not to be
entertained, except in very exceptional circumstances. Matters relating to
contracts entered into by public authorities with private parties fell within
the domain of commercial transactions. The writ jurisdiction could not be
invoked to facilitate a breach of contractual obligations by any private party,
even if the contract was with a State authority. When a breach of contract
was complained of, the party complaining of such breach could sue for
specific performance of the contract. In other words, the writ petitioner had
a remedy before a civil court to challenge the action of the appellant. The
executive action was supported by the terms and conditions of the contract.
The writ petitioner could not substantiate before His Lordship that the
appellant had acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory or unfair manner. A writ
court could exercise jurisdiction over the decision of a tendering authority
only to uphold public good or public interest. In the present case, public law
element was missing, as the action complained of only affected the writ
petitioner.
11. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Ghosh was Coal India Limited
vs. Prakash Roadlines Corporation & Ors. reported in 2009 SCC OnLine
Cal 685, in support of the contention that questions with regard to
interpretation of the terms of the agreement should not be withdrawn from
the jurisdiction of a domestic forum, by filing an application under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
12. Kerala State electricity Board and Another vs. Kurien E. Kalathil
and Others reported in (2000) 6 SCC 293 was relied upon to substantiate
the contention that interpretation and implementation of a clause in the
8
contract, could not be the subject matter of a writ petition. Whether the
price fall clause would be attracted in the given case or not, was a question
relating to construction of the clauses in the contract and as such, the
learned Court could not have passed orders by misinterpreting the price fall
clause.
13. Punjab National Bank and Others vs. Atmanand Singh and Others
reported in (2020) 6 SCC 256 was the next authority relied upon by Mr.
Ghosh to reiterate his contention that, High Courts should not entertain
writ petitions, but relegate the parties to the remedy of a civil suit, if
disputed questions of fact arose and resolution thereof would involve
appreciation of evidence.
14. Further reference was made to the Eastern Coal Fields Limited and
Another vs. UCC-RLA-STA (JV) and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine
Cal 8843 in support of the contention that, a prayer in the writ petition
restraining the Government from deducting a particular amount from the
bill of the writ petitioner, could not be considered in exercise of power under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He referred to Sections 45 and 55 of
the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 to contend that the dispute related to goods sold
and delivered.
15. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that, the dispute between the
appellant and the writ petitioner was a dispute within the meaning of
Section 2(c)(xii)(a) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Therefore, the writ
petition was not maintainable.
16. Mr. Subir Sanyal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the writ
petitioner submitted that the price fall clause was not applicable in the facts
9
of the case. He referred to the notice inviting tender and the terms and
conditions of the RC and submitted that, only if suppliers having parallel
RCs against the subject tender were supplying similar item to Coal India
Limited or its subsidiaries at a lower rate, the price fall clause could be
invoked. SCCL was not one of the subsidiaries of Coal India. The appellant
was not supplying to SCCL. Supply by Ideal, IDL and Regenesis to SCCL, of
a similar item at a lower price was not relevant and could not be imported
into the RC of the writ petitioner. The appellant had failed to prove that Ideal
and IDL etc. had a parallel RC against the same tender in respect of which
the appellant was the successful bidder. Moreover, by a letter dated
December 19, 2016, the writ petitioner had informed the General Manager
(MM)-HOD, Coal India Ltd. that they were not going to supply explosives at
the rate at which SCCL was being supplied. That the writ petitioner would
supply the explosives as per the rates as originally agreed upon with the
appellant. The question of accepting the price at which SCCL was procuring
the explosives, from other suppliers did not arise. The said letter was issued
in response to the communication dated November 30, 2016. It was further
submitted that, after the said letter was issued to the appellant, supplies
were made until March 2017 at the rate originally agreed upon and the
supplies were accepted. Coal India also proposed extension of the validity of
the RC for a further period of one month by a communication of March 27,
2017. There was no response to the letter dated December 19, 2016.
Suddenly, by a letter dated March 31, 2017 the Chief Manager (MM)
informed the writ petitioner that, in view of the price fall clause i.e. clause
10
7.2 of the RC, the price of SCCL which was applicable to other RC holders,
would also be applicable to the writ petitioner.
17. Aggrieved, the writ petitioner approached the court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India by challenging the arbitrariness in the actions of
the appellant. The writ petitioner prayed for quashing of the communication
dated March 31, 2017 and for further direction upon the appellant to
release the price of the materials supplied as per the RC dated March 30,
2015. Mr. Sanyal relied on the decision of ABL International Ltd. and
Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and
Others reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 and Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd
vs. Great Eastern Shipping co. Ltd. reported in AIR 2008 Supreme
Court 357.
18. Considered the submissions of the parties.
19. The price fall clause which was sought to be invoked by the appellant,
as mentioned in the RC dated March 30, 2015, is quoted below :-
“07. Price Fall Clause
7.1 Price fall clause: As per enclosed Pre Contract Integrity Pact clause
No. 7.
7.2 In case the price of a product is reduced for any supplier due to
invocation of “price fall clause” or any other reason, the same lower
price shall also be applicable for the other suppliers who are having
parallel RCs for that item. If any supplier does not accept the lower
price, CIL shall have the right to delete the item from the scope of Rc of
such firm and procure explosives/accessories from other existing
supplier/Reserve RC holders.”
20. The clause provides that, if the price of a product was reduced for any
supplier due to invocation of “price fall clause” or for any other reason, the
same lower price would be applicable for other suppliers who were having
parallel RCs for that item. If supplier did not accept the lower price, the
11
appellant would have the right to delete the item from the scope of the RC
and procure the same from other existing suppliers. It is pertinent to
mention that Ideal, IDL and Regenesis did not have a parallel RC with Coal
India or its subsidiaries for the said item. The records do not reveal whether
the said clause was invoked or not.
21. The letter dated November 30, 2016 included a table illustrating the
difference in destination price. The relevant portion of the letter is quoted
below :-
“It has come to our knowledge that M/s Ideal Industrial Explosives
Limited, M/s IDL Explosives Limited, Hyderabad, Secunderabad and
M/s Regenesis Industries Pvt Ltd, Secunderabad have accepted firm
order vide Nos. No. 7600006388 dated 02.05.2016, 7600006389 dated
02.05.2016 and No. 7600006390 dated 02.05.2016 respectively from
Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL) for supply of LD
Explosives (CAP sensitive/Booster) and LD Explosives (Non CAP
sensitive/Coloumn) to SCCL for a period from 02.05.2016 to
01.05.2018 at the prices lower than the prices at which they are
supplying to CIL against CIL’s RC with them. The comparison of prices
are as under :-
Item
Name
FOR Destination
FOR Destination
Price (excluding
Price (excluding
taxes & duties)
applicable against
taxes & duties)
applicable against
CIL’s RC for the
SCCL’s order for
quarter from
01.04.2016 to
the period from
02.05.2016 to
30.06.2016
30.06.2016
(Rs/MT)
(Rs/MT)
LD
Explosive
33,492/- 30,000/-
s (CAP
sensitive/
Booster)
LD
Explosive
28,581/- 27,500/-
s (Non
CAP
sensitive/
Coloumn)
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We would like to inform you that as per the terms of the clause – 7.1 of
the CIL’s RC dated 30.03.2015, Price Fall Clause will be invoked
against above mentioned three firms for the above items.”
22. The relevant portion of the communication dated March 31, 2017 is
quoted below :-
“Through our notice dated 30.11.2016 referred at Sl No. 2 above, you
were informed that M/s Ideal Industrial Explosives Limited,
Secunderabad, M/s IDL Explosives Limited, Hyderabad, and M/s
Regenesis Industries Pvt Ltd, Secunderabad have accepted firm Order
Nos. 7600006388, 7600006389 and 7600006390 [all dated
02.05.2016] respectively from Singareni Collieries Company Limited
(SCCL) for supply of LD Explosives (CAP sensitive/Booster) and LD
Explosives (Non CAP sensitive/Coloumn) to SCCL for a period from
02.05.2016 to 01.05.2018 at the prices lower than the prices at which
they are supplying to CIL against CIL’s RCs with them.
Vide the said notice, you were also informed that as per the terms of
the clause – 7.1 of the CIL’s RC dated 30.03.2015, Price Fall Clause
will be invoked against above mentioned three firm s for the above
items and you being the parallel RC holder having same prices for the
above items, the clause – 7.2 of the CIL’s RC dated 30.03.2015 would
be applicable in your case.
You were given 2 weeks’ notice from the date of issue of our above said
notice for implementation of the Price Fall Clause as per terms of the
CIL’s RC dated 30.03.2015.
We have received your reply vide your letter dated 19.12.2016 [referred
at sl no. 3 above] informing that you are not supplying LD Explosives
to SCCL, and at the same time disagreed to supply LD Explosives to
CIL at SCCL’s price in future.
However, this is inform you that you have accepted the Price Fall
clause of the NIT while submitting your offer against the tender no.
246 dated 30.12.2014 against which the RC indicated at sl no. 1 above
was concluded. Also, you are supplying LD Explosives to different sub
cos. Even after the issue of CIL’s Notice indicated at sl no. 2 above.
In view of the above, Price Fall Clause i.e. Clause No. 7.2 of our above
referred RC is hereby invoked so as to make the lower prices of SCCL
for other RC holders applicable to you also.”
23. The letter dated March 31, 2017 which included a table of amended
price is quoted below :-
“Accordingly, the prices of LD Explosives (CAP sensitive/Booster) and
LD Explosives (Non CAP sensitive/Coloumn) of the RC stand amended
as under for the period applicable thereto:-
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LD
explosives
30,00
28,82
29,94
29,94
0.00
1.15
5.75
5.75
Will be
(CAP
Sensitive/
as
applic
able in
Booster)
SCCL
during
LD
Explosives
27,50
27,91
26,41
27,45
0.00
5.89
9.38
0.27
the
period
(Non CAP
Sensitive/
Column
The prices applicable for the period from 30.03.17 to 31.03.17 shall be
communicated in due course.
All other terms and conditions of our above referred RC shall remain
unaltered.”
24. We do not agree with Mr. Ghosh’s submissions that the learned Judge
had misinterpreted the clause of the contract. A bare perusal of the said
clause would clearly indicate that the price fall clause does not apply to the
facts in hand. Moreover, by invoking the price fall clause, the appellant
could delete the item from the scope of the RC of the supplier, but could not
deduct the differential amount from the bills of the supplier or forfeit the
security deposit. The language of the price fall clause is unambiguous and
does not give rise to any complication. Factual situation herein does require
any adjudication upon appreciation of either oral or documentary evidence.
We find that the RC of the writ petitioner was operating in respect of Coal
India Limited and its eight subsidiaries, namely :-
a. Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Sanctoria
b. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., Dhanbad
c. Central Coalfields Ltd., Ranchi
d. Western Coalfields Ltd., Nagpur
e. South Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Bilaspur
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f. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., Sambalpur
g. Northern Coalfields Ltd., Singrauli
h. North Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Assam.
25. We also find it relevant to record that, even after the writ petitioner
refused to accept the rate at which the items were supplied to SCCL and
decided to supply at the rates fixed, the appellant continued to accept the
supply at the existing rate or agreed rate, which in turn indicates that the
contention of the writ petitioner in the letter dated December 19, 2016 had
been accepted by the appellant. His Lordship has rightly appreciated the
facts of the case and the issue involved.
26. By a communication dated March 27, 2017 the General Manager
(MM)- HOD proposed to extend the validity of the RC provisionally for a
period of one month at the existing terms and conditions. The writ petitioner
was requested to confirm acceptance of the proposal by a mail, positively by
the same day. The rates were proposed to be finalized either at the existing
rate or at the rates against Tender No. 293 dated February 14, 2017. This
letter demonstrates that the writ petitioner’s refusal to supply at the rates at
which SCCL was being supplied the item was accepted by the appellant.
27. The price fall clause in the tender notice dated February 14, 2017 is
quoted below :-
“12 Price Fall clause
12.1 Price Fall Clause : As per Pre Contract Integrity Pact Clause No. 7
which reads as under;
“The BIDDER undertakes that it has not supplied/is not supplying
similar product/systems or subsystems at a price lower than that
offered in the present bid in respect of any other Ministry/Department
of the Government of India or PSU and if it is found any stage that
similar product/systems or sub systems was supplied by the BIDDER
to any other Ministry/Department of the Government of India or a PSU
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at a lower price, then that very price, with due allowance for elapsed
time, will be applicable to the present case and the different is the cost
would be refunded by the BIDDER to the BUYER, if the contract has
already been concluded.
12.2 In case the price of a product is reduced for any supplier due to
invocation of ‘Price Fall clause’ or any other reason, the same lower
price shall also be applicable for the other suppliers who are having
parallel RCs against this tender. If any supplier does not accept the
lower price, CIL shall have the right to delete the item from the scope
of RC of such firm and procure explosives/ accessories from other
existing supplier / Reserve RC holders.”
28. It provided that, if the price of a product was reduced for any supplier,
due to the invocation of the price fall clause or for any other reason, the
same lower price would be applicable for the other suppliers who had
parallel RCs, against the said tender: i.e. the Tender No. CIL/C2D/Cart
Explo & Accy/2017 – 19/293 dated February 14, 2017. The price fall
clause, as rightly appreciated by the learned Single Judge could not be
invoked by the appellant as there was nothing on record to demonstrate that
Ideal, IDL and Regenesis were supplying the product at a lower price to all
or any of the subsidiaries of Coal India in respect of parallel RC arising out
of the said tender i.e. Tender No. CIL/C2D/Cant/Explox/Accy/2017-1/23
dated February 14, 2017.
29. We also find that in the notice inviting tender, the price fall clause was
as follows:-
“12. Price fall clause
12.1 Price fall clause: As per Pre Contract Integrity Pact clause No. 7.
‘price fall clause’ or any other reason, the same lower price shall also
be applicable for the other suppliers who are having parallel RCs
against this tender. If any supplier does not accept the lower price,
CIL shall have the right to delete the item from the scope of RC of
such firm and procure explosives/accessories from other existing
supplier/Reserve RC holders.”
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30. Whereas, in the letter dated March 30, 2015, which is the R.C, the
clause was misquoted, which is as follows :-
“07. Price Fall Clause
7.1 Price fall clause: As per enclosed Pre Contract Integrity Pact clause
No. 7.
7.2 In case the price of a product is reduced for any supplier due to
invocation of “price fall clause” or any other reason, the same lower
price shall also be applicable for the other suppliers who are having
parallel RCs for that item. If any supplier does not accept the lower
price, CIL shall have the right to delete the item from the scope of RC
of such firm and procure explosives/accessories from other existing
supplier/Reserve RC holders.”
31. Thus, a conjoint reading of the two clauses, will clearly mean that the
clause would be applicable in case similar items were being supplied by
entities having similar R.Cs against the subject tender, and not in respect of
any tender floated by SCCL which was another public sector undertaking,
operating in the lignite sector.
32. In exercise of power of judicial review, a writ court can interfere with
the action of a tendering authority in the event of unfairness, arbitrariness
and unreasonableness. We find the communication dated March 31, 2017 to
be arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable. No serious disputed questions of fact
were involved, to understand the impact of the price fall clause. Evidence
was not required to be scrutinized. Merely because the appellant interpreted
the price fall clause differently, the same would not give rise to a disputed
question of fact which could only be adjudicated by a civil court. The writ
court rightly went into the plain and simple meaning of the price fall clause
as was ex facie available from the clause itself and came to the conclusion
that invocation of the clause by the appellant was misplaced. His Lordship
rightly took note of the conduct of the appellant in accepting the supply
17
after the writ petitioner had clearly indicated that they would continue to
supply at the originally fixed rate of Coal India and not at SCCL’s rate.
Unlike private parties, the appellant as a public authority and State under
Article 12 of the Constitution of India, was expected to act fairly. Depriving a
contractor of its legitimate dues by arbitrarily invoking a clause, militates
against the rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Unfairness in State’s action is contrary to public interest.
33. The relevant portions of His Lordship’s order are quoted below :-
“29. Therefore, I am unable to persuade my judicial conscience to
accept the contention of Mr. Dutta that the language used in the letter
dated 19th December 2016 failed to clearly convey that the author did
not agree to accept the reduced rate.
30. However, despite receiving the letter dated 19th December 2016
from the petitioner, the respondents remained silent and did not
remove the items from the petitioner's RC. Instead, by a letter dated
27th March 2017, the petitioner was informed that the respondents
intended to extend the validity of the RC at the existing rates and on
the same terms and conditions. Although the term "provisionally" was
used, a plain reading of the letter suggests that the word
"provisionally" qualified the term "extend." The letter also categorically
stated that the final rate would be either the existing rate or the rate
finalized under Tender No. 293 dated 14th February 2017, whichever
was lower. Notably, Tender No. 293 was not referred to in the original
RC, and as such, reliance on it would amount to a modification of the
existing terms of the RC.
31. n the decision of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra), it was
held that an offer is not accepted merely by silence on the part of the
offeree; however, this does not 11 imply that acceptance must always
be expressed in explicit terms. Under certain circumstances, the
offeree’s silence, when accompanied by conduct amounting to a
positive act, may constitute acceptance—an agreement sub silentio.
Therefore, the terms of a contract between the parties may be
established not only through their express words but also through
their conduct.
32. In the present case, after expressing its disagreement with the
price fixed by SCCL, the petitioner ceased supplying goods to CIL.
Conversely, despite receiving the letter dated 19th December 2016, the
respondents remained silent and did not remove the items from the
petitioner’s RC. On the contrary, by a subsequent letter dated 17th
February 2017, the validity of the RC was extended on the existing
terms. Such conduct on the part of the respondents indicates that the
principle of sub silentio is clearly applicable in the present case.”
18
34. The contention of Mr. Ghosh that, as the dispute fell within the domain
of contractual obligations, the actions should not be judged on the anvil of
Article 14 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. The obligation of the
appellant to act fairly, justly and reasonably is an obligation of a public
character, which should be fulfilled in every case arising out of contractual
obligations.
35. In this context, the following paragraphs of ABL International Ltd.
(supra) are quoted below :-
“52. On the basis of the above conclusion of ours, the question still remains
why should we grant the reliefs sought for by the appellants in a writ petition
when a suitable efficacious alternate remedy is available by way of a suit. The
answer to this question, in our opinion, lies squarely in the decision of this
Court in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi [(1991) 1 SCC 212 : 1991 SCC (L&S)
742] wherein this Court held: (SCC pp. 235-37, paras 20-22 & 24)
The requirement of Article 14 should extend even in the sphere of
contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the State activity. Applicability
of Article 14 to all executive actions of the State being settled and for the same
reason its applicability at the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise
of the executive power being beyond dispute, the State cannot thereafter cast off
its personality and exercise unbridled power unfettered by the requirements of
Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be governed therein
only by private law principles applicable to private individuals whose rights flow
only from the terms of the contract without anything more. The personality of
the State, requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of
Article 14, does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a
contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in
addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and contractual
obligations are alien concepts, which cannot coexist. The Constitution does not
envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any
sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the preamble. Therefore,
total exclusion of Article 14 — non-arbitrariness which is basic to rule of law —
from State actions in contractual field is not justified. This is more so when the
modern trend is also to examine the unreasonableness of a term in such
contracts where the bargaining power is unequal so that these are not
negotiated contracts but standard form contracts between unequals.
Unlike the private parties the State while exercising its powers and
discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as is expected of it, for public good
and in public interest. The impact of every State action is also on public
interest. It is really the nature of its personality as State which is significant and
must characterize all its actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of
function, contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of scrutiny
19
permitted for examining the validity of its act. The requirement of Article 14
being the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably, there is nothing which
militates against the concept of requiring the State always to so act, even in
contractual matters. This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the
minimal requirements of public law obligations and impress with this character
the contracts made by the State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter
that the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain
of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties
may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided
for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. However, to the extent,
challenge is made on the ground of violation of Article 14 by alleging that the
impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also
falls within the domain of contractual obligations would not relieve the State of
its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To this extent,
the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrespective of
there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. An additional
contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article
14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of its actions.
53. From the above, it is clear that when an instrumentality of the State acts
contrary to public good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and
unreasonably, in its contractual, constitutional or statutory obligations, it really
acts contrary to the constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the
Constitution. Thus if we apply the above principle of applicability of Article 14 to
the facts of this case, then we notice that the first respondent being an
instrumentality of the State and a monopoly body had to be approached by the
appellants by compulsion to cover its export risk. The policy of insurance
covering the risk of the appellants was issued by the first respondent after
seeking all required information and after receiving huge sums of money as
premium exceeding Rs 16 lakhs. On facts we have found that the terms of the
policy do not give room to any ambiguity as to the risk covered by the first
respondent. We are also of the considered opinion that the liability of the first
respondent under the policy arose when the default of the exporter occurred
and thereafter when the Kazakhstan Government failed to fulfil its guarantee.
There is no allegation that the contracts in question were obtained either by
fraud or by misrepresentation. In such factual situation, we are of the opinion,
the facts of this case do not and should not inhibit the High Court or this Court
from granting the relief sought for by the petitioner.
54. Apart from the above reasons given by us to interfere with the judgment of
the Appellate Bench of the High Court, we have one other good reason why we
should not drive the appellants to a suit. The claim of the appellants was
rejected by the respondent in the year 1994. The respondent challenged the
basis of rejection by way of a writ petition in the year 1996. The objection as to
the maintainability of the petition was rejected by the High Court by its
judgment dated 15-5-1997. We are now at the end of the year 2003. We at this
distance of time and stage of litigation, do not think it proper to relegate the
parties to a suit. To direct the appellants to approach a civil court at this stage
would be doing injustice to the appellants. In this view of ours, we are
supported by a number of decisions of this Court like in Shambhu Prasad
Agarwal v. Bhola Ram Agarwal [(2000) 9 SCC 714] wherein this Court though
noticed the fact that the appellants had an alternate remedy for issuance of a
letter of administration, it refused to dismiss the appeal on the grounds: (SCC
p. 715, para 5)
20
Since considerable time has elapsed, the interest of justice demands that the
proceedings should come to an end as early as possible and that the appeal
should not be dismissed merely on highly technical ground.
55. In Bal Krishna Agarwal (Dr) v. State of U.P. [(1995) 1 SCC 614 : 1995 SCC
(L&S) 356 : (1995) 29 ATC 163] this Court held: (SCC p. 618, para 10)
“ 10 . Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the
view that the High Court was not right in dismissing the writ petition of the
appellant on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy under Section 68
of the Act especially when the writ petition that was filed in 1988 had already
been admitted and was pending in the High Court for the past more than 5
years. Since the question that is raised involves a pure question of law and even
if the matter is referred to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act it is bound
to be agitated in the court by the party aggrieved by the order of the Chancellor,
we are of the view that this was not a case where the High Court should have
non-suited the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy.
We, therefore, propose to go into the merits of the question regarding inter se
seniority of the appellant and Respondents 4 and 5. We may, in this context,
mention that Respondent 4 has already retired in January 1994.”
36. When the writ petitioner stuck to its original rate and refused to supply
at a lower rate, the appellant continued to accept supply at such rate. The
following paragraph of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (supra) is quoted
below :-
“ 19 . It is, no doubt, true that the general rule is that an offer is not
accepted by mere silence on the part of the offeree, yet it does not mean
that an acceptance always has to be given in so many words. Under
certain circumstances, offerees silence, coupled with his conduct, which
takes the form of a positive act, may constitute an acceptance – an
agreement sub silentio. Therefore, the terms of a contract between the
parties can be proved not only by their words but also by their conduct.”
37. We are of the considered opinion that, the appellant’s communication
under challenge demonstrated an act of arbitrary deduction of money
payable to the supplier for the goods supplied. The appellant made an
attempt to withhold the money due to the appellant by invoking a
contractual clause which did not apply. To arrive at such a conclusion, we
are not required to go deeper into the inherent and underlying meaning of
the said clause, inasmuch as, the clause in its plain and simple language
21
clearly indicated that the deduction of the money was not justified in the
present case.
38. Although, arguments were advanced by the appellant that the appellant
had the right to invoke the risk purchase clause as well, there is no instance
of purchase of the product from elsewhere and not from the writ petitioner,
during subsistence of the R.C. No notice of invocation of the risk purchase
clause was ever issued. That was not the case run by the appellant. The risk
purchase clause is quoted below :-
“ 16. Risk Purchase
16.1 In the event of failure of the supplier to deliver or dispatch the
stores within the stipulated date/period of the supply order or in the
event of breach of any of the terms and conditions mentioned in the
supply order, Coal India Ltd, or its subsidiary companies have the
right to purchase the stores from elsewhere after due notice to the
defaulting supplier at the risk and cost of the defaulting supplier. In
the event of failure of the supplier as detailed above, the cost as per
risk purchase exercise may be recovered from the bills against any
other supplies pending in the same Subsidiary Co. and also in any
other subsidiary companies/CIL.
16.2 Risk purchase action may be initiated under any of the following
conditions,
(a) When the supplier fails to deliver the materials even after the
delivery period in extended on several occasions, on request from the
supplier.
(b) When the supplier fails to respond to purchaser’s request for
supply of the materials and fails to provide any reason which is
considered to be genuine, for the delay in supply.
(c) When in the judgment of the purchaser the supplier is unable to
execute the order due to various reasons,
(d) When the materials are urgently required and the supplier fails to
deliver the materials within the extended/original delivery schedule.
(e) When the supplier breaches any of the terms and conditions of the
supply order and as a result fails to execute the order satisfactorily.”
39. Accordingly the appeal and connected application are dismissed. The
order of His Lordship is upheld and the directions passed under paragraph
36, which is quoted below should be implemented forthwith. However, we
extend the period of 12 weeks from the date of the order as stated in the
said paragraph, by a further period of six weeks from date.
22
“ 36 . Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of with a direction to
respondent no. 2 to release the payment for the goods supplied by the
petitioner at the rate agreed upon in the Running Contract (RC) dated
th
30 March, 2015, and to also release any other amounts, including
the Bank Guarantee held by the respondents, in accordance with the
law, within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of
this order.”
40. Urgent Photostat, certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon fulfilment of requisite formalities.
I Agree.
( Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J. ) ( Shampa Sarkar, J. )