Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan vs Richa Mishra And 6 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 4093 of 2026
Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan …..Petitioners(s)
Versus
Richa Mishra and 6 others …..Respondents(s)
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Akshay Kumar Singh, Anupama
Bhadauria, Apoorva Tewari
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Amal Rastogi, Puneet Chandra,
Radhika Varma, Sachin Tiwari,
Shreshtha Srivastava
Along with
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 4313 of 2026
Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan …..Petitioners(s)
Versus
Richa Mishra and 6 others …..Respondents(s)
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Akshay Kumar Singh, Anupama
Bhadauria, Apoorva Tewari
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Amal Rastogi, Puneet Chandra,
Radhika Varma, Sachin Tiwari,
Shreshtha Srivastava
AFR
Reserved on:-12.08.2026
Delivered on:-01.09.2026
Court No. - 8
HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.
1. The petitioner, who was the plaintiff of Regular Suit No. 455 of
2026, had filed a suit for declaration and injunction, wherein he had
prayed for an interim injunction, which was granted by the trial court

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vide order dated 02.04.2026, which was assailed in two appeals
preferred under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC, one by Smt. Sarojini Verma
and the other by Shri Brij Kishore Singh and Hind Charitable Trust; and
both the aforesaid appeals have been allowed by the Additional District
Judge, Court No. 3 / Special Judge (NIA), Lucknow vide judgment and
order dated 08.07.2026, which is under challenge in the aforesaid two
petitions preferred by the plaintiff/petitioner under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
FACTS IN BRIEF:
2. The petitioner filed a suit for declaration and injunction in the
Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lucknow, registered as R.S. No.
455 of 2026, wherein it was pleaded as under:-
(a) A public charitable trust under the name and style of Hind
Charitable Trust was created vide a registered trust deed
dated 09.12.2004, having seven founder trustees, namely: Dr.
Amod Kumar Sachan (Plaintiff), Smt. Sushila Chaudhary
(Defendant No. 4), Dr. Harish Chandra, Ms. Richa Mishra
(Defendant No. 1), Shri Sunil Kumar Verma, Shri Brij
Kishore Singh (Defendant No. 2), Smt. Madhu Chaudhary
(Defendant No. 5).
(b) Later, vide supplementary trust deed dated 19.11.2008,
Shri Vikram Singh (Defendant No. 3) and Shri Moti Lal
Goyal were inducted as trustees of the trust, as Dr. Harish
Chandra, Shri Sunil Kumar Verma, and Shri Moti Lal Goyal
ceased to be members of the trust due to their demise.
(c) That Smt. Sushila Chaudhary and Smt. Madhu Chaudhary
also ceased to be trustees as they had tendered their
resignations vide their letter dated 01.03.2004, which was
duly accepted by the Board of Trustees.
(d) The petitioner was always the Chairman of the Trust and
he also administered the affairs of two institutes managed by

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the Trust namely Hind Institute of Medical Sciences, Ataria
in District Sitapur and Hind Institute of Medical Sciences,
Safedabad in District Barabanki.
(e) The cause of action for filing of the suit precipitated on
account of the fact that while the petitioner was in Delhi,
taking advantage of his absence, it is alleged that defendant
Nos. 1 and 2, along with his son, respondent No. 6 and
others, entered in the administrative office of the hospitals
managed by the Trust at Barabanki and District Sitapur, broke
open the locks of the office, and removed important
documents relating to the functioning of the Trust and the
Hospitals. It was also alleged that the defendants took away
the money kept in the locker in the petitioner’s office, and
this incident was informed by the Financial Officer of the
Trust to the petitioner.
(f) The petitioner was also informed regarding some
fabricated minutes of meeting dated 03.02.2026, wherein Shri
Brij Kishore Singh who allegedly chaired a meeting and
resolved to remove the petitioner from the post of Chairman
of the Trust. In the same meeting, it was further resolved that
all executive, administrative, and financial powers of the
petitioner be seized, and he was barred from entering into the
hospitals administered and managed by the Trust.
(g) In the same meeting, it was also resolved that the
management of the hospitals at Barabanki and Sitapur would
be managed by Ms. Richa Mishra. The said minutes of
meeting dated 03.02.2026 were said to have been confirmed
in an alleged meeting held on 07.02.2026.
(h) It was also pleaded that in order to give vent to the evil
designs of taking over the Trust and ousting the petitioner
therefrom, another fabricated minutes of meeting was
prepared allegedly dated 16.01.2026, which allegedly

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confirmed the minutes of meeting allegedly held on
20.12.2025 and in this fashion, the resignation of Smt.
Sushila Chaudhary and Smt. Madhu Chaudhary was revoked,
which had already been accepted by the Board on
01.03.2004. Significantly by the same minutes dated
16.01.2026, Smt. Sarojini Verma (wife of) Late Sunil Kumar
Singh) was inducted as a founder trustee.
(i) The petitioner prayed that the minutes of meeting dated
16.01.2026 and 03.02.2026 be declared as fictitious,
fabricated and void ab initio. The petitioner further prayed
that a decree of perpetual injunction be granted in favor of the
plaintiff restraining the defendants of the suit from interfering
in the functioning of the petitioner as Chairman of the Trust.
(j) The plaintiff also filed an application under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. seeking interim injunction against the
defendants of the suit from interfering in the functioning of
the petitioner as Chairman of the Trust and also from creating
any interference in the functioning of the Trust by the
petitioner, in furtherance of the alleged fabricated minutes of
meeting dated 16.01.2026 and 03.02.2026, which be ignored.
(k) The trial court, after hearing the parties, vide its order
dated 02.04.2026 allowed the application for interim
injunction and restrained the defendant Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6
from interfering with the functioning of the petitioner as
Chairman of Hind Charitable Trust during pendency of the
suit or until a fresh election is conducted in accordance with
the trust deed. It also directed that the operation of the bank
accounts relating to the Trust would be operated strictly as
per the trust deed. Both the parties were directed to cooperate
in early disposal of the suit.
(l) The defendants of the suit, being aggrieved by the order
dated 02.04.2026, preferred two separate appeals under Order

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XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC i.e. one appeal Misc. Civil Appeal No.
79 of 2026 was filed by Smt. Sarojini Verma and the other
appeal bearing Misc. Civil Appeal No. 80 of 2026 was filed
by Shri Brij Kishore Singh and the Trust. Both the appeals
were entertained by the District Judge, and vide interim order
dated 10.04.2026 passed in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 80 of
2026, the operation of the order dated 02.04.2026 was stayed.
(m) This order dated 10.04.2026 was challenged by the
petitioner herein in a petition bearing (A-227) No. 2030 of
2026. While no interim order was granted by the High Court,
the petitioner later withdrew the aforesaid petition on
22.04.2026. In the meantime, the District Judge, Lucknow,
before whom the appeals were pending, noticed that the steps
had not been taken as directed by the court, hence, it refused
to extend the interim order.
(n) Now it was the turn of Shri Brij Kishore Singh (the
appellant of Misc. Civil Appeal No. 80 of 2026) to approach
this Court by filing a petition bearing (A-227) No. 2410 of
2026, which, upon hearing, came to be disposed of by this
Court vide order dated 30.04.2026 and the High Court
directed that the interim order granted by the appellate court
dated 10.04.2026 shall stand extended till 15.05.2026, and
thereafter it will be subject to the orders to be passed by the
appellate court. The Parties were directed to appear before the
appellate court on the date fixed and advance their
submissions, while the appellate court was directed to decide
the appeals in accordance with law.
(o) In furtherance of the aforesaid directions, the appeals
were finally heard by the Additional District Judge, Court No.
3, Special Judge (NIA), Lucknow, who, by means of
judgment and order dated 08.07.2026, allowed both the
appeals and set aside the temporary injunction order dated

