C.B.I. vs AMIT JOGI and ANOTHER

Court: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case type: CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION
Decided on: 25-03-2026

<div> 1 2026:CGHC:14207-DB NAFR Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.03.25 17:16:35 +0530 ANURADHA TIWARI HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 495 of 2011 CBI CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF SPCBI-SCR-III, 5-B, CBI, Headquarters, 3rd Floor, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi. ... Petitioner versus 1- Amit Jogi, S/o Ajeet Jogi, aged about 29 years, R/o Motilal Nehru Marg, New Delhi, Present Address Anugrah, Civil Line Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2- STATE OF CHHATTISGARH, Through the District Magistrate Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) </div><table><thead><tr><th>For Petitioner</th><th>:</th><th>Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, Advocate</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>For Respondent No.1</td><td>:</td><td>Mr. Shailendra Shukla, Advocate</td></tr><tr><td>For Respondent No.2</td><td>:</td><td>Dr. Saurabh Pande, Additional Advocate General</td></tr></tbody></table><div> Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 25.03.2026 1. Heard Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Shailendra Shukla, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and Dr. Saurabh Pande, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State/respondent No.2. 2 2. The present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31.05.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, by which the learned Trial Court, while convicting as many as 19 co- accused persons for offences including those punishable with life imprisonment and awarding sentences under various provisions of law, has acquitted respondent No.1 of all the charges. It is the grievance of the petitioner that despite there being sufficient material on record, including evidence pertaining to criminal conspiracy in which other co- accused have been held guilty, the learned Trial Court has erred in extending the benefit of doubt to respondent No.1, thereby resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice and warranting interference by this Court. 3. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that the State of Chhattisgarh had preferred Criminal Appeal No.1927 of 2014 along with connected matters before the Hon’ble Apex Court, assailing the orders dated 18.08.2011 passed in CRMP No.137/2008, 12.09.2011 passed in CRMP No.495/2011 and 19.09.2011 passed in CRMP No.434/2007. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after affording due opportunity of hearing to the parties, and upon a comprehensive consideration of the rival submissions as well as the material available on record, has rendered its authoritative judgment dated 06.11.2025. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has elaborately examined the statutory framework governing appeals against acquittal, particularly the scope and ambit of 3 Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in light of the earlier three-Judge Bench decision in Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 1 . The Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the principle that the power to prefer an appeal against acquittal in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (CBI) or other central agencies vests exclusively with the Central Government, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the State Government in such matters. 4. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further taken note of the peculiar factual matrix of the present case, wherein initially the investigation was carried out by the State Police and was subsequently entrusted to the CBI. While leaving certain larger questions of law open for consideration in an appropriate case, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the interest of justice, has condoned the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal by the CBI and has directed that the said application be considered on its own merits by the High Court. Importantly, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also mandated that the de facto complainant as well as the State of Chhattisgarh be impleaded as party respondents in the said proceedings and be afforded an opportunity of hearing. The matters were accordingly remitted to this Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. Relevant portion of order, reads as follows :- “ DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 17. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at bar and have carefully gone through the impugned orders. 4 We have also given our respectful consideration to the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra). 18. On a threadbare perusal of the three-Judge Bench judgment in Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra), we find that this Court extensively considered and discussed the provisions of law involved in the matter i.e., Sections 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898/Section 378 of the CrPC, 1973. The Bench has elaborately drawn distinction in the two enabling provisions i.e., 378(1) and 378(2) of the CrPC in the following manner: “30. Section 378 is divided into six sub- sections. Sub-section (1) provides that the State Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than the High Court or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision. It opens with the words “save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)” followed by the words “and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5)”. 31. Sub-section (2) refers to two classes of cases, namely, (i) those cases where the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the 1946 Act, and (ii) those cases where the offence has been investigated by 5 any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than the 1973 Code and provides that the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal. Such an appeal by the Central Government in the aforesaid two types of cases is subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (3). xxx 35. We have surveyed Section 378 in its entirety to have a complete conspectus of the provision. The opening words-“save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2)”-are in the nature of exception intended to exclude the classes of cases mentioned in sub- section (2) out of operation of the body of sub-section (1). These words have no other meaning in the context but to qualify the operation of sub-section (1) and take out of its purview two types of cases referred to in sub-section (2), namely, (i) the cases in which offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the 1946 Act, and (ii) the cases in which the offence has been investigated by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than the 1973 Code. By construing Section 378 in a manner that permits appeal from an order of acquittal by 6 the State Government in every case, except two classes of cases mentioned in sub-section (2), full effect would be given to the exception (clause) articulated in the opening words. 36. As noticed above, the words-“save as otherwise provided in sub -section (2)”-were added in the 1973 Code; Section 417 of the 1898 Code did not have these words. It is a familiar rule of construction that all changes in the wording and phrasing may be presumed to have been deliberate and with the purpose to limit, qualify or enlarge the pre -existing law as the changes of the words employ. Any construction that makes the exception (clause) with which the section opens unnecessary and redundant should be avoided.” 19. The entire existing case law on the subject was exhaustively referred to and analyzed. Thereafter, applying the principles of statutory interpretation, the Bench held that the legislature has maintained a mutually exclusive division in the matter of appeal from a judgment and order of acquittal inasmuch as the competent authority to appeal from a judgment and order of acquittal in two types of cases referred to in sub-Section (2) of Section 378 of the CrPC is the Central Government and the authority of the State Government in relation to such cases has been excluded. The relevant observations made in para 54 in Lalu Prasad 7 Yadav and Anr. (supra) are quoted hereinbelow: “54. In our opinion, the legislature has maintained a mutually exclusive division in the matter of appeal from an order of acquittal inasmuch as the competent authority to appeal from an order of acquittal in two types of cases referred to in sub- section (2) is the Central Government and the authority of the State Government in relation to such cases has been excluded…” 20. Indisputably, applying the ratio of the above judgment, the leave to appeal application filed by the State of Chhattisgarh would not be maintainable. 21. The core question which requires adjudication in these matters is whether the three-Judge Bench judgment in the case of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra) lays down the correct proposition of law, or whether the same requires reference to, and resolution by a larger bench. 22. Having examined the statutory framework and after mulling over the arguments advanced at bar, we see no reason to take a different view. However, there is one aspect of the controversy which may require a deeper probe in a suitable case. In para 37 of the judgment in Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra), this Court gave some indication that if a different view was to be taken, it would imply that, irrespective of the complaint not being lodged 8 by the State Government or its officers, the investigation not being done by its police establishment, and the State Government having no role in the criminal proceedings, and where all steps from launching of the prosecution until its logical end were undertaken by the Delhi Police Special Establishment, yet the State Government may file an appeal against a judgment and order of acquittal under Section 378(1) of the CrPC. 23. Apparently, these observations could give rise to an argument that, in cases like the present one, where at the initial stage, the investigation was undertaken by the State Police and subsequently, the State Government thought fit to assign further investigation to the CBI, perhaps the State Government may stake a right to challenge the judgment and order of acquittal on its own, irrespective of the CBI not pursuing such a course of action. 24. However, we do not see any reason to enter into the controversy nor are we persuaded to take a different view for the reason that in the case of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra), the CBI also supported the view taken by the High Court and chose not to file an appeal questioning the acquittal of the accused by the trial Court. However, in the present case, the distinguishing feature is that the CBI has also filed an application seeking leave to appeal against acquittal of the respondent-Amit Jogi. 9 25. In this background, we are of the view that the question as to whether the State Government can independently file an appeal against acquittal of the accused in a case which was initially registered by the local police and later tried on the chargesheet filed by the CBI, may be examined and deliberated in a suitable case involving the following situations: (a) the complaint was lodged by the State Government or its officers; (b) investigation was partly done by State Police; (c) prosecution was commenced at the instance of the State Government; (d) the State Government has a stake in the criminal proceedings; and (e) the jurisdiction of the CBI had been invoked at the instance of the State Government. 26. However, in the present case, we feel that ends of justice will be served by condoning the delay occasioned in filing of the application seeking leave to appeal by the CBI and requiring the High Court to consider the said application filed by the CBI, on its own merits. Such a course of action would ensure that the challenge to the judgment of acquittal would be examined on merits by the High Court instead of a technical rejection. II. Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 7331 of 2011 10 27. We also do not find any fault in the view taken by the High Court on the aspect of maintainability of the de-facto-complainant’s application filed under proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC9. Needless to say, that the judgment and order of acquittal in this case was rendered on 31st May, 2007, whereas, the enabling provision i.e., proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, which gives a substantive right to the victim to file an appeal against judgment and order of acquittal came into effect from 31st December, 2009. 28. This Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through LRs v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,has affirmatively held that the right conferred upon a victim to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC arises only in respect of orders of acquittal passed after 31st December, 2009. The observations made by this Court in para 72 are quoted hereinbelow: “72. What is significant is that several High Courts have taken a consistent view to the effect that the victim of an offence has a right of appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. This view is in consonance with the plain language of the proviso. But what is more important is that several High Courts have also taken the view that the date of the alleged offence has no relevance to the right of appeal. It has been held, and we have referred to those decisions above, that the 11 significant date is the date of the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. In a sense, the cause of action arises in favour of the victim of an offence only when an order of acquittal is passed and if that happens after 31-12-2009 the victim has a right to challenge the acquittal, through an appeal. Indeed, the right not only extends to challenging the order of acquittal but also challenging the conviction of the accused for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation. The language of the proviso is quite explicit, and we should not read nuances that do not exist in the proviso.” (Emphasis Supplied) 29. Thus, undeniably, as on the date of the judgment and order of acquittal i.e. 31st May, 2007, there was no provision in the statute book which permitted the de-facto-complainant to challenge the judgment and order of acquittal rendered by the trial Court by approaching the High Court through a victim’s appeal. Thus, Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 7331 of 2011 filed by the de-facto-complainant fails as being devoid of merit. III. Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012and @ SLP(Crl.) No. 1438 of 2012 30. We now turn to Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012 filed by the CBI and Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 1438 of 2012 filed by the de-facto-complainant, assailing the th order dated 12 September, 2011. Though it is 12 true that the CBI filed an application seeking leave to appeal after a significant delay of 1373 days, but it is equally true that the charges against the respondent-Amit Jogi were very grave, involving a conspiracy to murder a member of a rival political party. The judgment of acquittal was under challenge at the instance of the State Government and the de-facto- complainant and thus, the proceedings were still alive. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to have adopted a more liberal and pragmatic approach in dealing with CBI’s application seeking condonation of delay and should have examined application seeking leave to appeal applicable on its merits. 31. We may hasten to add that we are not giving any imprimatur to the explanation offered by the CBI in its application for condonation of delay, but our objective is to ensure that the case involving such grave allegations should not be thrown out on mere technicalities. 32. At the same time, we also make it clear that we are not commenting on the merits of the case. It shall be open to the High Court to examine the merits of the matter while considering the CBI’s prayer for grant of leave to appeal, uninfluenced by any observation made in this order. 33. Consequently, Criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012, preferred by the CBI succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. The delay occasioned in filing the application 13 for grant of leave to appeal by the CBI against the judgment and order of acquittal of the respondent-Amit Jogi is hereby condoned. The matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the application for grant of leave to appeal filed by the CBI, on merits. 34. Although, at the stage of grant of leave to appeal, the acquitted accused is ordinarily not required to be heard, however, in the peculiar facts of the present case, since we have condoned the significant delay occasioned by the CBI in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal, we consider it expedient, in the interest of justice, to permit the respondent-Amit Jogi (acquitted accused) an opportunity of hearing in the application seeking leave to appeal. The de-facto- complainant as well as the State of Chhattisgarh shall also be impleaded as parties in the CBI’s application seeking leave to appeal and would be entitled to advance their respective submissions before the High Court. 35. As a consequence, Criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012 preferred by the CBI is allowed; Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2014 preferred by the State of Chhattisgarh and Criminal appeals @ SLP(Crl.) Nos. 7331 of 2011 and 1438 of 2012, preferred by Satish Jaggi, the de-facto-complainant, are hereby dismissed. 36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” 14 5. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement and the explicit directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present application preferred by the CBI seeking grant of leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal merits acceptance. The Hon’ble Apex Court has, in clear and unequivocal terms, set aside the earlier order of this Court and remitted the matter for fresh consideration on merits, while also condoning the delay occasioned in filing the application for leave to appeal. The emphasis of the Hon’ble Apex Court is that cases involving serious allegations ought not to be defeated on technical grounds, and the matter deserves to be examined on its substantive merits. 6. In such circumstances, this Court is bound to act in aid of and in faithful compliance with the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The directions issued leave no scope for adopting a hyper-technical approach, and instead require a judicious, fair and merit-based consideration of the application. Accordingly, this Court is now under an obligation to proceed with the matter in its proper perspective, ensuring that the application for leave to appeal is adjudicated on merits so that the correctness of the judgment of acquittal can be duly examined in accordance with law. 7. Accordingly, the instant Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, being CRMP No. 495/2011, is allowed. 8. Consequently, leave to appeal, as prayed for under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is hereby granted. 15 9. Registry is directed to register the appeal and list the same under the appropriate head of “Acquittal Appeal.” The said acquittal appeal stands admitted for hearing. 10. Mr. Shailendra Shukla, learned counsel, submits that he has entered appearance and filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of respondent No.2. His appearance is taken on record. 11. Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, learned counsel appearing for the CBI, submits that some time may be granted to enable the agency to file an appropriate application for impleadment of the de facto complainant as party respondent in CRMP No.495/2011, in compliance with the judgment dated 06.11.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1927/2014. 12. It is very unfortunate that, in pursuance of the judgment and directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide order dated 06.11.2025, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has not taken necessary steps for impleadment of the de facto complainant as a party respondent in the present proceedings. Despite the matter having been remanded with a specific direction to ensure such impleadment, no application has been moved by the CBI till date. Such inaction on the part of the investigating agency amounts to non-compliance with the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which ought to have been followed in its true letter and spirit. 13. Having regard to the fact that the matters have been remanded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with a specific direction to the CBI to implead 16 the de facto complainant as well as the State as party respondents, it is noted that the State is already a party respondent and hence, this Court deems it appropriate, in the interest of justice, to waive of opportunity to the CBI to file an formal application for impleadment of the de facto complainant as a party respondent, we direct the learned counsel for the CBI to implead the de facto complainant as party respondent in the said acquittal appeal during the course of the day. 14. Dr. Saurabh Pande, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State, is also present. 15. Learned counsel for the CBI is further directed to supply a complete set of the paper-book to learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2, forthwith. 16. The respondent-Amit Aishwarya Jogi is directed to furnish bail bonds and sureties to the satisfaction of the trial Court concerned st before 31 March, 2026, failing which appropriate consequences shall follow in accordance with law. 17. The parties may engage counsel of their own choice before the next date of hearing in acquittal appeal. 18. List the said acquittal appeal for final hearing on 01.04.2026 , along with CRR No.434/2007 and CRR No.232/2008. </div><table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Sd/- Sd/-</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div> Anu</div>