JAMMU AND KASHMIR BANK LIMITED AND ORS. vs MR. NASEER AHMAD SHEIKH(sr.ct.ch)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR


LPA No. 233/2025
Reserved on: 16.04.2026
Pronounced on: 14.05.2026

Uploaded on: 14.05.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full

1. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd
Through its Chairman, Corporate
Headquarter, M.A. Road, Srinagar.

2. President Supervision and Controlling
Division (S&C) J&K Bank, Corporate,
Headquarter, Srinagar.

3. Disciplinary Authority, J&K Bank

…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
Corporate Headquarter, Srinagar.

4. Executive Manager, S&C, J&K Bank
Corporate Headquarters, Srinagar.

Through: Mr. Shafqat Nazir, Adv. with
Ms Heena Baqal, Adv.
Vs.

Naseer Ahmad Sheikh
S/o Sheikh Ghulam Ahmad
R/o Sheikh ul Alam Colony, Nowgam,
District Srinagar
...Respondent(s)

Through: Mr. Shuja-ul-Haq, Adv.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE

J U D G M E N T

Per Sanjeev Kumar: J
1. This intra-court appeal by the Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd, is
directed against an order and judgement dated 24th of July 2025 passed by
the learned Single Judge of this court in WP (C) No. 2887/2022 titled
Naseer Ahmed Sheikh vs. J&K Bank Ltd. & Ors, whereby the court has
allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent to throw challenge to an
st
order dated 1 of April 2022.

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2. Before we advert to the grounds of challenge urged by learned counsel
appearing for the appellants, we deem it proper to narrate few facts as are
relevant to the controversy raised in this appeal.
3. The respondent has retired on superannuation from the appellant-Bank
as Branch Head. He was placed under suspension by the appellant-Bank on
th
17 March 2021 in contemplation of an enquiry into various acts of
omission and commission alleged to have been committed by him during his
tenure as Branch Head, Branch Office Barzulla and Branch Office Rangreth.
4. With a view to investigate the allegations, the appellant-Bank
conducted a preliminary enquiry which culminated into the issuance of a
st
formal charge sheet to the respondent on 21 May 2021. This was the charge
sheet pertaining to his misconduct allegedly committed by him while
working as Branch Head of Branch Office, Rangreth.
5. It seems that during the course of enquiry, some serious acts of grave
omission and commission attributable to the appellant during his tenure as
Branch Head at Branch Office Barzulla, Srinagar, also came to light.
Consequently, another charge sheet dated 28th June 2021, was also issued
by the Bank to the respondent.
6. After receiving reply to the charge sheet, the disciplinary authority
having found the same unsatisfactory ordered a disciplinary/departmental
enquiry into the charges and appointed Mr. Hayat Mohammad Rather as
nd
Enquiry Officer vide order dated 22 June 2021. The second enquiry in
respect of Branch Office, Barzulla was handed over to Mr. Gulzar Ahmad
who was appointed as Enquiry Officer by the disciplinary authority vide
th
order dated 9 August 2021. While the departmental enquiries were going
th
on, the respondent attained the age of superannuation on 30 June 2021.
Notwithstanding the superannuation of respondent, two enquiries, initiated
while he was in service, proceeded, in which the appellant-Bank claims to
have afforded full opportunity to the respondent to defend. On conclusion of
the enquiries, the Enquiry Officer submitted their respective enquiry reports
on 07.09.2021 and 20.09.2021 to the disciplinary authority. In the said
reports, all imputations against the respondent stood proved except
imputation No. 4 of Article I of the charge sheet dated 28th of June 2021.
The disciplinary authority upon consideration clubbed both sets of charges

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and the finding returned by the Enquiry Officers for the purpose of issuance
of a composite show cause notice. Consequently, vide letter dated 20th of
November 2021, said composite show cause notice was served upon the
respondent to elicit his reply to the proposed penalty. The respondent not
only filed his reply thereto but also sought a personal hearing which was
th
granted to him by the disciplinary authority on 4 of January 2022.
7. The disciplinary authority, after considering the written submissions
and oral arguments advanced by the Presenting Officer, reply of the
respondent, material on record including the enquiry reports, passed a
st
reasoned/speaking order dated 1 of April 2022 whereby respondent was
dismissed from service of the bank. The dismissal order was made operative
from the date of his superannuation, i.e., 30th of June 2021. However, the
period of suspension of respondent from 17th of March 2021 till 30th of
June 2021 was not reckoned for any service or retiral benefits except for
payment of subsistence allowance already drawn by the respondent. The
Bank also reserved its right to initiate criminal proceedings against the
respondent for breach of trust, misfeasance and for recovery of his
outstanding liabilities towards the bank.
8. Feeling aggrieved of his order of dismissal, the respondent preferred
an appeal before the Appellate Authority of the Bank, which upon
consideration was dismissed vide order dated 9th of November 2022.
Having found no favour from the Appellate Authority, the respondent filed
WP (C) No. 2887/2022 before the Writ Court seeking inter alia the
following reliefs.
i. By issuance of writ, order or direction one in the
nature of certiorari, the order dated 01.04.2022
read with order dated 09.11.2022 issued by
respondent-Bank whereby the petitioner has been
dismissed from the services of Bank with effect
from 30.06.2021 i.e. the date on which the
petitioner retired from the service of the Bank on
superannuation be quashed.
By issuance of writ, order or direction one in the
ii.
nature of mandamus, the respondents be

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commanded to release all pensionary benefits and
other post retiral benefits in favour of the
petitioner.
9. The writ petition filed by the respondent was contested by the
appellants, who after filing a short affidavit also submitted detailed counter
affidavit, meeting each and every allegation made by the respondent in his
writ petition. The respondent also filed his rejoinder to controvert the stand
of the appellant-Bank.
10. The Writ Court, having considered the rival contentions and perused
the material on record, came to the conclusion that the charges framed
against the respondent were not sufficiently proved and that as per Rule 337
(C) of OSM-2000, an employee is expected to discharge his duties and
exercise the powers vested in him by applying his own independent
judgement, except in cases where he acts under directions of his superior
officer, in which cases, he is required to obtain directions in writing,
wherever practical, and if not immediately possible, to obtain written
confirmation of such directions at the earliest opportunity. The Writ Court
also found on facts that the TODs, five in number were sanctioned by the
respondent under verbal instructions of the Vice President (Central Kashmir)
who had previously also approved such TODs in the same account earlier.
The Writ Court, therefore, held that sanctioning of TODs in favour of
various loanees without seeking prior approval of the competent authority
was no infraction of any rule and regulation and, therefore, respondent could
not have been charged for such acts. The court also took note of the fact that
as regards another set of TODs, petitioner had applied for post-facto sanction
to the Zonal Office (ZOK Central) on 11th of September 2019, but did not
receive any response therefrom. The Enquiry Officer though took up the
matter with the Zonal Office to verify as to whether it had received any
proposal for post-facto sanction of TODs and had obtained a reply from one
Azad Ahmed Banday, the Senior Executive (Advances) denying receipt of
such proposals, yet gave no opportunity to the respondent for cross-
examination of Mr. Banday. On these grounds and few others, the Writ
Court found that the respondent had not been provided an adequate
opportunity of being heard and, therefore, the enquiries culminating into the

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order of dismissal were vitiated in law. This is how the Writ Court allowed
the writ petition filed by the respondent and quashed the order of dismissal
of the respondent in terms of its judgement which is impugned in this appeal.
11. The impugned judgement is challenged by the appellant-Bank inter
alia on the following grounds.
(1) That the Writ Court has failed to appreciate that the
constitutional courts do not sit in appeal over the
enquiries conducted by the Enquiry Officers in so
far as the merits of the allegations are concerned
and that the scope of judicial review in respect of
departmental enquiries is limited only to
ascertaining whether the enquiry has been
conducted in a fair, reasonable and non-arbitrary
manner. Ignoring the settled legal position, the Writ
Court ventured into testing the enquiries on merits
and came to the conclusions different from the one
arrived at by the Enquiry Officers on the basis of
evaluation of evidence collected during such
enquiries.
(2) That the Writ Court erred in understanding and
interpreting Rule 337 (C) of the Officers Service
Manual-2000 to conclude that respondent had
sanctioned several TODs under verbal instructions
from his seniors, and that was permissible under
the rule. The Writ Court did not appreciate that
Rule 337 (C) provided protection only to an
employee who had acted under the direction of his
superior and had promptly obtained written
confirmation of such directions at the earliest
possible opportunity. The Writ Court also did not
appreciate that respondent, being a Branch
Manager, was under an obligation to perform his
duties in strict compliance of the rules, regulations,
circular instructions, and the business practices of