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02.04.2026 and rejected the application under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
(p) The plaintiff, being aggrieved, challenging the order dated
08.07.2026 passed in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 79 of 2026 and
80 of 2026, filed the instant two petitions. Since the order is
common in both the appeals which have given rise to the
instant two petitions, hence, with the consent of learned
counsel for the respective parties, both the petitions were
heard at length spread over several dates and are being
decided by this common judgment.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3. Shri Jaideep Narain Mathur, learned Senior Counsel along with
Shri Apoorva Tewari, Shri Akshay Kumar Singh, Ms. Anupama
Bhadauria and Ms. Sangini Jha, vehemently urged that the Appellate
Court was not justified in interfering with an order passed by the trial
court granting an interim injunction in favor of the petitioner.
4. It was submitted that the trust deed contained certain stipulations,
and prima facie , the material on record established that the alleged
meetings said to have been held on 16.01.2026 and 03.02.2026 were
against the recitals of the registered trust deed. The alleged minutes of
meeting had glaring discrepancies which clearly established the fact that
the minutes had been fabricated. The remaining trustees did not have the
right to hold such a meeting violating the provisions of the trust deed
only to achieve their evil design of removing the petitioner from the
post of Chairman of the trust.
5. It was further submitted that where the trial court, after hearing the
parties and from the record available before it, had meticulously found
that there was a strong prima facie case in favor of the petitioner and that
balance of convenience and irreparable injury was also in favor of the
petitioner, in such circumstances, the grant of interim injunction by the
trial court was in sound exercise of its jurisdiction. The Appellate Court
was not justified in interfering with the aforesaid discretionary order,

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especially when there was no reversal of the findings recorded by the
trial court nor the Appellate Court could find that the basis on which the
trial court formed its prima facie opinion, was not borne out from the
record.
6. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Appellate
Court allowed the appeals and set aside the order passed by the trial
court on bland propositions of law which did not apply to the facts of the
instant case. It was also urged that being a first appellate court, it was the
duty of the court in appeal against an order of injunction to have
scrutinized the matter, exercising co-extensive powers as that of the trial
court, and only if it found that the findings recorded prima facie by the
trial court were unsustainable, could it interfere with an order of grant of
injunction.
7. The submission was that even if another view was possible before
the Appellate Court, it was only in sound exercise of jurisdiction that the
Appellate Court should have followed the same, unless it could reverse
the finding and hold that the prima facie case, balance of convenience,
and irreparable injury were not in favor of the petitioner. Having failed
to do so, the First Appellate Court committed an error of jurisdiction in
interfering with the order passed by the trial court.
8. Shri Mathur, learned Senior Counsel further emphasized that the
approach of the appellate court was patently illegal, inasmuch as it
recorded a finding that any relief which is similar to the final relief
cannot be granted at the interim stage, while failing to notice that this is
not an absolute proposition of law; the difference being that in cases
where interim injunction, if not granted, would result in frustration of the
suit and subject to successfully making out a case for injunction, a court
is entitled to protect the right of the parties, even if the interim injunction
has some similarity with the final relief.
9. He further submitted that in such cases, the standard of prima
facie case may be a little higher than in other usual cases, but it is not an
absolute proposition that where the interim relief has similarity with the

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final relief, then such a relief cannot be granted in all circumstances. The
Appellate Court, without appreciating the distinction between the two, as
a matter of bland proposition, applied the same to the facts of the case
while allowing the appeals, which was a patent error of jurisdiction
committed by the Appellate Court.
10. Shri Mathur further urged that the other grounds taken by the
Appellate Court to allow the appeals are equally perverse, inasmuch as it
referred to an interim order dated 10.04.2026 which was passed by the
appellate court at the time of entertaining the appeals at the admission
stage by which it had stayed the operation of the trial court dated
02.04.2026.
11. The submission was that any observation made by the Court at the
time of entertaining the appeal or a petition is prima facie and tentative
in nature. It is not as if the Court, while entertaining the petition/an
appeal, gives its final verdict. Non-challenge to the said order does not
operate as res judicata , as held by the Appellate Court; hence, the entire
reasoning upon which the order impugned has been based suffers from
patent illegality.
12. It was further submitted that the Appellate Court further erred in
holding that the plaintiff/petitioner had not approached the court with
clean hands. It was submitted that issues which were in the notice and
knowledge of all the parties and were quite disjunct from the cause of
action of the present suit were not facts which were germane for
adjudication of the controversy involved, non-disclosure of such facts
could not be taken against the appellant, nor could he be charged of
suppression of material facts to be taken as a ground to discharge the
injunction which was granted by the trial court.
13. It was also urged that the Appellate Court further erred in
discharging the injunction on an additional ground that certain
amendment which was to be done was not carried out by the
plaintiff/petitioner. Non-compliance of an order to amend the plaint
cannot be a ground to discharge the injunction per se . At best, the

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Appellate Court could have put the plaintiff to notice, and in case if the
petitioner still did not comply with the order, only then an appropriate
orders could have been passed, but still it cannot be a ground to set aside
an order of injunction and this reflects the manner in which the First
Appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction, which is against the settled
legal principles and it vitiates the order dated 08.07.2026.
14. It was urged by Shri Mathur that the Appellate Court, in order to
justify the fabricated minutes of meeting dated 03.02.2026 and
16.01.2026, invoked a plea of 'accidental omission', which was neither
the case of the defendants nor it was part of their pleadings, and thus, the
Appellate Court carved out a new case for the defendants, which renders
the order dated 08.07.2026 vulnerable to judicial scrutiny.
15. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that
because of the order passed by the First Appellate Court, the entire
functioning of the Trust and the Hospitals has been severely affected as
the salaries of the Doctors, staff amongst others could not be paid and
unless some protection is granted, the functioning of the Hospitals would
be in jeopardy which would also be a loss for the students as well as the
patients of the Hospital.
16. Thus, for all the aforesaid reasons, it was urged that the order
impugned is bad and deserves to be set aside. In support of his
submissions, he has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in:
Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 697; Shri
Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC
543, Chelubhai Nanabhai Khachar & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &
Ors., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596, Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish
Ambalal Choksi & Ors., (2024) 11 SCC 351.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS:
17. Shri Pritish Kumar, learned Senior Counsel along with Shri Amal
Rastogi led the submissions on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 7 (who
were the appellants of Misc. Civil Appeal No. 80 of 2026). It was

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submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that a relief for injunction is a
purely equitable and a discretionary relief. A person who approaches the
court must come to court with clean hands, indicating complete facts. It
was submitted that the petitioner did not disclose the true and correct
facts and this itself was a ground for refusal of interim injunction. Even
if at all there were certain discrepancies in the minutes of meeting, yet it
did not absolve the petitioner of his obligation to disclose the true and
correct facts, as the plaintiff has to support his case on its own strength
and the plaintiff cannot claim any benefit from any weakness of the
defendants. The mere fact that there were scathing observations made
against the petitioner by a Division Bench of this Court in the order
dated 06.02.2023 passed in W.P. No. 208 (MB) of 2017, and in
furtherance thereof, the petitioner was dismissed from his service from
the King George's Medical University, Lucknow, coupled with the fact
that the petitioner had fraudulently opened accounts in name of the Trust
on the basis of fabricated trust deed, were enough for the petitioner to be
dis-entitled to claim any equitable remedy.
18. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 7 urged that this
aspect of the matter was not considered by the trial court and it merely
concentrated on the submissions advanced by the counsel for the
plaintiff and did not take into consideration the submissions of the
defendants. This led the trial court into committing an error in passing
the order impugned dated 02.04.2026. It was also urged that the trial
court merely considered the issue of prima facie case, but did not delve
into the other two ingredients necessary for grant of temporary
injunction, i.e. the balance of convenience and irreparable injury; and
unless all the three ingredients co-existed in favor of the plaintiff, an
order of injunction could not have been granted. In the given
circumstances, the trial court had committed a grave error, which was
rectified by the Appellate Court, hence it cannot be said that the First
Appellate Court committed any error of jurisdiction and the Appellate
Court rightly set aside the order passed by the trial court.

