Rc Singla vs Geeta Rastogi & Ors.

$~58
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 31.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010403942026
+ RC.REV. 313/2026, CM APPL. 58051/2026 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 58052/2026 (Ex.)

RC SINGLA .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Rekha Rustagi, Advocate.

versus

GEETA RASTOGI & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: None.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
1
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , against the Order and Judgment
2
dated 09.06.2026 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-
3
Rent Controller, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi ,
4
whereby the Eviction Petition, being RC ARC 72/2023 , titled Geeta
Rastogi and Ors vs. RC Sjngla, filed by the Respondents against the
Petitioner, has been allowed, and the Petitioner has been directed to
vacate the tenanted premises, i.e., Shop No. 3 on the ground floor of
5
property bearing no. E-4/10, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-110051 .

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
learned RC
4
Eviction Petition
5
Subject Premises
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 1 of 14

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner would
submit that the challenge to the Impugned Order is confined to two
aspects.
3. Firstly, she would submit that the Respondents had initially
projected the requirement of the Subject Premises for establishing a
Gymnasium-cum-Fitness Centre, whereas the subsequent material
placed on record would indicate that the same are now being used for
running an eatery.
4. She would, therefore, submit that the very purpose for which
the Subject Premises were sought has undergone a change and, in
view of the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai &
6
Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad , the requirement must continue to subsist
throughout the proceedings and up to the passing of the final decree.
5. She would further submit that there was no specific pleading in
the Eviction Petition with regard to the dependency of the persons for
whose benefit the premises were allegedly required.
6. The second limb of the challenge relates to the requirement
projected by the Respondents for the grandsons of Petitioner No.1 and
the sons of Petitioner Nos.2 and 4.
7. Learned counsel would submit that the said requirement is not
bona fide , particularly since the aforesaid persons are not wholly
dependent upon the Respondents for their livelihood and are already
engaged in their respective occupations or activities.
8. She would, therefore, submit that the learned RC has erred in
accepting the requirement projected by the Respondents as bona fide
and in consequently directing eviction of the Petitioner.
9. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 2 of 14

Petitioner and, with her able assistance, perused the Impugned Order
as also the material placed on record.
10. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
11. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
7
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
8 9
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
12. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
10
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
11
Grover .
13. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,

6
(1983) 3 SCC 103
7
(1998) 8 SCC 119
8
(2014) 9 SCC 78
9
(2022) 6 SCC 30
10
2024:DHC:9322
11
2025:DHC:11285
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 3 of 14

including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

14. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 4 of 14

Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
16. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioners against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
17. Since the challenge in the present Petition is confined to the
aforesaid two aspects, it would be apposite to first advert to the
relevant findings returned by the learned RC on these issues. The
relevant portions of the Impugned Order, which deal with the aspects
sought to be canvassed before this Court, are extracted hereinbelow:
“ *
33) As far as the fact of ownership of the petitioners qua the
tenanted premises is concerned and as far as the fact of relationship
of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondent is
concerned, then the same is not in dispute in the present matter.
Thus, the only question which remains to be determined is as to
whether the projected need of the petitioners is bonafide or not and
further as to whether the petitioners have any other alternate
accommodation available with them for their projected need or not.
34) In respect of the bonafide requirement of the petitioners,
they have pleaded that the tenanted premises is required by them
for three grandsons of petitioner no.1 namely Sh. Nikunj Rastogi,
Sh. Nimish Rastogi and Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi alongwith son of
petitioner no.2 namely Sh. Nitin Rastogi and son of petitioner no.4
namely Sh. Rachit Rastogi. Petitioners have categorically pleaded
in their petition itself that Sh.Nikunj Rastogi, Sh. Nimish Rastogi
and Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi are unemployed and are completely
dependent upon the petitioner no.1. They have further disclosed in
the petition itself that Sh. Nitin Rastogi is already running his
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 5 of 14

business of selling disposable items in shop no.2. Thus, it is not the
case of the petitioners that Sh. Nitin Rastogi and Sh. Rachit
Rastogi are also completely dependent upon the petitioners for the
aforesaid projected need. It has been contended by ld. counsel for
the petitioners during the course of arguments that Sh. Nikunj
Rastogi, Sh. Nimish Rastogi and Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi intend to
open a Gymnasium-cum-Fitness Centre alongwith Sh. Nitin
Rastogi and Sh. Rachit Rastogi and accordingly the said fact has
been pleaded in the petition itself. Now, the respondent has alleged
that since Sh. Nitin Rastogi and Sh. Rachit Rastogi are not
dependent upon the petitioners, therefore, the present petition is not
maintainable. In this regard, this court is of the view that although
Sh. Nikin Rastogi and Sh. Rachit Rastogi are already earning
income, this does not in itself disentitle them from opening a
gymnasium-cum-fitness centre, alongwith Sh. Nikunj, Sh. Nimish
and Sh. Vaibhav. The tenanted premises is primarily required for
the bonafide need of Sh. Nikunj Rastogi, Nimish Rastogi and
Vaibhav Rastogi who are also the members of the same
family/extended family as that of Sh. Nitin Rastogi and Sh. Rachit
Rastogi. Thus, there is no bar if they together want to open a
venture for becoming independent. Further, the petitioners cannot
be forced to look for some other property for the said purpose
either on rent or by way of purchase when they already have their
own property which would meet their projected requirement.
35) It is further alleged by the respondent that Sh. Nikunj
Rastogi is already running a business under the name and style of
„Vaibhav Properties‟ in shop no.6, however, the respondent has not
led into evidence any document such as GST details or form 32
details of the said „Vaibhav Properties‟ so as to prove that Sh.
Nikunj Rastogi is the proprietor or a partner or a director thereof.
Similarly, RW1 has alleged that the grandsons of petitioner no.1
have started their business of eatery in the name of „Café Gainz" in
shop no.4 and 5 in the property bearing no.E-4/10 and he has also
led into evidence photographs Ex.RW1/4 in this regard, however,
again, no such document of proprietorship, partnership or
directorship has been led into evidence by RW1 to prove that the
said three grandsons of petitioner no.1 are the owners of the said
„Café Gainz" which is being run in the shop no.4 and 5. Upon
perusal of the photographs Ex.RW1/4, it is revealed that although a
flex board of “Cafe Gainz” is visible therein but neither the name
nor the details of the said three grandsons of petitioner no.1 are
reflected therein. Even the address of the said shop is not reflected
in the flex board of the „Café Gainz". Thus, merely from the
photographs Ex.RW1/4, it cannot be concluded that the grandsons
of petitioner no.1 have opened the said „Café Gainz". It has been
held in the case of Hasmat Rai (supra) that “this requirement must
continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 6 of 14

the date of decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of
the Final Court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial
provision of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act.”
However, in the given facts and circumstances of this case, this
court is of the view that since the respondent has failed to prove
that grandsons of petitioner no.1 have opened their own cafe,
therefore, he has failed to prove that the projected need of the
petitioners does not exist anymore. As such, this court is of the
view that the aforecited decision is not applicable upon the facts
and circumstances of the present matter.
36) Further, the respondent has alleged that Sh. Nimish Rastogi
is doing his own business of stock market trading whereas Sh.
Vaibhav Rastogi is engaged in the business of real estate alongwith
his father Sh. Ajay Rastogi. In this regard, PW1 has duly stated in
his cross-examination that Sh. Nimish Rastogi is doing a part time
job of trading in stock market from his home itself whereas he has
denied that Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi is running the business of real
estate alongwith his father Sh. Ajay Rastogi in Noida. Thus, it has
come on record that Sh. Nimish Rastogi is not doing any full time
job and it has also come on record that Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi is not
assisting his father in the business of real estate as alleged by the
respondent. In these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the
respondent to lead into evidence any record or document to prove
that Sh. Nimish Rastogi is engaged in a full time job and that Sh.
Vaibhav Rastogi is in fact running the business of his father and is
earning a handsome income from there. However, the respondent
has failed to lead any such evidence so as to rebut the case of the
petitioners. PW1 has stated in his cross-examination that it is Sh.
Nikunj Rastogi who sits at the shop of Sh. Ajay Rastogi. Be that as
it may, even if it is believed that Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi or Sh. Nikunj
Rastogi are assisting Sh. Ajay Rastogi in his business even then it
is evident that Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi and Sh. Nikunj Rastogi are not
doing any independent business of their own. And now, if they
intend to open their joint venture then they are very much entitled
to do the same and the respondent being a tenant does not have any
right to dictate the petitioners that their aforesaid grandsons and
sons cannot open any such joint venture and that they will have to
continue to sit idle or to continue to assist their parents in their
business. It has been held in the case of Inderjeet Kaur (supra) that
“when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement,
an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is
not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire
equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere
desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the
landlord to establish his case affirmatively.” In the present matter,
as already stated hereinabove, nothing has come on record to
suggest that Sh. Nikunj, Sh. Nimish and Sh. Vaibhav are already
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 7 of 14

earning a handsome income, therefore, there is no requirement for
them to open a Gymnasium-cum-fitness centre. Similarly, it has
also not come on record that the aforesaid persons own any other
commercial property in their own name so as to say that they are
not entitled for seeking eviction of the respondent qua the tenanted
premises. As such this court is of the view that the facts and
circumstances of the aforesaid decision are also not applicable
upon the present matter.
37) The respondent has further pleaded that the petitioners have
not pleaded the dependency of Sh. Nikunj Rastogi, Sh. Nimish
Rastogi and Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi upon petitioners no. 2 to 4 and
similarly that petitioners no.1,2 and 4 have not pleaded their
dependency upon petitioner no.3, therefore, petitioner no.1,
petitioner no.2 and petitioner no.4 cannot claim the share of
petitioner no.3. In this regard this court is of the view that the
petitioners no.1,2 and 4 have not claimed the share of petitioner
no.3. During the course of arguments it has been duly clarified by
ld. counsel for petitioners that petitioner no.3 has been impleaded
as a party merely because he is also one of the co-sharers and he
has no objection if the entire ground floor of the property no.E-
4/10 is utilized for the purpose of opening a gymnasium-cum-
fitenss centre by the aforesaid beneficiaries. It is a settled position
of law that every co-sharer is the owner of each and every inch of
the co-owned property, therefore, even if petitioner no.3 would not
have filed the present petition even then the same would have been
maintainable and now when all the co-sharers of the tenanted
premises have come forward to seek possession of the tenanted
premises specifically for the bonafide requirement of Sh. Nikunj
Rastogi, Sh. Nimish Rastogi and Sh. Vaibhav Rastogi alongwith
Sh. Nitin Rastogi and Rachit Rastogoi, therefore, it was not
required to specifically plead that the aforesaid grandsons of
petitioner no.1 are dependent upon petitioner no.2 to 4 as well or
that petitioner no.1, petitioner no.2 and petitioner no.4 are also
dependent upon petitioner no.3. Thus, considering the aforesaid
facts and circumstances this court is of the view that as far as as the
bonafide requirement of the petitioners is concerned then the same
has been duly proved by the petitioners in the present matter.
38) Coming to the availability of alternate suitable
accommodation with the petitioners, then it is their case that there
are 9 shops on the ground floor out of which shop no.1,3,5,6 and 7
are with the respective tenants whereas shop no.2, 4, 8 & 9 are
already with the petitioners. That shop no.2 is with Sh. Nitin
Rastogi, shop no.4 is with Sh. Ajay Rastogi whereas the shops no.8
and 9 are lying vacant. Admittedly, the shops no.5,6 and 7 have
also been vacated by the respective tenants during the pendency of
the present petition and it is, thus, contended by the respondent that
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 8 of 14

the said shops are also available with the petitioners now. In this
regard, the petitioners have duly disclosed in their petition itself
that they require the entire ground floor of the property no.E-4/10
for their projected need for which they also require the other
tenanted shops and for which they have already filed other eviction
petitions against the respective tenants. Thus, even if shops no.5,6
and 7 have been vacated during the pendency of the present
petition the same cannot be said to be an alternate accommodation
for the petitioners since the said shops alongwith the tenanted
premises are required by the petitioners for their projected need.
39) Apart from the above, the RW1 has deposed in his affidavit
Ex.RW1/A that the petitioners have merged the shops no.8 and 9
and have converted it into a parking and that they have also carved
out a shop no.10 on the ground floor of property no.E-4/10. This
court is of the view that the said averment does not lend any
support to the case of the respondent because firslty, RW1 has not
led into evidence any site plan to demonstrate as to what structural
changes have been made by the petitioners qua the said shops no.8
and 9. Secondly, he has not led into evidence any photographs to
show that a parking space has been created and another shop no.10
has also been constructed by the petitioners. Thirdly, Ld. counsel
for respondent has not even cross-examined PW1 in respect of the
aforesaid structural changes. Pertinently, PW1 was lastly cross-
examined on 18.09.2025. Thereafter, as per the order dated
04.11.2025 time was sought on behalf of the respondent to move
an application for incorporating subsequent events which had taken
place yesterday (i.e. on 03.11.2025) itself. In the said application it
has been alleged by the respondent that he came to know about the
subsequent events on 03.11.2025 itself. But there is no whisper
about the fact as to how he came to know about the said events. It
cannot be so that the said structural changes took place on one
single day i.e. on 03.11.2025. It can also not be the probability that
the structural changes at such level took place and the respondent
who is running his clinic in the shop no.3 of the same property did
not notice the ongoing construction and it came to his knowledge
on 03.11.2025. Thus, it is hard to believe that on the date of last
cross-examination of PW1, the respondent was not aware of any
such structural changes. Fourthly, even otherwise the petitioners
have duly stated in their petition itself that they would be making
the desired/appropriate changes/construction to convert the entire
ground floor of property into a space for Gym-cum-fitness centre.
Therefore, even if it is believed that the said changes have been
made by the petitioners the same would not automatically lead to
the conclusion that the said changes have been made with any
ulterior motive and not for the projected need of the petitioners.
40) Further, admittedly, the remaining portion on the ground
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 9 of 14

floor of the property no.E-4/10 is being used for residential
purposes as has been admitted by the respondent himself in her
written statement in paragraph no.18. Apart from that the
respondent has alleged that the entire first floor of the property no.
E-4/10 is lying vacant and thus, is available with the petitioners.
However, in his cross-examination, RW1 has duly deposed that
first floor of the property is occupied although partially, by the
family of petitioners i.e. Smt. Alka Rastogi, Mr. Nikunj Rastogi @
Anchal Rastogi and petitioner no.4. Thus, evidently, the first floor
of the property no. E-4/10 is not lying vacant and is not available
with the petitioners.
41) Further, another contention that the petitioners have not
used shop no.8 and 9 for any purpose since its vacation by the
previous tenants is not relevant for the purpose of the present
petition since it is for those tenants to raise any objection in this
regard under Section 19(6) of the DRC Act and not for the
respondent herein. It is reiterated here that the petitioners have
already pleaded at the first instance that they require the entire
ground floor of the property no.E-4/10 which includes the shop
no.8 and 9, therefore, if the same are presently lying vacant the
same would not be counted as an alternate accommodation and is
of no help to the respondent.
42) As far as the contention that petitioner no.3 is not residing
in property no.E-4/10 and that he is running his own independent
business in Gandhi Nagar, is concerned, then the respondent has
not led into evidence the ownership documents in respect of the
said property of Gandhi Nagar so as to say that petitioner no.3 is
the owner of the said property. Even otherwise admittedly, the said
property is not lying vacant since petitioner no.3 is running his
medical store therein. Careful perusal of the leave to defend
application filed by the respondent in eviction petition bearing
no.,132/2012 (Ex.RW1/3) reveals that the said eviction petition
was filed against Smt. Beena & Smt. Pinki Gupta for the bonafide
requirement of Sh. Sachin Rastogi (petitioner no.3 herein). In the
said leave to defend application, it was pleaded that Sh. Sachin
Rastogi is already running his own business of medical store in
Gandhi Nagar. The said eviction petition has been stated to have
been disposed off by the respondent, however, the said order vide
which it was disposed off, has not been placed on record. Be that as
it may, the present eviction petition has been filed for the bonafide
requirement of Sh. Nikunj Rastogi, Sh. Nimish Rastogi, Sh.
Vaibhav Rastogi, Sh. Nitin Rastogi and Sh. Rachit Rastogi and not
for the bonafide requirement of petitioner no.3. Therefore, the fact
that petitioner no.3 is running his own business independently is of
no relevance for the purpose of the present petition. As such
considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances this court is of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 10 of 14

the view that the respondent has failed to prove that any other
alternate suitable accommodation is available with the petitioners
for their projected need.
43) Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, this court is of the
view that the petitioner has duly proved his bonafide requirement
qua the tenanted premises as well as the fact that he does not have
any other alternative suitable accommodation for the same. Hence,
in view of the aforesaid discussion the petition in hand is hereby
allowed and the respondent is hereby directed to vacate the
tenanted premises i.e. shop no.3 on the ground floor of property
bearing no. E-4/10, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-110031, as shown in the
site plan of petitioner in terms of section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act and handover its vacant and peaceful possession to the
petitioner. However, as per Section 14 (7) DRC Act, the Petitioner
shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiry
of a period of six months from the date of this order.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. A perusal of the aforesaid findings would reveal that the learned
RC has dealt with both the aspects which are sought to be urged
before this Court.
19. Insofar as the bona fide requirement is concerned, the learned
RC has considered the requirement pleaded for the grandsons of
Respondent No.1 and the sons of Respondent Nos. 2 and 4, as also the
objections raised by the Petitioner with regard to their existing
occupations and alleged financial independence.

20. The learned RC has also considered the contention regarding
the subsequent running of the business under the name and style of
“Café Gainz” and has returned a finding, on the basis of the evidence
led, that the material placed by the Petitioner was insufficient to
establish that the projected beneficiaries had commenced an
independent business so as to render the pleaded requirement non-
existent.
21. Likewise, on the aspect of alternate suitable accommodation,
the learned RC has examined the various properties and portions
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 11 of 14

relied upon by the Petitioner, including the other shops situated on the
ground floor, the alleged use of Shops Nos. 8 and 9, the alleged Shop
No. 10, the first floor of the property and the property stated to be in
Gandhi Nagar, Delhi.
22. The learned RC has considered the evidence led by the parties
in respect of each of these properties and has thereafter concluded that
none of the accommodation relied upon by the Petitioner constituted
alternate suitable accommodation for the requirement pleaded by the
Respondents.
23. In particular, it has been noticed that the Respondents had
themselves pleaded that the entire ground floor was required for the
proposed Gymnasium-cum-Fitness Centre and that the mere vacation
of some of the shops during the pendency of the proceedings would
not, in the facts of the case, render them available as alternate
accommodation.

24. It is, therefore, evident that the findings returned by the learned
RC are not founded merely upon the averments contained in the
Eviction Petition but upon an examination of the pleadings, the
evidence led by the parties and the material placed before the learned
RC during the course of the proceedings. The Judgment in Hasmat
Rai (supra) relied upon by the Petitioner has also been noticed and
explained why, on the facts found by it, the said decision would not
advance the Petitioner's case.
25. The principal submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner is
essentially that the material relied upon by the Petitioner ought to have
resulted in a different conclusion, particularly with regard to the
alleged commencement of the “Café Gainz” and the alleged
availability of other accommodation.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 12 of 14

26. However, such an exercise would necessarily require this Court
to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own assessment for that
undertaken by the learned RC and the same, as discussed above, is not
the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
27. The fact that another view may possibly be taken on the
evidence is, by itself, no ground for interference in revision. The
jurisdiction of this Court is supervisory and is intended to ensure that
the learned RC has acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and that
the decision-making process is not vitiated by perversity, manifest
illegality or material irregularity.
28. In the present case, the learned RC has considered the material
aspects arising from the pleadings and evidence and has given reasons
for accepting the Respondents' case on both bona fide requirement and
alternate suitable accommodation.

29. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to
demonstrate any material evidence which was wholly ignored by the
learned RC or any finding which is such that no reasonable person, on
the material available on record, could have arrived at the same. The
present challenge, in substance, seeks a re-appreciation of the
evidence on the issues which have already been adjudicated upon after
trial.
30. This Court, therefore, finds no perversity, jurisdictional error,
illegality or material irregularity in the Impugned Order warranting
interference in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
31. Consequently, the present Petition, being devoid of merit,
stands dismissed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 13 of 14

32. The present Petition, along with pending application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 31, 2026/nd/jk

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 313/2026 Page 14 of 14