Bibol Toppo vs State Of Odisha
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 1244
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8294 OF 2026
BIBOL TOPPO & ORS. ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF ODISHA & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.
1. The present appeal takes exception to the decision dated
06.09.2024 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack passed in
1
Writ Petition (C) No. 31638/2022 , whereby the writ petition
preferred by the appellants was dismissed by the High Court.
The appellants had challenged the acquisition of certain lands
by the State of Odisha for the purpose of mining by M/s.
Dalmia Cements Bharat Limited.
Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR 1
Hereinafter referred as “impugned judgment”
Date: 2026.11.18
19:20:56 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 1 of 44
THE CASE
2. The appellants are residents of three villages, namely
Kukuda, Bihabandha and Lanjiberna falling in Sundergarh
District of the State of Odisha. They are aggrieved by the land
acquisition proceedings commenced by the respondent State at
the instance of respondent no. 7, M/s Dalmia Cements Bharat
2
Limited . As per the admitted position, the State Government
had granted a mining lease to the company for conducting
mining operations over an area of 893.55 Ha. The lease was
extended from time to time. Lastly, on 27.06.2016, the lease
period was extended till 29.02.2040. After surrender of
20.493 Ha by the company, the total leased area was modified
to 873.057 Ha. Out of this area, mining operations were
ongoing over an area of 335.96 Ha. In 2015, the company
became desirous of carrying out mining operation over the
remaining area of 273.57 Ha. This area comprised of land
parcels falling in the three villages, named above. The company
already had mining rights over the area, however, it also needed
surface rights over the land to conduct mining activity and for
this, acquisition of land was desired.
3. Accordingly, on 09.12.2015, the company submitted
three proposals to the State Government vide Form A under
Section 2(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
2
Hereinafter referred as “the company”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 2 of 44
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
3
Resettlement Act, 2013 , thereby requesting for acquisition of
surface rights over 273.57 acres of agricultural land for the
mining project. On 23.08.2017, the State Government accorded
its administrative approval to the proposal under Rule 3 of
Odisha Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
4
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Rules, 2016 ,
subject to condition that prior consent provisions under Section
2(2)(b)(i) of the 2013 Act shall be applicable.
4. On 06.11.2017, a notification under Rule 8 of Odisha
Rules was issued by the State for the commencement of
consultation and Social Impact Assessment Study. On
18.09.2019, ADM, Sundergarh issued a letter to Block
Development officer regarding the requirement of prior consent
of Gram Sabha for the proposed acquisition as per Section 41(3)
of 2013 Act. On 06.01.2020, the Sub-Collector, Sadar,
Sundergarh addressed a letter to Sarpanch of concerned Gram
Panchayats of Kukuda and Katang villages to include the
agenda of proposed acquisition for the meeting on 26.01.2020.
In the said meeting, unanimous resolutions were passed by the
concerned Gram Panchayats rejecting the proposal. On
04.02.2020 and 06.02.2020, the proceedings of respective Gram
3
Hereinafter referred as “the 2013 Act” or “the Act”
4
Hereinafter referred as “Odisha Rules”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 3 of 44
Panchayats were forwarded to the concerned Sub-Collector
through the Block Development Officers.
5. On 24.02.2020, the State issued a fresh notification under
Section 4(1) of 2013 Act read with Rule 8 of Odisha Rules
expressing its intention to acquire the subject land and to
conduct Social Impact Assessment for the same. This
notification was issued in view of the lapse of six months after
the first notification. On 03.03.2020, the Collector, Sundergarh
called upon the concerned Tehsildar to update the record of
rights of the subject land within fortnight.
6. On 18.03.2021, a notification under Section 5 of the Act
came to be issued by the Collector notifying a schedule for
holding public hearing on the draft SIA. The scheduled
meetings in the three affected villages were proposed on
16.04.2021. However, on 13.04.2021, Kukuda and Katang
Gram Panchayats informed the Collector and Block
Development Officers that due to Covid-19, public hearing
could not be conducted. As per the RTI responses furnished by
both the Gram Panchayats, no public meeting or hearing could
be conducted on the proposed date i.e. 16.04.2021.
7. On 01.06.2021, final SIA report came to be submitted by
the Nabakrushna Choudhary Centre for Development Studies
(NCDS), Bhubaneswar to the Collector for evaluation by the
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 4 of 44
Expert Group. The Expert Group conveyed its report to the
Collector on 08.06.2021.
8. On 22.06.2021, a declaration was prepared under Section
8(2) of the Act regarding the acquisition of the subject land on
the basis of the expert group and the Collector’s report. It was
served on the Panchayat Executive Officer of the concerned
Gram Panchayats on 24.06.2021. Subsequently, on 06.07.2021l,
three preliminary notifications were issued under Section 11 of
the Act in respect of the lands situated in the above-named three
villages. The appellants filed objections to these notifications.
9. Thereafter, some villagers including the appellants herein
preferred Writ Petition (C) No. 23979/2021 before the High
Court to challenge the final SIA report, declaration under
Section 8(2) and notification under Section 11(1) of the Act. It
was disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to file objections
before the appropriate authority. Another Writ Petition (C) No.
25730/2021 filed by the villagers was also disposed of in a
similar manner. Pursuant to the liberty, the appellants filed their
objections on 18.10.2021. On 22.10.2021, the Collector rejected
all the objections and recommended issuance of a notification
under Section 19 of the Act for the acquisition of the subject
land. The said notification was promptly issued on 03.11.2021.
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 5 of 44
10. In December, 2021 and January, 2022, unnamed notices
under Section 30(2) of the Act were issued to the recorded
owners.
11. In the aftermath of these events, the appellants preferred
Writ Petition (C) No. 31638/2022 before the High Court,
thereby challenging the land acquisition proceedings and
notifications issued under Sections 11 and 19 of the Act. The
said petition came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment.
Hence, the present challenge.
VIEW OF THE HIGH COURT
12. The High Court firstly held that the appellants do not
possess the requisite locus standi to challenge the acquisition
process for failing to establish any link with the land in question
and for failing to adhere to the procedure meant for filing a writ
petition in a representative capacity. It further held that the
company was entitled to get the surface rights over the land in
question in view of the mining rights in its favour, as conferred
by the pre-existing lease deed. Addressing the interplay of
statutory provisions, the High Court held that the land
acquisition proceedings are only complementary in nature to
effectuate the grant of mining rights as per the lease. It further
held that the provisions of 2013 Act shall prevail over the
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 6 of 44
5
Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957
only in the matter of grant of compensation as the provisions of
2013 Act are more beneficial in that regard.
13. As regards the requirement of prior consent of the
landowners, the Court held that the said requirement did not
apply to the subject acquisition as it was an acquisition by the
State, as the State was being clothed with the right, title or
interest in the land. Thus, the Court held that the provisions of
Section 2(2)(b) of 2013 Act shall not apply. The Court further
held that the invocation of the said provision in the order
granting administrative approval of the State was a case of
misquoting. The Court further held that even if the requirement
of obtaining prior consent of 80% land owners was applicable,
the process of taking consent ought to be a continuing process
which takes place through the various stages of the acquisition
proceedings. On the basis of this position, the Court
acknowledged that as on 22.01.2024, total 535 affected persons
have given their consent in Form J as per Odisha Rules, which
satisfies the legal requirement.
14. The High Court also found fault with the appellants’
failure in not challenging the Collector’s report wherein the
challenge raised by the appellants was rejected by him.
5
Hereinafter referred as “MMDR Act”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 7 of 44
15. Procedurally, the High Court invoked the “ doctrine of
compliance ” to hold that undue hardship must be avoided and
inconsequential aspects cannot be described as the essence of
the legal procedure. As regards the consent of Gram Sabha
under Section 41 of 2013 Act, the Court placed reliance on the
words “ as far as possible ” and “ demonstrable last resort ” to
hold that the requirement of prior consent cannot be read as a
mandatory requirement in law. It also noted that the statute does
not provide for any consequence for non-compliance of
Section 41.
16. As regards the composition of the Expert Group, the
Court held that the list contemplated in Section 7(2) of 2013
Act is not exhaustive and is only illustrative. Thus, such Group
may very well include other members having technical
expertise including a member having connection with the
project proponent.
17. In view of this reasoning, the High Court found that the
respondents have substantially complied with the procedural
requirements of land acquisition and the challenge is without
any merit.
CHALLENGE BEFORE THIS COURT
18. Taking exception to the impugned judgment, the
appellants have advanced the following broad submissions:
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 8 of 44
i. The land in question falls in a scheduled area as per
6
Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India, 1950 and
it could not be acquired without prior consent of the
Gram Sabha as per Section 41 of 2013 Act read with
Rule 41 of Odisha Rules;
ii. The provisions of prior consent are mandatory and not
directory;
iii. The acquisition in question is acquisition of land by a
private company for public purpose and the same is
covered by Section 2(2)(b)(i) of the Act. Thus, prior
consent of at-least 80% of the affected families is
mandatory in accordance with Rule 21 and after
updating the Record of Rights as per Rule 20 of
Odisha Rules;
iv. Social Impact Assessment has not been conducted in
accordance with the applicable provisions as no public
hearing was conducted; prior consent of individual
land owners was not obtained; and no development
plan was prepared;
v. SIA team included a member having connection or
financial interest with the requiring body which was
impermissible;
6
Hereinafter referred as “the Constitution”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 9 of 44
vi. Despite MMDR Act, the 2013 Act would fully govern
the acquisition in question and would not be limited to
the determination of compensation as MMDR Act was
th
not a part of the statutes notified in the 4 Schedule of
the 2013 Act.
19. The present appeal has been opposed by respondent nos.
1 to 5 on the following grounds:
i. The appellants lack locus standi to present the instant
challenge as they are not the landowners and have
failed to bring requisite material to show any
authorization or connection with the landowners;
ii. The appellants have urged that they are connected
with the recorded tenants of the land in question,
however, they have failed to produce any documents
to prove the said relationship. Further, only appellant
no. 6 has been mentioned as a recorded tenant in the
record of rights produced by the appellants before the
Court;
iii. Only five out of 12 appellants had filed formal
objections under Section 15 of the 2013 Act and thus,
they have approached the Court to frustrate the
process due to vested interests;
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 10 of 44
iv. The mining lease is a contractual arrangement
between the State and the company, and the appellants
have no privity with the same;
v. The rights of the company to conduct mining
operation on the subject land stand crystallized in
view of Section 24A(1) of MMDR Act and the
landowners are only supposed to be compensated for
any loss or damage that the operations may cause;
vi. In lieu of the conferment of mining rights to
the company, it is entitled to obtain rights over the
surface of the land by paying compensation to the
occupiers. Reliance has been placed upon Rule 52 of
Minerals (Other than Atomic and Hydro Carbons
7
Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016 ;
vii. The reference to 2013 Act is justified only to govern
the aspect of compensation payable to the occupiers of
the land qua which mining rights have been conferred
by the State;
viii. The State Government was compelled to invoke the
2013 Act for the computation of compensation as it
was necessary to discharge the State’s obligation
under the mining lease;
7
Hereinafter referred as “MCR Rules”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 11 of 44
ix. Public hearing on the draft SIA was duly conducted
on 16.04.2021 as per schedule in the presence of
concerned Sub Collector, Tehsildar and BDO;
x. SIA report duly records that no alternate site was
feasible; the project caused no displacement; land
sought to be acquired was marginal in comparison
with the total cultivable land in the area; no person
was going to lose residential house; and most of the
people from affected villages did not oppose the
acquisition since proper compensation was awarded;
xi. The acquisition of land was done by the State
Government for a public purpose and therefore, the
acquisition was strictly governed by Section
2(1)(b)(iii) and not by Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act;
xii. 448 affected persons gave their consent for the land
acquisition in question;
xiii. The requirement of taking consent of the affected
persons is a continuing process and arises after the
preliminary notification under Section 11 of 2013 Act
as land records are updated after the said notification
as per Rule 20 of Odisha Rules. It is added that the
requirement of obtaining prior consent does not arise
after the issuance of notification under Section 8(1) of
the Act;
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 12 of 44
xiv. The affected villagers of the concerned villages
attended the public hearing scheduled on 16.04.2021,
however, videography of their concerns could not be
conducted due to nuisance and non-cooperation by
people. Further, SIA report has noted that most of the
villagers are agreeable to the acquisition on payment
of adequate compensation;
xv. As regards the non-compliance of Section 41(3) of
2013 Act, the requirement of prior consent of Gram
Sabha must be given an interpretation which does not
frustrate the land acquisition proceedings. Minor and
inconsequential non-compliances may not be
instrumental in the decision of the Court;
xvi. Any compliance could be said to be mandatory only if
it renders the entire proceeding as invalid and not
otherwise;
xvii. As per the provisions of Panchayat Extension to
8
Scheduled Areas Act, 1996 , the mandatory
requirement of obtaining the prior recommendation of
Gram Panchayat for grant of mining lease applies only
for minor minerals and not for major minerals, as
done in the instant case.
8
Hereinafter referred as “PESA Act”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 13 of 44
20. The submissions advanced on behalf of the company can
be encapsulated as follows:
i. The appellants have no locus standi to bring any
challenge against the land acquisition proceedings as
they are neither the landowners nor connected to the
tenants/landowners as per the record of rights;
ii. The appellants filed the petition in representative
capacity without complying with the requirements of
9
Order I Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ;
iii. MMDR Act is a complete code insofar as the
regulation of mining and mineral development is
concerned;
iv. The mining operations are to be carried out as per the
terms and conditions of mining lease granted as per
MMDR Act, and 2013 Act must be read along with
MMDR Act;
v. MMDR Act not only provides for the grant of mining
lease or the terms and conditions of such lease, but
also provides for a situation wherein surface rights
over the leased land vest in private occupiers;
vi. Section 24A(1) of MMDR Act confers statutory right
upon the lessee of a mining lease to enter upon the
9
Hereinafter referred as “CPC”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 14 of 44
subject land at all times during the operation of lease
and to carry out mining operations. It is added that
consent of occupier is required only while affecting
entry into the occupier’s building, court or garden;
vii. Section 24(2) provides for payment of compensation
to the occupier of surface rights for any loss or
damage likely to arise during mining operations;
viii. Section 103 of 2013 Act provides that the Act shall
be in addition to and not in derogation of any other
law for the time being in force and thus, the provisions
of MMDR Act cannot be whittled down in any
manner by invoking 2013 Act;
ix. The acquisition of land containing mines and minerals
shall be governed by Land Acquisition (Mines) Act,
1885 which forms part of the list of enactments placed
in Schedule IV of the 2013 Act;
x. The provisions of 2013 Act shall apply with less
vigour in the present case because the appellants do
not have any right to the minerals underneath the
surface and they merely enjoy surface rights, if any,
over the land;
xi. In the documents of acquisition, there are some
incorrect references to the provisions of 2013 Act.
However, mere mentioning of incorrect provisions
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 15 of 44
does not affect the correct application of law and the
power of acquisition can be traced to the correct
provisions;
xii. When the existence of source of power is not in
dispute and the source is traceable to multiple
provisions, the exercise of such power does not get
vitiated solely because of the omission to include
some applicable provisions or invocation of incorrect
provisions;
xiii. The grant of mining rights does not result in transfer
of title over the leased land and ultimately, it is the
State which acquires ownership over the land. Thus,
the acquisition shall be governed by Section
2(1)(b)(iii) and not by Section 2(2)(b) of 2013 Act;
xiv. The provisions of Section 41(3) of 2013 Act are
merely directory and not mandatory, as the Gram
Sabha cannot be a body to override the consent of the
land owners.
DISCUSSION
21. Having understood the challenge before us, we may now
proceed to adjudicate the seminal issue whether the acquisition
of subject land by the State is legally sustainable or not.
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 16 of 44
22. The admitted factual position suggests that the company
has pre-existing mining rights over the subject land by way of a
lease granted by the State in accordance with MMDR Act. The
rights pertain to an expansive land parcel of which the land in
question also forms a part. Although, the company had
pre-existing mining rights in its favour, no mining activity was
being carried out over the subject land as it did not have
proprietary rights over the surface of the land. The surface
rights continued to vest in the landowners. In order to acquire
the surface rights, a proposal for acquisition of land was
initiated by the company. After granting administrative
approval to the proposal, the State commenced the process for
the acquisition of land. The first issue that arises here is
regarding the precise provision of Section 2 of 2013 Act which
would govern the acquisition in question. The determination of
the provision is important as the applicable procedure is directly
contingent upon the nature of acquisition.
23. Section 2 provides for the application clause of the Act
and relevant part thereof reads thus:
“2. Application of Act.- (1) The provisions of this
Act relating to land acquisition, compensation,
rehabilitation and resettlement, shall apply, when
the appropriate Government acquires land for its
own use, hold and control, including for Public
Sector Undertakings and for public purpose , and
shall include the following purposes, namely:—
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 17 of 44
(a) for strategic purposes relating to naval,
military, air force, and armed forces of the Union,
including central paramilitary forces or any work
vital to national security or defence of India or
State police, safety of the people; or
(b) for infrastructure projects, which includes the
following, namely:—
(i) all activities or items listed in the notification of
the Government of India in the Department of
Economic Affairs (Infrastructure Section) number
13/6/2009-INF, dated the 27th March, 2012,
excluding private hospitals, private educational
institutions and private hotels;
(ii) projects involving agro-processing, supply of
inputs to agriculture, warehousing, cold storage
facilities, marketing infrastructure for agriculture
and allied activities such as dairy, fisheries, and
meat processing, set up or owned by the
appropriate Government or by a farmers’
cooperative or by an institution set up under a
statute;
(iii) project for industrial corridors or mining
activities, national investment and manufacturing
zones, as designated in the National
Manufacturing Policy;
(iv) project for water harvesting and water
conservation structures, sanitation;
(v) project for Government administered,
Government aided educational and research
schemes or institutions;
(vi) project for sports, health care, tourism,
transportation or space programme;
(vii) any infrastructure facility as may be notified
in this regard by the Central Government and after
tabling of such notification in Parliament;
(c) project for project affected families;
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 18 of 44
(d) project for housing for such income groups, as
may be specified from time to time by the
appropriate Government;
(e) project for planned development or the
improvement of village sites or any site in the
urban areas or provision of land for residential
purposes for the weaker sections in rural and
urban areas;
(f) project for residential purposes to the poor or
landless or to persons residing in areas affected by
natural calamities, or to persons displaced or
affected by reason of the implementation of any
scheme undertaken by the Government, any local
authority or a corporation owned or controlled by
the State.
(2) The provisions of this Act relating to land
acquisition, consent, compensation, rehabilitation
and resettlement, shall also apply, when the
appropriate Government acquires land for the
following purposes, namely:—
(a) for public private partnership projects, where
the ownership of the land continues to vest with the
Government, for public purpose as defined in
sub-section (1);
(b) for private companies for public purpose, as
defined in sub-section (1):
Provided that in the case of acquisition for— (i)
private companies, the prior consent of at least
eighty per cent of those affected families, as
defined in sub-clauses (i) and (v) of clause (c) of
section 3; and (ii) public private partnership
projects, the prior consent of at least seventy per
cent of those affected families, as defined in sub-
clauses (i) and (v) of clause (c) of section 3, shall
be obtained through a process as may be pre-
scribed by the appropriate Government:
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 19 of 44
Provided further that the process of obtaining the
consent shall be carried out along with the Social
Impact Assessment study referred to in section 4:
Provided also that no land shall be transferred by
way of acquisition, in the Scheduled Areas in
contravention of any law (including any order or
judgment of a court which has become final)
relating to land transfer, prevailing in such
Scheduled Areas.…”
24. A reading of sub-section (1) of Section 2 clearly indicates
that it applies when the government acquires land for “ its own
use, hold and control ” and for public purposes specified in the
provision. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, applies when the
government acquires land for private companies for public
purpose. The public purpose is traceable from the list of
purposes specified in sub-section (1). For the present case,
suffice to note that a project for mining activity falls in the
category of public purposes.
25. A careful examination of the facts makes it evident that
the acquisition in question was not meant for the “ use ” of the
State. The State has, at no point, proposed to carry out any
activity on the subject land. It was also not meant to be held or
controlled by the State as the land was exclusively leased to
the company for conducting mining activity till 2040. The
respondents have not made any claim to the effect that the
subject land was to be held or controlled by the State in any
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 20 of 44
manner after its acquisition. In fact, it has been unequivocally
stated by the respondents that the company was enjoying
uninterrupted mining rights in the said area since independence.
The lease in its favour has been extended from time to time and
thus, there is no indicator of any present or future control of the
State over the acquired land.
26. The submission that the land would return to the State
after the expiry of mining lease in 2040 is liable to be rejected.
It is not only contrary to the fact that the mining lease has
invariably been renewed by the State from time to time, but is
also irrelevant to the present enquiry. It is so because the nature
of acquisition needs to be determined on the strength of the
dominant purpose as on date. It cannot be determined on the
speculative consideration that the existing purpose as on date
may get altered after 2040. To allow this would actually enable
the project proponents to bypass and dilute the provisions of the
statute. The second submission that the proprietary rights over
the acquired land shall vest in the State and not in the company,
is also liable to be rejected. For, it has no bearing in identifying
whether sub-section (1) or (2) would apply to a given case. Both
in sub-section (1) and (2), it is the appropriate government
which acquires the land. The words “ when the appropriate
Government acquires land ” are present in both the provisions
and thus, the enquiry does not turn on this aspect. The
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 21 of 44
determining factor is the purpose for which land is proposed to
be acquired – whether for own use of the State or for a private
entity .
27. Once the purpose is examined in the instant case, it is
evident that the acquisition was made at the instance of and for
the exclusive purpose of mining by respondent no. 7 – a private
company. In certain situations, it may be possible that the
purpose of acquisition may be traceable to both the
sub-sections. In such cases, the Court must try to find out the
dominant purpose by taking into account the facts of the case
and the jurisprudential essence of the legislation. Be that as it
may, no question of overlapping arises in this case as the
subject acquisition is clearly covered by Section 2(2)(b) of the
Act.
28. The legislative scheme of Section 2(2)(b) suggests that
enhanced public participation is envisaged when the land is
sought to be acquired by the government for a private company
engaged in a public purpose. The proviso to Section 2(2)(b) lays
down that when the land is sought to be acquired for a private
company, prior consent of at least 80% of the affected families
shall be obtained. The second proviso lays down that the
process for obtaining such prior consent shall be carried out
along with the SIA study contemplated in Section 4 of the Act.
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 22 of 44
29. Therefore, a straightforward examination of the Act
makes it clear that the subject acquisition not only required the
prior consent of at least 80% of the affected families, but also
that such consent was to be obtained along with the SIA study.
Thus, the legislature has not only laid down the requirement of
obtaining prior consent, but has also laid down the stage at
which such consent is to be obtained. The stage for obtaining
prior consent of affected families is further fortified by Section
8 of the Act which reads as follows:
“ 8. Examination of proposals for land
acquisition and Social Impact Assessment report
by appropriate Government.— (1) The
appropriate Government shall ensure that—
(a) there is a legitimate and bona fide public
purpose for the proposed acquisition which
necessitates the acquisition of the land identified;
(b) the potential benefits and the public purpose
referred to in clause (a) shall outweigh the social
costs and adverse social impact as determined by
the Social Impact Assessment that has been
carried out;
(c) only the minimum area of land required for the
project is proposed to be acquired;
(d) there is no unutilised land which has been
previously acquired in the area;
(e) the land, if any, acquired earlier and remained
unutilised, is used for such public purpose and
make recommendations in respect thereof.
(2) The appropriate Government shall examine the
report of the Collector, if any, and the report of the
Expert Group on the Social Impact Assessment
study and after considering all the reports,
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 23 of 44
recommend such area for acquisition which would
ensure minimum displacement of people, minimum
disturbance to the infrastructure, ecology and
minimum adverse impact on the individuals
affected.
(3) The decision of the appropriate Government
shall be made available in the local language to
the Panchayat, Municipality or Municipal
Corporation, as the case may be, and the offices of
the
District Collector, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
and the Tehsil, and shall be published in the
affected areas, in such manner as may be
prescribed, and uploaded on the website of the
appropriate Government:
Provided that where land is sought to be acquired
for the purposes as specified in sub-section (2) of
section 2, the appropriate Government shall also
ascertain as to whether the prior consent of the
affected families as required under the proviso to
sub-section (2) of section 2, has been obtained in
the manner as may be prescribed .”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Section 8 provides for the examination of a proposal for
land acquisition by the appropriate government. It contemplates
the stage at which the government applies its mind to the
material available before it. Such material includes the report of
the Collector and report of Expert Group on the SIA study, and
after considering all the reports, the government makes a
recommendation for acquisition of land. Importantly, the
proviso to Section 8(3) lays down that where the land sought to
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 24 of 44
be acquired is governed by Section 2(2) of the Act, the
government shall also ascertain whether prior consent of the
affected families has been obtained in the prescribed manner.
Therefore, the requirement of obtaining prior consent must
stand fulfilled before the government examines the proposal
under Section 8 of the Act. During examination, the
government must ascertain that prior consent has been obtained,
wherever applicable.
31. Once this legal position is laid down, it becomes clear
that the view taken by the High Court, in holding that the
process of obtaining prior consent is a continuous process
which continues throughout the acquisition proceedings, is
erroneous. The proposition laid down by the High Court is in
teeth of the statutory provisions and has the effect of rendering
a mandatory participative provision of the statute as practically
redundant.
32. It is equally noteworthy that prior consent contemplated
in Section 2(2) is to be taken in the manner prescribed by law.
The legislature has been careful in using these expressions so as
to avoid vague compliance of the provision by using innovative
means, such as oral consent or consent by show of hands, etc.
Rule 21 of Odisha Rules comes into picture here and it provides
that prior consent of the affected families must be taken in
Form J.
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 25 of 44
33. In the present matter, the State has advanced a
submission that the consent of 482 families has been obtained.
However, the submission is not enough to sustain the
acquisition for two reasons. Firstly , there is no material to show
that consent has been obtained in Form J and in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by Rule 21. The respondents have
not placed any material on record to substantiate the
submission. Secondly , even if it is assumed that consent has
been obtained, it is apparent that no prior consent was in place
at the time of examination by the government under Section 8
of the Act. As held above, the proposition that consent can be
taken at all stages of acquisition is erroneous and defeats the
whole purpose of “ prior ” consent. The statute provides for prior
consent and there is no basis to justify subsequent consent, even
if assumed to have been taken.
34. Even in view of the legislative scheme and objects of
transparency and public participation, any subsequent consent
cannot be justified. It would not only amount to defeating the
core idea of the legislation but would also amount to rewriting
the statute by introducing or materially modifying a
requirement, which revolts against its entire scheme.
35. Interestingly, even the administrative approval granted by
the State duly recorded that prior consent provisions of Section
2(2)(b)(i) of 2013 Act shall apply to the proposed acquisition. It
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 26 of 44
is indicative of the State’s own understanding of the statute.
Despite so, the respondents proceeded without obtaining the
same, possibly foreseeing that such consent was unlikely in
view of the rejection of proposal by Gram Sabha(s). Despite
specific reference to the correct provision in the original
administrative approval, the High Court held it to be a case of
‘misquoting’ to justify the procedure under Section 2(1) of the
Act. In fact, the State did not even raise this argument in the
writ petition and credit must go to the High Court for its
observations in this regard. As discussed above, we are unable
to agree with the line of reasoning adopted in the impugned
judgment.
36. As regards the ground of non-compliance of Section 41
as well, we are constrained to take a similar view. Section 41
has been incorporated as a special provision applicable to the
acquisition of land falling in Scheduled Areas under Fifth
Schedule to the Constitution of India. It is the admitted position
that the land in question falls in the Scheduled Area of
Sundergarh District of Odisha. The relevant part of Section 41
reads as:
“ 41. Special provisions for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes.—
(1) As far as possible, no acquisition of land shall
be made in the Scheduled Areas.
(2) Where such acquisition does take place it shall
be done only as a demonstrable last resort.
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 27 of 44
(3) In case of acquisition or alienation of any
land in the Scheduled Areas, the prior consent of
the concerned Gram Sabha or the Panchayats or
the autonomous District Councils, at the
appropriate level in Scheduled Areas under the
Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, as the case
may be, shall be obtained, in all cases of land
acquisition in such areas, including acquisition
in case of urgency, before issue of a notification
under this Act, or any other Central Act or a
State Act for the time being in force:
Provided that the consent of the Panchayats or the
Autonomous Districts Councils shall be obtained
in cases where the Gram Sabha does not exist or
has not been constituted.…”
(emphasis supplied)
37. Section 41 is framed as a bundle of various special
provisions mentioned separately in its sub-sections. Sub-section
(3) thereof lays down that in case of acquisition of land falling
in the Scheduled Areas, prior consent of concerned Gram
Sabha(s) “ shall be obtained , in all cases ”. As regards the stage
of this consent, the provision provides that it must be obtained
before the issuance of a notification under the Act.
38. Notably, the controversy regarding prior consent of Gram
Sabha pertains to the binding or non-binding nature of this
requirement, and not to the stage of consent. Our analysis will
be commensurate to the same. The High Court has adopted a
unique mode of interpretation to turn down the appellants’
challenge on this aspect. It took the phrase “ as far as possible ”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 28 of 44
from sub-section (1) and “ demonstrable last resort ” from
sub-section (2) to hold that the requirement provided in
sub-section (3) is merely directory, and not mandatory. Our
short response to this novel interpretive technique is that it is
wholly erroneous and unsustainable. Our long response would
be as follows. Section 41 incorporates meaningfully distinct
special provisions in its sub-sections. Sub-section (1) provides
that as far as possible, acquisition in scheduled areas may be
avoided; sub-section (2) provides that if such acquisition is felt
as necessary, it must be done as a demonstrable last resort; and
sub-section (3) provides that if the government finally decides
to proceed with such acquisition, prior consent of Gram
Sabha(s) must be obtained.
39. Whereas, sub-sections (1) and (2) are of guiding value,
sub-section (3) operates in a completely different sphere and
lays down a mandatory requirement for land acquisition in
Scheduled Areas. Once the government finally decides to
proceed with land acquisition in such areas, it has already
crossed the stages contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2), and
has entered the stage contemplated by sub-section (3). At this
juncture, the mandatory requirement of sub-section (3) cannot
be negated by referring to the directory nature of the words used
in sub-sections (1) and (2). To do so would not only be against
the principle of simple and textual interpretation of the statute,
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 29 of 44
but would also amount to a gross violation of the language and
scheme of the statute. Therefore, we hold that the requirement
of Section 41(3) of the Act is mandatory in nature, and there is
nothing to suggest it to be directory or advisory.
40. This finding is not only consistent with the statute but
th
also finds recognition in the observations recorded in the 24
Report of the Standing Committee on Rural Development and
th
Panchayati Raj (2025-26) of 18 Lok Sabha titled as “ Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Implementation
and Effectiveness ”. In the section on
observations/recommendations for the strict implementation of
the provisions of 2013 Act, the Committee has observed that:
“2. Strengthening Role of Gram Sabha
The Committee note that The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (LARR Act, 2013) significantly strengthens
the role of the Gram Sabha, ensuring
grassroots participation in the land acquisition
process with key provisions of mandatory Prior
Consent of Gram Sabha under the Fifth Schedule
of the Constitution and Social Impact Assessment
to empower rural communities, especially
tribals and marginalized groups, with a
decisive role in safeguarding their land and
livelihoods. The Committee is highly concerned
about the growing incidents where consent of
Gram Sabha is obtained on paper just as a
formality without actually involving the majority of
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 30 of 44
the population being affected by the respective
projects. The Committee recommend to give more
power to Gram Sabha by making their consent
mandatory for all land acquisitions, not just in
Scheduled Areas and to give Gram Sabha the
power to veto land acquisition proposals that do
not align with local development plans or
community interests.”
41. The observations are quite interesting, as they reflect the
consciousness and concern of the legislature regarding the
growing instances of compromising with the requirement of
taking Gram Sabha’s prior consent and reducing it into a paper
formality. The Committee not only restates that the requirement
of such consent is mandatory in Scheduled Areas, but also
recommends that such consent must be made mandatory to
other areas as well. Unfortunately, the impugned judgment has
the effect of reducing a mandatory statutory requirement into a
paper formality. What is more concerning is that the present
case is on an even worse footing. Far from a meaningful
consent, there is not even paper consent of Gram Sabha in this
case. This consent was required to be taken on Form M as per
Rule 41 of Odisha Rules, and there is no such material on
record. Contrarily, it is the admitted position that both the Gram
Sabha(s) had expressly rejected the proposal at the threshold
through the resolutions passed on 26.01.2020. Nevertheless, the
respondents proceeded unhindered on the path of illegality.
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 31 of 44
42. The High Court has observed that non-fulfilment of the
requirement under Section 41 is an inconsequential irregularity.
The company, drawing inspiration and taking the argument
further, has effectively questioned the desirability of the
requirement of obtaining consent from Gram Sabha. It has
contended that this requirement violates the consent and will of
the land owners. Without any hesitation, we reject both the
contentions. The requirement under Section 41 has a sound
constitutional and statutory basis. The Fifth Schedule of the
Constitution is meant to confer enhanced protection to the lands
falling in Scheduled Areas. Section 41 has been enacted in
furtherance of this constitutional mandate and has been couched
in a language that leaves no scope to infer it as a directory
provision. The prescription of a dedicated form for obtaining
this consent in Odisha Rules makes it further evident that the
law prescribes a specific manner for obtaining such consent.
Once law provides for a thing to be done in a particular and
unambiguous manner, it must be done in that manner alone, or
not at all. Moreover, it is not for this Court to question the
wisdom of the legislature in incorporating a mandatory
provision in the statute book, as long as the provision
continues to be valid. The ground urged by the company
regarding the desirability of Section 41(3) cannot be examined,
as it essentially requires the Court to question the wisdom of the
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 32 of 44
legislature, which we have invariably refrained from doing in
the exercise of judicial review.
43. There is a peculiar observation in the impugned judgment
that Section 41(3) does not provide for any
sanction/consequence in case of violation of the said provision
and thus, the provision must be deemed as directory.
Consequence, though is one of the tests for determining whether
a provision is directory or mandatory, is not the sole test. Once
a provision is placed in the statute book after being clothed as a
mandatory provision and the State acts in breach of the same,
the remedy of judicial review by the Constitutional Courts gets
triggered, irrespective of whether the statute does or does not
explicitly provide for it. The power of judicial review against
the acts of State and its instrumentalities flows directly from the
Constitution. It cannot be curbed or weakened by any statute.
Of course, existence of alternate remedy in the statute may be
preferred.
44. We may now come to the objections regarding the SIA
report and composition of the Expert Group. Section 4 and 5 of
the 2013 Act provide for the conduct of a social impact assess-
ment study to assess various factors including existence of pub-
lic purpose, existence of affected families, extent of lands likely
to be affected, acquisition of bare minimum land, enquiry
regarding existence of alternate land, social impact of the
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 33 of 44
project, etc. Admittedly, SIA report was prepared in this matter
and we are clear that we are not examining the contents of the
same. However, the provisions also provide for consultation and
public hearing on the draft report. Such hearing must be
conducted in the affected area. Conscious of this requirement in
the present case, a public hearing was scheduled in the affected
areas on 16.04.2021. However, there is no material to suggest
that any hearing actually took place. The RTI responses indicate
that no public hearing could be conducted due to Covid-19
restrictions, and the respondents have nothing to counter this
contention. They have urged that a hearing was conducted, but
could not be recorded due to non-cooperation and nuisance by
some villagers. Notably, the views of the affected persons are
required to be recorded in the final SIA report so that the Expert
Group and appropriate government could have the benefit of
examining the concerns of the affected persons. But no such
views form part of the final report, which also points towards
the appellants’ contention that no hearing was conducted.
45. Insofar as the composition of Expert Group is concerned,
the appellants’ contention is that the Expert Group is supposed
to be an independent body and the presence of one Mr. Ashok
Kumar Sahoo vitiated the composition of the Group as he was
connected to the requiring body/the company. There is no
quarrel with respect to the fact that Mr. Sahoo was indeed
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 34 of 44
connected to the company in the capacity of Advisor, Land
Acquisition. The High Court turned down this argument by
observing that Section 7 does not provide for a rigid
composition of the Expert Group and it is merely an inclusive
provision. It observed that Mr. Sahoo could have been
legitimately included as a technical expert. Let us have a look at
Section 7 of the Act, which reads thus:
“7. Appraisal of Social Impact Assessment report
by an Expert Group.—
(1) The appropriate Government shall ensure that
the Social Impact Assessment report is evaluated
by an independent multi-disciplinary Expert
Group, as may be constituted by it.
(2) The Expert Group constituted under
sub-section (1) shall include the following,
namely:—
(a) two non-official social scientists;
(b) two representatives of Panchayat, Gram
Sabha, Municipality or Municipal Corporation, as
the case may be;
(c) two experts on rehabilitation; and
(d) a technical expert in the subject relating to the
project.…”
46. Evidently, Section 7(2) is an inclusive provision and
provides that the Expert Group shall include four different
categories of members. No doubt, the Group could have a
technical expert as a part of its composition, but the expert must
be chosen in a manner that the mandate of independence under
Section 7(1) is not compromised in any sense. Sub-section (1)
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 35 of 44
explicitly states that the report must be evaluated by “ an
independent multi-disciplinary Expert Group ”. Thus, a
challenge questioning the independence of the members of the
Expert Group is sustainable. Importantly, the Expert Group has
the mandate to examine and give its opinion regarding the
existence or non-existence of public purpose in the project,
social costs and adverse social impacts outweighing social
benefits. Is a person having direct financial and professional
link with the requiring entity/project proponent expected to give
an independent opinion that the required project is against
public interest or involves disproportionate social costs or
adverse social impacts? The answer is a clear ‘ no’ .
47. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
inclusion of Mr. Sahoo in the Expert Group compromised with
the statutory requirement of independence of the Group. It had
the effect of rendering the deliberation of the Expert Group as a
fixed match. The respondents have, thus, violated Section 7 of
the Act.
48. We may now come to the argument regarding the
interplay of MMDR Act and 2013 Act. In order to defend this
challenge, the respondents seem to have adopted a two-pronged
strategy. While trying to demonstrate that the subject
acquisition has been carried out in accordance with 2013 Act,
they have also attempted to show that MMDR Act operates as a
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 36 of 44
complete code insofar as mining activity is concerned.
However, the ultimate argument seems to be that both 2013 Act
and MMDR Act must be read together and effect must be given
to both.
49. On a careful analysis of both the legislations, we are of
the view that the respondents have endeavored to introduce an
artificial conflict between the two legislations. The 2013 Act
and MMDR Act operate in completely distinct spheres and
regulate different aspects of a mining project. There is no
occasion to hold any of their provisions to be in conflict
inter-se . MMDR Act lays down the pre-requisites for carrying
out mining activity; regulates the relationship between the State
and mining lessee/licensee; and provides for penalties for
various acts such as illegal entry, unauthorized mining etc. One
of the pre-requisites for carrying out mining activity is to have a
lease or license from the State. In the present case, there is a
lease between the State and the company. However, MMDR
Act nowhere suggests that the existence of such lease would
override all other statutory requirements of law. The
requirement of lease only governs the contractual relationship
between the State and mining company. It cannot be construed
to affect the proprietary rights of the landowners of the land on
which mining is proposed to take place. A bilateral relationship
based on lease between two parties cannot affect the proprietary
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 37 of 44
rights of third-party land owners, who are independent to such
lease. The mineral lease provides mineral concession to the
lessee and royalty to the State. The landowner has no privity
with it and has no benefit to derive from the same. Suffice to
note that a contractual arrangement between State and mining
lessee cannot affect third parties in the manner urged by
the company.
50. The 2013 Act provides for acquisition of land for the
purpose of mining project, which is something that MMDR Act
does not provide for. There appears to be no conflict between
the provisions governing lease in MMDR Act and provisions
for land acquisition under 2013 Act. They operate in distinct
spheres and full effect can be given to both without any
disharmony. Section 103 of 2013 Act provides that the
provisions of the Act operate in addition to other laws and not
in derogation thereof. We have no reason to disagree with it and
there is no question of derogation of MMDR Act by following
the statutory procedure for land acquisition as per 2013 Act.
51. The respondents have referred to Section 24A of MMDR
Act to contend that the said provision lays down the lessee’s
right to enter upon the leased land to carry out mining
operations. The provision requires reproduction:
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 38 of 44
“24A. Rights and liabilities of a holder of mineral
concession.―
(1) On the issue of a mineral concession under this
Act and the rules made thereunder, it shall be
lawful for the holder of such permit, licence or
lease, his agents or his servants or workmen to
enter the lands over which such permit, lease or
licence had been granted at all times during its
currency and carry out all such reconnaissance,
prospecting or mining operations as may be
prescribed:
Provided that no person shall enter into any
building or upon an enclosed court or garden
attached to a dwelling-house (except with the
consent of the occupier thereof) without previously
giving such occupier at least seven days’ notice in
writing of his intention to do so.
(2) The holder of a mineral concession referred to
in sub-section (1) shall be liable to pay
compensation in such manner as may be
prescribed to the occupier of the surface of the
land granted under such permit, licence or lease
for any loss or damage which is likely to arise or
has arisen from or in consequence of the
reconnaissance, mining or prospecting operations.
(3) The amount of compensation payable under
sub-section (2) shall be determined by the State
Government in the manner prescribed.”
52. A bare reading of the provision makes it evident that it
makes it lawful for the mineral lessee to act in furtherance of
the mineral lease at all times and to carry out mining operations.
It provides that if any loss is caused to the occupier of surface
of the land in the course of operations, the lessee shall
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 39 of 44
compensate the occupier for loss or damage. The respondents
seek to read this provision to mean that mere grant of mining
lease enables the lessee to conduct mining operations on
payment of compensation under Section 24A to the occupiers,
without anything more.
53. We must tread carefully while dealing with this
submission. It is so because the scope of the present case is
quite limited and the submission has the potential to take this
Court on an academic path and lead it into over-adjudication of
the lis . In the instant case, we are not examining whether
acquisition of land was possible in some other legislation such
10
as Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885 or whether mining
activity was permissible without acquisition and on payment of
compensation under MMDR Act read with MCR Rules. Even if
we assume that these courses were open to the company, it is
clear that they were not adopted. Being desirous of carrying out
mining activity on the subject land, the company admittedly
chose to initiate a proposal under the 2013 Act. We must be
mindful of the fact that the company has not chosen any other
route, if at all it was available, under 1885 Act or MMDR Act
or MCR Rules. These provisions have been invoked only as
defence in the present proceeding and no proceeding has been
carried out under these provisions. Therefore, we are not
10
Hereinafter referred as “1885 Act”
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 40 of 44
concerned with these hypothetical possibilities, and are only
concerned with the legality of the process chosen by the
respondents i.e. process under 2013 Act.
54. Although we refrain from expressing any final view on
these possibilities, we prima facie find that the submission is
not only based on an incorrect reading of Section 24A, but is
also in complete derogation of 2013 Act. Section 24A talks
about compensation for loss or damage caused or likely to be
caused during the conduct of mining operations. It cannot be
construed to mean that a mining lessee can start mining activity
on any land by simply paying some compensation to the
occupier, and without acquiring the land in accordance with
2013 Act. Compensation payable on account of loss or damage
caused to the land, and that payable on account of acquisition of
land, cannot be equated. The respondents have indulged in a
clear misreading of the provision under Section 24A of MMDR
Act. They have tried to convert a right acquired under the
mining lease to completely override the 2013 Act. This reading
is also in the teeth of Section 2 of 2013 Act, which explicitly
provides for acquisition of land by the government for the
purpose of mining. If mining activity was permissible solely on
the basis of a mining lease and compensation under Section
24A of MMDR Act, the legislature ought to have omitted
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 41 of 44
‘mining’ from the list of purposes for which land acquisition
could be carried out under the 2013 Act.
55. The reference to Rule 52 of MCR Rules is also
inconsequential to the case at hand. It pertains to the payment of
annual compensation to the owners of surface rights. However,
for reasons discussed above, we find it sufficient to note that no
dispute pertaining to annual compensation arises in this matter.
We repeat that we are only dealing with the legality of the
proceedings carried out under 2013 Act.
56. In view of the above discussion, we have no doubt in
observing that both 2013 Act and MMDR Act can be construed
harmoniously, and full effect can be given to their respective
provisions without any derogation. Having once started a
process for land acquisition under Section 2 of 2013 Act, the
respondents cannot now be permitted to avoid a challenge to the
said process by contending that such acquisition was not even
required in view of MMDR Act or other laws. Even if it was not
so required, we are not concerned with that. We are concerned
with the fact that a process has been carried out in violation of
the 2013 Act, and the affected persons cannot be deprived of
their proprietary rights or interests in view of the illegalities
committed in the process.
57. On the issue of locus standi , we may only observe that
the respondent State cannot be permitted to question the locus
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 42 of 44
after failing to discharge its statutory duty to update the record
of rights during the acquisition process. Without updating the
records, the State cannot take a stand that the appellants are not
affected by the acquisition. Further, one of the appellant’s name
was admittedly mentioned in the record of rights, however, his
locus was questioned because his signature was not present in
the affidavit. Instead of outrightly declaring that he lacked locus
standi , despite finding his name in the record of rights, the High
Court ought to have directed the concerned individual to furnish
a fresh affidavit. When the State is found to have indulged in
illegality and breach of statute, a Constitutional Court is not
expected to turn down a challenge solely for technical reasons,
that too when the defect was curable and could have been an
outcome of State’s own inaction. Nevertheless, it goes to the
credit of the High Court that it has decided the challenge on
merits and accordingly, we have also decided this appeal on
merits.
58. In finality, we allow the writ petition, and hold that the
land acquisition in question is unsustainable. The acquisition,
along with the relevant notifications, orders etc., is hereby set
aside. The impugned judgment is also set aside.
59. We make it clear that this decision shall not operate as an
embargo in initiating fresh land acquisition process in
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 43 of 44
accordance with the law and our findings in this judgment. The
respondents shall be at liberty to do so.
60. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of along with
pending application(s), if any.
….…………………………………J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
....…………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
New Delhi
November 18, 2026.
C. A. No. 8294 of 2026 Page 44 of 44