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19. Shri Kumar further urged that it is now too well settled to be
disputed that any relief which is in the nature of final relief cannot be
granted at the interim stage. In the instant case, where the injunction
granted by the trial court was identical to the final relief, such an order
apparently falls foul of the settled legal principles and an interim
injunction to the aforesaid extent could not be granted. The Appellate
Court has rightly considered this aspect of the matter and found that the
prayer made by the petitioner in his application under Order XXXIX
Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. was identical to the relief claimed in the suit; hence,
such relief could not have been granted and the order passed by the
Appellate Court cannot be said to be bad or violative of any principles of
law.
20. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 7
further submitted that the petitioner, in connivance with the respondent
No. 1, had created a fictitious trust deed. The original trust deed had
seven founder trustees, whereas a fictitious parallel trust under the name
and style of Hind Charitable Trust was created by the petitioner and the
respondent No. 1, and on the strength of the aforesaid fraudulent trust
deed, parallel accounts were opened in the name of the Trust, and all the
money which was payable to the Trust was being siphoned through these
illegal accounts to the detriment of the Trust and the other founder
trustees.
21. It was also urged that the petitioner was not justified in his actions
to work against the interest of the charitable trust. Once the aforesaid
facts came to the notice of the other trustees, a meeting was called
wherein the trustees present unanimously agreed to remove the petitioner
from the post of Chairman of the Trust. It was submitted that removal
from the post of the Chairman of the Trust does not mean that the
petitioner has been removed from the Trust itself. As per the trust deed, it
was open for the trustees to revisit the designations given to the founder
trustees; and if it was decided that the plaintiff was to be removed from
the post of Chairman of the Trust in light of the financial

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misappropriation and fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner, then in
such circumstances, he was not entitled to an interim injunction and in
this view of the matter, the injunction granted by the trial court in favor
of the petitioner was not justified. The First Appellate Court has rightly
intervened, and the order impugned does not suffer from any error which
may require this Court to interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, thus the petitions deserve to be
dismissed.
22. Shri Sudeep Kumar, learned Senior Counsel, along with Ms.
Radhika Verma, for respondent Nos. 4 and 5, very fairly submitted that
since respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had not filed their objections against the
application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C., hence, he would
confine his submissions only on legal propositions. Shri Sudeep Kumar
submitted that an injunction can only be granted in terms of the
provisions contained under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. It was
urged that from the bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it would
indicate that the conditions envisaged in the said provisions are not
attracted to the facts of the case, and in such circumstances, the
injunction application was not maintainable and the trial court also did
not have the jurisdiction to allow such an application.
23. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that for the grant of
injunction, three ingredients must co-exist, and in the instant case, the
trial court has merely considered the issue of prima facie case, but has
not considered the issue of balance of convenience and irreparable injury
and for the said reason, the order passed by the trial court is patently
erroneous.
24. It was further urged that the trial court, while granting the
injunction, has practically held a mini-trial, which is legally not
permissible at the interim stage. It was further urged that the First
Appellate Court has taken a wholesome view of the matter and has
rightly discharged the injunction granted by the trial court. In such
circumstances, this Court may not interfere, and since the trial has

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already been expedited, it would be appropriate for the parties to get the
suit decided on merits.
25. Shri Puneet Chandra, learned counsel for respondent No. 6, has
made submissions which are practically the same as advanced by the
learned Senior Counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 7, hence the same are
not being replicated here.
26. Significantly, the respondent no. 1 was represented by Sri H.G.S.
Parihar, learned Senior Counsel along with Sri Sachin Tewari, learned
counsel but no submissions were advanced on behalf of respondent no.1.
DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS
27. The Court has heard the learned Senior Counsel for the respective
parties and also perused the material on record.
28. Before proceeding to consider the rival submissions, it would be
worthwhile to notice certain decisions of the Apex Court and the
principles which are applicable for consideration of an application for
injunction.
29. The law regarding grant of temporary injunction and interlocutory
orders is covered by Section 94 and Order 39 of the CPC. Upon perusal
of Rule 1 of Order 39 CPC, it would indicate that where in any suit, it is
proved by affidavit or otherwise- (i) that any property in dispute in a suit
is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the
suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the
defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of the property
with a view to defrauding the creditors, (c) that the defendant threatens
to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in
relation to any property in dispute in the suit; the Court may grant an
order of temporary injunction to restrain such acts.
30 .  It is now well settled that before a Court grants a temporary
injunction, it needs to be satisfied that a person seeking an injunction has
a prima facie case in his favour and that the balance of convenience and
irreparable injury also lies in his favour.

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31.  The word “prima facie case” apparently indicates something
which at first impression makes out a triable case. The term “prima facie
case” should not be confused with the term “prima facie title” which has
to be established at the trial upon permitting the parties to lead evidence.
Thus, it means a substantial question which has been raised and which
upon first sight needs to be investigated and decided on merits.
32.  The word “balance of convenience” denotes that the Court must
be satisfied that the comparative mischief and hardship which is likely to
be caused to the person seeking injunction is more than the
inconvenience likely to be caused to the other party, by granting such
injunction.
33.  The word “irreparable injury” on the other hand guides the Court
to be satisfied that the refusal to grant injunction would result in such
injury which cannot be compensated in terms of costs or otherwise and
the person seeking injunction needs to be protected from the
consequences of apprehended injury.
34.  The aforesaid three ingredients have been noticed by the House of
Lords in the celebrated case of  American Cyanamid Co.  v.  Ethicon Ltd. ,
reported in [1975] 1 All ER 504 . The principles regarding grant of
injunction as laid down by the Lord Diplock in Cyanamid case can be
summarized as under:—
(1) The plaintiff must first satisfy the court that there is a
serious issue to decide and that if the defendants were not
restrained and the plaintiff won the action, damages at common
law would be inadequate compensation for the plaintiff's loss.
(2) The court, once satisfied of these matters will then consider
whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting
injunction or not, that is, whether justice would be best served
by an order of injunction.
(3) The court does not and cannot judge the merits of the
parties' respective cases and that any decision of justice will be
taken in a state of uncertainty about the parties' rights.
35 .  The Apex Court in  Wander Ltd. and another v. Antox India (P.)
Ltd. 1990 Supp SCC 727 had the occasion to consider the principles
regarding grant of injunction and in Paragraphs 9, 13 and 14 of the
report it held as under:

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“9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction
is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by
the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and
uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the
trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well
settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory
remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object
of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated
“…is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his
rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in
damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were
resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection
must be weighed against the corresponding need of the
defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his
having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for
which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must
weigh one need against another and determine where the
“balance of convenience’ lies.”
The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo,
the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case.
The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what
he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to
be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration
whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or
whether he has already been doing so in which latter case
considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a
case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are
attracted.”
----xxx----xxx-----xxx----xxx-----xxx
“13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the
appellate bench fell into error on two important propositions.
The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and
nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the
powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in
an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second
pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality
of Antox's alleged user of the trademark on which the passing-
off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately.
14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the
appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion
of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion
except where the discretion has been shown to have been
exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the
court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant
or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against
exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle.
Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach
a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below
if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the

