STATE vs KALLOKA KU.DAS

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.32 of 2011

CNR No.ODHC010364622011
(In the matter of an application under Section 378(5) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Odisha (Vigilance) Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Kallola Kumar Das & others Opposite Parties
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Parties : Mr. P.K. Padhi, Advocate

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 01.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 30.06.2010 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Balasore in C.R. No.143 of 2007 arising out of V.G.R. Case
No.41 of 2000, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused-

opposite parties of the charges under Sections 13(2) read with Sections
13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and
Sections 468, 471, 477-A and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
2. During the pendency of the trial Opposite Party No.3 namely
Radhashyam Mantri died, and the proceedings stood abated on account
of his death.
3. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Padhi, learned counsel for the opposite-
parties.
4. The prosecution case was initiated on the basis of a written report
submitted by B.K. Pattnaik, the then Inspector of Vigilance Unit,
Bhadrak, on 24.08.2000 before the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance,
Balasore Division. The allegation was that the settlement operation in
Mouza-Ganeswarpur had concluded and the final R.O.Rs. had been
published, but thereafter certain settlement cases were allegedly
instituted with antedated dates and pattas were directed to be issued in
favour of private persons. It was further alleged that the accused persons

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had thereby facilitated conversion of Government land into private
holdings and caused loss of Government revenue.
During the Hal Raghupati Method Survey and Settlement
operation in respect of Mouza-Ganeswarpur, the final R.O.Rs. had
already been published and distributed, but accused Kallola Kumar Das,
who was then functioning as the Major Settlement Officer, Balasore,
allegedly entertained settlement cases under Section 41 of the Orissa
Survey and Settlement Act, 1958, on the basis of certain sale deeds and
passed orders for issuance of pattas, allegedly resulting in inclusion of
Government land in private holdings. It was further alleged that the other
accused persons, who were associated with the settlement process, aided
and abetted such acts and that the accused persons thereby committed
offences of forgery, falsification of records and criminal misconduct.
5. The prosecution examined 19 witnesses and relied upon
documentary evidence including the settlement case records, R.O.Rs.,
reports of the Settlement Office, reports of the District Sub-Registrar and
Tahasildar, registered sale deeds and the opinion of the Handwriting
Expert. P.W.19 was the Investigating Officer.

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6. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
the prosecution had failed to establish that the settlement cases had been
falsely or ante-datedly instituted or that the accused had illegally
manipulated the settlement records and granted pattas over Government
land. The learned trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence of the
official and other witnesses as well as the settlement records and
R.O.Rs., found that the impugned orders had not been set aside or
declared illegal by any competent authority and that there was no cogent
evidence to establish that Government land had been converted into
private land or that the accused had obtained any pecuniary advantage.
The Court further held that the prosecution had failed to prove the
ingredients of forgery, use of forged documents or falsification of
accounts and that the evidence of the witnesses did not satisfactorily
establish the alleged conspiracy or fabrication of the settlement records.
It was also noticed that the prosecution had not specifically established
which documents were allegedly falsified for attracting Section 477-A of
the I.P.C. and that the evidence regarding the alleged manipulation of the
settlement cases and the role of the co-accused was insufficient.

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Accordingly, extending the benefit of reasonable doubt to the accused,
the learned Special Judge held that the prosecution had failed to prove
the charges beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted all the accused
persons. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein
for ready reference:-
“ 21. Under the O.S.S. Act, 1958, the settlement authorities
have been vested with powers to prepare R.O.Rs. There are
different stages for preparation of R.O.Rs. The Act does not
bar preparation of R.O.R. at different stages. Under section-
41 of the O.S.S. Act, the Settlement Officer has been vested
with power to correct R.O.Rs, maps on the ground of mistake
and clerical errors. Though in the case in hand, the
prosecution alleges that the impugned orders were passed by
accused Kalipada Das to gain pecuniary advantage, yet the
prosecution has failed to place any cogent material to show
that the impugned orders have been held to be illegal by the
higher authorities.
In paragraph-19 of his evidence, P.W.19(I.O.) has stated that
he cannot say whether the impugned orders have been
interfered with by the Revisional authority.
P.W.19(I.O.) has admitted in paragraph-1.9 of his evidence
that in all the cases, the State of Orissa was a party. On going
through those case records, it is found that Additional
Government Pleader of Balasore Madhusudan Panda was
appearing in those cases on behalf of the State. There is no
material to show that impugned orders were challenged
before higher forum.
Prosecution witnesses, who are acquainted with survey and
settlement operation such as; P.Ws 3,5,7,8,12 and 16 have not
deposed about any defect or illegality in the impugned orders
and the R.O.Rs. prepared in pursuant thereto. There is also no
evidence in what manner accused Rajanikanta and
Radhasyam fabricated amin reports. A perusal of the
settlement case records reveals the same to have been
instituted after execution of the sale deeds in respect of which

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the cases were instituted. The
R.O.Rs(Exts.3,4,5,25,26,27,28,29,30 & 31) which the
prosecution terms as illegal have not been set aside or held to
be incorrect by competent authorities. It is trite that change in
the R.O.Rs as per the orders of competent authority takes
effect for fiscal purpose from the date it was finally published.
In sum the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution is not in consonance with its allegations. From
the mere fact of passing of those orders criminal liability
cannot be fastened upon the accused. Considering the entire
gamut of the prosecution case, it is found that the prosecution
has not been able to substantiate its allegations that the
impugned settlement cases were fake ones and accused
Kallola Das with the help of other two accused passed illegal
orders for issue of Pattas, thereby committed the offence
under Sections-468 and 471 I.P.C..
22. So far as the offence u/s.-477-A I.P.C. is concerned, it is
found that the prosecution has not specified the documents
which the three accused falsified. Pattas/R.O.Rs
(Exts.3,4,5,25,26,27,28,29 and 30) which were prepared in
pursuant to the impugned orders till date have not been
challenged or held to be illegally prepared by any competent
authority. I have already held that the prosecution has not
been able to establish that the Government lands were
included in the Pattas granted in pursuant to the impugned
orders. Thus, the prosecution has also failed to establish the
charge u/s.-477-A I.P.C.
23. Coming to the charge u/s.-13(1)(c) & (d) of the P.C.Act,
1988, it is found that the said charges have been levelled
against the accused on the ground that they dishonestly and
fraudulently converted the Government lands into their own
use, gained pecuniary advantage by enhancing area in pattas
and kissa[m] of lands causing loss of revenue to the State. At
the risk of repetition it is noted here that the prosecution has
failed to establish that any Government land was converted
into a private holding for the personal use of three accused or
of their relatives. The impugned orders in those settlement
cases may not have been passed in legally correct manner, yet
the same having not been set aside by the higher authority, it
cannot be said that the three accused gained pecuniary
advantage, increased the area of plots and changed Kissam of
lands thereby caused loss of revenue to the state. This court

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being a criminal court cannot brand the impugned orders as
illegal and hold the accused guilty of criminal misconduct. No
witness has been examined by the prosecution to show that he
obtained patta by bribing the accused. There is absolutely no
evidence of any worth to conclude that the three accused
obtained any kind of pecuniary advantage by obtaining the
impugned pattas. From the above discussions, I am of the
view that the prosecution has not also been able to establish
the charges under Section-13(1) (c) & (d) of P.C Act.
24. The three accused have been charged for commission of
offence u/s.-120(B) I.P.C. The prosecution having failed to
establish the principal charges, the offence of criminal
conspiracy u/s.-120(B) I.P.C. must also fail.
Before parting with the case, I may note here that out of 19
witnesses examined by the prosecution, eight important
witnesses have turned hostile against the prosecution. So far
as the rest witnesses, except the I.O. (P.W.19), are concerned,
there is nothing substantial in their evidence to fasten the
criminal liability upon the accused.
In view of the above, I conclude that the prosecution has
failed to establish the charges levelled against the three
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I hold them
not guilty of the charges, hence, they are acquitted of the same
u/s.-235(1) of Cr.P.C. ”

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner-State submitted that the
learned trial court failed to properly appreciate the evidence of
P.Ws.3, 12 and 19 regarding the legal effect of the final publication
of the Record-of-Rights (R.O.R.) and the consequent lack of
jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer to alter the status or rent
fixation of the lands or to institute proceedings under Section 41 of
the O.S.S. Act and grant pattas. It is contended that, despite the final

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publication of the R.O.R. of Mouza-Ganeswarpur on 31.03.1998,
accused-opposite party No.1 purchased land on 24.04.1998 and
thereafter, in collusion with the other accused, managed to institute
Settlement Case Nos.159/98, 150/98 and 884/98 by antedating the
proceedings to 01.04.1998, got lands recorded in their names and
obtained orders for issuance of pattas. Such acts, according to the
appellant, clearly disclose manipulation and creation of false
documents with intent to defraud, attracting Sections 468, 471 and
477-A IPC, besides the ingredients of Sections 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. The learned trial court further erred in discarding the testimony
of P.W.10 regarding coercive purchase and manipulation of the
recorded area, as well as the evidence of P.W.17, the Handwriting
Expert, and the admission of accused-opposite party No.1 under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he had passed orders in the relevant
settlement cases.
8. He further submitted that the learned trial court committed
material irregularity in placing undue reliance upon the defence

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evidence and minor discrepancies while failing to appreciate the
consistent and corroborated testimony of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly P.W.19, a police officer whose evidence could not have
been discarded merely on account of his official status when
otherwise found reliable and corroborated. The defence witnesses,
who allegedly introduced an entirely new story at the far end of the
trial, ought not to have been relied upon, particularly in the absence
of any credible explanation furnished by the accused-opposite
parties. The appellant therefore contends that the acquittal is contrary
to the evidence on record, suffers from perversity and non-
consideration of material evidence, and is not supported by
substantial, compelling or cogent reasons.

9. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State as
well as the learned counsel for the respondent at length. The rival

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submissions have been duly considered in the light of the materials
available on record.

10. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-

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m the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
“29. Fro
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible. ”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets

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strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to
rebut the same in appeal.”

11. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi

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@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

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12. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite parties for more than 16 years, as they were
acquitted by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage
would not only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.

13. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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