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the Bank, and that respondent extended
unauthorized TODs, thereby exposing the Bank to
serious financial losses.
(3) That the Writ Court erred in taking the view that
the punishment imposed by the appellant-Bank on
the respondent was not commensurate with the
lapse/misconduct attributed to respondent. The
court dismissed the order of dismissal without
leaving it open to the appellant-Bank to impose a
different or a lesser punishment upon the
respondent for his proved misconduct as an officer
of the Bank.
(4) That the Writ Court also failed to appreciate that in
the absence of any specific allegations of malafides
against the Enquiry Officers, there was no warrant
to interfere with the findings of fact returned by the
Enquiry Officers on the basis of evidence that was
before them.
(5) That the Writ Court has also erroneously held that
the respondent was denied a fair opportunity, in
that, despite a specific demand made by him,
respondent was not provided with certain
documents. The court did not appreciate that the
demand for certain documents and information was
made by the respondent after the conclusion of the
enquiry and not during the course of the enquiry.


12 . Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent supports the
judgement impugned on the elaborate reasoning given by the Writ Court. He
would argue that the sanctioning of TODs was as per the practice of the
Bank. He would submit that the TODs were sanctioned in favour of various
beneficiaries under the oral instructions of the superiors, and even a post-
facto sanction was sought in writing immediately after disbursement of the
TODs. He would, therefore, submit that the Writ Court has rightly
appreciated the entire controversy and concluded that the allegations

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attributed to the respondent were not proved and, in any case, did not
amount to any misconduct warranting the extreme penalty of dismissal from
service.
13. Mr. Shuja-ul-Haq, learned counsel for respondent would place a
strong reliance on 337(C) of OSM-2000 to substantiate his arguments. He
would also argue that the order of dismissal could not have been passed by
the appellant-Bank after the superannuation of the respondent. He would
argue that only an employee who is in service can be dismissed, and not an
employee who has been superannuated. The existence of master-servant
relationship, he argues, is a condition precedent for ordering the dismissal.
14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
on record, following questions arise for determination:
1. Whether an employee against whom a disciplinary
enquiry is initiated while he was in service can be
dismissed from service by passing an order after
his superannuation. What is the true scope of
interference by the Constitutional Court into the
departmental/disciplinary proceedings and the
nature of punishment imposed pursuant thereto.
2. Whether the enquiry proceedings conducted by the
appellant-Bank against the respondent were
vitiated in law, and whether the order of dismissal
suffers from any perversity or is otherwise
disproportionate to the misconduct proved.


Question No. 1 .

15. In so far as the question whether an employee against whom a
disciplinary enquiry is initiated while he was in service can be dismissed
from service by passing an order after his superannuation is concerned, the
legal position is well settled. If the extant service rules/regulations permit
continuance of disciplinary proceedings initiated against an officer/employee
before he had attained the age of superannuation, those can be continued and
taken to its logical end even after he had attained the age of superannuation.
In this regard, it would be worthwhile to advert to Rule 259 of the Officers’
Service Manual-2000 which for facility of reference is set out below:


“259. The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings
have been initiated will cease to be in services on the date
of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will
continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are
concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof.

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The concerned officer will not receive any pay and/or
allowance after the date of superannuation including
subsistence allowance. He/She will also not be entitled
for the payment of retirement benefits till the proceedings
are completed and final order passed thereon. On
conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings against an
Officer after the date of his superannuation, the Bank
may impose on him any of the penalties as provided in
Rule 372 of J&K Bank Officers Recruitment,
Discipline, conduct and Appeal Rules 2000 . The Bank
can make recoveries from his terminal benefits in the
event the Officer is found guilty of having caused
monetary loss to the Bank. Provided that a fresh show
cause notice is issued to the superannuated employee
calling upon him as to why his retirement benefits should
not be forfeited/reduced in view of the charges proved
against him in disciplinary proceedings. Before making
such an order the Officer concerned shall also be offered
an opportunity of being heard. Further any reduction in
the pension of the Officer (whether permanently or for a
specific period) fully or partially shall be ordered in
accordance with the provisions of Pension Regulations in
force at that time.”

16. The disciplinary authority has powers to impose penalty of
dismissal/major penalty upon the delinquent employee even after his
superannuation, provided the disciplinary proceedings were initiated while
such employee was in service. It is thus trite that if disciplinary proceedings
under the relevant rules of service have been initiated against a delinquent
employee before he ceased to be in service, then by the operation of or by
virtue of any of the rules or regulations, the disciplinary proceedings may
continue and be brought to the logical conclusion as if the officer was in
service. Such deemed continuation in service shall only be for the purposes
of continuance and conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings.
17. It is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
that the regulations of the Officers Service Manual permit continuation of
the disciplinary proceedings if initiated while the delinquent bank officer
was in service and such disciplinary proceedings could be taken to logical
conclusion which may include imposition of penalty of dismissal. For the
purposes of continuation of the proceedings, such employee shall be deemed
to be in service. This legal position was elaborately discussed and reiterated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent case of Virinder Pal Singh vs.
Punjab and Sind Bank 2026 INSC 266. While interpreting the similar

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regulations of the Punjab and Sind Bank , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
came to the conclusions which are set out in para 36 of the judgment which
reads as under:
“36. On a survey of the decisions cited and discussed
above, in our view, what is settled is that if the extant
service Rules/Regulations permit continuance of the
disciplinary proceedings, initiated against an officer/
employee before he had attained the age of
superannuation, those can be continued and brought to its
logical conclusion even after he had attained the age of
superannuation. And where, pursuant to such
proceedings, the ultimate penalty imposed is of dismissal,
there may be no technical difficulty in its implementation
as it may result in forfeiture of pension and other retiral
dues. Therefore, in such an event, the question of
entitlement to pensionary benefits may not arise.
However, where the punishment imposed is such which
may, instead of forfeiture of pension in its entirety, result
in mere reduction or adjustment of pension, or recovery
from post retiral dues, the Court may have to consider
whether such punishment is implementable or not, post-
retirement.”

18. So far as true scope of interference by the Constitutional Court in
disciplinary proceedings is concerned, the issue is no longer res-integra.
There is long line of precedents laying down the parameters to be borne in
mind while examining the disciplinary proceedings in the exercise of
extraordinary writ jurisdiction. It is trite law that the courts do not act as an
appellate court and re-assess the evidence led in a disciplinary enquiry nor
do they interfere on the ground that, on evaluation of material on record,
another view was also possible.
19. Once it is demonstrated that the enquiry has been fairly and properly
held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence or of its reliable nature or its credibility shall not be a
ground for interfering with the findings in the departmental enquiry. It is
only where the enquiry is found to be based on no evidence or where it
clearly suffers from perversity, it may invite the intervention of the court.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had the occasion to re-survey the case
law on the point in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors Vs. Bhupendra
Singh (Civil Appeal Nos. 8546-8549 of 2024) decided on 8th August 2024.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court having considered its earlier judgments in the

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case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723,
a 3-Judge Bench Judgment, titled State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal
Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249, State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Chitra
Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557 and many others came to the conclusion
that power of judicial review is not directed against the decision, but is
confined to the decision making process.
20. The courts do not sit in judgment on merits of the decision of the
disciplinary authority. So, it is absolutely not open to the High Court to re-
appreciate and re-appraise the evidence led before the enquiry officer and
examine the findings recorded by the enquiry officer as a Court of Appeal
and reach its own conclusions. The decision of the disciplinary authority
cannot be lightly interfered with unless it is found totally illogical or suffers
from procedural impropriety or shocks to the conscience of the Court, in the
sense, that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards. At this stage, we wish
to set out para 7 of a Three Judge Bench Judgment in the case of Sree Rama
Rao (supra) which reads thus.
“7. There is no warrant for the view expressed by the
High Court that in considering whether a public officer is
guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied,
and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is
competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not
constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a
public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf,
and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,
and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
Where there is some evidence, which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent Officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the
evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere
where the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner

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inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or
by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or; where the conclusion on the very face
of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held,
the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal
evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”

Question No. 2.
21. With a view to finding out as to whether the enquiry proceedings
conducted by the appellant-bank were vitiated in law and that whether the
order of dismissal suffers from any perversity or is otherwise
disproportionate to the misconduct proved, we went through the entire
enquiry record.
22. From perusal of the entire enquiry record, we could find that all legal
statutory and procedural requirements have been followed by the appellant-
bank. Clear and unequivocal charges were framed in the twin enquiries,
those were initiated against the respondent and he was provided an adequate
opportunity to defend himself. It, therefore, cannot be the case of the
respondent that the inquiries conducted by the enquiry officers are in
violation of principles of natural justice. There is ample documentary
evidence produced by the Bank before the enquiry officer to substantiate the
charges.
23. As a matter of fact, the respondent has not disputed his acts and
omissions of disbursing huge loans beyond his authority to various
borrowers without ensuring their repayment. The defence of post-facto
approval sought by him has been rightly rejected by the enquiry officer after
having got the confirmation from the concerned office that no such request
for post-facto approvals were ever received from the respondent. The plea of
the respondent which has, to a great extent, weighed with the learned Single
Judge that the respondent was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine

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one Azad Ahmed Banday, Senior Executive, (Advances Department) and,
therefore, the principle of natural justice were violated, is without any
substance and deserves to be noticed for rejection only.
24. Needless to say that Mr. Azad Ahmed Banday was never examined by
the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer had only addressed an email to the
Zonal Office of the Bank which was responded to by the then Senior
Executive, (Advances Department) namely Azad Ahmed Banday, who only
confirmed that his office had not received any post-facto sanction of the
proposals claimably submitted by the respondent after disbursement of
TODs beyond his authorization. The response to the email was only an
official document issued by the Zonal Office on the basis of available
record.
25. Since Mr. Azad Ahmed Banday did not enter the witness box, as such,
there was no question of allowing respondent to cross-examine him.
Otherwise also, there is no request ever made by the respondent to summon
either the record from the Zonal Office or Mr. Azad Ahmed Banday for
examination.
26. In the face of the fact that petitioner never dispute the grant of TODs
to various customers of the Bank beyond his authorization, there was hardly
any necessity to go into this aspect of the matter. It was the defense of the
respondent before the enquiry officer that with regard to the proposals for
grant of TODs beyond his authorization, the respondent had sought post-
facto sanction from the Zonal Office. The onus was, thus, on the respondent
to prove that he had actually sought post-facto approvals of his proposals by
leading some documentary evidence.
27. From the enquiry record, it clearly transpires that there is enough
irrebuttable documentary evidence on record which goes on to show that the
respondent indulged in indiscriminate allowing of overdrafts without
sanction from the competent authority. The TODs were granted by the
respondent without verifying the credit worthiness of the borrowers, as a
result whereof, several TOD accounts turned NPA causing huge financial
loss to the Bank. He continued this practice at both the branches i.e., Branch
Barzulla and Branch Rangreth where he served as Branch Head. There is no
allegation by the respondent that the enquiry officers who conducted the
disciplinary proceedings against him were either biased or were in any

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manner inimical to him. He also does not complain of any lack of
opportunity provided to him to defend himself in the enquiries.
28. From the record, it clearly transpires that elaborate enquiry providing
every opportunity to the respondent to defend was conducted as per the
regulations of the Bank.
29. Needless to say that a bank officer holds a position of trust as he deals
with public funds. Sanction of loan beyond one's power or not ensuring end-
use of the loan amounts to financial irregularity which exposes the bank to
financial risk. The penal action on proof of such a charge cannot be
questioned merely because no loss is suffered by the Bank. This is so
observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Virinder Pal Singh
(supra). Para 19 and 20 are relevant and quite apposite to the case in hand
and, therefore, are set out below:
“19. Besides, a bank officer holds a position of trust as
he deals with public funds. Sanction of loan beyond one’s
power, or not ensuring end-use of the loan, amounts to
financial irregularity which exposes the Bank to financial
risk. Therefore, penal action on proof of such a charge
cannot be questioned merely because no loss is suffered
by the Bank.


20. Moreover, where an employee of a Bank handles
money of depositors /customers/investors, it
is Disciplinary Authority-Cum-Regional Manager and
others v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC
69 most essential for him to be cautious and not reckless
in discharge of his duties because he deals with the
money for and on behalf of his employer. Every such
employee/officer is, therefore, required to take all
possible steps to protect the interests of his employer. He
must, therefore, discharge his duties with utmost sense of
integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and must
ensure that he does nothing, which is unbecoming of an
employee/officer. Although good conduct and discipline
is expected from every employee/officer of an institution,
but it is required more when the institution deals with
money of customers/depositors/investors. Any dereliction
in discharge of duties by such an employee or officer,
whether by way of negligence/casualness, or with
deliberate intention, constitutes misconduct.”

30. The respondent being a responsible officer of the Bank was found
guilty of indulging in reckless lending and accommodated the parties beyond
his delegated powers in utter disregard to circular instructions issued by the

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bank from time to time. He allowed the TOD facilities without any sanction
of the competent authority, and as a sequel thereto, several accounts turned
NPA within short span of time. Besides, before allowing the TODs,
respondent did not bother to obtain sanction from the competent authority
nor did he seek post-facto confirmation of his unauthorized actions. It was
also found established that respondent was habitual of granting TOD
facilities without obtaining any sanction from competent authority. This he
did in both the branches where he worked as Head of the Branch.
31. With regard to his acts and omissions committed by him in the twin
branches of the Bank, two separate enquiries were instituted which were
conducted by the respective enquiry officers in full regard to the rules and
regulations of the bank and observing the principles of natural justice.
32. The enquiry reports were elaborately considered by the disciplinary
authority. Not only respondent was put on show cause notice, but he was
also given a personal hearing. The disciplinary authority passed a detailed
order giving its reasons for taking the extreme action against the respondent,
i.e., his dismissal from services of the bank with effect from the date he
attained the age of superannuation.
33. In a nutshell, we may say with a sense of certainty that from perusal of
entire record in backdrop of submissions made by the learned counsel for the
respondent, we could find no perversity in the findings returned by the
enquiry officers nor did we find any procedural irregularity committed by
the disciplinary authority in disposing of the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against the respondent.
34. Regard being had to the limited scope of interference with the
disciplinary proceedings explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to
accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the
enquiry proceedings were vitiated in law and, therefore, the order of
dismissal passed by the Bank is not sustainable.
35. Last, but not the least, we would like to deal with Rule 337-(c) of
OSM-2000 which for ready reference is reproduced hereunder:-
“337-c. No employee shall, in the performance of his
official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on
him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when

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he is acting under the direction of his official superior;
and shall where he is acting under such direction, obtain
the directions in writing wherever practicable and where
it is not practicable to obtain the direction in writing he
shall obtain written confirmation of the direction as soon
thereafter as possible”.

36. The rule has not been correctly appreciated by the learned Single
Judge. From a careful reading of the rule reproduced above, it is evident that
what is conceded in favour of an employee in this rule is that in the
performance of his official duties or in the exercise of power conferred on
him, he shall not act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is
acting under the directions of his official superiors. Rule further provides
that where such employee is acting under the directions of his seniors, he
shall obtain the directions in writing wherever practical and where it is not
practicable to obtain the written directions, he shall obtain a written
confirmation of his action as soon as possible. The rule deals with a situation
where an employee is acting under the directions of his superiors.
Ordinarily, such employee should insist for written directions. However,
where it is not practicable to obtain the directions in writing immediately, he
would obtain written confirmation of the directions as soon as thereafter
possible. Rule does not permit an employee to act otherwise than in his best
judgment nor does it permit the employee to act beyond his authority.
37. It is true that in the instant case, the respondent claimed that he had
allowed various TODs under the verbal directions of the Vice President
(Central), but there is nothing brought on record by him to show that
immediately on complying the said direction, he sought written confirmation
of such directions. His plea that he sought post-facto approval of the grant of
TODs beyond his capacity also could not be proved by him during the
course of enquiry rather the Zonal Office confirmed on the basis of records
that it had not received any such proposal for post-facto approval. Be that as
it is, the fact remains that the enquiry officers have returned finding on the
basis of oral and documentary evidence produced before them and we
cannot sit in judgment over the said findings of facts more particularly when
the same have not been shown to be perverse or based on no evidence.

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38. Viewed from any angle, neither the inquiries conducted by the enquiry
officer nor the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate
authority can be found fault with.
39. For all these reasons, we find merit in this appeal, the same is
th
accordingly allowed . The impugned judgment dated 24 July 2025 passed
by the Writ Court is set-aside and the writ petition dismissed.

(SANJAY PARIHAR) (SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE JUDGE
SRINAGAR:
14.05.2026
Altaf


Whether approved for reporting? Yes

LPA No. 233/2025 Page 16 of 16
Mohd Altaf Nima
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and authenticity of this
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14.05.2026