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material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in
interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely
on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial
stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the
discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and
in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would
have taken a different view may not justify interference with the
trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these
principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private
Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [ (1960) 3 SCR 713  :  AIR 1960 SC 1156 ]
: (SCR 721)
“… These principles are well established, but as has been
observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton &
Co. v. Jhanaton [ [1942] A.C. 130 ] “…the law as to the
reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge
below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and
any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well
settled principles in an individual case’.”
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this
principle.”
36 .  Once again, the Apex Court in  Dalpat Kumar  v.  Prahlad Singh ,
(1992) 1 SCC 719,  considering the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1(c)
CPC in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said report held as under:
“4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may
be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or
otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the
plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to
any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant
a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other
order for the purpose of staying and preventing … or
dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the
plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the
court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further
orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law
Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by Section 86(i)
(b) of the Amending Act 104 of 1976 with effect from February
1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the
inherent power under Section 151 CPC to grant ad interim
injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerned
with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights
are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a
party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular
act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent
future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exercise of
the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve the
subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It
is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary
relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that

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4313 of 2026
(1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit
and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is
probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the
plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to
protect the party from the species of injury. In other words,
irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal
right would be established at trial; and (3) that the
comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is
likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater
than that would be likely to arise from granting it.
5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde
by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in
his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence
of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his
property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary
injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima
facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial.
Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona
fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits.
Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not
sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy
that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable
injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other
remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction
and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended
injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not
mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the
injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of
damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of
convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The
Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should
exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of
substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the
parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that
which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is
granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities
of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending
the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo,
an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise
its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of
ad interim injunction pending the suit.”
37 .  Again, in the case of  Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd.  v.  Coca Cola Co. ,
(1995) 5 SCC 545 noticing the English decisions as well as earlier
authorities of the Apex Court in Paragraphs 42, 43 and 47 has held as
under:—
“42. In the matter of grant of injunction, the practice in
England is that where a contract is negative in nature, or

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4313 of 2026
contains an express negative stipulation, breach of it may be
restrained by injunction and injunction is normally granted as
a matter of course, even though the remedy is equitable and
thus in principle a discretionary one and a defendant cannot
resist an injunction simply on the ground that observance of the
contract is burdensome to him and its breach would cause little
or no prejudice to the plaintiff and that breach of an express
negative stipulation can be restrained even though the plaintiff
cannot show that the breach will cause him any loss. [See :
Chitty on Contracts, 27th Edn., Vol. I, General Principles,
paragraph 27-040 at p. 1310; Halsbury's Laws of England,
4th Edn., Vol. 24, paragraph 992.] In India Section 42 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 prescribes that notwithstanding
anything contained in clause (e) of Section 41, where a contract
comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act,
coupled with a negative agreement, express or implied, not to
do a certain act, the circumstance that the court is unable to
compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement shall
not preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the
negative agreement. This is subject to the proviso that the
plaintiff has not failed to perform the contract so far as it is
binding on him. The Court is, however, not bound to grant an
injunction in every case and an injunction to enforce a negative
covenant would be refused if it would indirectly compel the
employee either to idleness or to serve the employer.
[See : Ehrman v. Bartholomew [ [1898] 1 Ch. 671  : [1895-99]
All ER 1680]; N.S. Golikari [(1967) 2 SCR 378 :  AIR 1967 SC
1098  :  (1967) 1 LLJ 740 ] at p. 389.]
43. The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the
pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the
exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the
discretion the court applies the following tests-- (i) whether the
plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of
convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the
plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for
interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or
not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a
time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the
plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and
uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the
trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is
granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during
the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object
of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against
injury by violation of his right for which he could not be
adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action
if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The
need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against
the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against
injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising
his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately
compensated. The court must weigh one need against another

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4313 of 2026
and determine where the “balance of convenience” lies.
[See : Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. [ 1990 Supp SCC
727 ], (SCC at pp. 731-32.] In order to protect the defendant
while granting an interlocutory injunction in his favour the
court can require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking so that
the defendant can be adequately compensated if the uncertainty
were resolved in his favour at the trial.”
-----xxx----xxx-----xxx----xxx-----xxx
“47. In this context, it would be relevant to mention that in
the instant case GBC had approached the High Court for the
injunction order, granted earlier, to be vacated. Under Order
39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to
interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary
injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on
being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also
look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of
the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was
free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature,
the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show
that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not
responsible for bringing about the state of things complained
of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings
with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His
conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will
arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of
injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching
the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction
order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings.”
38 .  In  Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd.,
(1999) 7 SCC 1 , the Apex Court while dealing with the issue of grant of
temporary injunction relied upon the earlier decisions and quoted with
approval the decision of House of Lords in the case of  American
Cyanamid Co.  v.  Ethicon Ltd. , and in Paragraph 24 held as under:—
“24. We, however, think it fit to note herein below certain
specific considerations in the matter of grant of interlocutory
injunction, the basic being non-expression of opinion as to the
merits of the matter by the court, since the issue of grant of
injunction, usually, is at the earliest possible stage so far as
the time-frame is concerned. The other considerations which
ought to weigh with the court hearing the application or
petition for the grant of injunctions are as below:
(i) extent of damages being an adequate remedy;
(ii) protect the plaintiff's interest for violation of his rights
though, however, having regard to the injury that may be
suffered by the defendants by reason therefor;

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4313 of 2026
(iii) the court while dealing with the matter ought not to ignore
the factum of strength of one party's case being stronger than
the other's;
(iv) no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the matter of
grant of injunction but on the facts and circumstances of each
case -- the relief being kept flexible;
(v) the issue is to be looked at from the point of view as to
whether on refusal of the injunction the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable loss and injury keeping in view the strength of the
parties' case;
(vi) balance of convenience or inconvenience ought to be
considered as an important requirement even if there is a
serious question or prima facie case in support of the grant;
(vii) whether the grant or refusal of injunction will adversely
affect the interest of the general public which can or cannot be
compensated otherwise.”
39. The Apex Court in Deoraj (supra) , while considering the manner in
which an application of injunction is to be considered, in paragraphs 11,
12, and 13 held as under:
“11. The courts and tribunals seized of the proceedings within
their jurisdiction take a reasonable time in disposing of the
same. This is on account of fair-procedure requirement which
involves delay intervening between the previous and the next
procedural steps leading towards preparation of case for
hearing. Then, the courts are also overburdened and their
hands are full. As the conclusion of hearing on merits is likely
to take some time, the parties press for interim relief being
granted in the interregnum. An order of interim relief may or
may not be a reasoned one but the factors of prima facie case,
irreparable injury and balance of convenience do work at the
back of the mind of the one who passes an order of interim
nature. Ordinarily, the court is inclined to maintain status quo
as obtaining on the date of the commencement of the
proceedings. However, there are a few cases which call for
the court's leaning not in favour of maintaining the status quo
and still lesser in percentage are the cases when an order
tantamounting to a mandamus is required to be issued even at
an interim stage. There are matters of significance and of
moment posing themselves as moment of truth. Such cases do
cause dilemma and put the wits of any judge to test.
12. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief
would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then
there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim
relief would tantamount to dismissal of the main petition
itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing
there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the
petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such

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4313 of 2026
cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case — of a
standard much higher than just prima facie case, the
considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable
injury forcefully tilting the balance of the case totally in
favour of the applicant may persuade the court to grant an
interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief
itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases.
The court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied
that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the court
and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice
being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the
court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice.
Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by
compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is
immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship.
The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the
court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent.
13. The present one is a case where we are fully satisfied that
a foolproof case for the grant of interim relief was made out
in favour of the petitioner in the High Court on the basis of
the material available before the Court. There was only one
nomination filed which was found to be in order and was not
withdrawn. The time appointed for filing nominations,
scrutiny and withdrawal was over. There was no contest.
Nothing had remained to be done at the meeting of the
Committee which was to be convened only for the purpose of
declaring the result. Nothing was to be put to vote. Holding of
a meeting was only for the purpose of performing the
formality of declaring the appellant as elected. In fact the
election programme, as notified, itself contemplated the
meeting at 1400 hours for voting and counting “if felt
necessary”. The provision as to quorum lost all its
significance. It did not make any difference whether there
were eight Directors to hear the declaration of result or just
four or even none. Maybe, the Directors having learnt of
there being a single valid nomination and that too not
withdrawn, and also knew that the result of the election was a
fait accompli, and therefore, did not want to take the trouble
of even coming to the venue of the meeting. Unless something
was brought to the notice of the Court either by way of
material in the shape of documents or affidavits or even by
way of a plea raised before the Court which could come in the
way of the relief being granted to the writ petitioner, in a case
of such nature, the interim relief ought to have been granted.
The writ petitioner appellant is right in submitting that the
election was for a period of one year out of which a little less
than half of the time has already elapsed and in the absence
of interim relief being granted to him there is nothing which
would survive for being given to him by way of relief at the
end of the final hearing.”

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4313 of 2026
40. Lately, the Apex Court in Shruti Manav Sharma & Anr. v.
Sunaina Singh & Ors: 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1549, while dealing with
the issue of injunction and the limits of appellate interference in such
matters, held as under:
“ 17.  The jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction though
statutory in form but equitable in substance. Section  36  of
the  Specific Relief Act, 1963  declares that preventive relief is
granted at the discretion of the court; Section 37(1) defines a
temporary injunction and subjects it to the Code. Order
XXXIX Rule 1(a) of the Code is directed, in terms, at property
“in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated”; Section
94(c) empowers the court to grant such an injunction “to
prevent the ends of justice from being defeated.” Where a
case falls outside the letter of Order XXXIX, the court's
inherent power under Section 151 supplements, though it
does not supplant, these express provisions.
18.  The remedy is, in its origin, the characteristic remedy of
the Court of Chancery, and its incidents, namely (i) it
operates in personam, (ii) it is discretionary, and (iii) it is
withheld where the common law remedy in damages is
adequate, are traceable to that origin. The width of a
discretion so conceived was addressed early. Sir George
Jessel M.R. took the view that the court's power to grant an
injunction was, in principle, unlimited wherever it would be
right or just to do so; that width was promptly qualified by
the Court of Appeal:
“I have no doubt that the words ‘just or convenient’ do not
mean that the Court can grant an injunction because it thinks
it convenient, but mean that the Court should grant an
injunction for the protection of rights or the prevention of
injury according to legal principles.”- North London Railway
Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co.,  [L.R.] 11 Q.B.D. 30 , per
Cotton L.J.
19.  The discretion is therefore, a judicial one, exercised
according to settled principles and not according to an
individual sense of convenience. It presupposes a right in the
applicant which the court is protecting. In the instant case,
the original plaintiff claimed beneficial and testamentary
interest in the family estate, now asserted on her behalf by her
legal representatives. Indian law applies the equitable
maxims to the same end. This Court held that the grant of an
interlocutory injunction is a discretion to be exercised in a
judicial manner and in accordance with the settled principles
of equity, so that the conduct of the party invoking the
jurisdiction is itself examined by the court. On the pleadings
and the findings of the learned Single Judge, it is the conduct
of defendant Nos. 4 and 9 in procuring the impugned
transfers - by undue influence practiced upon an elderly

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4313 of 2026
widow residing in their household - that is squarely in issue;
that is a matter for trial, but at the interlocutory stage it
weighs in favour of preserving, rather than permitting further
dealing with, the properties and shareholding in question.
VII. THE OBJECT OF THE ORDER: PRESERVATION OF
THE SUBJECT - MATTER FOR TRIAL
20.  The single most important proposition governing these
appeals is that an interlocutory injunction decides nothing; it
is a holding operation, so that the trial, when it comes, is not a
barren exercise. Lord Diplock's classical formulation, has
been adopted verbatim in India:
“The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the
plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he
could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable
in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at
the trial.”

22.  The Indian formulation, adopting the American Cyanamid
language, is found in Wander Ltd. (supra), where this Court
held that the interlocutory remedy is intended “to preserve
in status quo the rights of the parties which may appear on
a prima face case.” This preservative purpose is echoed in the
structure of the statute itself: Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) speaks of
property “in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated,”
and Section 94 of the Code speaks of preventing “the ends of
justice from being defeated.” This Court explained that an
interim order is intended to protect the subject-matter of the
proceedings until disposal of the case, so that the ultimate
relief, if the party succeeds, is not rendered meaningless.
*
VIII.  PRIMA FACIE CASE: A SERIOUS QUESTION TO BE
TRIED
24.  The threshold for a prima facie case is a modest one. It
does not require proof of title; it requires only that the claim not
be frivolous or vexatious - a serious question to be tried.
A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but
a case which can be said to be established if the evidence
which is led in support of the same were believed. While
determining whether a prima facie case had been made out,
the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was
possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and as to
whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at
on that evidence.
*
IX. BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
28 . The Court, while dealing with the prayer for injunction has
also to advert itself to the second essential ingredient for grant

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A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
of injunction viz. ‘balance of convenience’. In order to
determine whether the balance of convenience lies, the Court
must weigh two matters. The first is to protect the plaintiff
against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not
be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the
action if the uncertainty were to be resolved in his favour. The
second matter is that the defendant's need to be protected
against injury resulting from his having been prevented from
exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be
adequately compensated by an undertaking if the uncertainty
were to be resolved in defendant's favour at the trial.
*
IRREPARABLE INJURY
X. 
31.  The Court, while dealing with the prayer for grant of
injunction is required to consider the third essential
ingredient viz. irreparable injury. This Court in Gujarat
Bottling Co. Ltd.. (supra) has held that the Court is required to
satisfy itself that the party seeking injunction needs protection
from the consequences of apprehended injury and the injury is
such which cannot be adequately compensated by way of
damages. Thus, the Court is required to satisfy itself that in
case an injunction as prayed for is not granted, the party
seeking the same will suffer irreparable injury.
32.  A party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter
of right. The grant of interlocutory injunction is a remedy
which is discretionary in nature. However, such a discretion
has to be exercised on the touchstone of trinity test viz. prima
facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. It is
equally well settled legal proposition that the temporary
injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant
such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiffs conduct is
free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean
hands.
33.  This is precisely the injury that is irreparable in the sense
in which equity uses that word. Loss of controlling
shareholding in family companies, or the creation of third-
party rights in properties acquired with the proceeds of
disputed transfers, that a subsequent decree cannot unwind, is
the paradigm of such injury; it is not mere financial loss
capable of computation and recovery from a solvent party, of
the kind that courts, following Evans Marshall & Co.
Ltd. v. Bertola SA, have held to be adequately met by an
award of damages. No decree for money could restore to the
appellants the specific shareholding and properties in
question, once alienated to third parties during the pendency
of the suit.

XI.  THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE
INTERFERENCE

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4313 of 2026
36.  An order on an application for temporary injunction is a
discretionary one, and an appellate court does not ordinarily
substitute its own discretion for that of the court of first
instance, save where the discretion has been exercised
arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or in ignorance of the
settled principles governing the grant or refusal of such relief.
The principle laid down in Wander Ltd. (supra) which has
been approved by subsequent decisions of this Court, has been
guiding the appellate courts in the country for decades while
exercising the appellate jurisdiction considering the
correctness of the discretion and jurisdiction for grant or
refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The order of the learned
Single Judge, resting as it does on seven specific findings
addressing the nature of the original plaintiff's interest under
the Will, the doubt surrounding its finality, the plea of undue
influence, and the alter-ego character of the defendant
entities, cannot be said to be arbitrary, capricious or perverse,
nor to have been passed in ignorance of settled principle. It is,
on the contrary, an order squarely anchored in the three
conditions that govern the grant of interim injunction. The
Division Bench's substitution of its own appreciation of the
Will, of the parties' conduct, and of the applicability of
statutory provisions bearing on the final merits, for the
exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge, was not
warranted on the standard it had itself correctly recited, and
constitutes precisely the kind of interference that Wander
Ltd. (supra) forbids.
THE VICE OF THE MINI-TRIAL
XII. 
37.  Before parting with these appeals, we consider it
necessary to record our disquiet at a recurring feature of
orders passed under Order XXXIX of the Code, and of
appellate orders reviewing them, that reach this Court. Such
orders are, with increasing frequency, running into pages of
close analysis of the rival documents, weighing the probable
outcome of issues of title, undue influence or fraud, and
expressing views, in substance, on which party is likely to
succeed at trial. Orders become lengthy for a single reason:
the court passing them has, whether consciously or not,
entered upon the final merits of the controversy and conducted
what is, in substance, a mini-trial upon affidavits and
documents that properly await the leading of evidence.
38.  This is not what Order XXXIX requires, nor what the law
permits - whether of the court of first instance or of an
appellate court reviewing it. Lord Diplock's caution, that the
interlocutory stage is not the occasion to resolve conflicts of
evidence on affidavit or to decide difficult questions of law
calling for mature consideration, has been consistently
accepted in India. This Court, emphasised the court's
reluctance to decide difficult questions of law or fact at the
interlocutory stage. The scope of examination on an
application under Order XXXIX - and, equally, of an appeal

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A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
against an order made on such an application - is confined to
the limited and threshold question whether the plaintiff has
shown a serious dispute meriting investigation at trial; it does
not extend to an examination of the final effect, probative
value or ultimate merits of the documents annexed to the
pleadings, which is the trial court's task, to be undertaken
after evidence and not before.”
41. Keeping a track of the perimeter set by the Apex Court relating
to consideration of applications for injunction in the aforesaid
decisions and noticing the facts of the instant case, it would indicate
that the basic grievance raised by the petitioner was in respect of his
removal as Chairman of the Trust in question. From the perusal of the
order passed by the trial court dated 02.04.2026, it would reveal that
the trial court considered the contention of the respective parties, the
documents filed by them in support of their case, and thereafter it
found that there were glaring discrepancies relating to the minutes of
meeting dated 03.02.2026 and it creates a doubt over the authenticity
of holding of the meeting and the minutes so drawn and thus a prima
facie case was made out by the petitioner. It also took note of the fact
that the relief which was being granted was necessary to protect the
rights of the parties during trial, failing which, if the ultimate decree
comes to be passed in the suit it may not be render the relief as futile
and in such circumstances it was required of the trial court to
intervene.
42. The Trial Court also noticed that the removal of the plaintiff as
Chairman of the Trust was on the basis of an FIR lodged by other
trustees but no show-cause notice or an internal inquiry was done to
give credence to the contents of the FIR. It also noticed that there was
no agenda for the meeting allegedly held on 03.02.2026, and there
was no such agenda even for the meeting dated 16.01.2026. The
contents of the minutes of meeting indicated a different picture which
raised doubts on its authenticity.
43. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent nos. 2 and 7
suggested that the trial court delved into the issue of prima facie case,

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A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
but the issue of balance of convenience and irreparable injury was not
considered in its correct perspective but what is important to note is
that as far as the trial court is concerned, it considered the material on
record and gave its findings on the three ingredients. It is to be
equally appreciated that at the stage when the rights of the parties are
in a fluid stage, which can only be crystallized after evidence is led
during trial, hence, in such circumstances, the trial court went ahead
in considering the matter and arrive at its own conclusion, which
cannot be faulted per se, for want of proper adherence of
consideration on the issue of prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable injury.
44. In case if the said conclusions were incorrect, it was open for
the aggrieved party to escalate the matter before the Appellate Court
and the Appellate Court exercising co-extensive powers as that of a
trial court, could have re-examined the matter in light of the
observations made by the Apex Court in Sunaina Singh (supra).
45. This Court finds that the issue whether the trial court had
rightly or incorrectly granted the injunction could have been
examined by the Appellate Court by appreciating the material on
record and keeping in mind that a mini-trial is to be avoided.
46. It is in this context, this Court finds that the First Appellate
Court fell short in exercising its jurisdiction while acting as an
Appellate Court. The Appellate Court recorded four reasons for
vacating the interim injunction and for dismissal of the application,
namely:
(i) That the trial court had granted final relief at the
interim stage;
(ii) That the Appellate Court, while entertaining the
appeals, had passed an order on 10.04.2026 which was
neither challenged by the parties, and certain
observations made therein holding that the order dated

28
A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
02.04.2026 was not valid and had been stayed, would
operate as res judicata and binding on the Appellate
Court while considering the appeal on its merit;
(iii) The Appellate Court also found that even if there
were certain discrepancies regarding circulation of the
agenda and holding of the meeting, then the same was
an accidental omission, and such accidental omission
was contemplated in the trust deed itself and that itself
would not vitiate the meeting, hence, giving the
benefit to the defendants, it held that the meeting
dated 03.02.2026 and 16.01.2026 could not be faulted;
(iv) The Appellate Court further found that the
plaintiff/petitioner had not approached the court with
clean hands and had not disclosed the facts leading up
to the suit, coupled with the fact that the conduct of
the petitioner was such that the injunction should not
have been granted; moreover, the trial court had
passed an order while deciding applications under
Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. indicating the manner in
which the Trust was to be impleaded through its
representative, and since the said correction in the
array of parties had not been carried out by the
petitioner, hence on this ground also, the injunction
was discharged.
47. If the aforesaid grounds are taken for consideration, it would
reveal that the Appellate Court was obligated to test the order passed
by the trial court on the three golden ingredients of prima facie case,
balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. The Appellate Court
could have introduced its own reasoning, but before that it should
have discussed the findings of the trial court and met the reason to
show how they were erroneous, and then the Appellate Court could
record its own finding for coming to a different view.

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4313 of 2026
48. As far as the first ground regarding grant of final relief at the
interim stage is concerned, suffice to state that it is not an absolute
proposition which creates a jurisdictional embargo for the Court not
to grant an interim injunction. Actually, this has to be seen in context
with the facts of each case. Illustratively, in a suit for permanent
injunction where a plaintiff seeks a remedy against his unlawful
dispossession, primarily his interim relief and final relief is
practically the same, yet the court grant temporary injunctions
protecting a person from his forcible dispossession, without due
process of law. In such cases, the interim and the final relief is almost
identical, yet in order to do complete justice, interim orders are
granted. What is important to note is that in such cases, the
consideration of prima facie case, is of a higher level, and needless to
say, the issue of balance of convenience and irreparable injury also
has to be seen as noticed by the Apex Court in Deoraj (supra).
49. In this context, the Apex Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden v.
Coomi Sorab Warden & Others, (1990) 2 SCC 117, considered the
power of the Trial Court to grant an interim mandatory injunction
which otherwise is not usually granted. Thus, the propositions being
that a Court cannot be left powerless nor can a litigant be left
remediless. Thus, whenever compelling circumstances exist, the
Courts are expected to rise to the occasion, as per law. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid report reads as under:-
“ 10. The trial court gave an interim mandatory injunction
directing respondent 4 not to continue in possession. There could
be no doubt that the courts can grant such interlocutory
mandatory injunction in certain special circumstances. It would
be very useful to refer to some of the English cases which have
given some guidelines in granting such injunctions.
11. In Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham [(1970) 3 All ER 402:
(1970) 3 WLR 348] Megarry J. observed:
“(iii) On motion, as contrasted with the trial, the court was far
more reluctant to grant a mandatory injunction; in a normal case
the court must, inter alia, feel a high degree of assurance that at
the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted;

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A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
and this was a higher standard than was required for a
prohibitory injunction.”
12. In Evans Marshall & Co. Ltd. v. Bertola SA [(1973) 1 All ER
992: (1973) 1 WLR 349] the Court of Appeal held that:
“Although the failure of a plaintiff to show that he had a
reasonable prospect of obtaining a permanent injunction at the
trial was a factor which would normally weigh heavily against
the grant of an interlocutory injunction, it was not a factor
which, as a matter of law, precluded its grant;”
The case law on the subject was fully considered in the latest
judgment in Films Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales
Ltd. [(1986) 3 All ER 772] , Hoffmann, J. observed in that case:
(All ER pp. 780-81)
“But I think it is important in this area to distinguish between
fundamental principles and what are sometimes described as
‘guidelines’, i.e. useful generalisations about the way to deal
with the normal run of cases falling within a particular category.
The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory
injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is by
definition a risk that the court may make the ‘wrong’ decision, in
the sense of granting an injunction to a party who fails to
establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was a trial)
or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a party who
succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamental principle is
therefore that the court should take whichever course appears to
carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been
‘wrong’ in the sense I have described. The guidelines for the
grant of both kinds of interlocutory injunctions are derived from
this principle.”
Again at page 781 the learned Judge observed:
“The question of substance is whether the granting of the
injunction would carry that higher risk of injustice which is
normally associated with the grant of a mandatory injunction.
The second point is that in cases in which there can be no dispute
about the use of the term ‘mandatory’ to describe the injunction,
the same question of substance will determine whether the case is
‘normal’ and therefore within the guideline or ‘exceptional’ and
therefore requiring special treatment. If it appears to the court
that, exceptionally, the case is one in which withholding a
mandatory interlocutory injunction would in fact carry a greater
risk of injustice than granting it even though the court does not
feel a ‘high degree of assurance’ about the plaintiff's chances of
establishing his right, there cannot be any rational basis for
withholding the injunction.”
and concluded that: (All ER p.782)
“These considerations lead me to conclude that the Court of
Appeal in Locabail International Finance Ltd. v. Agroexport
[(1986) 1 All ER 901, 906: (1986) 1 WLR 657, 664] was not

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4313 of 2026
intending to ‘fetter the court's discretion by laying down any
rules which would have the effect of limiting the flexibility of the
remedy’, to quote Lord Diplock in the Cyanamid case [American
Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., (1975) 1 All ER 504, 510: 1975
AC 396, 407] . Just as the Cyanamid [American Cyanamid Co. v.
Ethicon Ltd., (1975) 1 All ER 504, 510: 1975 AC 396, 407]
guidelines for prohibitory injunctions which require a plaintiff to
show no more than an arguable case recognise the existence of
exceptions in which more is required (compare Cayne v. Global
Natural Resources plc [(1984) 1 All ER 225] ), so the guideline
approved for mandatory injunctions in Locabail [(1986) 1 All ER
901, 906: (1986) 1 WLR 657, 664] recognises that there may be
cases in which less is sufficient.”
On the test to be applied in granting mandatory injunctions on
interlocutory applications in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th
edn., Vol. 24, para 948 it is stated:
“A mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory
application as well as at the hearing, but, in the absence of
special circumstances, it will not normally be granted. However,
if the case is clear and one which the court thinks ought to be
decided at once, or if the act done is a simple and summary one
which can be easily remedied, or if the defendant attempts to
steal a march on the plaintiff, such as where, on receipt of notice
that an injunction is about to be applied for, the defendant
hurries on the work in respect of which complaint is made so that
when he receives notice of an interim injunction it is completed,
a mandatory injunction will be granted on an interlocutory
application.”
13. The law in United States is the same and it may be found in
42 American Jurisprudence 2d page 745 et seq.
14. As far the cases decided in India we may note the following
cases.
15. In one of the earliest cases in Rasul Karim v. Pirubhai
Amirbhai [ILR (1914) 38 Bom 381: 16 Bom LR 288: 24 IC 625] ,
Beaman, J. was of the view that the courts in India have no
power to issue a temporary injunction in a mandatory form but
Shah, J. who constituted a bench in that case did not agree with
Beaman, J. in this view. However, in a later Division Bench
judgment in Champsey Bhimji & Co. v. Jamna Flour Mills Co.
Ltd. [(1914) 16 Bom LR 566: 28 IC 121] two learned Judges of
the Bombay High Court took a different view from Beaman, J.
and this view is now the prevailing view in the Bombay High
Court. In M. Kandaswami Chetty v. P. Subramania Chetty [ILR
(1918) 41 Mad 208: 1917 MWN 501: 41 IC 384] , a Division
Bench of Madras High Court held that courts in India have the
power by virtue of Order XXXIX Rule 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to issue temporary injunctions in a mandatory form
and differed from Beaman J.'s view accepting the view in
Champsey Bhimji & Co. v. Jamna Flour Mills Co. [(1914) 16
Bom LR 566: 28 IC 121] In Israil v. Shamser Rahman [ILR

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4313 of 2026
(1914) 41 Cal 436: 18 CWN 176] , it was held that the High
Court was competent to issue an interim injunction in a
mandatory form. It was further held in this case that in granting
an interim injunction what the court had to determine was
whether there was a fair and substantial question to be decided
as to what the rights of the parties were and whether the nature
and difficulty of the questions was such that it was proper that
the injunction should be granted until the time for deciding them
should arrive. It was further held that the court should consider
as to where the balance of convenience lies and whether it is
desirable that the status quo should be maintained. While
accepting that it is not possible to say that in no circumstances
will the courts in India have any jurisdiction to issue an ad
interim injunction of a mandatory character, in Nandan Pictures
Ltd. v. Art Pictures Ltd. [AIR 1956 Cal 428] , a Division Bench
was of the view that if the mandatory injunction is granted at all
on an interlocutory application it is granted only to restore the
status quo and not granted to establish a new state of things
differing from the state which existed at the date when the suit
was instituted.
16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus
granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last
non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy
until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to
compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or
the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party
complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a
party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may
cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against
whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party
who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great
injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain
guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of
a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally
required for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which
normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking
such relief.
17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an
interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the
sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light
of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above
guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules,
and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action,
applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such
injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.”

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4313 of 2026
50. Thus, to state as a matter of bland proposition that an interim
relief which is somewhat similar to the final relief cannot be granted
at all would be an incorrect enunciation of law. It was open for the
Appellate Court to have discharged the injunction provided it would
have considered the facts as well as the material on record and dealt
with the findings recorded by the trial court. Not having done so,
merely applying a proposition without even noticing whether it
applied to the present facts and circumstances or not. Thus, the
Appellate Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction, in accordance with
law.
51. From the perusal of the order impugned passed by the appellate
court, it would indicate that the First Appellate Court reproduced the
order passed by the trial court in extenso . It thereafter reproduced the
interim order passed by the Appellate Court dated 10.04.2026 at the
time of admission of the appeals. The Appellate Court recorded a
finding that since the order dated 10.04.2026 indicated that the order
passed by the trial court could not sustain, and as an interim measure
the operation of the order dated 02.04.2026 was stayed, and the said
interim order had not been challenged or set aside by a higher Court,
hence the said order would have a binding impact on the Appellate
Court while deciding the appeal on merits, is per se erroneous.
52. It is too well settled that any observations made by the court at
the time of entertaining a petition/an appeal is purely tentative in
nature and does not impact the merits, nor binds the court at the time
of final hearing. This approach of the First Appellate Court reflects
poorly on the understanding of legal propositions and its
applicability.
53. Another fallacy in the reasoning of the Appellate Court is that
the very ground upon which the Appellate Court was convinced to
discharge the injunction order granted by the trial court i.e. to say,
that a final order could not have been granted at the interim stage then

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A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
on the same analogy the First Appellate Court while passing the
interim order dated 10.04.2026 could not have stayed the operation of
the order dated 02.04.2026, thereby granting final relief at the interim
stage. This has been expressed only to illustrate the danger faced by
the Court when it applies legal propositions in abstract and divorced
from the factual matrix of a case as this has a propensity to lead to
traversity of justice in the name of upholding the law.
54. This Court also finds that the First Appellate Court considered
the controversial minutes of meeting and found the same to be
protected on account of 'accidental omission'. This plea of 'accidental
omission' has been lifted from the text of the trust deed; however,
there were no pleadings of any of the defendants invoking the said
clause in their defence. Even otherwise, the issue as to whether there
was any accidental omission or not was for a party to plead and
establish during trial, and this itself could not have been taken as a
ground for pre-judging the issue at the interim stage and that too by
the Appellate Court considering the validity of an order passed by the
trial court granting interim injunction especially when this was not a
plea taken before the Trial Court.
55. The other reason adopted by the Appellate Court regarding the
plaintiff not coming to court with clean hands is also an issue which
should have been considered appropriately in the given facts and
circumstances, and the Appellate Court ought to have recorded a
finding as to the nexus of the facts allegedly not disclosed vis-à-vis
the right of the party to seek injunction. In case if the nexus was
rooted to an extent which dis-entitled a party to seek injunction, then
it could have been a valid consideration for the court to consider
whether an injunction ought or not to have been granted. However,
the Appellate Court has failed in its obligation to consider this aspect
of the matter while passing the impugned order, but has taken it as a
ground upon which it discharged the injunction granted by Trial
Court.

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A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
56. In this background, an important aspect arises and which
should have been considered by the Appellate Court, and that is
whether a Court would be justified in refusing to grant interim relief,
ignoring the pleadings and its supporting material, as in this case
relating to the removal of the plaintiff from the office of Chairman of
the Trust, on the plea of misconduct of the plaintiff raised by the
defendants thereby converting the proceedings into a trial in disguise
of the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff, even without a counter
claim or a prayer of counter injunction.
57. Much emphasis was laid by the learned senior counsel for the
respondent that the conduct of the petitioner was not conducive for
him to hold the position of the Chairman of the Trust and the
fraudulent acts of the petitioner as pointed out before the trial court,
were not noticed nor its impact on the right of the petitioner to seek
an injunction, was considered.
58. In response, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also
pointed out that even the conduct of the respondents was not above
board, inasmuch as allegations were leveled both against the
petitioner and the respondent No. 1, but the respondents are pressing
the allegations only against the petitioner, and the same conduct of
the respondent No. 1 appears to have been condoned and this in itself
indicates the mala fides of the respondents, who too have not
approached the Court with clean hands. In case if the respondents
were seeking vacation of the interim order, then it was the duty of the
court to have considered the conduct of the respondent as well.
59. Be that as it may, the Appellate Court should have probed
whether the status of the plaintiff as the Chairman of the Trust was an
established fact and if so then whether the defendants had the legal
authority to remove him and as to whether the defendants had
adopted the agreed procedure as provided in the Trust deed or law, to
remove the plaintiff from his office of Chairman of the Trust.

36
A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
60. It was also important for the Appellate Court to determine
whether an allegation of misconduct against a trustee by itself
amounted to legal removal and the defendants could convert the
allegations of misconduct per se into a defence, for removal of
plaintiffs, as a Chairman of the Trust and whether the trust deed or
the law applicable to the parties, gives a right to remove the plaintiff
as per the procedure prescribed and whether such procedure was
followed. This ought to have been seen in light of the material placed
on record by the respective parties and its prima facie consideration
without holding a mini-trial.
61. Unfortunately, the issues arising in the two appeals were not
considered by the Appellate Court in its correct perspective and the
reasons adopted by the Appellate Court were not germane or cogent
as it lacked proper application of the legal propositions applicable to
the facts and circumstances of the case.
62. This Court is conscious of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India and in exercise thereof and it is not expected
to enter into questions of fact or re-appraise the material or evidence
on record to substitute its own findings. Hence, this Court cannot
enter into the merits of the matter and give its own findings as that
would amount to sitting as a court of appeal over the judgment of the
Appellate Court. The Apex Court in Nandi Infrastructure Corridor
Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745 ,
in paragraph 35, after taking note of several earlier decisions on the
aforesaid point, has culled out the principles as under:
“ 35 .   In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as
follows:
a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised
unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not
vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an
unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals.

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A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article
cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own
judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which
is not apparent on the face of the record.
c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court
of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to
correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is
justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own
decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.”
CONCLUSION:-
63. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is satisfied that the First
Appellate Court has not considered the appeals in its correct
perspective, hence the order impugned cannot be sustained. It is a fit
case where the order impugned dated 08.07.2026 deserves to be set
aside and the appeals be remitted to the First Appellate Court for
decision afresh, where the appeals shall stand restored on the board.
The parties shall appear before the First Appellate Court on
09.09.2026, on which date the Appellate Court shall rehear the parties
and decide the appeal afresh preferably within a period of three
weeks keeping in view the observations made by this Court. It is also
clarified that the Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction shall
consider the plea of the respective parties on merits to adjudge
whether the petitioner was entitled or not for relief of interim
injunction, keeping in mind the observations made above.
64. Since the matter stands remanded to the Appellate Court for
decision afresh and the order dated 08.07.2026 is set aside, hence, its
effect would be that the order of the Trial court would revive. Thus,
in order to protect the competing interest of the parties and noticing
that the dispute also affects the functioning of hospitals and a medical
college run by the Public Charitable Trust, accordingly, to protect and
ensure accountability of the parties without jeopardizing the
functioning of the Trust & its institutions, it is provided that none of

38
A-227 No. 4093 of 2026 &
4313 of 2026
the bank accounts of the Trust would be operated singly or jointly by
the petitioner and the respondent no. 1 till the decision of the Appeal.
This Court directs that the said accounts of the Trust and the two
institutions shall be operated jointly, by the petitioner and Sri Vikram
Singh a founder trustee and any amount withdrawn would be only for
the basic purposes of payment of salaries to the employees, staff and
Doctors of the Hospital and the Trust and any recurring dues, if any,
of banks and other financial institutions, payment of public utility
bills, statutory dues, taxes or other like dues, and each withdrawal or
payment so made shall be placed before the Appellate Court
indicating the details, nature and purpose of the payment so made.
This arrangement will be operative till the decision of the Appellate
Court and thereafter it would follow and abide with the order to be
passed by the Appellate Court.
65. Subject to the aforesaid directions and protection, the two
petitions bearing (A-227) No. 4093 of 2026 & (A-227) No. 4313 of
2026 are allowed . The impugned order dated 08.07.2026 passed in
Appeal Nos. 79 of 2026 and 80 of 2026 shall stand set aside. In the
facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
(Jaspreet Singh, J)
Order Date :- 01.09.2026
Asheesh
Digitally signed by :-
ASHEESH KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench