Laloo @ Sanjay And Another vs State of U.P.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 246 of 2013
Laloo @ Sanjay And Another
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : B.P. Nigam
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt. Advocate
[A.F.R.]

Court No. - 14
HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
1. Heard Shri B.P. Nigam, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri
G.D. Bhatt, the learned AGA-I for the State U.P.
2. By means of the instant appeal, the appellant had challenged the validity
of the judgment and order dated 07.02.2013 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 12, Hardoi in Session Trial No.
226/2011 arising out of Case Crime No. 424/2010, under Sections 498-A,
304-B, 302 of IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Manjhila,
District Hardoi lodged against the appellant No.1- Laloo @ Sanjay, the
appellant No.2 Hardwari and mother of the appellant No.1.
3. The complainant- Asha Ram Agnihotri gave a written complaint to the
police on 27.07.2010 stating that he had got his niece married to the
appellant No.1- Laloo @ Sanjay, son of Hardwari (the appellant No.2),
about one year ago. The complainant's niece used to tell through mobile
phone that the appellant No.2 Hardwari and his wife used to demand
additional dowry. On 27.06.2010, he got a telephonic information that his
niece had got burnt and upon reaching there, he found her lying dead. The
complainant expressed a suspicion that his niece had been killed by setting
her ablaze for demanding dowry.
4. A 3 liters' plastic container having smell of kerosene, some burnt clothes
and other articles were recovered from the spot.
5. The postmortem examination report mentions burning from first to third
degree burns in patches present all over the body except both soles, line of
redness was present, vasicles present at places, skin peels at places, burn was
about 95%. The cause of death was opined to be ante-mortem burn injuries.
6. After investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted a charge-sheet

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dated 03.08.2010 against the appellants and involvement of Premwati
(mother of the appellant No.1 and wife of the appellant no. 2) could not be
established during investigation.
7. The complainant was examined as PW-1. He stated that he had got his
niece married to the appellant No.1 about two years ago. The accused
persons were not satisfied with the dowry given at the time of marriage. Her
husband Laloo @ Sanjay (the appellant No.1), his mother Premwati, father
Hardwari, Fufa Jai Prakash, Bua Sukkho, sister Ranu etc. used to demand a
motor-cycle, a color television and a gold chain as dowry. The complainant,
his wife and some other family members tried to persuade the accused
persons that they could not give additional dowry but the accused persons
pressed their demand of dowry even in presence of the persons who had
gone with the complainant. He stated his niece was killed because of his
failure to give additional dowry.
8. Bhure Shukla, a maternal uncle of the deceased, was examined as PW-3.
He stated that the appellant and their family members were not happy with
the dowry given in the deceased's marriage and they were demanding a
motor-cycle, a color television and a gold chain. He had gone to the
matrimonial home of the deceased about two months after the wedding and
the demand of the aforesaid articles was made in his presence. PW-3 had
tried to persuade the appellant No.1 but he did not agree.
9. DW-1 Amit Kumar and DW-2 Ashok Kumar stated that the appellant did
not harass his wife. Her mental balance was not normal. She had gone away
from her matrimonial home on 3-4 occasions without informing any person.
The appellant No.1 and his family members used to search her out and bring
her back. DW-2 Ashok Kumar stated that a day before the incident, the
deceased had gone away without informing any person. The appellant No.2
Hardwari had brought her back. He stated that the appellants and their
family members did not harass the deceased for demanding dowry. Both the
defence witnesses stated that the appellant No.2 Hardwari was not present in
the village and he had gone to visit a satsang along with several other
villagers, on a tractor driven by DW-1. The appellant No.1 was breaking
stones for the road outside the village.
10. The trial Court held that the accused persons did not give information of
death of the deceased to her family members. The deceased died within
seven years of her marriage in unnatural circumstances due to burn injuries.
She had been harassed soon before her death. The trial Court held that all the
ingredients of Section 304-B IPC were established. The presumption under
Section 113-B IPC was also attracted against the appellants. The accused
persons had failed to adduce evidence to prove that the deceased committed
suicide. They did not make any submission and lead any evidence to

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establish that before the incident also the deceased had tried to commit
suicide. The aforesaid material proves the appellants guilty of the offences
under Sections 304-B/34, 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act. The charges under Sections 302 IPC and 306 IPC were not proved.
11. Assailing validity of the aforesaid order, the learned counsel for the
appellants has submitted that there is no evidence to establish that the
deceased had been harassed for demanding dowry soon before her death. He
has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
cases of Major Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab : (2015) 5 SCC 201 and
:
State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta @ Sanju @ Prem Prakash
(2025) 3 SCC 433.
12. Per contra , the learned AGA-I has submitted that the trial court has
rightly come to the conclusion that the accused persons used to demand
dowry from the family members of the deceased and that the deceased had
been harassed soon before her marriage. Therefore, the trial court has rightly
convicted the appellants for offences under Section 304-B, 498-A and
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
13. Section 304-B IPC reads as follows: -
"304B. Dowry death.—
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of
her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for,
or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called
"dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the
same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of
1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life."
14. When we examine the evidence in the present case, it appears that the
complainant PW-1 stated that she had got her niece married to the appellant
No.1. The appellant's family members were not satisfied with the dowry
given at the time of marriage. They were demanding a motorcycle, a colour
TV, and a gold chain and for this reason, they killed the victim by pouring
kerosene on her and setting her ablaze. During cross-examination, PW-1
stated that the pair-pujai ceremony of the deceased was performed in the
house of the appellant. No dowry had been settled at the time of the
marriage. The Bhawar (Saptpadi) was performed in the village of the
appellants. After the deceased had stayed in the house of the appellant for
eight days, her mother had gone to bring her from her matrimonial home.

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The mother of the deceased had told this witness that the family members of
the appellant No.1 were demanding dowry. PW-1's brother Maya Prakash
(father of the deceased) was alive at that time. PW-1 Maya Prakash, Suresh,
Ved Prakash, Dharmendra and Bhure had gone to the house of the appellant
to convince his family members, but they did not agree and demanded a
motorcycle, a gold chain, and a color television. The marriage was
performed in the month of Asadh and the deceased died in the month of P oos
(after about 7 months). PW-1 stated that after the marriage of his niece and
before the death of his brother, he had visited the matrimonial home of his
niece on 6-7 occasions. He always found his niece unhappy in her
matrimonial home. She was beaten up in her matrimonial home. However,
she did not make any complaint to any authority in this regard. PW-1 stated
that before her death, the appellants, Hari Prakash and two other persons had
happily taken her to her matrimonial home 14 days prior to her death.
Thereafter, he got telephonic information regarding her death.
15. After the death of his brother- Maya Prakash. PW-2 visited the
matrimonial home of his niece on two occasions, along with the mother of
the deceased but at that time, the deceased was not there, she was at her
maika. Some altercation had taken place between PW-1 and the family
members of the appellant No.1. After 8-10 days, the appellants had come to
take the deceased to their home. They have taken the deceased with the
consent of PW-1. PW-1 stated that the deceased was found in the house of
Amarnath in village Dhighia a day prior to her death because the accused
persons had beaten her up about three days ago. She was limping. She was
sitting in front of the house of Ramnath in village Dhighia. Ramnath had
telephonically informed and thereafter, the family members of the appellants
had taken her away. The deceased had asked to save her life.
16. The deceased's mother was examined as PW-9 and she gave a similar
statement. She stated that pair-pujai ceremony of her daughter was
performed in the house of the appellants because she was not in a position to
host a feast for the baraat. Her daughter used to visit her from her
matrimonial home once a month and thereafter, she used to go back.
Whenever the appellant No.1 came to take her daughter, she used to send
her. She also stated that after she had sent her daughter to her matrimonial
home, she never visited her father's home. PW-9 also stated that her husband
and his elder brother Asha Ram (the complainant) did not have good
relations. The complainant did not want the deceased to get married to the
appellant No.1 but PW-9 and her husband got her married to the appellant
No.1 against the wishes of the complainant. She stated that quarrels had
taken place between her husband and his elder brother on 1-2 occasions and
the complainant had assaulted her husband with a lathi. The PW-1 had

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caught hold of the lathi.
17. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, was examined
as PW-6. He proved the postmortem examination report and stated that the
deceased had approximately 95% burns and smell of kerosene was present
over the body. During the cross-examination, PW-6 stated that if a person
pours kerosene and sets himself/herself ablaze, 95% burn injuries are
possible.
18. From the aforesaid statements, it is established that the marriage
ceremony of the deceased was performed in the house of the appellants,
because her family's financial condition was poor and they were not in a
position to even host a feast for the baraat. No dowry was settled and no
dowry was given at the time of the marriage. The prosecution witnesses
alleged that after the marriage, the accused persons started demanding a
motorcycle, a color television and a gold chain as dowry. The witnesses have
stated that they used to demand dowry whenever the deceased's uncle and
mother visited the appellants' place. They also alleged that the deceased was
harassed for demanding dowry. However, none of the prosecution witnesses
have stated the date and time of the alleged demand of dowry. The
prosecution witnesses have stated that the deceased was staying at the
residence of the complainant for some time. 14 days prior to the incident the
appellants themselves had gone to bring her back to her matrimonial home.
She was sent with the appellants willingly, without there being any dispute.
There is absolutely no evidence that the deceased was harassed for
demanding dowry at any time soon before her death.
19. For making out the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, it is
necessary that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty
or harassment on account of any demand for dowry in connection with any
demand for dowry. In absence of evidence to establish that the deceased was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative or husband
for or in connection with any demand for dowry, the offence under section
304-B IPC is not made out.
20. The trial Court has referred to Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which
provides as follows:
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry deathWhen the question is whether a
person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that
soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person
to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for
dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry
death.Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, "dowry death"
shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860)]."
21. In Major Singh (Supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: -

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" 10. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113-B
of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections 304-B IPC
and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry
Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the
increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows:-
" -the question is whether a person
113-B: Presumption as to dowry death
has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon
before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation. For the purposes of this Section, 'dowry death' shall have
the same meaning as in Section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860)"
It is imperative to note that both these sections set out a common point of
reference for establishing guilt of the accused person under Section 304-B,
which is "the woman must have been 'soon before her death' subjected to
cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand of dowry"
22. In : (2025) 3 SCC 433, the
State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -
" That the death was suicidal is very clear from the expert evidence,
10.
which however would not absolve the accused under Section 304-B IPC.
This Court in Surender Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. [(2009) 17 SCC 243]
considered the effect of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act on Section 304-B
IPC. It was held that Section 304-B IPC presupposes several factors for its
applicability, which are: (i) the death of a woman caused by burns or bodily
injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death
having occurred within seven years from the date of the marriage; (iii) soon
before her death, the woman having been subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (iv) such
cruelty or harassment being in connection with the demand of dowry. It was
categorically held that if one of the ingredients is absent, the presumption
under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would not be available to the
prosecution and the onus of proof would not shift to the defence."
23. Section 113-B Evidence Act would apply when it is shown that soon
before her death, the woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for
or in connection with any demand for dowry. When the prosecution has
failed to establish that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty or
harassment for demanding dowry, the ingredients of Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act are not made out and therefore, no presumption can be drawn
against the appellants under section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
24. The learned AGA-I has placed reliance upon a judgment of a Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Paranagouda and Anr. v. State of
Karnataka : (2024) 18 SCC 793, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that: -
"We are aware that the word "soon" finds place in Section 304-B, but we
would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but
as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or
an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death
under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306 IPC/Once the

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presence of these concomitants is established or shown or proved by the
prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of
innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon
transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to
produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt. It seems to
us that what Parliament intended by using the word "deemed" was that only
preponderance of evidence would be insufficient to discharge the husband
or his family members of their guilt. This interpretation provides the
accused a chance of proving their innocence. This is also the postulation of
Section 101 of the Evidence Act. The purpose of Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC, in our opinion, is to counter what is
commonly encountered the lack or the absence of evidence in the case of
suicide or death of a woman within seven years of marriage. If the word
"shown" has to be given its ordinary meaning then it would only require the
prosecution to merely present its evidence in court, not necessarily through
oral deposition, and thereupon make the accused lead detailed evidence to
be followed by that of the prosecution. This procedure is unknown to
common law systems, and beyond the contemplation of CrPC."
25. It is correct that the phrase "soon before her death" cannot be put in a
straight jacket formula and interpreted strictly but it has to be adjudged
keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case. PW-9, mother
of the deceased, has stated that the deceased had stayed in her parental house
for 8-10 days and thereafter the appellant had gone to take her back to her
matrimonial home. PW-9 had sent her back with the appellants amicably and
congenially. The deceased died 14 days thereafter and no demand of dowry
was made during this period. Therefore, it cannot be said that the deceased
was harassed for demanding dowry soon before her death.
26. The prosecution witnesses PW-2 and PW-9 have established that no
dowry was given at the time of the marriage but the appellants used to harass
the deceased and this harassment of the deceased drove her to commit
suicide. Therefore, the offence under Section 498-A IPC is made out and the
trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the said offence. Further,
the prosecution witnesses have categorically stated about the demand of
dowry made by the appellants and therefore, the offence under Section 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act is also established.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed in part.
Conviction and sentence of the appellants for the offence under section 304-
B IPC is unsustainable in law and the same is . However, there is no
set aside
error or illegality in the conviction of the appellants for the offences under
Sections 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
28. The offence under Section 498-A carries a maximum sentence of
imprisonment up to 3 years and the trial court had awarded the maximum
sentence.
29. The accused – appellants had submitted before the trial Court on the
point of sentence that the appellant No. 2, Hardwari is an old person and the

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appellant No.1- Laloo @ Sanjay, has the responsibility to look after his old
parents. The trial Court discarded these mitigating circumstances without
assigning any reason and awarded the maximum sentence of three years'
imprisonment to the appellants.
30. In K. Pounammal v. State , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1784, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred to numerous precedents on the question of reduction
of sentence and held that: -
" 6. The conviction and sentence have their respective realms. While the
conviction would be recorded on the basis of evidence adduced before the
Court which would establish the implication of the accused in the offence,
the guilty person or the convicted when to be awarded a sentence, a host of
factors would operate to govern.
6.1. In determining the final sentence and the nature thereof, variety of
factors that would operate would include the intervening time between the
commission of offence and the actual award of the sentence, age of the
accused, the stress which he or she might have suffered because of
passage of time during each case has remained pending and undecided,
the family circumstance and such other factors, without becoming
exhaustive.
7. The process of sentencing by the courts is guided by theories such as
punitive, deterrent or reformative. Each school of thought has its own
object and purpose to explain awarding of sentence and its utility.
Amongst these theories, reformative approach has become increasingly
acceptable to the modern jurisprudence. Reformation is something always
considered progressive. When there are mitigating circumstances, the
court would lean towards reducing of the sentence. The focus would be on
the crime, and not on the criminal. The society and system would nurture
the guilt with positivity, while selecting the sentence .
8. In light of the above principles guiding the sentencing process, the
submission of learned advocate for the appellant could be countenanced
that in the case on hand the incident had taken place on 23.09.2002. Since
then, more than two decades have passed by. The appellant underwent
imprisonment for 31 days. The appellant is a widow lady. It was stated that
she is now 75 years of age. The appellant has been staying alone, the
husband having died, stated her learned counsel. She belongs to scheduled
caste and has been spending her life negotiating all hardships.
9. The prolongation of a criminal case for an unreasonable period is in
itself a kind of suffering. It amounts to mental incarceration for the
person facing such proceedings. For a person who is convicted and who
has appealed against his or her conviction and sentence and who
everyday awaits the fate of litigation, spends time in distress. In the
present-day system of administration of justice, in which proceedings
have often go on protracted unreasonably and therefore unbearably, the
.
passage of long time itself makes the person suffer a mental agony "
(Emphasis added)
31. In V.K. Verma v. CBI : (2014) 3 SCC 485, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that: -

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" 7. In imposing a punishment, the concern of the court is with the nature of
the act viewed as a crime or breach of the law. The maximum sentence or fine
provided in law is an indicator on the gravity of the act. Having regard to the
nature and mode of commission of an offence by a person and the mitigating
factors, if any, the court has to take a decision as to whether the charge
established falls short of the maximum gravity indicated in the statute, and if
so, to what extent.
8. The long delay before the courts in taking a final decision with regard to
the guilt or otherwise of the accused is one of the mitigating factors for the
superior courts to take into consideration while taking a decision on the
quantum of sentence . As we have noted above, the FIR was registered by
CBI in 1984. The matter came before the Sessions Court only in 1994. The
Sessions Court took almost ten years to conclude the trial and pronounce the
judgment. Before the High Court, it took another ten years. Thus, it is a
litigation of almost three decades in a simple trap case and that too involving
a petty amount.
9. In Ashok Kumar v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 282], the
commission of offence of theft was committed in 1971 and the judgment of
this Court was delivered in 1980. The conviction was under Section 411 IPC.
This Court having regard to the purpose of punishment and "the long
protracted litigation", reduced the sentence to the period already undergone
by the convict.
10. In Sharvan Kumar v. State of U.P. [(1985) 3 SCC 658], the commission of
offence was in 1968 and the judgment was delivered in 1985. The conviction
was under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. In that case also, the long delay in the
litigation process was one of the factors taken into consideration by this
Court in reducing the sentence to the period already undergone.
12. The appellant is now aged 76. We are informed that he is otherwise not
keeping in good health, having had also cardiovascular problems. The
offence is of the year 1984. It is almost three decades now. The accused has
already undergone physical incarceration for three months and mental
incarceration for about thirty years. Whether at this age and stage, would it
not be economically wasteful, and a liability to the State to keep the
appellant in prison, is the question we have to address. Having given
thoughtful consideration to all the aspects of the matter, we are of the view
that the facts mentioned above would certainly be special reasons for
reducing the substantive sentence but enhancing the fine, while
maintaining the conviction."
(Emphasis added)
32. The incident took place in the year 2010. The appellant No.1 has already
spent about 1 years and 9 months 10 days in custody and the appellant No.2
has spent about 1 year and 5 months 6 days in custody. The appellant No.2 is
presently aged about 68 years. Making the appellants undergo the remaining
part of the sentence of three years' imprisonment will not serve any purpose
of incarceration - either deterrence or reformation. Keeping in view the
aforesaid facts, the sentence of three years' imprisonment imposed upon the
appellants is reduced and modified to the period of custody already
undergone by them. The amount of fine shall remain unaltered.

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33. The appeal is partly allowed in terms of the aforesaid order.
34. The appellant shall furnish a personal bond and two sureties to the
satisfaction of the trial Court within two weeks from today in compliance
with Section 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In case an appeal
against this judgment/order is preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
and notice is issued to the appellant therein, the appellant shall appear before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in accordance with such notice.
July 2, 2026
-Amit K-
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)
Whether the judgment is speaking – Yes/No
Whether the judgment is speaking - Yes/No
Digitally signed by :-
AMIT KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench