Saeeda Fatima Ashraf vs State Of U.P. Thru. Collector Barabanki And 10 Others

A.F.R.
Reserved
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 11450 of 2025
Saeeda Fatima Ashraf
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. Thru. Collector Barabanki and 10 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Aftab Ahmad,
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Akhilesh Kumar Tiwari,
Amit Singh, Atif Iqbal, Mohd.
Shakeel, Saud Rais, Yogesh Singh
Court No. - 16
HON'BLE SYED QAMAR HASAN RIZVI, J.
1. Shri. Aftab Ahmad, along with Sri. Shavez Ahmad for petitioner; Shri
Abhishek Kumar Pandey, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
assisted by Shri Yogesh Kumar Awasthi, learned Standing Counsel for the
State/respondent No.1 and 2; Shri Akhilesh Kumar Tiwari, learned
counsel for respondent No. 3, Shri Mohd. Shakeel, learned counsel for
respondent No. 4; Shri Saud Rais, learned counsel for respondent nos. 5
to 9; Shri Amit Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 10 and Shri
Yogesh Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 11 are present.
2. This case has come up before this Court in furtherance of the
nomination made by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, wherein pleadings have
been exchanged by way of counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4
and 5 to 9 and rejoinder to it has been filed by the petitioner.
3. By means of the present petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief:

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
“(i) issue or pass a writ, direction, and/or order in the nature
of certiorari quashing the order dated 13.10.2025 passed by
the opposite party no.2/ Prescribed Authority/A.D.M.,
Nawabganj, Barabanki, in Case No.1509/2025 under section
10 (2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act, 1960.
(ii) issue any other writ, direction and/or order in any other
nature deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case
including an order awarding the costs of this petition to the
petitioner and against the respondents.”
4. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State-
respondents No. 1 and 2 and learned counsel for the opposite party No. 4,
raised preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the
instant writ petition on the ground of availability of remedy of appeal
under Section 13 of the Ceiling Act. They further contended that in view
of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Radhey Shyam versus Chhabi Nath , reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423, the
instant writ petition under Article 226 is not maintainable, rather, at the
most, a petition under Article 227 ought to have been filed.
5. The factual matrix of the case, as culled out from the pleadings shows
long drawn litigation history and the issues involved herein requires
mentioning of certain relevant facts in nutshell, for better appreciation of
the case.
(a) As is borne out from the pleadings and submissions of the
counsels appearing for the respective parties, the properties i.e. subject
matter of the instant writ petition were admittedly owned and possessed
by Ch. Rasheed Uddin Ashraf who was having four sons namely Ch.
Azeem Uddin Ashraf, Ch. Zia Uddin Ashraf, Ch. Nazeer Uddin Ashraf
and Ch. Emad Uddin Ashraf. The said Ch. Rasheed Uddin Ashraf is said
to have died in the year 1939 and was succeeded by his abovementioned
four sons. It has also not been disputed by any of the private parties that
this succession by his four sons was in furtherance of a registered will-
deed dated 06.02.1939 executed by Ch. Rasheed Uddin Ashraf and acting
upon the same, names of the aforesaid four sons of Ch. Rasheed Uddin
Ashraf were duly recorded in the revenue records as well as other records.

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(a.i) In paragraph No.9 of the Writ petition the petitioner has given the
following pedigree and has stated that the parties to the instant writ
petition are the heirs/ legal representatives of these four recorded tenure
holders. The said pedigree is as under:
Khan Bahadur Ch. Rasheed Uddin Ashraf (died in 1939)
Ch. Nazeer Uddin Ashraf
(died in 1942)
Ch.Azeem Uddin Ashraf
(died in 1986)
Ch. Emad Uddin Ashraf
(died on 15.03.1973)
Ch. Zia Uddin Ashraf
(died in 1949)
(b) The State initiated ceiling proceedings against Ch. Azeem Uddin
Ashraf and Ch. Emad Uddin Ashraf and when the fact that Ch. Emad
Uddin Ashraf had died prior to the issuing of the notice, was brought to
the knowledge of the concerned authority by his heirs, the said
proceedings were dropped against him and case continued against Ch.
Azeem Uddin Ashraf only, who filed objections, asserting therein that the
properties as mentioned in the notice under Section 10(2) of the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 belong to all four sons of Ch.
Rasheed Uddin Ashraf namely Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf, Ch. Zia Uddin
Ashraf, Ch. Nazeer Uddin Ashraf and Ch. Emad Uddin Ashraf or their
heirs and are not his exclusive property. Apart from it, categorical
objection was taken to the effect that Khata No.210 of village Paisar and
certain lands situated in village: Satrikh were falling within municipal
limits and were outside the purview of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred as “Ceiling Act” ) and it was also
stated by him in his objection that he holds only around 20 bighas of land
as such proper notices may be issued to all the tenure holders as per extent
of their shares. Though it transpires from record, the said proceedings
were culminated by the order dated 08.02.1983, but on certain reports by
Tahsil authorities and applications by tenure holders as well as State, the

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
order dated 08.02.1983 was recalled thereby the proceedings stood
revived.
(c) Thereafter, notice was amended by the order dated 26.11.1996 against
which fresh objections were filed by the heirs of Ch. Rasheed Uddin
Ashraf jointly and discarding all the objections raised by the predecessors
in-interest of the petitioner. There upon Vide order dated 31.03.2003, the
Prescribed Authority declared an area of (56-5-19) as surplus from total
holdings of (85-3-3), treating entire land as of Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf
only.
(d) The said order was challenged, by the petitioners and respondents 3 to
11 jointly by filing an appeal viz. appeal no. 35 before the Additional
Commissioner Faizabad Division wherein vide order dated 29.11.2003
the order of the Prescribed Authority was quashed and the case was
remanded to him for decision afresh as per the directions as given in the
order of remand.
(e) Consequent upon remand, the matter stood revived before the
Prescribed Authority, the parties appeared, matter was contested and the
Prescribed Authority, passed the order dated 18.08.2011. Two separate
appeals were filed against the order fated 18.08.2011 one by the owners
of the property and the other by the transferees of the portion of the
property.
(f) The appeal of the transferees was allowed by the Additional
Commissioner, Faizabad Division vide order dated 05.10.2018 which
attained finality but the other appeal filed by the petitioner remained
pending and ultimately was allowed by the order dated 04.04.2025, passed
by the Commissioner Ayodhya thereby the case was again remanded by
the Appellate Authority to the Prescribed Authority, to be decided as per
directions contained in the order of remand dated 04.04.2025. It is also
apparent that the directions as issued by order dated 04.04.2025 were
more or less analogous to the directions as were given vide the earlier
remand order dated 29.11.2003.
(g) After the aforesaid second remand, the Prescribed Authority vide the
impugned order dated 13.10.2025, once again decided the matter

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
declaring 48-3-16 as surplus land. Aggrieved by the same the petitioner
has approached this Court by preferring the instant Writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
ONTENTION OF THE ARTIES
C P :
6. In the first limb of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that a notice under Section 10(2) of the Ceiling Act had been
issued in the year 1974 to her father Ch. Emad Uddin Ashraf after his
death, who passed away on 15.03.1973 and that, after his death, the
petitioner, along with her mother and sister, succeeded to his Estate and
jointly filed objections against the said notice. The said objections were
allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 08.03.1981
(Annexure No.6) by which the notice was withdrawn on the ground that
it had been issued against a dead person. The Prescribed Authority further
directed to sent copy of the order to the Tahsildar, Nawabganj to proceed
with ceiling proceedings against the legal heirs in accordance with law. It
is contended by the learned counsel that, despite the said direction, no
fresh notice has ever been issued to the legal heirs of Ch. Emad Uddin
Ashraf till date. Operative portion of the order is extracted herein below;
for ready reference:
“ fu.kZ;
Jh pkSèkjh beknqínhu v'kjQ iq= Jh jlhnqínhu v'kjQ] fuoklh islkj]
ckjkcadh ds uke v-tks-lh- vf/kfu;e dh èkkjk 10 ¼2½ ds vUrxZr
uksfVl tkjh dh x;h gS ftlds fo:) Jherh tqys[kk [kkrwu] vatqe
Qkfrek v'kjQ] lbZnk Qkfrek v'kjQ us ;g vkifÙk çLrqr fd;k fd
pkSèkjh beknqínhu v'kjQ dh e`R;q 15&3&73 dks esfMdy dkyst
y[kuÅ esa gks x;h gS tks 8 twu] 1973 ds igys dh frfFk gS lhfyax
vfèkfu;e 8 twu] 1973 ls çHkkoh gqvk gSA beknqínhu v'kjQ dh e`R;q
ds ckn mudh leLr [ksrh ;ksX; Hkwfe rhuksa vkifÙk drkZvksa esa cjkcj
& cjkcj 13 fnlacj 1972 dks fy[kh xbZ fgck ds vkèkkj ij dCtk
dj fy;k x;k gS vkSj nkf[ky [kkfjt Hkh gks x;h gS blfy, beknqínhu
ij lhfyax dh dk;Zokgh xyr 'kq: dh x;h gSA
vius mijksä dFku ds leFkZu esa esfMdy dkyst y[kuÅ ls ,d
e`R;q çek.k i= çkIr djds nkf[ky fd;k x;k gS ftlesa ;g çekf.kr
fd;k x;k gS fd beknqínhu v'kjQ dh e`R;q 15&3&1973 dks esfMdy
dkyst esa gh gqbZ gS pwafd mudh e`R;q lalksèku vfèkfu;e 1972 ds ykxw
gksus ds fnukad ¼8 twu] 1973½ ds igys gks pqdh gS blfy, ejs gq;s
vkneh ds uke uksfVl xyr tkjh gks xbZ gS vLrq beknqínhu v'kjQ
ds fo:) tkjh dh x;h èkkjk 10¼2½ dh uksfVl fujLr dh tkrh gSA

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
bldh ,d çfrfyfi rglhynkj uokcxat dks fu;ekuqlkj
mÙkjkfèkdkfj;ksa ds fo#) lhfyax dk;Zokgh djus gsrq Hkstk tkosA ”
7. In the second limb of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that a notice under Section 10(2) of the Ceiling Act was issued
to Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf (eldest son of Late Ch. Rasheed Uddin
Ashraf), by clubbing together the properties individually held by all four
brothers. His contention is that the Prescribed Authority failed to
appreciate this material fact as well as the other objections raised by Ch.
Azeem Uddin Ashraf in his objection dated 21.08.1979. Learned counsel
further submitted that the property in question being ancestral property
jointly held by the objector and other co-sharers, having devolved from
their common ancestor, Ch. Rasheed Uddin Ashraf, who died in the year
1939 leaving behind four sons, namely, Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf, Ch. Zia
Uddin Ashraf, Ch. Nazeer Uddin Ashraf, and Ch. Emad Uddin Ashraf as
such the holdings could not have been treated as held by one, as the said
property was inherited by the four sons under a registered Will dated
08.02.1939 and that the heirs of all four brothers are contesting parties.
He further submitted that the notice dated 23.08.1974 issued to Ch. Azeem
Uddin Ashraf was subsequently amended on 26.11.1996 by including the
remaining properties of the petitioner and other independent tenure-
holders, thereby increasing the area alleged to be surplus in the hands of
Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf.
8. It has been categorically submitted by the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the four sons inherited the property in question through the
registered Will executed by their father and that the said Will has never
been challenged by any of the beneficiaries or any other person till date,
therefore, constitutes the best evidence regarding the division and
determination of the separate shares of the four sons of Ch. Rasheed
Uddin Ashraf. It is urged by petitioner’s counsel that the respective shares
of the above named four brothers ought to have been recognized and
determined independently for the purposes of ceiling proceedings treating
each brother as independent tenure holder.

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
9. Further, contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after
the cancellation/ withdrawal of the notice under Section 10(2) Ceiling Act
vide order dated 08.03.1981 no other or fresh notice has ever been issued
to the petitioner or her mother or her sister i.e. respondent No.11 herein,
either jointly or individually till this date and no independent proceedings
against the petitioner, her mother or her sister/ respondent No.11 were
taken for determination of the ceiling area and as such whatever
proceedings which have been taken giving rise to the instant writ petition
were only against Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf, wherein the land held by his
brothers were illegally and wrongly clubbed and was declared surplus.
10. He also submitted that Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf had appeared and
filed his objection asserting therein that the holdings as shown in the
notice are not his exclusive holdings but he is a co-tenure holder along
with his three brothers/their heirs. On such objections of co-tenancy being
raised, notice to other sharers were issued calling for their objections in
furtherance where of objections were also filed including objections by
the transferees. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the Prescribed Authority did not pay any heed to the objections taken
by Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf and other land holders and proceeded with
the case only against Ch. Azeem Uddin Ashraf in the most arbitrary
manner and passed the order dated 31.03.2003. For better appreciation of
the case the operative part of the order dated 31.03.2003 is extracted
herein below:
“ vr% budh vkifÙk Lohdkj djus ;ksX; ugha gS rFkk fujLr dh tkrh
gSA uksfVl esa x.kuk dh =qfVo'k [kkrsnkj dh dqy èk`r Hkwfe dk flafpr
vFkksZa esa {ks=Qy 56&12&5 vafdr gS tcfd okLrfod {ks=Qy flafpr
vFkksZa esa 85&3&3 vkrk gS blesa ls vfèkdre~ ç;ksT; {ks=Qy
28&17&4 ?kVkus ij flafpr vFkksZa esa 56&5&19 Hkwfe vfrfjä ?kksf"kr
gksus ;ksX; cprh gSA [kkrsnkj vFkok mlds okfjlku }kjk dksbZ fodYi
¼Pokbl½ çLrqr ugha dh x;h gS ,slh n'kk esa lqfoèkk dh –f"V ls lwph
^^c esa vafdr Hkwfe mlds vfèkdre~ ç;ksT; {ks=Qy esa NksM+h tkrh gS
rFkk lwph ^^l esa vafdr Hkwfe vfrfjä ?kksf"kr dh tkrh gSA lwph ^^v
^^c rFkk ^^l bl vkns'k dk vax gksxhA vfèkfu;e dh èkkjk&14 ds
vUrxZr visf{kr dk;Zokfg;ksa ds mijkUr i=koyh lafpr jktLo
vfHkys[kkxkj dh tk,A ”
11. The next submission of the learned counsel is that the order dated
31.03.2003 was challenged before the learned Appellate Authority by the

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
petitioner and other tenure holders by filing 3 separate appeals
respectively, which were clubbed together and decided by a common
order dated 29.11.2003, whereby, on due appreciation facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellate authority, set-aside the order
passed by the Prescribed Authority and remanded the matter to the
Prescribed Authority with specific directions to decide the case afresh.
The relevant portion of the judgment dated 29.11.2003 is quoted herein
below:
^^mijksä foospu ds ifjçs{; esa vihy Lohdkj dh tkrh gS fu;r frfFk
dk vkns'k fnukad 31-03-2003 fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA i=koyh fu;r
çkfèkdkjh vfèkdre tksr lhek vkjksi.k vfèkfu;e@vij dysDVj
ckjkcadh dks bl vH;qfä ds lkFk izfrçsf"kr dh tkrh gS fd og [kkrsnkj
}kjk èk`r Hkwfe dk lgh tksr fooj.k Åij fn;s x;s vkCtoZs'ku dks –
f"Vxr j[krs gq, rS;kj djkdj [kkrsnkj }kjk mBk;h x;h vkifÙk;ksa ds
vkèkkj ij mij fn;s x;s funZs'ksa dks –f"Vxr j[krs gq, lg[kkrsnkjksa dk
va'k fu;ekuqlkj vyx dj uksfVl esa lfEefyr xzke iSlkj ds [kkrk
la0 210 o xzke lrfj[k dh 'kgjh {ks= esa fLFkr Hkwfe ftl ij vfèkdre
tksr lhek vkjksi.k vfèkfu;e ds çkfoèkku ykxw ugh gS dks [kkrsnkj
dh ewy tksr ls vyx dj rS;kj djkdj ;fn [kkrsnkj ds ikl fuèkkZfjr
lhek ls vfèkd Hkwfe fu;r frfFk dks ik;h tk, rks èkkjk 10 dh mièkkjk
2 ds vUrxZr [kkrsnkj@lg[kkrsnkj dks uksfVl nsdj mUgs viuk i{k
çLrqr djus rFkk dFku leFkZu dk volj nsdj vfrfjä Hkwfe voèkkfjr
djus dh dk;Zokgh i=koyh çkIr gksus ds ,d ekg ds vUnj lqfuf'pr
djs D;ksfd ç'uxr çdj.k esa igys gh vR;fèkd le; chr pqdk gSA
lg[kkrsnkj beknmnnhu dk va'k vyx djus ij beknmnnhu }kjk
foØe [email protected]'k ds cSukes dh Hkwfe Lo;aeso [kkrsnkj ds va'k ls
vyx gks tk,xh rFkk ewy vkns'k fujLr gks tkus ds QyLo:i vihy
la0 56 rFkk 57 esa vyx ls vkns'k ikfjr djus dh vko';drk ugh
gSA voj U;k;ky; dh i=koyh vkns'k dh çfr ds lkFk okil çsf"kr
dh tk,A i{k fnukad 29-12-03 dks fu;r çkfèkdkjh ds U;k;ky; esa
mifLFkr gksA ckn vko';d dk;Zokgh i=koyh nkf[ky n¶rj gksosA
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the contesting parties
appeared before the Prescribed Authority on the given date and filed their
objections and requested the Prescribed Authority to consider the
directions passed by the Appellate Authority in the order dated 29.11.2003
and decide the matter expeditiously but the Prescribed Authority sat over
the matter and ultimately decided the case on 18.08.2011 i.e., after a long
span of 8 years, however while passing the said order dated 18.08.2011,
the Prescribed Authority failed to follow the directions/ observations
made by the Appellate Authority and decided the matter in utter violation

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
the same. It has been vehemently asserted by the counsel for the petitioner
that the Prescribed Authority not only failed to comply with the specific
directions issued by the Appellate Authority in the remand order,
travelled much beyond the scope of the said order as was fixed by the
Appellate Authority. To substantiate the said argument, the learned
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that although the Prescribed
Authority accepted the independent and separate ownership of aforesaid
four brothers, but failed to separate their shares and to draw independent
proceedings, if any, against any of them subject to the condition that
anyone was coming within the purview of the Ceiling limit. But, the
Prescribed Authority again decided the matter treating Ch. Azeem Uddin
Ashraf as a single tenure holder, reducing total holdings from 85-3-3 to
69-2-8. Despite there being specific direction in order of remand the
Prescribed Authority also failed to exclude land falling within municipal
limits of Village Paisar and Satrikh and no care was taken to exclude the
land already sold by the father of the petitioner before the commencement
of the Act. As such, the Prescribed Authority while passing the order dated
18.08.2011 travelled beyond the scope and ambit of remand order dated
29.11.2003. Relevant extract of the order dated 18.08.2011 is reproduced
here-in-below:
“ iwoZ esa [kkrsnkj dk 1@3 va'k fy;k x;k gSA ijh{k.k ds mijkUr
lhfyax [kkrsnkj dh leLr Hkwfe esa rhu HkkbZ;ksa ds LFkku ij cgeh
cVokjk@ikjLifjd cVokjs ds vkèkkj ij pkjksa HkkbZ;ks dk fgLlk
vyx&vyx 1@3 ds LFkku ij 1@4 djus ij ,oa uku tsM0,0 dh
Hkwfe uEcj 51@0&03&10 dks NksM+us ds i'pkr lhfyax [kkrsnkj ds
fgLls esa dqy Hkwfe dh x.kuk djus ij flafpr vFkkZs esa dqy 69&02&08
Hkwfe gksrk gSA lhfyax [kkrsnkj ds ç;ksT; lhek esa 28&17&04 Hkwfe
NksM+us ds i'pkr flafpr vFkksZa esa dqy Hkwfe 40&05&04 lhfyax Hkwfe ?
”
kksf"kr gksus ;ksX; gS] ftldk fooj.k fuEu gSA
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the order
dated 18.08.2011 passed by the Prescribed Authority was challenged by
the petitioner as well as the transferees of the land before the Appellate
Authority, wherein the appeal of the transferees was allowed on
05.10.2018 and the land purchased by them was ordered to be excluded
from the purview of Ceiling Act. Operative portion of the order dated
05.10.2018 is reproduced here-in-below:

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
“
vkns'k
vr% vihy Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA ç'uxr~ vkns'k fnukad 18-08-2011
fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA fookfnr foØhr Hkwfe xkVk la[;k 206@2&11&0
o xkVk la[;k 298@5&2&0 fLFkr xzke ljk; vdckjkckn] ijxuk o
rglhy uokcxat] ftyk ckjkcadh dks vfrfjä ?kksf"kr Hkwfe vfèkdre
tksr lhek vkjksi.k@ lhfyax ls eqä fd;k tkrk gSA voj U;k;ky;
dh i=koyh vfxze dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr fd;s tkus gsrq fu;r çkfèkdkjh
lhfyax dks okil Hksth tk;A vko';d dk;Zokgh ds mijkUr bl
U;k;ky; dh i=koyh nkf[ky n¶rj gksA ”
14. It is asserted by the learned counsel that the said appeal preferred by
the petitioner remained pending and was ultimately decided on
04.04.2025. While adjudicating the appeal, the Appellate Authority took
note of the fact that the Prescribed Authority had failed to comply with
the specific directions contained in the earlier remand order. The
Appellate Authority observed that although the Prescribed Authority had
accepted the independent ownership of the four brothers as independent
tenure holders and had also acknowledged the observations made in the
earlier remand order dated 29.11.2003, it nevertheless failed to separately
identify the respective shares of the landholders. He urged that on noticing
that the Prescribed Authority had not examined or determined the
applicability of the provisions of the Ceiling Act and other relevant laws
governing the controversy and considering the complete failure on the
part of the Prescribed Authority to give effect to the remand directions and
the fact that the order had been passed in gross violation thereof, the
Appellate Authority found the impugned order unsustainable.
Consequently, the matter was once again remanded to the Prescribed
Authority with fresh directions, referring to the earlier remand order dated
29.11.2003. The Prescribed Authority was further directed to decide the
matter afresh, strictly in accordance with law and in compliance with the
directions contained in the remand orders, within a period of three months.
The relevant directions issued by the Appellate Authority are reproduced
here-in-below:
^^mijksä of.kZr leLr rF;ksa ds vkyksd esa ç'uxr vihy
Lohdkj djrs gq, fu;r çkfèkdkjh ¼lhfyax½@vij dysDVj] ckjkcadh
ds fnukad 18-08-2011 ds vkns'k dks fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA çdj.k
fuEufyf[kr funZs'kksa ds vuqikyu gsrq fu;r çkfèkdkjh ¼lhfyax½ dks
çR;kofrZr fd;k tkrk gS%&

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1& vij vk;qä ¼ç'kklu½ ds vkns'k fnukad 29-11-2003 ds
vuqlkj] pkSèkjh jlhnmíhu v'kjQ ds leLr fofèkd okfjlksa dks
mÙkjkfèkdkj vFkok Ø; ds ekè;e ls tks Hkh Hkwfe çkIr gqbZ gks] mldh
lhfyax lhek dh x.kuk çR;sd O;fä ds fy, i`Fkd&i`Fkd :i ls
dh tk,A ;g lqfuf'pr fd;k tk, fd Hkwfe dh x.kuk la;qä :i
ls u dh tk,] cfYd çR;sd okfjl ds LokfeRo dh fLFkfr dk i`Fkd
ewY;kadu fd;k tk,] tksfd m0ç0 vfèkdre tksr lhek vkjksi.k
vfèkfu;e dh çorZu frfFk ij ykxw gksrh gksA
2& ;fn vfèkfu;e dh çorZu frfFk ls iwoZ fdlh [kkrsnkj }kjk
Hkwfe dk foØ; dj fn;k x;k gks] rks ,slh Hkwfe dks mldh tksr esa
lfEefyr u fd;k tk,A
3& tSlk dh vkns'k fnukad 29-11-2003 esa mfYyf[kr gS] uxj
ikfydk {ks= ds vUrxZr fLFkr Hkwfe dks tksr fooj.k dh x.kuk esa
lfEefyr u fd;k tk,A uxj ikfydk xBu gsrq fuxZr
vfèklwpuk@uksfVfQds'ku dk ijh{k.k dj ;g Li"V fd;k tk, fd
dkSu&dkSu ls xkVs uxj ikfydk {ks= esa lfEefyr fd;s x;s Fks] ftlls
fu.kZ; ysrs le; dksbZ =qfV u gksA
4& vihydrkZ }kjk çLrqr fofèkd fcUnqvksa dk ijh{k.k fd;s tkus
ds mijkUr] ;fn ;g Li"V gks fd fdlh okfjl dks çkIr Hkwfe lhfyax
vfèkfu;e ds vUrxZr vkrh gS] rks ,sls çR;sd O;fä dks i`Fkd :i ls
uksfVl fuxZr fd;k tk,A ;g lqfuf'pr fd;k tk, dh ljljh
ewY;kadu ds vkèkkj ij fdlh dh Hkwfe dks vfrfjä ?kksf"kr u fd;k
tk;A
pwafd ç'uxr çdj.k o"kZ 2003 ls fopkjkèkhu gS] vr% funZsf'kr
fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksä lHkh fcUnqvksa dk ikyu djrs gq, bldk
fuLrkj.k vfuok;Z :i ls rhu ekg dh vofèk ds Hkhrj fd;k tk,A
fuLrkj.k rd fookfnr Hkwfe dk Ø;&foØ; çfrcafèkr jgsxk rFkk mldh
uoS;r esa dksbZ ifjorZu ugha fd;k tk;sxkA bUgha funZs'kksa ds lkFk vihy
fuLrkfjr dh tkrh gSA vkns'k dh çfr ds lkFk vèkhuLFk U;k;ky; dh
i=koyh okil Hksth tk;A vko';d dk;Zokgh mijkUr bl U;k;ky;
dh i=koyh lafpr vfHkys[kkxkj dh tk;A
15. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner that the order dated 13.10.2025 passed by the
Prescribed Authority is in violation of the observation made in the remand
orders dated 29.11.2003 as well as 04.04.2025 and the Prescribed
Authority has failed to appreciate the purport of specific directions of the
two remand orders, that led to incorrectly hold that there are only three
brothers instead of four and also failed to give any basis for reducing the
total holdings from 69-2-8 to 48-3-16 and declared surplus land 19-6-14
excluding the permissible limit.
16. The main thrust of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
impugned order has been passed by the Prescribed Authority/ respondent
No. 2 in the most premeditated manner, ignoring the fact that the matter
was remanded for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made

12
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
by the learned Appellate Authority. He further asserted that the order of
remand entrusted the Prescribed Authority with genuine adjudication of
those objections as well as adherence to the directions contained in
remand and the Prescribed Authority/A.D.M., Nawabganj, District
Barabanki/ respondent No. 2 was under legal obligation to firstly
determine the share of the four brothers individually, then assess the
property falling within municipal limits to be excluded from the share of
the brothers, then he was under legal obligation to exclude the land sold
by the petitioner’s father to third party as their Appeal was allowed vide
order dated 05.10.2018 and thereafter if the property is found beyond the
permissible ceiling limits then notice under section 10(2) of the Ceiling
Act ought to have been given to that individual who holds land beyond
the ceiling limit.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument that a
remand order passed by an Appellate Authority is binding upon the
authority to which the matter is remanded and that such authority is
obligated to act strictly in accordance with the observations and directions
contained therein, invited the attention of the Court to a decision passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Dwivedi versus State
of U.P. reported in (2003) 12 SCC 572.
18. He further placed before this Court a judgment passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Amar Bahadur versus
State of U.P. reported in (2007) 102 RD 87 and drawn attention of this
Court to the following paragraphs of the said judgment, that reads as
under:
8. ....After the said finding of the Appellate Court in the
remand order dated 8.11.1983, subsequently it could not
be held that orders of consolidation authorities are not
binding upon the ceiling authorities. An Appellate Court
hearing appeal against an order passed by the Lower
Court in pursuance of earlier remand order by the same
Appellate Court cannot go beyond the earlier remand
order.
9. I need not to decide the question as to whether in this
writ petition, State authorities as respondents can
question the correctness of the appellate order dated
8.11.1983 as said point has not been argued. In view of
the above the earlier order of the Appellate Court dated

13
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
8.11.1983 was binding upon prescribed authority as
well as appellate authority while passing the impugned
order dated 24.2.1990.
19. On the other hand, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
appearing on behalf of State pressed objection regarding the
entertainability of the writ petition for want of statutory appeal. His
contention is that there is statutory remedy of appeal provided under
Section 13 of the Ceiling Act and bypassing such remedy and directly
invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is not permissible. He pressed that in presence of
efficacious statutory remedy, the present writ petition be dismissed as not
maintainable. In addition to the same he also informed the Court that one
of the aggrieved party has already filed an appeal challenging the same
very order before the Appellate Authority, which is still pending for
consideration. Defending the impugned order passed by the Prescribed
Authority, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel asserted that
there is no such illegality or infirmity in the impugned order that warrants
interference by this Court.
20. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 also supported the
arguments made by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. In
addition to it, he submitted that the statutory remedy of appeal as provided
under Section 13 of the Ceiling Act has already been availed by the
respondent No.3 by way of filing an Appeal which is registered as Appeal
No. C202504000003503 titled as “Khalida Fazli Vs. State of U.P.” and is
pending before the Appellate Authority. He further argued that as per
Section 37 and 38 of the Ceiling Act the order passed by the Prescribed
Authority amounts to an order passed by a Civil Court, therefore, the
impugned order having been passed by the Prescribed Authority under the
Ceiling Act, may be examined by the Court under its supervisory
jurisdiction enshrined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As
such challenge to the order passed by Prescribed Authority under the
Ceiling Act, by means of writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, is not sustainable. In support of his argument the
learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 categorically relied

14
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
upon the paragraph 8 to 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 23, 24 and 25 of judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam
versus Chhabi Nath, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 .
21. Further, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the
respondent No.4 on the judgment passed by Coordinate Bench of this
Court in the case of Romil Jain versus Ashok Kumar Jain (Writ-A
No.1624 of 2025), decided on 27.02.2026, wherein while dealing with the
provision of Section 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 it was held that the source of
jurisdiction, the nature of the powers exercised, and the binding and
authoritative character of the determinations rendered under Section 22,
unmistakably establish that the District Judge acts as a Civil Court and
exercises judicial power and an order passed in appeal under Section 22
is a judicial order rendered by a Civil Court exercising statutory
jurisdiction and that such orders are not amenable to challenge by way of
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, any
interference, if warranted, lies only within the well-defined contours of
the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution, to be exercised in accordance with the established
parameters governing the exercise of such jurisdiction.
22. In support of his arguments, he also placed reliance on the judgment
passed by this Court in the case of Sri Nayak Chaube versus Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Faizabad reported in 2010 (110) R.D. 356
wherein it was held that it is established law that in writ jurisdiction, this
Court should not sit as an Appellate Court on the orders passed by the
Subordinate Courts. Writ jurisdiction should be exercised in the cases
where the Subordinate Courts act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess
of it or in violation of principles of natural justice in refusing to exercise
jurisdiction vested in it or there is apparent error resulting into manifest
injustice.
23. To buttress the arguments, he also placed reliance on the judgments
passed in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay versus Vivek V.
Gawde reported in 2024 INSC 985 (SC); LIC versus Nandani J. Shah

15
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
reported in AIR 2018 SC 1197; Kotak Mahindra Bank versus State of
U.P. reported in 2010 RD 165 (DB); Bhagwan Das versus Jiley Kaur
reported in AIR 1991 SC 266 .
24. Refuting the aforesaid objections on the question of
entertainability/maintainability of the petition as raised by the learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel as well as the learned counsel for the
respondent No.4; the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance
upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Rajeev Sinha versus Union of India and 2 others reported in 2024
SCC OnLine All 297, judgment passed by this Court in the case of
Mamta Upadhyay versus State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
All 8490 as well as law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Whirlpool Corporation versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai
and Others, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 , which provides that mere
availability of the statutory remedy ipso facto doesn't oust the jurisdiction
of this Court to entertain the petition, which has later been followed in the
case of M/S. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. versus The Excise And Taxation
Officer , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95 .
25. With regard to the objection raised by the learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel that since the respondent No. 3 has already availed the
statutory remedy of appeal before the Appellate Authority, which is
pending adjudication, as such, the present writ petition filed by the
petitioner is not entertainable before this Court; the learned counsel for
the petitioner submitted that the said objection is highly misconceived and
liable to be rejected. His argument is that even where one of the parties
has availed an alternative remedy, the petitioner is not precluded from
invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court for seeking the
same relief, particularly when the material facts are undisputed and the
issues involved can be adjudicated without requiring determination of
disputed questions of fact. In support of the aforesaid submission, he
placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. versus State of Bihar

16
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been
pleased to hold as under:
“ 14.  Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant
that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the
Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost
simultaneously approached the High Court under Article 226
is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether the
filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the
disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not. The
existence of an adequate or suitable alternative remedy
available to a litigant is merely a factor which a court
entertaining an application under Article 226 will consider
for exercising the discretion to issue a writ under Article 226
[A.N. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR
1961 SC 1506] . But the existence of such remedy does not
impinge upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with
the matter itself if it is in a position to do so on the basis of
the affidavits filed. If, however, a party has already availed
of the alternative remedy while invoking the jurisdiction
under Article 226, it would not be appropriate for the court
to entertain the writ petition. The rule is based on public
policy but the motivating factor is the existence of a parallel
jurisdiction in another court. But this Court has also held
in Chandra Bhan Gosain v. State of Orissa [(1963) 14 STC
766, 918 : (1964) 2 SCR 879] that even when an alternative
remedy has been availed of by a party but not pursued that
the party could prosecute proceedings under Article 226 for
the same relief. This Court has also held that when a party
has already moved the High Court under Article 226 and
failed to obtain relief and then moved an application under
Article 32 before this Court for the same relief, normally the
Court will not entertain the application under Article 32. But
where in the parallel jurisdiction, the order is not a speaking
one or the matter has been disposed of on some other ground,
this Court has, in a suitable case, entertained the application
under Article 32 [Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,
(1969) 1 SCC 110 : AIR 1970 SC 898]. Instead of dismissing
the writ petition on the ground that the alternative remedy
had been availed of, the Court may call upon the party to
elect whether it will proceed with the alternative remedy or
with the application under Article 226 [K.S. Rashid and
Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC
207]. Therefore, the fact that a suit had already been filed by
the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which
could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on
merits.”

17
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
26. On the issue of maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority would not
amount to an order passed by a Civil Court. In support of his submission
he invited the attention of the Court to the scope and ambit of Section 37
and 38 of the Ceiling Act, wherein the powers of Prescribed Authority and
Appellate Authority have been provided, which reads as under:
37 . Any officer or authority holding an enquiry or hearing an
objection under this Act, shall, insofar as it may be
applicable, have all the powers and privileges of a Civil
Court, and follow the procedure laid down in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, for the trial and disposal of suits
relating to immovable property.
38. (1) In hearing and deciding an appeal under this Act, the
appellate court shall have all the powers and the privileges
of a civil court and follow the procedure for the hearing and
disposal of appeals laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.
(2) Where under the provisions of this Act, an appeal has
to be heard by the [Commissioner] he may either hear the
appeal himself or transfer it for hearing to [Additional
Commissioner] subordinate to him.
27. Disputing the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent
No.4 with regard to the non-maintainability of the instant writ petition,
the learned counsel for the petitioner has very categorically asserted that
the judgments including Radhey Shyam (supra) as well as the Romil
Jain (supra) categorically lay down that orders of the Civil Court cannot
be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution but in both the cases
the orders under challenged giving rise to those cases that were emanating
from the Civil Court itself, as the Appellate Authority under U.P. Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is the
Principle Judge, Civil Court. To substantiate his argument, the petitioner’s
counsel drew the attention of this Court to paragraphs 25 and 27 of the
judgment passed in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) , wherein, it was
held that the judicial orders passed by Civil Court are not amenable to the
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

18
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
25.  It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities
associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role
to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel
system of King's Court in India and of all the other courts
having limited jurisdiction subject to the supervision of the
King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the
laws. All the courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are
subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision
under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally
conferred on all the High Courts. Broad principles of writ
jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and
a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without
jurisdiction orders of tribunals or authorities or courts other
than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for the
High Courts to issue writs to the subordinate courts. Control
of working of the subordinate courts in dealing with their
judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional
powers or power of superintendence under Article 227.
Orders of the civil court stand on different footing from the
orders of authorities or tribunals or courts other than
judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional
jurisdiction is regulated by the statutes, power of
superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The
expression “inferior court” is not referable to the judicial
courts, as rightly observed in the referring order [ Radhey
Shyam  v.  Chhabi Nath , (2009) 5 SCC 616] in paras 26 and
27 quoted above.
--------
27.  Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil
courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article
226. We are also in agreement with the view [ Radhey
Shyam  v.  Chhabi Nath , (2009) 5 SCC 616] of the referring
Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private
person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article
227 is different from Article 226.
28. It is asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on applying
the test as laid down in the cases of Shalini Shyam Shetty versus
Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329; Salem Advocate
Bar Assn. (2) versus Union of India reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344;
Surya Dev Rai versus Ram Chander Rai reported in (2003) 6 SCC
675; Rupa Ashok Hurra versus Ashok Hurra reported in (2002) 4 SCC
388; Waryam Singh versus Amarnath reported in AIR 1954 SC 215; it

19
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
can be seen that the courts passing the orders in such cases were Civil
Courts but putting the Prescribed Authority to the same test, the result is
in negative and applying the test as laid down in these judgments by no
stretch of imagination the Prescribed Authority can be held to be a Civil
Court and amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
29. The learned counsel for the petitioner continuing with his submissions
asserted that a plain reading of Section 37 read with Section 3(13) of
Ceiling Act do not support the objection as raised by the counsel for the
respondent No.4. He stated that Section 37 of Ceiling Act starts with “any
officer or authority holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this
Act” itself makes the legislative intention clear that the power conferred
upon the Prescribed Authority is very limited and does not include the
power of adjudication with regard to right, title or interest of the parties in
any property and in absence of the same, the Prescribed Authority cannot
be termed to be a Civil Court. Further that the power, which is exercised
by the Prescribed Authority is provided under Section 11 and Section 12
of the Ceiling Act. As per Section 11, the determination of surplus land is
done by the Prescribed Authority when no objection is filed, whereas
under Section 12 the determination is done where objection is filed by the
noticee/tenure holder and a perusal of Section 12 makes it explicitly clear
that to what extent and for what purpose this power has to be exercised.
The said Section 12 confers the power merely “to determine the surplus
land” and this power as provided therein to be exercised by the Prescribed
Authority as per the procedure dealt with under Section 37 of the Ceiling
Act, as such the extent of power, which has been conferred upon the
Prescribed Authority by Section 12 is limited to the determination of
surplus land and on combined reading of these provisions viz., Section
3(13), Section 11(1), Section 12 and Section 37 it is beyond any doubt
that a Prescribed Authority is not a Civil Court.
30. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that a plain
reading of Sections 37 and 38 of the Ceiling Act clearly demonstrates that
the powers conferred upon the Prescribed Authority are distinct from

20
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
those vested in the Appellate Authority. He pointed out that Section 37
provides that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to
proceedings before the Prescribed Authority only “in so far as may be
applicable”, whereas Section 38 confers upon the Appellate Authority all
the powers and privileges of a Civil Court. According to learned counsel
for the petitioner, this distinction clearly indicates that the legislature itself
has not conferred power on Prescribed Authority akin to that of Appellate
Authority. The power of the Prescribed Authority is confined to
determining the extent of surplus land held by a tenure holder and does
not extend to adjudication of questions relating to right, title, or interest in
a property. Such powers, according to him, are vested exclusively in the
competent Civil Court. In this regard reference can be made upon the
judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Chetanya Raj Singh v.
Second Addl. Civil Judge, Aligarh, reported in 1977 SCC OnLine All 23
it was held as under:
11.  It is well settled now that the Prescribed Authority is
neither a civil court nor a revenue court and, therefore,
section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, in
terms, would not apply to the present case. Besides Section
38-B of the Ceiling Act contemplates that no finding or
decision given before the commencement of this section in
any proceeding or on any issue including any order, decree
or judgment by any court, tribunal or authority in respect of
any matter governed by this Act, shall bar retrial of such
proceeding or issue under this Act, in accordance with the
provisions of this Act as amended from time to time. The
amended section 38-B of the Ceiling Act was brought in by
U.P. Act No. XX of 1976 with effect from 10th October,
1975, when the appeal against the order of the Prescribed
Authority was pending before the learned Civil Judge. The
decision of the consolidation authorities was, admittedly,
much before the 10th of October, 1975, and, therefore, the
decision of right and title of the tenure-holders by the
consolidation authorities would not bar the consideration of
the same question by the authorities under the Ceiling Act.”
31. The learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on Ram
Charan v. State, reported in AIR 1979 All 114 passed by the Hon’ble Full
Bench of this Court, wherein the judgment passed in Chetanya Raj Singh
(supra) and Kshetrapal Singh v. State of U.P. , reported in 1975 SCC

21
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
OnLine All 308; has been considered as correct law while holding as
under:
“ 16. In Chetanya Raj Singh v. Second Addl. Civil Judge
(1977 All WC 289) a single judge of this Court took the view
that the Prescribed Authority constituted under the Ceiling
Act is neither a civil court nor a revenue court within
meaning of Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. The last part
thereof was hence not attracted to proceedings under the
Ceiling Act
---------
23. In this view when the legislature by adding the
Explanation created a fiction that proceedings under the
Ceiling Act shall not be deemed to be proceedings in respect
of declaration of adjudication of rights or interest in any land
it had obviously intended to exclude the ceiling proceedings
from the purview of the Consolidation Act, The Explanation
was made applicable for purpose of Sub-Section (2) of
Section 5. Since Section 49 is an extension of Sub-Section
(2) of Section 5 in relation to future litigation of the same
kind, the fiction created by the Explanation would equally
apply to the bar created by Section 49, A proceeding under
the Ceiling Act shall not be deemed to be a proceeding which
is barred under Section 49 as well.
---------
25. The legal fiction is that ceiling proceedings are not
proceedings for declaration of rights or interest in land. This
imaginary state of affairs must equally apply to all situations
in which it would on terms be applicable. Though the
Explanation says "for the purposes of Sub-Section (2)" it
would apply to S.49 also because S.49 is integrally
connected with and referable to Sub-Section.
---------
28. In Kshetrapal Singh v. State of U.P., 1975 All WC 618 , a
Bench of this Court has repelled a similar submission. It was
held that S.10, C.P.C. is not applicable to proceedings under
the Ceiling Act, because by virtue of S.37 only the procedure
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of suits
has been made applicable. Section 10 relates to jurisdiction
of Courts. The same will not apply. In my opinion this
decision lays down the correct law.
---------
32. Proceedings under the Ceiling Act are for an entirely
different purpose, Section 5 of the Ceiling Act declares that
no tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate
throughout Uttar Pradesh any land in excess of the ceiling
area applicable to him. This Act, therefore covers lands held
by a tenure-holder throughout the State.”

22
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
32. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3, respondent Nos. 5 to
9, and respondent Nos. 10 and 11 did not opposed the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner rather, they fairly stated that they
would have no objection in the event this matter is remanded to the
Prescribed Authority for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 5 to 9, also controverted the
objections raised by the State and respondent No. 4 with regard to the
maintainability of the present writ petition. In support of his submissions,
he placed reliance upon the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court
passed in the case of Dinesh Chandra v. Deputy Director of
Consolidation, (Writ-B No.229 of 2023) decided on 03.05.2023, and
reported in (MANU/UP/4937/2023) wherein it was observed by the Court
that orders passed by Revenue Authorities or Consolidation Authorities
cannot be equated with orders passed by Judicial Authorities or Civil
Courts. Relying upon the aforesaid decision, learned counsel submitted
that the preliminary objections regarding maintainability of the writ
petition as raised by the State and respondent No. 4 are not in consonance
with law. Relevant paragraphs of Dinesh Chandra (supra) are reproduced
here-in-under:
23. The judgments so cited by the respective parties, there is
no dispute that reliance upon the dictum of the Apex Court
in re; Radhey Shyam (supra) has been placed. Learned
counsel for the parties are in agreement that the Apex Court
in re; Radhey Shyam (supra) has clearly and explicitly has
observed as to what would happen in respect of the orders
being passed by the Judicial/ Civil Courts and the orders
being passed by other than Judicial/Civil Courts. No writ
petition shall lie against the orders of Judicial/Civil Courts
under Article 226 and there is apparent distinction between
Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Since the
Apex Court has not held that even if any order is passed by
a judicial or quasi judicial authority while exercising its
statutory powers and even if that authority is other than
judicial/ Civil Court, no writ shall lie under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, therefore, no other inference may
be drawn from the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court
in re; Radhey Shyam (supra) , which has not specifically been
held. If the specific and clear direction has been issued by
the Apex Court in re; Radhey Shyam (supra) , any other
inference should not be drawn. If the Apex Court was of the
view that the orders of all judicial authorities, be it

23
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
Judicial/Civil Court or Revenue/Consolidation
Court/Authority, are not amenable under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, specific direction to that effect would
have been given but no specific direction to that effect has
been given by the Apex Court in para-29 of the judgment in
re; Radhey Shyam (supra) . The Full Bench of the Apex Court
in re; Kiran Devi (supra) has observed that the Apex Court
has considered all relevant judgments in re; Radhey Shyam
(supra) including the judgment in re; Shalini Shyam Shetty
(supra) and held that the petition styled as 'Under Article
226' would not bar the High Court to exercise jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Basically,
the jurisdiction of the High Court is to examine the
correctness, legality and propriety of the orders being passed
by the subordinate authority/court, the nomenclature of the
proceedings as a petition under Article 226 or a petition
under Article 227 is wholly inconsequential and immaterial.
The Full Bench of the Apex Court in re; Kiran Devi (supra)
has not restricted entertaining such type of petitions under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, rather has observed
that in the given facts and circumstances, the nomenclature
of the proceedings would be wholly immaterial.
--------
26. There is apparent difference between the court of law and
the Tribunals. The court of law is vested with general
jurisdiction over all the matters, whereas the Tribunals deal
with the matters vested with limited jurisdiction to decide a
particular issue/issues as per specific statutory prescription
to that effect. Courts exercise only the judicial functions
whereas the Tribunals undertake various other
administrative functions. Officers of the court, more
particularly judicial courts, are trained and expert persons in
the law, however, it is not mandatory in every case that the
members of the Tribunal need to be trained and expert in law.
In view of the above, the revenue authorities/consolidation
authorities when discharge their judicial/ quasi judicial
functions used to follow the specific mandate and
mechanism so prescribed under the Statute and quite often,
those officers are not trained judicial officers but being
prescribed authorities under the particular Statute, they
discharge their functions as revenue/consolidation officer. In
that way, they may not be treated at par with the judicial
officers of the Civil Court and therefore, they are not
judicial/Civil Court. At the best, it may be said that they
discharge their duties and functions as Tribunal.
27. Accordingly, considering the arguments of learned
counsel for the parties and the judgments so placed, which
have been considered herein above, I am of the considered
opinion that the orders being passed by the revenue authority
or consolidation authority preliminary objections so raised
by the learned counsel for the opposite parties are not the

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
orders being passed by judicial authority/Civil Courts,
therefore, the regarding maintainability of the writ petitions
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is hereby
rejected. These writ petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India challenging the orders of the
consolidation/revenue authorities are held to be
maintainable.
C ONSIDERATION :
33. Heard, learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the
material available on record and considered the judgments relied by the
parties. Before proceeding to deal with the rival submissions advanced by
the parties, the law with regard to the alternative remedy been which has
already reiterated and reaffirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in
Rajeev Sinha (supra), requires to be looked into which is reproduced
here-in-below:
“ 18. As regards the discretion of the High Courts to entertain
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
despite a remedy provided under any statute, law in this
regard needs reiteration.
19. The Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, in the case of
State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 Supreme Court
86, has held that there is no rule with regard to Certiorari as
there is with Mandamus, that it will lie only where there is
no other equally effective remedy. A Writ of Certiorari will
lie, provided the requisite grounds exist, although a right of
appeal has been conferred by Statute. It was observed that
the fact that the aggrieved party had another adequate
remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior
court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in
exercise of its discretion, issue a Writ of Certiorari to quash
the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate
to it and, ordinarily, the superior court will decline to
interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted other
statutory remedies, if any. This rule requiring the exhaustion
of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule
of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of
law.
20. Another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the
case of K.S. Rashid & Son v. Income Tax Investigation
Commission & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 207, observes that there
are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of the
powers by a High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution; one is that the power is to be exercised
"throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction", that is to say, the writs issued by the Court

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction.
The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom
the High Court is empowered to issue writs "must be within
those territories" and this implies that they must be amenable
to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those
territories. It is with reference to these two conditions thus
mentioned that the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue
writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is to be
determined.
21. The Supreme Court, in the case of Ram and Shyam
Company v. State of Haryana and Others, (1985) 3 S.C.C.
267, laid down that ordinarily it is true that the court has
imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 where the party invoking the
jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy.
More often, it has been expressly stated that the rule which
requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of
convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. At any
rate, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court.
22. The three judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case
of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah And Another,
A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 425, observed that the jurisdiction which
Articles 226 and 136 confer, entitles the High Courts and the
Supreme Court to examine the decisions of all Tribunals to
see whether they have acted illegally. That jurisdiction
cannot be taken away by a legislative device that purports to
confer power on a tribunal to act illegally by enacting a
statute that its illegal acts shall become legal the moment the
tribunal chooses to say they are legal. The legality of an act
or conclusion is something that exists outside and apart from
the decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of
the land which cannot be finally determined or altered by
any tribunal of limited jurisdiction. The High Courts and the
Supreme Court alone can determine what the law of the land
is vis-a-vis all other courts and tribunals and they alone can
pronounce with authority and finality on what is legal and
what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a
tentative conclusion which is subject to review under
Articles 226 and 136.
23. The Supreme Court, in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1
S.C.C. 603, spelt out at least five illustrative and non-
exhaustive exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of remedies
as follows:-
(i) Where remedy available under statute is not effective but
only mere formality with no substantial relief; or
(ii) Where statutory authority not acted in accordance with
provisions of enactment in question, or ;
(iii) Where statutory authority acted in defiance of
fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or;

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WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
(iv) Where statutory authority resorted to invoke provisions
which are repealed, or;
(v) Where statutory authority passed an order in total
violation of principles of natural justice.
24. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in State of
Madhya Pradesh and Anr. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006,
held that the power to give relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been
reiterated in N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and
Others, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai and
Anr. v. Kamal Kumar and Another, AIR 1965 SC 1321;
Siliguri Municipality and Others v. Amalendu Das and
Others, AIR 1984 SC 653; S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan,
AIR 1988 SC 616; Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, AIR
1995 SC 1715; Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v.
Kurien E. Kalathil and Others, AIR 2000 SC 2573; A.
Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695;
and L.L. Sudhakar Reddy and Others v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru
Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha
Utpadak Sanstha and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and others,
(2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh and Anr. v. State of
Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and G.K.N. Driveshafts (India)
Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 72.
25. In Harbans Lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,
(2003) 2 SCC 107, the Supreme Court held that the rule of
exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative
remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and
the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case and
then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the
petitioner seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights; where there is failure of principles of natural justice
or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.... But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt
the remedies provided by the statute. Reference to another
judgement of Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal
Sahnia & Anr. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Ors., JT 2002 (10)
SC 561 can be made, in which also the view taken by the
Supreme Court is that the rule of exclusion of Writ
Jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is the rule
of discretion and not one which is compulsory.”
34. In light of the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well
as Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court as discussed here-in-above, it is

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evident that the petitioner approaching the High Court cannot be relegated
to an alternative remedy as a matter of routine, where, in the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, it is established that the principles of
natural justice have been violated, or that the impugned order has been
passed without jurisdiction, or where it is demonstrated before the Court
that grave injustice has been caused to the petitioner and that relegation to
the alternative remedy would perpetuate such injustice and result in
prejudice, it is always open to this Court to exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction and issue an appropriate Writ to strike down the offending
action.
35. The learned counsel for the respondent No.4 when confronted as to on
what basis he asserts the Prescribed Authority as a Civil Court he only
relied upon Section 37 of Ceiling Act. In this regard reference to these
Sections is necessary:
“ 3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires–
………
(13) ‘prescribed authority’ means such officer not
below the rank of an Assistant Collector of the first class as
may be empowered by the State Government, by notification
in the Gazette, to perform the functions of prescribed
authority under this Act for such area or areas as may be
specified in that behalf ;
--------
Determination of surplus land where no objection is
filed–
11. (1) Where the statement submitted by a tenure-
holder in pursuance of the notice published under Section 9,
is accepted by the Prescribed Authority or where the
statement prepared by the Prescribed Authority under
Section 10, is not disputed within the specified period, the
Prescribed Authority shall accordingly, determine the
surplus land of the tenure-holder.
--------
Determination of the surplus land by the Prescribed
Authority where an objection is filed–
12. (1) Where an objection has been filed under sub-
section (2) of Section 10 or under sub-section (2) of Section
11, or because of any appellate order under Section 13, the
Prescribed Authority shall, after affording the parties
reasonable opportunity of being heard and of producing
evidence, decide the objections after recording his reasons,
and determine the surplus land.

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(2) Subject to any appellate order under Section 13,
the order of the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1)
shall be final and conclusive and be not questioned in any
court of law.
--------
Powers of officers and authorities in hearing and disposal
of objections and the procedure to be followed–
37. Any officer or authority holding an enquiry or
hearing an objection under this Act, shall in so far as it may
be applicable, have all the powers and privileges of a civil
court, and follow the procedure laid down in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, for the trial and disposal of suits
relating to immovable property.”
36. A perusal of the above referred provisions as well as the object of the
Act, it is apparent that this Act no where confers any power of adjudication
with regard to the right, title and interest of the parties rather on the basis
of the revenue records as well as limit of holdings to be retained by a
tenure holder, the Prescribed Authority is empowered to declared the land
beyond the said limit as surplus and for this declaration certain norms and
standards with regard to the determination of area of land etc. viz.
agricultural, grove are to be seen and for the entire proceedings from the
issuance of notice till the final determination, no adjudication with regard
to right and title or interest of a tenure holder is involved and in absence
of any power regarding adjudication of right, title and interest as per the
test laid down in the judgments relied by the parties; this much can be
safely observed that the Prescribed Authority under the Ceiling Act is not
a Civil Court, despite being conferred power and privileges of Civil Court
under Section 37 of Ceiling Act as exercise of such power is limited to
determination of surplus land. This observation also finds support by a
recent judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Dinesh Chandra
(supra) , specially its paragraph 23 to 27, as quoted above.
37. Further, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of Radhey Shyam (supra) and the judgment passed by Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Chetanya Raj Singh (supra) , further made clear the
picture that orders passed by Civil Court ought to be challenged under
Article 227 whereas orders passed by the statutory and quasi-judicial
authorities which are not Civil Courts are challengeable under Article 226

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of the Constitution of India. In view of the above, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the Prescribed
Authority would not be considered to be an order passed by the Civil
Court as the law laid down in the case of Chetanya Raj Singh (supra) ,
which is upheld by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Charan
(supra) and recently followed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of Dinesh Chandra (supra) . Therefore, the objection in this
regard, raised by the respondent No.4 though attractive but have no force
being not tenable in the eyes of law.
38. In view of the discussion made herein above, the objection raised by
the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel in respect of the
entertainability of the present writ petition on the ground of availability of
remedy of appeal under Section 13 of the Ceiling Act is not acceptable.
Thus, this Court finds the instant Writ petition maintainable under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and proceed to consider the submissions
of the learned counsel for the parties with regard to legality of the
impugned order to the extent of directions as issued by the Appellate
Authority while remanding the matter and failure of the Prescribed
Authority in adhering to the same while passing the impugned order.
39. Taking into consideration submissions made by the learned counsels
and the material available on record this Court prima facie finds that there
is violation of remand directions which is not permissible under law as
held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.P. Dwivedi (supra) , which read as
under:
“11.  In our considered opinion, there is a glaring mistake in
the impugned order dated 29-3-1996 of the Prescribed
Authority passed after remand in treating the earlier order
dated 5-8-1977 passed in appeal by the District Judge to have
been totally set aside by the earlier order of the High Court
dated 19-1-1979 passed in writ petition against the order of
the District Judge dated 5-8-1977. From the order of the
High Court extracted, it is clear that the whole order of the
District Judge was not set aside. It was set aside only with
respect to categorisation of lands in the two villages and the
remand was restricted to fresh determination of the same.
The observations that “no other controversy shall be allowed
to be raised hereafter before the Prescribed Authority or

30
WRIC No. - 11450 of 2025
before the Appellate Authority” only meant that the remand
would be restricted to redetermination of the nature of the
land and all other issues decided which have not been
disturbed by the order of the District Judge in appeal shall
not be allowed to be re-agitated.
12.  From the contents of the order of the High Court, we
have no manner of doubt that the writ petition of the holder
of the land against the judgment of the District Judge had
only succeeded with an order of the remand limited to re-
examination of the nature of the lands. In all other respects,
the order of the District Judge was confirmed prohibiting
reopening of the same. We have already mentioned above
that the order of the District Judge passed in appeal dated 5-
8-1977 was not challenged by the State of U.P. and therefore,
that order to the extent it was in favour of the appellant, had
attained finality and could not have been disturbed. The
Prescribed Authority and the appellate court in their orders
passed on 29-3-1996 and 18-3-1997 respectively,
overlooked this aspect of the case of the finality of the order
of the District Judge dated 5-8-1977. They misdirected
themselves by assuming that the whole case was open before
them for reconsideration and re-determination of the ceiling
area. In the second writ petition filed by the appellant to the
High Court against the orders passed by the authorities under
the Act after remand, the learned Single Judge took no care
to re-examine the contents of the orders previously passed
and which had attained finality to the extent indicated in
those orders. The High Court by the impugned order dated
9-5-1997 cursorily examined the case and wrongly
dismissed it as being without merit.
13.  As a consequence of discussion aforesaid, the impugned
orders dated 29-3-1996 of the Prescribed Authority, dated
18-3-1997 of the Additional Commissioner (Judicial),
Gorakhpur Division and dated 9-5-1997 of the High Court
to the extent of adversely affecting the finality of the
judgment dated 5-8-1977 of the District Judge in appeal are,
hereby, set aside. The course now available to us is to allow
this appeal and send back the case to the Prescribed
Authority. It is accordingly so ordered and the case is
remanded. The Prescribed Authority shall redetermine the
ceiling limit and declare the surplus land, if any, of the
appellant on the basis of the judgment of the District Judge
dated 5-8-1977, to the extent it has attained finality by its
affirmance by order dated 19-1-1979 of the High Court. In
so redetermining the ceiling area of the appellant, the nature
of land and its categorisation, as irrigated or unirrigated,
shall be made in accordance with the order dated 29-3-1996
of the Prescribed Authority which we do not intend to disturb
to that extent as categorisation of land under Section 4-A of
the Act, is essentially a question of fact, to be determined on

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the basis of evidence led by the parties. After re-
determination of the ceiling limit and extent of surplus land,
if any, of the appellant, a fresh opportunity shall be given to
the appellant to exercise his option for surrender of surplus
land of his choice in accordance with the provisions of the
Act.”
40. As none of the respondents could have effectively disputed the factual
matrix of the case as narrated in the writ petition and the objection raised
by learned counsel for the respondents No.1, 2 and 4 is limited only to the
extent of maintainability/entertainability of the writ petition, which is
already dealt and discarded in the preceeding paragraphs. It is noteworthy
that the learned counsel for the respondents 3, 5 to 11 also do not dispute
the alleged illegality in the impugned order dated 13.10.2025, rather, all
the counsels are in agreement to some extent though have asserted that the
appellate court be directed to decide the appeal afresh but they could not
demonstrate any prejudice to be caused, if the matter is remanded to the
Prescribed Authority by this Court itself.
41. In the instant case, the directions of Appellate Court while remanding
the matter on 29.11.2003 as well as 04.04.2025 are very specific and
categorical and goes to the root of the matter. A tenure holder can be
subjected to the proceedings of the Ceiling Act only if on the basis of the
statement, prepared as provided under Section 9 of the Act, he is found in
excess of the holdings beyond the limit prescribed under the Act, as such
the germane of the proceedings is the statement prepared under Section 9
of the Act. A tenure holder as provided under Sub Section 17 of Section
3, is the holder of the holding but not including a woman whose husband
is a tenure holder or a minor child whose father or mother is a tenure
holder. For better appreciation, a reference to Sub Section 17 of Section 3
of the Ceiling Act is necessary:
“ 3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires–
(17) ‘tenure-holder’ means a person who is the
holder of a holding but [except in Chapter III] does not
include —
(a) a woman whose husband is a tenure-holder ;
(b) a minor child whose father or mother is a tenure-
holder ;”

32
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42. In the instant case, the tenure holders admittedly despite being real
brothers being major, independent and recorded tenure holders having
succeeded their father, decades earlier to the promulgation of the Ceiling
Act cannot be shun of their independent rights and all the four brothers
(now deceased) have to be proceeded separately for determination of their
holdings and ignoring this very basis requirement of separation of
holdings of each tenure holder resulting into an apparent illegality and
exercise of a jurisdiction not vested as well as in a manner not provided
was rightly interfered with by the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court
realizing the separation as a sine qua non to proceed, very rightly vide
order dated 04.04.2025 directed to separate/ segregate the holdings of all
the above-named four brothers and then if required to proceed for the
purposes of preparation of statement as provided under the Act, and the
direction for the exclusion of such land which falls within the urban/
municipal area is also in-consonance with the principles of the Act and
failure to abide by the same while passing the order impugned has resulted
into abuse of process of law as well as gross violation of the order of
remand and also amount to judicial indiscipline.
43. The direction with regard to exclusion of the land transferred prior to
the cut-off date, from the holdings of the tenure holders in the appeal
preferred by the transferees vide order dated 05.10.2018 is also required
to be followed before preparing the statement, but in the case in hand, it
appears that while passing the impugned order, none of the directions have
been followed, renders the same unsustainable in law.
44. A bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Prescribed
Authority reproduced the directions of the remand order, dealt with the
same to some extent but instead of remaining within the ambit of the same,
just repeated the earlier orders without any consideration to the directions
under the remand order, the provisions of the Ceiling Act and the
applicable laws, more so, when there was categorical direction by the
Appellate Court, in that regard. More particularly, no proper
determination and segregation of the land situated within the urban area
and the land falling under the ceiling area had been properly carried out.

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45. It is well settled that where a matter is remanded with specific
observations and directions, the subordinate authority is bound to confine
itself within the limits prescribed by the remand order and cannot
disregard the same.
46. It is trite in law that adherence to the principles of natural justice is a
sine qua non for the legality of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings,
however, at the same time, it would not be out of place to note that the
principles of natural justice are not confined merely to affording
opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, but also require that the
proceedings be conducted strictly in the manner as prescribed under law.
In the present case, the procedure contemplated under the Ceiling Act and
the Rules framed thereunder was required to be scrupulously followed and
the Prescribed Authority was under legal obligation to comply with and
give effect to the directions issued by the Appellate Authority and to
proceed in the manner specified therein. Failure to adhere with the
statutory procedure as well as the directions contained in the remand
order, vitiated the proceedings and rendered the impugned order
unsustainable in law and amenable to the extraordinary writ jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
47. The provisions of the Ceiling Act being confiscatory in nature
adherence to the procedure prescribed by the Act itself is mandatory. In
the instant case, when the Appellate Authority remanded the matter to the
Prescribed Authority with certain observations and categorical direction,
the responsibility of the Prescribed Authority becomes two fold as it has
to abide by the provisions as well the directions. The failure of the
Prescribed Authority in adhering to the directions and provisions of the
Act has given rise to the unnecessary litigation. Looking to the facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court of the opinion that even if the
petitioner is relegated to the statutory remedy of appeal, the outcome of
the same would be a further remand, that too, will also consume time.
Subjecting the tenure holders to unnecessary litigation will in no way be
in the interest of justice. No doubt, if statute puts a limit on a tenure holder
to hold the excess land, it should be declared surplus and taken over by

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the State as provided under the Act, but such proceedings ought to be
carried only after preparation of the Statement strictly in accordance with
the provisions as contained in the Act, which was directed by the
Appellate Authority to be adhered by the Prescribed Authority while
deciding the matter after remand, which appears to have not been followed
and for this reason to avoid multiplicity as well as to shorten the span of
the litigation, the impugned order dated 13.10.2025 passed by the
Prescribed Authority cannot be allowed to stand. Accordingly, the matter
is remanded to the Prescribed Authority for re-determination afresh in
accordance with law, reposing trust in the Prescribed Authority that while
deciding the matter, it shall strictly adhere with the directions and
observations made by the Appellate Authority vide the remand order dated
05.10.2018.
48. Considering the long history of litigation this Court directs the
Prescribed Authority/respondent no. 2, to conclude the aforesaid
proceedings as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six
months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before it.
49. In view of what has been discussed herein-above, the impugned order
dated 13.10.2025 being not sustainable in the eyes of law, is hereby
quashed and resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed in terms of
observation and directions made here-in-above.
50. Before parting, this Court places on record its sincere appreciation for
the valuable assistance and diligent research rendered by Mr. Rajat
Srivastava, Research Associate, and Ms. Mizana Kabeer, Law Intern, in
finding the relevant case law applicable to the present case.
(Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi,J.)
October 14, 2026
Virendra
Digitally signed by :-
VIRENDRA KUMAR GUPTA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench