Pooja Jain And Ors. vs Directorate Of Education Old Secretariat, Civil Lines And Ors.

$~5
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
# CNR No. DLHC010137762020
Date of Decision: 13.10.2026

+ W.P.(C) 2157/2020
POOJA JAIN AND ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Ankit Gupta with Mr. Kunal Dave
and Mr. Anmol Gupta, Advocates.
versus
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION OLD SECRETARIAT, CIVIL
LINES AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC with Ms. Jyoti
Tyagi, Advocates for R-1 and 2.
Mr. Anunaya Mehta, Mr. Inderjeet
Saroop, Mr. Raghav Saroop, Mr.
Prabhakar Roy, Ms. Anandita Tayal,
Advocates for R-3.

HON ’ BLE MR. JUSTICE A. J. BHAMBHANI
J U D G M E N T
A. J. BHAMBHANI, J
By way of the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioners seek setting-aside of Letters of
Termination dated 14.05.2019 issued to each of them by respondent
No.3 (Modern International School). The petitioners also seek
reinstatement in service at respondent No.3 school along with full back
wages and consequential benefits at par with their counterparts in that
school.
2. Respondent No. 3 is an unaided private school in Delhi which runs in
accordance with the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act,
1973 (‘DSE Act’) and the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (‘DSE
Rules’).
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3. Mr. Ankit Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits
that impugned termination letters were issued about a week after the
petitioners made complaint dated 06.05.2019 to respondent No.1
(Directorate of Education) (‘DoE’) alleging various irregularities and
illegalities committed by the management of respondent No. 3 school
inter-alia by paying salary to their teachers in cash, at rates below the
minimum pay-scales shown in the school records, and then also
demanding pay-back of part of the salary to the school.
4. Notice on the petition was issued on 25.02.2020.
5. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No.3.
Rejoinder to the counter-affidavit also been filed by the petitioners.
6. Mr. Gupta submits that, keeping all other allegations aside, it is the
undisputed position borne-out from the record, that the petitioners were
serving on ‘regular’ basis and their services were terminated by
respondent No.3 without issuance of any show-cause notice; without
conducting any inquiry; and most importantly, without taking the prior
approval of the DoE as is mandatory under section 8(2) of the DSE Act.
7. Attention in this behalf is drawn to section 8(2) of the DSE Act, which
reads as under :
8(2). Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no
employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated
except with the prior approval of the Director.
(emphasis supplied)
8. Counsel argues that the petitioners’ contention is also substantiated
from the contents of affidavit dated 26.07.2021 filed on behalf of
respondents Nos.1 and 2 (DoE), and the enquiry report appended to the
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said affidavit, which bear-out the allegations against respondent No. 3
school in the following way:
“ 1. Since the termination of the complainant teachers was
done without adopting the due procedure and without the prior
approval of the Director of Education, in violation of section 8(2) of
DSEAR-1973 [sic] . These four teachers should be reinstated with
immediate effect and then enquiry should be conducted in respect of
these teachers as per norms involving the principal/officials of
another public school regarding the absenteeism of the teachers from
their duties and also by giving due consideration to the replies of the
complaint [sic] teachers for their absenteeism from 03-05-2019 to 14-
05-2019.”
(emphasis supplied)

9. Attention is further drawn by Mr. Gupta to Rule 121 of the DSE Rules
to submit that, in view of the evidently illegal termination of their
services by the school, the petitioners are entitled to reinstatement with
full back wages . Rule 121 of the DSE Rules reads as under:
121. Payment of pay and allowances on reinstatement.
(1) When an employee who has been dismissed, removed or
compulsorily retired from service is reinstated as a result of appeal
or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement on
superannuation while under suspension preceding the dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, the managing
committee shall consider and make a specified order:-
(a) with regard to the salary and allowances to be paid
to the employee for the period of his absence from duty,
including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be; and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as
the period spent on duty.
(2) Where the managing committee is of opinion that the
employee who had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired
from service had been fully exonerated, the employee shall be paid
the full salary and allowances to which he would have been entitled
had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired from
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service or suspended prior to such dismissal, or compulsory
retirement from service, as the case may be:
Provided that where the managing committee is of opinion
that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the
employee had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the
employee, it may, after giving a reasonable opportunity to the
employee to make representations and after considering the
representation, if any, made by the employee, direct, for reasons to
be recorded by it in writing, that the employee shall he [sic., be] paid
for the period of such delay only such proportion of the salary and
allowances as it may determine.
(3) The payment of allowances shall be subject to all other
conditions under which such allowances are admissible and the
proportion of the full salary and allowances determined under the
proviso to sub-rule (2) shall not be less than the subsistence
allowance and other admissible allowances.
(emphasis supplied)
10. Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, learned counsel appearing for the DoE submits that,
as narrated in affidavit dated 26.07.2021 filed in compliance of order
dated 25.02.2020, and as has been recorded in the enquiry report
appended therewith, respondent No. 3 school has been remiss on
several counts; and in particular, the school has terminated the services
of the petitioners without compliance with the mandatory provisions of
section 8(2) of the DSE Act.
11. Ms. Tyagi submits that, as far as the nature of employment of the
petitioners is concerned, the school’s own entries on the Unified
District Information System for Education portal display the status of
the petitioners as ‘regular’ employees of the school; and that therefore,
there is no excuse for respondent No.3 school to not have followed the
mandatory provisions of the DSE Act, as referred to above.
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12. On the other hand, Mr. Anunaya Mehta, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.3 objects to the maintainability of the present petition,
contending that an equally efficacious, alternative, statutory remedy is
available to the petitioners under section 8(3) of the DSE Act, which
envisages the filing of an appeal before the Delhi School Tribunal
constituted under section 11 of the DSE Act.
13. Apart therefrom, Mr. Mehta argues that no weightage can be accorded
to the so-called ‘findings’ contained in the enquiry report appended to
affidavit dated 26.07.2021 filed by the DoE, since there is nothing on
record to show that the enquiry report has either been accepted by the
Director of Education or that the findings therein have been otherwise
confirmed in any manner.
14. Insofar as the issue of compliance with section 8(2) of the DSEA is
concerned however, Mr. Mehta in his usual fairness submits, that there
is nothing on record to suggest that the school has complied with the
requirements of that provision.
15. As regards the objection of availability of an alternative, efficacious
remedy before the Delhi School Tribunal is concerned, Mr. Mehta, has
placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishan
1

Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. , where the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court
have been laid down in the following words :
“ 27 . The principles of law which emerge are that:
“ 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.

1
(2021) 6 SCC 771
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“ 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a
writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High
Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the
aggrieved person.
“ 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where
: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a
fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there
has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a
legislation is challenged.
“ 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High
Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an
appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be
entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.
“ 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or
liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before
invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of
policy, convenience and discretion.
“ 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the
High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition.
However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature
of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such
a view would not readily be interfered with.
“ 28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this
Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad [Chand Ratan v. Durga
Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399] , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal
Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas
Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India
[Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632] among other
decisions. ”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the circumstances, it is Mr. Mehta’s contention that the petitioners
have an alternative and efficacious, statutory remedy before the Delhi
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School Tribunal; and this court, may therefore not entertain the present
petition.
17. Mr. Mehta has also argued that, even if the order of dismissal or
removal from service is set-aside, or is rendered void, it is available for
a school to place an employee under suspension; and such suspension
must be deemed to start from the date of the original termination as is
contemplated in Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules. Learned counsel
accordingly submits, that if at all any back wages are directed to be
paid, such wages must be calculated by deeming that the petitioners
have been under suspension w.e.f. 14.05.2019 i.e., the date of the
termination letters issued by respondent No.3 to the petitioners. Mr.
Mehta has drawn attention to the following provision of the DSE
Rules:
“ 115. … …
*
“ (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory
retirement from service imposed upon an employee is set aside or
rendered void, in consequence of or by, a decision of a court of law
or of the Tribunal; and the disciplinary authority on a consideration
of the circumstances of the case decides to hold further inquiry
against such employee on the same allegations on which the penalty
of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally
imposed, such employee shall be deemed to have been placed under
suspension by the managing committee from the date of original
order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall
continue to remain under suspension until further orders. ”
(emphasis supplied)
18. On the other hand, Mr. Gupta has rebutted the argument raised on
behalf of respondent No. 3 against maintainability of the present
petition, by placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in
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2
Satwati Deswal vs. State of Haryana & Ors. , in particular to the
following portions of the said decision:
“ 4. Admittedly, in this case no show-cause notice was issued
to her nor was the order of termination passed by initiating any
departmental proceeding after giving opportunity of hearing to the
appellant. This order of termination was challenged by the appellant
by way of a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed
by it on the ground that the appellant had an alternative remedy to
file an appeal under the rules before the appellate authority against
the order of termination.
“ 5. In our view, the High Court had fallen in grave error in
rejecting the writ petition on the aforesaid ground. First, such an
order of termination was passed without issuing any show-cause
notice to the appellant and without initiating any disciplinary
proceedings by the authorities and without affording any opportunity
of hearing. It is well settled that a writ petition can be held to be
maintainable even if an alternative remedy is available to an
aggrieved party where the court or the tribunal lacks inherent
jurisdiction or for enforcement of a fundamental right; or if there had
been a violation of a principle of natural justice; or where vires of the
Act were in question.

*
“ 7. Such being the position and in view of the admitted fact in
this case that before termination of the services of the appellant, no
disciplinary proceeding was initiated nor was any opportunity of
hearing given to the appellant. It is clear from the record that the
order of termination was passed without initiating any disciplinary
proceedings and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the
appellant. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the writ
petition was maintainable in law and the High Court was in error in
holding that in view of availability of alternative remedy to challenge
the order of termination, the writ petition was not maintainable in
law. ”
(emphasis supplied)

2
(2010) 1 SCC 126

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19. Mr. Gupta also disputes the interpretation placed by Mr. Mehta on Rule
115(4) of the DSE Rules submitting that “ further inquiry ” as
contemplated under Rule 115(4) can be conducted only when an
inquiry was initially conducted. Mr. Gupta submits that in the present
case, no inquiry was ever conducted; and the procedure adopted to
terminate the petitioners’ services was entirely illegal and therefore
non-est .
20. Upon a conspectus of the submissions made by learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners and respondent No.3, this court is of the
view that while the petitioners might have had a remedy under section
8(3) read with section 11 of the DSE Act before the Delhi School
Tribunal, considering the facts and circumstances obtaining in the
present case, this court would be guided by the following principles
that can be elucidated on a combined reading of Radha Krishan
Industries and Satwati Deswal :
20.1. The bar of alternative remedy is one of self-restraint, not of

jurisdiction: In para 27.4 of Radha Krishan Industries the
Supreme Court holds that an alternate remedy by itself does not
divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that ordinarily a writ
petition should not be entertained where an efficacious alternate
remedy exists, but this is a rule of practice and the constitutional
power vested in the High Court under Article 226 is never
ousted. Para 27.5 of Radha Krishan Industries further confirms
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that the rule of exhaustion is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion.
20.2. The rule admits of well-recognised exceptions : Para 27.3 of
Radha Krishan Industries lists four exceptions to the rule against
maintainability of a writ petition in the face of availability of an
alternative remedy. These are : (a) enforcement of a fundamental
right under Part III of the Constitution; (b) violation of the
principles of natural justice; (c) orders or proceedings that are
wholly without jurisdiction; and (d) challenge to the vires of
legislation. Of these exceptions violation of the principles of
natural justice is an independent and sufficient exception. In
Satwati Deswal the Supreme Court applies this exception in a
concrete setting. In that case, the termination order was passed
without a show-cause notice, without disciplinary proceedings
and without a hearing being given to the affected party. In those
circumstances the Supreme Court held that the High Court had
fallen into grave error in dismissing the writ petition on the
ground of availability of alternative remedy. The Supreme Court
reiterated that a writ is maintainable despite an alternative
remedy where there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, where a
fundamental right is to be enforced, and in a case of violation of
the principles of natural justice, or when the vires of a statutory
instrument are in question.
21. Applying the position of law as distilled above, this court is of the view
that in the present case, the mere availability of an alternative remedy
before the Delhi School Tribunal would not oust the constitutional
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jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution; and this
court would step-in and provide relief to the petitioners inter-alia since
there has been manifest and evident failure of compliance with the
statute and with principles of natural justice.
22. In the present case, it is the admitted position that no disciplinary
enquiry or any other similar proceedings was conducted before
imposing upon the petitioners the drastic penalty of dismissal and
removal from regular service.
23. Besides, the present petition was filed and was entertained by this court
way back in 2020 and has remained pending before this court ever
since. In such circumstances, this court would be loath to take a view
that, despite manifest non-compliance with the statute i.e. section 8(2)
of the DSE Act and with the principles of natural justice on the part of
respondent No.3, the petitioners should now be relegated to file for
relief afresh before the Delhi School Tribunal, even though the present
petition has remained pending before this court for the past 06 years.
24. In view of the above, this court considers it just and fair to decide the
matter on merits.
25. Having held in favour of maintainability of the present petition, and
steering clear of any disputes questions of fact as regards issuance or
non-issuance of show-cause notice, respondent No.3 has not disputed
the fact that no approval was taken by them from the DoE as
mandatorily required under section 8(2) of the DSE Act before
dismissal/removal of the petitioners from regular service. As a matter
of fact, respondents Nos.1 and 2 (DoE) have confirmed that no such
approval was ever sought by respondent No.3.
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26. Though respondent No. 3 has contended that they had issued to the
petitioners certain notices dated 08.05.2019 and 11.05.2019 relating to
the alleged absenteeism by the petitioners and other matters, without
entering into the controversy whether such notices were at all issued or
whether they were in the nature of show-cause notices, it remains
undisputed that no inquiry was conducted by respondent No.3 against
any of the petitioners in relation to any allegations of wrongdoing on
their part.
27. As a sequitur to the above, and without delving any further into the
controversies in the matter, this court is of the view that the termination
of the petitioners’ services vidé termination letters dated 14.05.2019 is
illegal being in rank violation of section 8(2) of the DSE Act .
28. Termination letters dated 14.05.2019 are accordingly quashed and set-
aside. Respondent No. 3 is directed to reinstate all 04 petitioners in
‘regular’ service with immediate effect.
29. The next question that arises for consideration is about the petitioners’
entitlement to receive wages and allowances upon being reinstated.
30. In this regard, Mr. Gupta has drawn attention to Rule 121 of the DSE
Rules, arguing that once the petitioners’ termination is set-aside, they
are entitled to be paid full salary and allowances to which they would
have been entitled, had they not been illegally dismissed or removed
from service.
31. In the course of a brief hearing on the issue of the quantum of pay and
allowances that would be owed to the petitioners, Mr. Mehta has
submitted that respondent No.3 school would be willing to consider a
mediated settlement with the petitioners on this issue.
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32. Notwithstanding the position taken by the school, this court is
persuaded to hold that, since the termination of the petitioners’ services
has been held to be rank illegal in view of non-compliance with section
8(2) of the DSE Act, there is no reason why this court should hold-back
on granting to the petitioners the consequential relief which is clearly
made-out.
33. Accordingly, respondent No.3 school is directed to pay to the
petitioners the full salary and allowances to which they would have
been entitled for the period from 14.05.2019 onwards had they not been
dismissed or removed from service vidé Termination Letters dated
14.05.2019. It is directed that the salary and allowances as above shall
be paid by respondent No. 3 to the petitioners within 06 weeks from
today.
34. The petition stands disposed-of in the above terms.
35. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed-of.



A. J. BHAMBHANI, J
OCTOBER 13, 2026
ds




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